

Rough Draft

Sunday, January 6, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

From: Leo Szilard

Below you will find a tentative draft of the "instructions" that might be given to the American and Russian participants of the "Angels" project.

~~Very likely these instructions could be improved upon and certainly they ought to be thoroughly discussed both in Washington and in Moscow before the final draft is prepared.~~
Since discussion of these instructions must be based on the objectives which the project is supposed to accomplish, I propose to describe here first of all these objectives and to follow this with a tentative draft of the "instructions".

I am ~~personally~~ convinced that the economic savings which could be derived from arms control and disarmament provides a strong incentive to Russia. It stands to reason that this should be so, because Russia's arms expenditure represents a very large fraction of her industrial output. An agreement providing for sufficiently far-reaching arms reduction would solve some of Russia's most pressing domestic economic problems and it would also permit her to extend her political influence by enabling her to give economic aid to other nations on an unprecedented scale--if she wished to do so.

The economic savings which would result from disarmament do not provide a strong motivation for America; America's desire for an agreement on arms control is motivated by her

desire for greater security. Many Americans in responsible positions know that America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in an all out arms race and therefore they would like to have an agreement that would provide for arms control and would stop the arms race.

The Russians argue, with some justification, that an agreement providing for arms control, but not for general and complete disarmament, would not create a stable peace because it would not eliminate the possibility that America and Russia may intervene militarily in conflicts that might arise in areas of the world which might be geographically remote from both America and Russia. The trouble is, however, that general and complete disarmament would not automatically guarantee peace either, and the issue of how peace may be secured in a disarmed world has so far not been adequately studied either in America or in the Soviet Union.

In the circumstances, America may make a proposal on arms control and disarmament which provides for general and complete disarmament to be arrived at in stages, but since no one really knows today how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, any such proposal would have to describe the provisions of the late stages of the agreement in such general terms as to be almost meaningless. If Russia were to accept any proposal that America may make in the next few months, there would be no way to give Russia any real assurance that the provisions of the later stages of the agreement would be implemented in the predictable future. Only the provisions of the first few stages of the agreement,

which provide for controlled arms limitations rather than complete disarmament, could be defined in sufficiently precise terms to permit their implementation on a fixed time schedule, and the Russians may well ask themselves what would impell America to implement the later stages of an agreement if the early stages of the agreement were to provide for the kind of arms control which America needs for her security.

If the early stages of the draft agreement were to give Russia an increased measure of security and also far-reaching economic savings, then Russia might conceivably be willing to pay a commensurate price and to accept adequate measures of inspection as well as the kind of political settlements that may be needed.

But even if America were to propose an agreement of the sort which the Russians ought to accept, the negotiations would not be likely to succeed if they were conducted in the same manner in which they were conducted in the past. If America were to propose such an agreement in Geneva the Russians would be likely to say "nyet", and if they kept on saying "nyet" month after month, the odds are that by the time they turn around and are ready to accept the proposed agreement, the Government may not be able to go through with it, because public opinion has not been prepared to accept what up to then no one regarded as a serious possibility.

The Angels project might sketch out the rough outline of the first stages of an agreement providing for arms reduction, and with luck, both governments might regard this outline as

an acceptable basis of negotiations. If that were the case the Angels project ought to be followed up by informal conversations between the governments involved in order to find out whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to be reasonably sure that formal negotiations would be likely to ~~reach~~ ^{lead to} an agreement.

If the President knew six months ahead just what kind of an agreement was going to be negotiated he would then be in a position to prepare public opinion and by the time a ~~suitable~~ ^{reasonable} American plan is officially put forward ~~there~~, the public in America would understand just what the Government ~~hoped~~ to accomplish.

A number of important issues ~~would~~ remain outside of the scope of the Angels project. Thus, for instance, the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world or what kind of concomitant political settlements would be needed before the last stages of a disarmament agreement could be implemented would not come within the scope of the project.

~~A projected~~ ^{Another} joint Russian-American study, ~~& of~~ ^{a study on} how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world is at present under consideration; the conditions under which that study would be carried out are quite different from those proposed for the Angels project and accordingly the instructions to the participants in the two projects would be quite different also. A tentative draft, dated November 25, 1962, of the instructions ~~which may be issued~~ to the participants of the study concerned with the securing of peace in a disarmed world, ~~is enclosed.~~ ^{attached}

The Angels project is limited to ~~a consideration~~ of those first stages of a disarmament agreement which ~~would~~ provide for controlled arms reduction under provisions so clearly defined that they could be implemented on a fixed time schedule in the predictable future. The participants in the study do not represent their own governments nor is it their task to find out what the Government of the other nation would find acceptable. What the participants are asked to do is to come up--if they can--with a rough outline of the first stages of an agreement that would provide for the kind of balanced arms reduction which *would make sense to them and which* they would be willing to recommend, ~~each~~ to ^{their} ~~his~~ own government, and which would make sense to them.

There might be various approaches to this problem but only one approach can be fully explored, ~~if indeed they can agree on one approach~~ during the first meeting (lasting two or three weeks) *scheduled under* that would be ~~held within the general framework of~~ the Angels project. *P* The purpose of the project is not to negotiate an agreement but rather to discover what kind of an agreement might be negotiable. Clearly, the draft of an agreement which makes sense to both the Russian and American Angels would have a greater chance of providing a useful basis of negotiation than the draft of an agreement which did not make sense either to the American Angels or to the Russian Angels.

It may be useful to draw a clear distinction at this point between an attempt to negotiate an agreement and an attempt to discover what may be negotiable; For a long time American

Angels have believed that it would not be practicable to go down to zero with ^{the} agreed-upon number of long range rockets to be retained at the end of the first stage because in that case it would be necessary to verify that ^{and this} virtually no long range rockets have remained undisclosed. ~~This~~ may encounter unsurmountable difficulties, at least during the early stages of the disarmament agreement. Some of the Russian Angels have come to accept this point of view in private conversations and finally, in October, 1962, Gromyko, speaking before the United Nations General Assembly accepted in ~~principle~~ ^{may} that a certain number of long range rockets ^{may} be retained by America and the Soviet Union at the end of the first stage of the disarmament agreement. The question of how many should be retained would have to be determined through negotiations and it is not the task of the Angels to determine just what this number should be. Their task is rather as follows: It may be assumed that because America would have a greater difficulty in appraising the number of undisclosed Russian rockets than Russia would have in appraising the number of undisclosed American rockets, therefore ~~the~~ American Government would want to set the number of rockets to be retained at the end of the first stage comparatively high and the Soviet Union would want to set it comparatively low.

What ~~the~~ Angels who participate in the project are ^{not asked} ~~supposed~~ to say ~~is not~~ ^{is asked} what number of rockets their government would be likely to ^{want to retain} demand, but each Angel ought ^{is asked} to state ~~truthfully~~ what number he himself would be willing to accept, on the basis of his own appraisal of the security requirements of

of his nation. It might ^{then} very well turn out that American Angels would be willing to go down with the number of long range rockets, to be retained at the end of the first stage, to numbers ranging from 10 to 20 and that the Russian Angels would be willing to go up, if need be, to numbers ranging from 100 to 200.

This could then be regarded as a good omen ^{and} ~~which~~ would indicate that the number of rockets retained at the end of the first stage ^{was} ~~would be~~ likely to be negotiable. On the other hand, it might also turn out ~~that on the basis of what the Russian Angels regard as an acceptable measure of inspection,~~ ^{that} the American Angels conclude that the number of rockets to be retained ought to be between 100 and 200 whereas the Russians feel that they personally would not be willing to advocate numbers higher than those ranging from 10 to 20. This then, would be a bad omen ^{and} ~~that~~ would indicate that the governmental negotiations on the number of rockets to be retained might run into trouble.

Even though it would not be the task of the Angels to come up with a consensus and to recommend the number of rockets to be retained at the end of the first stage, still, the discussion of the Angels ought to bring out clearly the points of view which are relevant for the determination of the number of long range rockets that are to be retained at the end of the first stage.

In order to minimize the danger that ~~elements of~~ negotiation might creep into the proposed meeting of the Angels, it might

be well to stipulate that for the duration of the meeting the participants shall avoid communicating with their own government.

There is more than one possible approach to the problem of balanced arms control. It might turn out that the approach which the Angels explored in their first two to three week session would not provide a basis of negotiations acceptable to the American as well as the Russian government. In that case the participants in the proposed project ought to stand ready--perhaps after an interval of two-to three months--to meet for another stretch of two to three weeks and try another approach.

The End

For S

January 8, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

FROM: Leo Szilard

TO:

This memorandum describes the genesis of a project aimed at utilizing private channels of communications with the Russians for the purpose of finding out what kind of an agreement on "arms control" might be negotiable.

At the Pugwash meeting held last August in Cambridge, England, one of our Russian colleagues, R., talked to me about the need of making some progress on the issue of disarmament. There was a note of insistence and urgency in what he said to me which was not present in any of our previous conversations.

For a number of years I have attended the so-called Pugwash meetings; R was one of our Russian colleagues whom I met repeatedly and we have a relationship of mutual trust. Whether he likes or dislikes what I say to him, R. knows that I say it because I believe it to be true and not for any other reason. Nor has R. ever said anything to me that he, personally, didn't believe to be true.

On this occasion, I discussed with R. the possibility of setting up a privately sponsored project aimed at getting around the current impasse in the disarmament negotiations. What struck me was his insistence that we do in a hurry whatever we intended to do. He said that Khrushchev had expected to reach an accommodation with the Kennedy Administration and that as long as he had hoped that this would be possible, he had kept the lid on the arms race, but that with this hope virtually gone now, the lid was now off.

In this context R. talked to me about a number of different lines along which technical development was proceeding in Russia at full speed. He thought that unless there were to arise some fresh hope that arms control may be obtained in the near future, before long we would reach a point of no return in an all out arms race. I have heard the same concern expressed by some of our American colleagues, but never before by any of our Russian colleagues.

When I got back to Washington I called on a few people in the Administration and told them about this conversation with R.

Most people in the Administration know that America cannot be made secure by trying to keep ahead in the arms race. Some of them are on the side of the Angels and would be willing to give up, if necessary, certain temporary advantages we hold at present, for the sake of ending the arms race. Others seem to want to eat their cake and have it too; they would like to have an agreement with Russia that would stop the arms race, and they also want to hold on to any temporary superiority that we may have, for as long as possible.

I found the Angels frustrated and groping in the dark. They were unsure whether Russia would be likely to accept any kind of an agreement providing for arms controls, nor did they know which of the various approaches to this problem would be likely to be acceptable to the Russians. They told me that occasionally they have had very friendly informal conversations with Russian negotiators but that these had been wholly unproductive and didn't furnish any guidance as to what kind of arms control Russia would be likely to accept.

Some of the obstacles that seem to block the road to arms control are rather formidable, but perhaps they are not unsurmountable, and it would be rather tragic if a failure in communications were to cause an impasse. Therefore I asked myself whether it might not be possible to explore, through privately arranged conversations between Americans and Russians, what form of arms control may be negotiable.

Such conversations would be useful only if the participants feel free to speak their minds. The Russians are perfectly capable of speaking their minds freely, but only if they are instructed to do so, and no one except Chairman Khrushchev is in a position to issue such instructions.

I have met Khrushchev about two years ago. Our conversation was scheduled to last fifteen minutes but went on for two hours. It was a good conversation and a month later when I attended the Pugwash meeting in Moscow I discovered that those of our Russian colleagues of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who participated in the meeting had a detailed report of this conversation.

Before writing to Chairman Khrushchev I first outlined the project that I had in mind to a few people in the Administration. I also discussed the project with a number of those from among whom the participants in the project might be chosen. Encouraged by the response I then talked with Ambassador Dobrynin and I had a good conversation with him.

Dobrynin drew my attention to a difficulty which had not previously occurred to me. He pointed out that in America there are a number of distinguished men, many of them scientists, who act as consultants or advisers to the Government on arms control, but who are not functionaries of the Government, and that there are no counterparts to these men in the Soviet Union. Dobrynin also said that the governmental staff familiar with the problem of arms control is much smaller in Russia than in America; he said he could count on his ten fingers the Russians who could participate in the proposed project and be good at it. Still, Dobrynin thought that the project ought to be seriously considered and offered to transmit a letter from me to Chairman Khrushchev. The text of my letter, dated October 9, is below:

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Washington, D. C.
October 9, 1962

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev:

When I had the privilege of talking to you in New York, a year ago last October, I thought that no matter whether Nixon or Kennedy were elected, a fresh attempt would be made to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union that would end the arms race. Events have not borne me out so far. With President Kennedy, a number of young and exceptionally able men moved into the Administration; many of them are deeply concerned about our drifting into an all-out arms race, but so far matters have not taken a turn for the better. It would seem that something would have to be done at this time if the arms race is to be halted before it reaches a point of no return and it would appear that there is perhaps something that I myself could undertake at this particular point. The purpose of this letter is to find out whether what I propose to do would meet with your full approval.

First, I wish to say, if I may, the following:

Contrary to what one might think, most people closely connected with the Administration are keenly aware of the need of avoiding an all-out arms race. Moreover, there are a number of men among them who are "on the side of the angels" and who have consistently taken the position that the United States should be prepared to give up certain temporary advantages it holds, for the sake of attaining an agreement with the Soviet Union that would stop the arms race. These "angels" do not dominate the scene in Washington at present but, given certain favorable circumstances, their influence could be very considerable and perhaps decisive. Some of these "angels" hold key positions in the Administration; others hold junior positions in the White House, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and owe their influence not to their rank but to their ability and perseverance; and still others are consultants to the Government and owe their influence to the high respect in which their opinions are held.

Recently, I attended the Pugwash Conference in Cambridge, England, where I had good conversations with some of our Russian colleagues. Upon my return to Washington, I met with some of the "angels" who hold key positions and found that they were groping in the dark. They were quite uncertain just how far-reaching the reduction of armaments in the first stages of any proposed disarmament agreement would have to go and what form it would have to take in order to make the proposals acceptable to the Soviet Union. Moreover, some of them have begun to doubt whether Russia would accept any reasonable disarmament proposal, even if it were to provide for a very far-reaching reduction of armaments in the first stages.

In the past, many of these men have worked very hard trying to persuade the Government to put forward proposals in Geneva which the Soviet Union would be able to accept, as a basis of negotiations. On many occasions,

they did not prevail in Washington, and on the occasions when they did prevail, it turned out that the proposals which they had drafted were not acceptable to Russia. If their proposals are to be accepted in Washington, these men must put in long hours of work, must be willing to quarrel with their friends, must risk being politically exposed and must be ready to resign their jobs, if necessary. One cannot expect them to go on indefinitely putting up a fight again and again only to find, if they prevail in Washington, that their proposals are not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The "angels" have not as yet given up the fight but they are rather close to it, and if they were to give up, we would be in serious trouble; for if these men cease to exert themselves in Washington, then there can no longer be any useful negotiations on disarmament.

In order to appraise the chances of the Geneva negotiations we must first of all realize that even though America may submit a good draft agreement on general and complete disarmament in Geneva, it would at present be impossible to give the Soviet Union any real assurance that America would in fact go through, stage by stage, all the way to general and complete disarmament; as long as Russia and America do not reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, the later stages of any draft agreement will remain couched in such general terms as to be virtually meaningless. (It is impossible to say how long it might take for Russia and America to reach a meeting of the minds on this issue, but something should be done now in order to prepare the ground for a constructive discussion of this problem. I have touched upon this point in a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin and hope to pursue this topic with him further.)

At the present time, only the provisions of the first few stages of a disarmament agreement can be defined clearly enough to offer reasonable assurance that if the agreement were accepted, the provisions would be implemented on schedule. Therefore, the immediate concrete task before us is to try and devise a draft for an agreement which might be acceptable to America and which would provide in the first, clearly defined, stages for sufficiently far-reaching arms reduction to make the agreement attractive to Russia - even in the absence of any real assurance that disarmament would proceed beyond these first few stages in the predictable future.

The project which I propose to discuss addresses itself exclusively to this issue. Assuming your full approval, I would invite three of the American "angels" to meet for a period of two or three weeks with three of their Russian counterparts. I would not include among the American participants anyone who holds a key position in the Administration. Rather, I would select the American participants from among the consultants to the Government and those who hold a junior position in the Government. They would be expected to draft, together with their Russian counterparts, a proposal for the first stages of the disarmament agreement which they personally would be willing to advocate in Moscow and Washington. Presumably, they would examine various alternative proposals in the course of their discussions and they would be expected to state in each case frankly whether they are personally opposed to a particular proposal and, if so, why, or whether they would be personally

in favor of a given proposal but would be unwilling to advocate it because they saw no chance of being able to persuade their government to accept it. The draft agreement that would emerge would commit no one, except those who prepared it; they would be expected to advocate and, if necessary, to fight for the provisions which it contains.

The Russian participants would be expected to fulfill much the same function as the American participants. I propose to discuss tentatively the identity of the American participants with Ambassador Dobrynin and if the project is approved, I would need later on to discuss with him the precise instructions which the Russian and the American participants would have to receive in order to make it likely that the discussions would be productive.

Such a project would be bound to fail if either the participants, or their governments, were to regard these discussions as a negotiation. Certain precautions will have to be taken in order to avoid this pitfall and I would be somewhat reluctant to invite anyone holding a rank above that of a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Government to participate in the discussions on the American side.

I explained what I proposed to do to a number of men in high positions in the Administration whose opinions I respect. I made it clear to them that I am not seeking at this point the permission of the Government to go forward with this project. (Naturally, if invited to participate, Americans who are connected with an agency of the Government would need to clear their own participation with that agency.)

Having listened to what these men had to say, I saw Ambassador Dobrynin on September 18, told him what I proposed to do and had a good conversation with him.

Thereafter, I approached individually about ten of the "angels" about their possible participation in the proposed discussion. Because I met with a very encouraging response, I am now ready to take the next step. I shall see Ambassador Dobrynin, discuss with him some of the details with which I do not need to trouble you here and ask him to transmit this letter to you.

If this project meets with your full approval, I would want to go forward with it at once. Because of the forthcoming American elections, it would not be advisable to try to hold the meeting before November 8. It would be, however, desirable to hold the meeting as soon as possible thereafter, so that it may take place before the Berlin issue reaches a crisis stage.

If it were possible for me to discuss this project with you personally, I would be able to state in Washington with full assurance that the project is not being misunderstood by the Soviet Government and that it is not looked upon as a negotiation, so to speak, through the back door. This would greatly improve the chances of securing the participation of those who, among the men I have approached, have the greatest influence in Washington.

I understand that you might be coming to New York and, in this case, I would hope to have an opportunity to see you there; however, if this would mean a delay of more than two weeks, and if you were able to see me in Moscow at an early date, then I would prefer to fly to Moscow for the sake of avoiding such a delay.

The invitation to the American participants would be issued by me either personally or in my capacity as the Chairman of a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston - a non-governmental institution which has been lately sponsoring the Pugwash meetings.

A reply would reach me fastest in care of your Ambassador in Washington, D. C.

Respectfully,

s/

Leo Szilard
Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

My letter of October 9 was written before the Cuba crisis. The text of Khrushchev's reply, written after the Cuba crisis, on November 4, is below:

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Unofficial translation

Dear Dr. Szilard,

I have received your letter and I am very glad that you are healthy and full of new ideas. I should say that I have read your letter with great satisfaction, I was especially pleased to learn that you display great concern over the intensification of the armaments race and seek ways toward safeguarding peace.

The international crisis that we have just survived reminds to all people of good will in a very acute form how actual and urgent is the question of a reasonable solution of the disarmament problem. Disarmament is necessary to exclude the danger of a destructive and devastating thermonuclear war, and during those days the world was practically on the brink of such a war.

I was interested in what you write about your "angels" who realize all the dangers of the continuing all-absorbing armaments race and feel responsibility before history.

For a great many years the disarmament negotiations have been carried on among the Governments at various levels but these negotiations bring no results whatsoever. It appears that the main reason for such a situation lies in the fact that the forces which determine the policy in the countries of capitalist world feel great uncertainty about their future. They seem to be afraid that disarmament may, so to say, bring nearer their end and they hope that the armaments race and the building up of the armed forces which they have created can prolong the existence of the capitalist system.

This is, of course, a dangerous delusion. How can one expect to retard the succession of one social system by another by the force of arms,

against the will of the peoples themselves?

In the era of rocket and nuclear weapons only a madman could pursue the objective of reaching his political ends by unleashing a thermonuclear war. The war between the states would lead to the total defeat of the aggressor. But it would bring untold sufferings to all the peoples of the world, because it would mean a nuclear war which would probably quickly develop into a world war.

But some statesmen seem to underestimate the consequences to which a war of today might lead. But even if they realize it they are unable to overpower the negative forces. Moreover, they themselves have no desire to make the necessary efforts for they are the product of the same environment and they are subject to the same delusion.

I have considered your proposal for an unofficial Soviet-American meeting at a non-governmental level to exchange views and examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on disarmament. I like this proposal. I also thought that perhaps there should be held a meeting on the disarmament problem with the participation of scientists or public figures. My understanding is that the participants of the meeting which you have in mind are not to be officials or representatives of governments of their respective countries. They are to hold their discussions without, if I may say so outsiders, without microphones, without short-hand typists, without correspondents, without representatives of television or radio corporations. And the conclusions to which they would come are to be considered as their personal views. But at the same time they are to be the people enjoying respect and confidence of the public opinion in their countries. Otherwise such a meeting could turn into an idle tea party talk and pastime and nobody would attach any importance to the agreement reached there.

It would be another matter if these persons were people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them.

If you are willing to undertake this task which, I would say, is rather a difficult one, - we welcome your idea and we are ready to try this as another possibility of strengthening the cause of peace. We leave it to you to decide how this could be done. You may forward your further considerations to our Ambassador to Washington, and should you wish, as you write, to come to Moscow, we shall be glad to welcome you on the Moscow soil and to see you.

With respect

N. KHRUSHCHEV

November 4, 1962

Khrushchev's letter of November 4 reached me on November 15 in Geneva. While it seems to be a warm personal letter and appears on the face of it very positive, it contains a passage which is not clear. This passage reads:

"It would be another matter if these persons were people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them."

I felt that I had to write Khrushchev another letter and make sure that there was no serious misunderstanding before basing any further action on his reply. The text of my letter, dated Nov. 15 is below:

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Geneva, 15th November 1962

N. S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Moscow.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I was very much moved by your kind letter of November 4th which reached me last night in Geneva. Since I can imagine how disturbing the recent crisis must have been for you I am all the more grateful that you found the time to answer my letter of October 9th.

Your answer raises the issue of who the American participants in the proposed project ought to be in order to make the project really effective. You will find the names of those among whom I would propose to choose the American participants - and some other relevant information - in the Appendix which is attached to this letter.

As you will see most of those named are consultants to the Department of State, Department of Defense and the White House. Because of their special relationship to the US Government they could be very effective in fighting for specific disarmament proposals which would make sense, if the proposed project were carried out. However, because of this relationship they would have to fight for any such proposals in Washington and they would not be in a position to influence the Government through the pressure of public opinion. In spite of this limitation these men could be effective, I believe, because so many key people inside of the Administration know by now that America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in the arms race.

If what I am saying makes sense to you, then I would propose to go from Geneva first to Moscow and to return thereafter from Moscow to Washington. In Moscow I would want to discuss with someone designated by you

who the American and Russian participants ought to be in order to make the project as effective as possible. In a preliminary conversation which I had with Ambassador Dobrynin on this subject we discussed the difficulty of finding the exact Russian counterparts to the American participants, which arises from the fact that the Soviet Government has very few, if any, consultants in the field of disarmament. I believe that Ambassador Dobrynin has communicated at that time with Federov, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in this matter, and perhaps you would want me to talk to Federov also.

It is my thought that if I could discuss these matters in Moscow with someone designated by you, and if I were able to see you also, then on my return to Washington I would be in a good position to help the Americans invited to participate in the project in clearing their participation with the governmental agency with which they are connected. This is my main reason why I would prefer to visit Moscow before I return to Washington.

I trust that you will let me know if there is a date in the near future when you could be reasonably sure that you could see me, if I came to Moscow for a few days. My wife, who also functions as my doctor, would accompany me on the trip.

Your letter of November 4th was transmitted to me by Mr. Moliakov, Permanent Representative of the USSR, to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. I am now asking him to transmit my letter to you and to transmit a copy of it to Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Moliakov could transmit a reply from you to me in Geneva.

Respectfully,

/s/
Leo Szilard

In response to my letter of November 15 the head of the Russian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, N. J. Moliakov, conveyed to me, a few days later, the Chairman's invitation to come and see him in Moscow and it was thereupon arranged that I would fly, with my wife, to Moscow on November 26.

Two days before that date I received a telephone call from a friend in Washington; from what he told me I gathered that during my absence from Washington some misunderstandings have arisen there concerning the nature and objectives of the project, which would have to be cleared up before we could proceed to implement the project.

Thereupon I cancelled my flight to Moscow and explained to Chairman Khrushchev what had happened. I left it up to him whether he preferred that I come to Moscow before I returned to Washington or whether he preferred that I straighten out matters in Washington first.

Khrushchev's reply reached me in the form of a telephone message, brought to me by Moliakov. He said that Chairman Khrushchev thought that I would know best whether in the circumstances I would want to go to Moscow or whether I would rather go back to Washington and straighten out matters there first. The Chairman felt that perhaps it would be better for me to go first to Washington but that it was up to me to make this decision.

I told Moliakov that in the circumstances I would propose to return to Washington and communicate with the Chairman at some later date through Ambassador Dobrynin. Moliakov stressed that I was free to change my mind, my visa was valid for another two weeks and if I proceeded to go to Moscow the Chairman would see me.

I did not go to Moscow, but returned to Washington. Since this is a private, non-governmental, project we would want to involve the U.S. Government as little as possible. The success of the project demands, however, that the Government smile on it, rather than frown on it, and we need to make sure that the project is fully understood and appreciated by the Government.

Upon my return to Washington I was able to clear up the misunderstandings which had arisen during my absence. In order to eliminate any ambiguities that might remain I am now trying to formulate the text of the "instructions" under which the American and the Russian participants of the project would operate. Because of the need to consult with others there might be a short delay before the final text may be drafted. Thereafter it should not take too long to learn whether we can count on the Government to smile on the project.

When we have the green light in Washington I might then have to go to Moscow, but not until we have the names of the Americans who would participate in the project.

The End.

March 11, 1963

(The Council) will seek to develop materials (on the following issues) ^{which} which can be used by members for local agitation and in Washington to sell Congress and the Administration on these points of view. (It will also) explore methods of exerting pressure on unsympathetic Congressmen to reconsider.

1. Test Ban

There is a good chance that a test-ban treaty will be signed within several months. The anti-test ban forces are rallying strong opposition and there is an excellent chance that the Republican Party will throw its full weight in opposition to ratification. A major effort on the part of all groups with any interest in disarmament and peace will be required to arouse public sentiment in favor of its ratification. If a treaty should come before the Senate, the Council proposed to embark on a major project of organizing in Washington a broad spectrum lobby and a grassroots ~~letter~~ ~~writing~~ campaign in favor of ratification.

2. Limitation of Procurement of Long-Range Delivery Systems

One of the (two) immediate objectives of the Council is to exert the strongest possible pressure on the Administration to set a limit to the number of long-range nuclear weapons delivery systems which it is planning to procure over the next five years.

Despite the candid and clear statement by Sec'y. of Defense McNamara that the U.S. is rapidly approaching a military situation where further increase in the number of our long-range delivery systems cannot increase our security, current programs still call for numbers to be on hand by 1968 far in excess of the military requirements for an invulnerable second strike deterrent force. The danger in such rapid accumulation is that it inflames the arms race and (increases the difficulty of achieving) agreements for limiting and reducing strategic weapons systems.

3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The presence of large numbers of low yield tactical nuclear weapons in regions of direct confrontation between NATO and WARSAW (countries) (might) lead to a dangerously unstable situation if a military conflict were to break out.

According to Sec'y. of Defense McNamara, current strategy calls for (the) use of tactical nuclear weapons by (the United States) us in Europe only under three circumstances; 1) If the Russians use them first 2) If Europe is in imminent danger of being militarily overrun
3) If there is a Russian attack on West Berlin.

Therefore there is no need to have them proliferated in the areas of direct NATO-WARSAW confrontation in the hands of local commanders. Since command control is much safer if they are withdrawn back of (the) lines, we press for this.

1) quote 1963 Berlin Program

2) quote McNamara

3) Clear McN rejects notion of immediate response of tactical nuclear (TN) weapons + contemplates some "pause" ~~to assess~~ (caused by command and control frictions) to assess situation. If unresponsible use to be prevented + "pause" notion measured such a policy is ^{undermined} undermined gravely by presence of TNs in theater in hands of local commanders.

1) Temptation of field commanders to use almost irresistible
of any good war history shows difficulty of maintaining C/C in battle, esp where own troops on defensive or advance.

2) Presence in theater clear temptation to other side to preempt.

3) Once started escalation virtually certain - conventional/nuclear distinction readily visible + well understood
T.N. vs Str. N. fuzzy at best if not non-existent.

1 + 6

MEMORANDUM

March 12, 1963

X W-16

FROM: Leo Szilard

TO:

If we keep on following the line of least resistance we shall before long reach a point of no return in an all-out arms race and I am taking the liberty of sending you this memorandum on the tentative assumption that you have been asking yourself whether there is anything that any of us could do to halt the current drift towards war.

I myself didn't think that there was until about a year ago when I began to see that even a comparatively small group of people, ten to twenty thousand perhaps, who unite on a set of attainable political objectives ^{might} would have a chance to bring about the change that is needed.

We came close to war last October when the Russians transported rockets to Cuba and if the arms race continues other crises of this sort are ^{likely} bound to occur. It is easier to build solid fuel long-range rockets, such as the Minuteman, as fast as available production facilities permit, than to arrive at an agreement on arms control with Russia that the United States Senate would be willing to ratify. Thus, it is ^{almost} a foregone conclusion that we shall keep on following this line of least resistance unless there emerges in Washington a consensus on a set of objectives and the Administration decides consistently to pursue these objectives. This can be done successfully only if the objectives pursued are compatible with each other.

Last October, when the Russians transported rockets to Cuba, the Administration interpreted this move as an act of perfidy. Today, the Administration is striving to reach an agreement with the Russians on a test ban, which would require for its ratification a two-thirds vote in the Senate. But you cannot eat your cake and have it too; if the Russians are the kind of evil people that they were supposed to be last October, then we would have no business entering into a test ban agreement with them today.

The Administration does not at present pursue a consistent policy, but perhaps, with luck, this could be changed. With President Kennedy a number of exceptionally

March 12, 1963

capable men moved into the Administration. They know very well that America cannot be made secure by trying to keep ahead in the arms race, but it is difficult for them to keep their attention focused on the central issues when peripheral issues take up much of their time and attention.

There is a number of exceptionally capable men in the Senate, also. Many of them are deeply concerned about the general trend towards war and have considerable insight into what needs to be done, but, more often than not, they lack the courage of their convictions. They may give a lucid analysis of the situation that faces us in private conversation and then, at some point or another, they may say "Of course, I couldn't say this in public."

About a year ago, it occurred to me that if enough people would unite on a set of attainable objectives, they could maintain an organization which would bring to Washington from time to time scientists and scholars who understand the problem that the bomb poses to the world. These distinguished men would speak with the sweet voice of reason to people within the Administration and the Senate and they might, perhaps, induce them to keep their attention focused on the central issues.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished men would be heard but they might not be listened to, if they were able to deliver neither votes nor campaign contributions.

I was lead to conclude that the sweet voice of reason alone could not do the job, substantial campaign contributions alone could not do the job, but the combination of the sweet voice of reason and substantial campaign contributions might very well do the job.

Twenty thousand people having an average income of \$10,000 and willing to devote one or two percent of their income to campaign contributions for congressional candidates would provide an amount of \$4 million a year and this amount if wisely spent could have a profound effect on the composition and the attitudes of Congress.

March 12, 1963

The Council for a Livable World set up in Washington in June of last year is prepared to advise those of its supporters who are willing to devote one or two percent of their income to campaign contributions as to where these contributions ought to go. The Council is composed of scientists, scholars and men well versed in practical politics. It includes William Doering, Director of the Division of Science, Yale University; Morton Grodzins, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, and James G. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union.

In the last election, the Council recommended to those who sought such advice to concentrate their campaign contributions on three senatorial candidates. Checks were made out directly to the candidate and sent to the Council for transmission. Three candidates thus received checks totaling about \$4,000, \$10,000 and \$20,000 and all of them were elected.

During the current year, the Council proposes to keep in close contact with about fifteen senators and about an equal number of men within the Administration.

On the basis of the experience gained so far, I am inclined to believe that with ten thousand supporters the Council could become the most powerful public interest lobby that ever hit Washington. If you believe that you might wish to be one of them, please let me know and the Council will then promptly send you the information which you would need to have.

MEMORANDUM

From: Leo Szilard

March 18, 1963

To:

I am taking the liberty of sending you this memorandum on the tentative assumption that you have been asking yourself if there was anything that any of us could do to halt the general drift towards war. I, myself, didn't think that there was - until about a year ago - when I began to see how even a small group of people, ten to twenty thousand perhaps, who may unite on a set of attainable political objectives would have a chance to bring about the change that is needed.

We came close to war last October when the Russians transported rockets to Cuba and if the arms race continues other crises of this sort are bound to occur. It is easier to build long-range rockets, such as the Minuteman, as fast as the available production facilities permit, than to stop the arms race by arriving at an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union which the Senate may be willing to ratify. And if we keep on following this line of least resistance we shall before long reach a point of no return in an all out arms race.

With President Kennedy, a number of exceptionally capable men moved into the Administration. No one knows better than they do that America cannot be made secure by trying to keep ahead in the arms race, but they find it difficult to keep their attention focused on the central issues when peripheral issues take up much of their time and attention and when they get little encouragement from the Congress.

There are a number of exceptionally capable men in the Congress, also, particularly in the Senate. Many of them are deeply concerned about the general trend towards war and have considerable insight into what needs to be done, but, more often than not, they give in private conversation a lucid analysis of the problems with which we are faced and then, at some point or other, they say "Of course, I couldn't say this in public".

About a year ago, it occurred to me that if enough people would unite on a

March 18, 1963

set of attainable objectives they could maintain an organization which would bring to Washington from time to time scientists and scholars who understand the problem that the bomb poses to the world. These distinguished men would speak with the sweet voice of reason to the people within the Administration and the Senate, they would try to get them to focus their attention on the central issues and try to assist them in clarifying their minds on some of the more complex issues which are involved.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished men would be heard, but they might not be listened to, if they were able to deliver neither votes nor campaign contributions.

I was led to conclude that the sweet voice of reason alone could not do the job, that campaign contributions alone could not do the job, but the combination of the sweet voice of reason and substantial campaign contributions might very well do the job.

Twenty thousand people having an average income of \$10,000 and willing to devote one or two percent of their income to campaign contributions for congressional candidates would provide an amount of \$2 to \$4 million a year. This amount if wisely spent could have a profound effect on the composition and the attitudes of Congress.

The Council for a Livable World, set up in Washington in June of last year, is prepared to advise those of its supporters who are willing to devote one or two percent of their income to campaign contributions, as to where these contributions would be most effective. The Council is composed of scientists, scholars and men well versed in practical politics. It includes William Doering, Director of the Division of Science, Yale University; Morton Grodzins, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; and James G. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union.

In the last election, the Council recommended to those who sought ^{its} advice to

MEMORANDUM

-3-

March 18, 1963

concentrate their campaign contributions on three senatorial candidates. Checks were made out directly to the candidate and sent to the Council for transmission. Three candidates thus received contributions from Council supporters totaling about \$4,000, \$10,000 and \$20,000 respectively - and all of them were elected.

On the basis of the experience gained so far, I am now inclined to believe that with ten thousand supporters the Council could become the most effective public interest lobby that ever hit Washington. If you believe that you wish to be one of them, please write your address on the enclosed form and mail it to the Council for a Livable World, Suite 301, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. A prepaid envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

MEMORANDUM

From: Leo Szilard

March 22, 1963

To: A Selected Group of Well-Informed Persons

I am taking the liberty of sending you this memorandum on the tentative assumption that you have been asking yourself if there was anything that any of us could do to halt the general drift towards war. I, myself, didn't think that there was, until about a year ago, when I began to see how even a small group of people, ten to twenty thousand perhaps, who may unite on a set of attainable political objectives would have a chance to bring about the change that is needed.

We came close to war last October when the Russians transported rockets to Cuba, and if the arms race continues other crises of this sort are bound to occur. It is easier to build long-range rockets, such as the Minuteman, as fast as the available production facilities permit, than to stop the arms race by arriving at an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union which the Senate may be willing to ratify. And if we keep on following this line of least resistance we shall before long reach a point of no return in an all-out arms race.

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There are a number of exceptionally capable men in the Congress also, particularly in the Senate. Many of them are deeply concerned about the general trend towards war and have considerable insight into what needs to be done but, more often than not, they give in private conversation a lucid analysis of the problems with which we are faced and then, at some point or other, they say "Of course, I couldn't say this in public".

About a year ago, it occurred to me that if enough people would unite on a set of attainable objectives they could maintain an organization which would bring to Washington from time to time scientists and scholars who understand the problem that the bomb poses to the world. These distinguished men would speak with the sweet voice of reason to the people within the Administration and the Senate; they would try to get them to focus their attention on the central issues and try to assist them in clarifying their minds on some of the more complex issues which are involved.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished men would be heard, but they might not be listened to, if they were able to deliver neither votes nor campaign contributions.

I was led to conclude that the sweet voice of reason alone could not do the job, that campaign contributions alone could not do the job, but the combination of the sweet voice of reason and substantial campaign contributions might very well do the job.

March 22, 1963

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The Council for a Livable World, set up in Washington in June of last year, is prepared to advise those of its supporters who are willing to devote one or two percent of their income to campaign contributions, as to where these contributions would be most effective. The Council is composed of scientists, scholars and men well-versed in practical politics. It includes William Doering, Director of the Division of Science, Yale University; Morton Grodzins, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; and James G. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union.

In the last election the Council recommended to those who sought its advice to concentrate their campaign contributions on three senatorial candidates. Checks were made out directly to the candidate and sent to the Council for transmission. Three candidates thus received contributions from Council supporters totaling about \$4,000, \$10,000 and \$20,000 respectively - and all of them were elected.

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., Phone: 265-3800, ac 202



- I would like to become a Supporter of the Council.
My initial contribution is enclosed.
- I am interested in the objectives of the Council.
Please send me further information.

NAME

STREET

CITY ZONE STATE

FIRST CLASS
PERMIT NO. 34890
WASHINGTON, D. C.


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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.

Washington 6, D. C.



ABOUT LEO SZILARD

Dr. Leo Szilard, currently professor of biophysics at the University of Chicago, was among the first to conceive of the possibility of an atomic chain reaction and to recognize what it would mean to the world. The first patent issued in America in the field of atomic energy was issued jointly in his name and the name of the late Enrico Fermi. With Professor E. P. Wigner he shared the Atoms for Peace Award for 1959.

In 1939 Szilard took the initiative in inducing the U. S. Government to assume responsibility for the development of atomic energy. The historic letter which Albert Einstein wrote on August 2, 1939, to President Roosevelt was based on the work of Fermi and Szilard. In 1945 Szilard assumed the leadership of those of his colleagues who were opposed to dropping atomic bombs on the cities of Japan. In 1946 he led the successful fight of his colleagues against the May-Johnson Bill, which would have placed the development of atomic energy in the U. S. in the hands of an agency not under the direct "civilian" control of the President. His recently published little book, *THE VOICE OF THE DOLPHINS*, containing five stories of political and social satire, gives in the whimsical title story, a lucid analysis of the problems involved in disarmament. A speech, "Are We On The Road To War?," which he gave at eight universities across the country, evoked 2500 letters expressing approval and led to the establishment of the Council for a Livable World.

1963

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1963 ACTION PROGRAM OF THE

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



DURING THE WINTER OF 1962 Leo Szilard, nuclear physicist and molecular biologist, a leading figure in the conception and execution of the Manhattan Project, winner of the 1959 Atoms for Peace Award, gave a speech, "Are We on the Road to War?" at a number of major academic centers across the country. In this speech Szilard expressed his concern at the present drift toward nuclear war and proposed a national political organization to work for a comprehensive disarmament agreement and the abolition of war. The immediate and enthusiastic response resulted in the formation of the Council for a Livable World in June, 1962.

Through its members who pledge annually 2% of their incomes, the Council conducts a broad operational program. It makes substantial contributions to the campaigns of Congressional candidates who are concerned about the present course of events, who have insight into what needs to be done and who can be counted upon not only to support the Administration's constructive foreign and defense policies, but also to press for improvements in these policies.

The Council intends to initiate research projects related to arms reduction and disarmament. It has proposed a joint Russian-American non-governmental study on the problem of securing the peace in a disarmed world (cf. 1a below) which it hopes to commence in 1963.

A third major undertaking is the Washington lobby. The Council brings to Washington scientists, scholars and others who, speaking to members of the Administration and Congress with the "sweet voice of reason," press for specific changes in policy and legislation based on the objectives set forth in this Action Program.

For the first time in history it is now possible to establish acceptable minimum standards of freedom and economic well-being for virtually all of mankind. This goal can perhaps be accomplished within the span of a single generation—but only if far-reaching disarmament is achieved and if war is abolished. The challenge of our time is a double one: To make substantial progress toward this goal and to comprehend and act upon the overriding truth of our age—that the advent of the atomic bomb has turned war and victory, in the conventional military sense, into obsolete concepts. The world is living on the brink of unparalleled disaster. Many potential danger areas exist, in any one of which irresponsible action by a major power could lead to a Third World War. If a war were to break out tomorrow, and if the United States and the Soviet Union were to be involved on opposite sides, the danger is extremely great that nuclear weapons would be introduced and that the war—even a so-called "limited" war—would soon erupt into a general nuclear conflagration.

Today the use of major military force or the threat of its use are perilous methods of pursuing foreign policy objectives. Until such time as an effective international system for maintaining the peace shall exist, it is doubtful that nations will give up the right to defend what they consider to be their vital interests by all available means, including the use of force and the threat of its use. It is imperative, therefore, that two vital principles govern all nations in the conduct of their foreign policy.

- (1) The only acceptable means of bringing about substantial changes in the *status quo* are through negotiations and other methods of peaceful change.

(2) In the event that a situation arises where, in the face of aggression, a nation has no alternative but to resort to force or the threat of force in order to prevent the imposition of changes which would undermine its vital security interests, the objectives must be limited to the restoration of the *status quo ante*, and the means employed must be commensurate with these limited objectives.

Both qualitatively and quantitatively, the weapons now available to the major powers are vastly out of proportion to their military needs. Even the smallest conflicts raise the threat of catastrophic mutual destruction. National self-restraint in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives has become essential; but it is not enough. Means must be found for the elimination by mutual agreement of the horrendous overkill capacities now possessed by the two major powers.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union are on record as favoring general and complete disarmament, a number of major roadblocks have thus far impeded progress in the negotiations. One of the main obstacles has been the failure on the part of both countries to examine in sufficient and realistic detail the nature and problems of a disarmed world. As long as there is no meeting of the minds between Russia and America on the question of securing the peace in a disarmed world, both American and Russian leaders will remain uncertain about the feasibility and even the desirability of comprehensive disarmament.

There exists, however, the definite possibility that, as the first step toward general and comprehensive disarmament, an agreement providing for far-reaching arms limitations and controls could be negotiated. The most important feature of this agreement would provide for a major and rapid reduction in delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, bringing them down to the minimum level required to deter their use and to safeguard against the consequences of an attempt by any nation to arm with nuclear weapons. In this first stage, nuclear missile bases and nuclear delivery systems outside the continental limits of the major powers would also be eliminated. At the same time, the agreement should provide for drastic reductions in conventional forces. It could also include measures for control over production of weapons-materials; for a limitation of weapons stockpiles; as well as measures aimed at stabilizing the main areas of current East-West confrontation. If this type of agreement were to be carried through in a short time, it could require little of the intrusive inspection which has hitherto been unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and could also provide sufficient guarantees to satisfy the security

requirements of the West. On the basis of recent amendments to the Soviet proposals at Geneva, the principles of such an agreement would now seem to be acceptable to the Soviet Union. However, unless and until the United States firmly and publicly renounces any intention of acquiring a strategic nuclear striking force of such numerical superiority that it could destroy in a single attack all or almost all Soviet long-range rockets and strategic air bases (the so-called counterforce first-strike strategy), the West is in a poor position to propose an arms limitations agreement which the Soviet Union would find acceptable. Conversely, if the conventional forces of the Soviet Union remain significantly superior to those of the West, the United States is not likely to abandon its present strategic policies for the defense of Western Europe; these policies today appear to call for the initiation by the United States of the use of strategic nuclear weapons in response to a successful conventional attack on the NATO countries by Russia.

Unilateral initiatives in arms control and in partial disarmament measures can help to create a more favorable atmosphere for fruitful disarmament negotiations—as, for example, if the United States were to adopt a strategic policy of using its nuclear weapons only for retaliation in kind, or if we were to dismantle vulnerable missile bases in Europe. It does not seem likely, however, that unilateral acts can alone resolve the present impasse. The best hope for embarking on the path of general and complete disarmament lies in the proposal by our government to the Soviet Union of a first-stage arms limitation agreement embodying the principles outlined above.

Aims of the Action Program

The overall goal of the Council for a Livable World is to establish a livable world free from war. In working towards this goal, the Council has as its general aims:

1. To remove the main obstacles to a disarmament agreement.
2. To halt the arms race before it reaches the point of no return, and to promote a first-stage arms reduction agreement at an early date.
3. To diminish the risk of war between the Soviet Union and the United States and to increase cooperation between nations.
4. To reduce the likelihood of escalation in the event that a war should break out, thereby enhancing the possibility that a cease-fire might be arranged before an all-out nuclear catastrophe occurred.

The Council will pursue these aims by identifying and pressing for specific objectives which appear to be currently attainable. The Action Program, which will be brought up to date from time to time, will be limited to measures for which it appears possible to generate support within the Administration and Congress. The Program may omit certain objectives considered by many individuals and groups to be eminently desirable and which, in the long run, may indeed be necessary. However, the Council is restricting its Action Program to objectives it believes have reasonable prospects for realization in the near future and—to be effective—it must be selective even with respect to these.

The Immediate Action Program

1

Towards removing obstacles to a disarmament agreement, the Council proposes—

- a) To take the initiative in establishing a non-governmental joint Russian-American staff study on the problem of maintaining and securing the peace in a disarmed world.
- b) To seek the cooperation of labor and industry in promoting the passage by Congress of legislation which would facilitate the orderly transition of our economy from high arms expenditures to low ones. Such legislation would include measures providing for federal retraining of labor; for federal housing for relocated workers; and for substantial compensation to industry for losses from such causes as cancelled contracts, retooling and reconversion for non-military production during the period of transition.

2

Towards halting the arms race before it reaches the point of no return and promoting a first-stage arms reduction agreement, the Council proposes that—

- a) The United States renounce, at the earliest possible date, any intention of achieving a strategic nuclear weapons capacity sufficient for substantially destroying in a single massive attack the Russian retaliatory forces.
- b) United States Government agencies concerned with the disarmament negotiations concentrate on attaining a workable first-stage disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union aimed at the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons delivery capabilities.

Towards diminishing the risk of war and promoting cooperation between nations, the Council proposes that—

- a) United States delegations to the United Nations and other international bodies shall treat each issue separately rather than as an element of the cold war, and shall base their negotiations on the merits of each case rather than upon the desire to win essentially meaningless diplomatic victories, and that this policy shall be clarified to the American people.
- b) The United States lift all geographical restrictions on foreign travel by American citizens, and that the prohibition against travel in certain countries, currently printed in American passports, be replaced by a simple listing of countries where the United States does not have diplomatic facilities and where, accordingly, the passport is useful for identification purposes only.
- c) The United States seek, if possible, under the auspices of the United Nations, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone (with a prohibition against installation of offensive missile bases and offensive nuclear weapons delivery systems) in Latin America and in other regions of the world where nuclear weapons technology has not yet been independently developed, such as Africa and the Near East.

4

Towards reducing the likelihood of escalation in the event of a war, the Council urges that—

- a) In order to be in a position at the earliest possible date to renounce the first use of tactical as well as strategic nuclear weapons, the United States shall take all possible steps to redress the current imbalance in conventional armed forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The most desirable method of achieving this end would be to include in a first-stage disarmament agreement a provision for the reduction of conventional arms and forces-in-being. In the absence of such an agreement, the United States should make every effort to convince our NATO Allies to increase their conventional forces to adequate levels, at the same time discouraging by all means possible, the development of an independent NATO nuclear capability.
- b) American nuclear warheads and bombs shall be withdrawn from advanced positions in West Germany, that they shall not be located, stockpiled or distributed to troops in any area of confrontation with opposing forces or in zones of actual conflict and that, wherever located, they shall be retained in American hands under effective American control.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: Dupont Circle Building
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington 6, D.C.
Phone: COlumbia 5-3800 ac 202

Members and supporters need not be in complete agreement with all the major objectives of the Action Program; but they should be wholeheartedly in favor of at least one. When speaking in the name of the Council, members are restricted to the current Program. However, they are free to press, either as individuals or through other organizations to which they may belong, for objectives not contained in the Program.

Local and regional groups will conduct seminars open to all members and supporters based on the Action Program for the purpose of clarifying the relevant issues in order that they may be able to present their views as effectively as possible when speaking with members of the Administration and Congress. If the Washington lobby is to succeed it will need the cooperation of its members in generating substantial grass-roots support for the specific objectives of the Action Program through public discussion and the communications media.

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FRANKLIN W. STAHL, Assistant Professor of Biology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon.



file

MEMORANDUM

May 17, 1963

From: Leo Szilard
To: Allan Forbes, Jr.

Attached is an item sent by the clipping service. It raises the question whether we should not suggest to one of our supporters in each locality to write a similar letter to the editor of their local newspaper.

Would it be possible to get this going? Or, should we wait until the fall?

LS

MEADVILLE, PA.
TRIBUNE
D: 15, 193

MAY 4 1963 *Byhalles*

Letter—Material Available On Council for Livable World

Editor of The Tribune,

Last year Dr. Leo Szilard, a distinguished nuclear scientist who helped develop the A-bomb, winner of the 1959 Atoms for Peace Awards, gave a speech, "Are We on the Road to War?" at a number of major academic centers across the country, expressing his concern at the present drift toward nuclear war and proposing a national political (nonpartisan) organization to work for arms control and eventual voluntary disarmament (with adequate controls). The immediate and enthusiastic response resulted in the formation of the Council for a Livable World.

Through its members, who pledge annually 2 per cent of their incomes (supporting members pledge 1 per cent), the council (whose officers consist mainly of distinguished scientists) makes substantial contributions to the campaigns of congression-

al candidates who can be counted upon not only to support the administration's constructive foreign policies, but also to press for improvements in those policies.

The council intends to initiate research projects related to arms reduction and disarmament, including a joint Russian-American non-governmental study.

A third major undertaking is the Washington lobby. The council brings to the capitol scientists, scholars and others who press for specific changes in policy and legislation based on the objectives of the council, as set forth in the 1963 Action Program.

I have several copies of the council's program, Dr. Szilard's speech and other materials from the council which I should be happy to share with anyone in Meadville who is interested.

THE REV. NEAL W. FERRIS
Unitarian Church of Meadville

MEMORANDUM ON JET INJECTIONS

May 23, 1963

Large Gadget: (\$1,200) Scientific Equipment Manufacturing Company, Post Office Box 149, 20 North Avenue, Larchmont, N.Y. Person-to-person to Mr. Kittner, telephone: TE 4-1700.

Small Gadget: (\$380) Z & W Manufacturing Company, 30250 Lakeland Blvd., Wickliffe, Ohio, telephone: WH 3-5700.

Expert: Dr. R. A. Hingson, University Hospital, Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, telephone: RA 1-7000.

Literature: MILITARY SURGEON, 1963, June issue.

MEMORANDUM

May 31, 1963

From: Leo Szilard

To: Fellow scientists and scholars.

I am taking the liberty of sending you this memorandum on the tentative assumption that you have been asking yourself if there was anything that any of us could do to halt the general drift towards war. I, myself, didn't think that there was, until about a year ago, when I began to see how even a small group of people, ten to twenty thousand perhaps, who may unite on a set of attainable political objectives would have a chance to bring about the change that is needed.

We came close to war last October when the Russians transported rockets to Cuba, and if the arms race continues other crises of this sort are bound to occur. It is easier to build long-range rockets, such as the Minuteman, as fast as the available production facilities permit, than to stop the arms race by arriving at an agreement on arms control with the Soviet Union which the Senate may be willing to ratify. And if we keep on following this line of least resistance we shall before long reach a point of no return in an all-out arms race.

With President Kennedy, a number of exceptionally capable men moved into the Administration. No one knows better than they do that America cannot be made secure by trying to keep ahead in the arms race, but they find it difficult to keep their attention focused on the central issues when peripheral issues take up much of their time and attention and when they get little encouragement from the Congress.

There are a number of exceptionally capable men in the Congress also, particularly in the Senate. Many of them are deeply concerned about the general trend towards war and have considerable insight into what needs to be done but, more often than not, they give in private conversation a lucid analysis of the problems with which we are faced and then, at some point or other, they say "Of course, I couldn't say this in public".

They
About a year ago, it occurred to me that if enough people would unite on a set of attainable objectives they would maintain an organization which would bring to Washington from time to time scientists and scholars who understand the problem that the bomb poses to the world. These distinguished men would speak with the sweet voice of reason to the people within the Administration and the Senate; they would try to get them to focus their attention on the central issues and ~~try to~~ assist them in clarifying their minds on some of the more complex issues which are involved.

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished men would be heard, but they might not be listened to, if they were able to deliver neither votes nor campaign contributions.

I was led to conclude that the sweet voice of reason alone could not do the job, that campaign contributions alone could not do the job, but the combination of the sweet voice of reason and substantial campaign contributions might very well do the job.

May 31, 1963

Twenty thousand people having an average income of \$10,000 and willing to devote 1% or 2% of their income to campaign contributions for Congressional candidates would provide an amount of \$2 to \$4 million a year. This amount, if wisely spent, could have a profound effect on the composition and the attitudes of Congress.

The Council for a Livable World, set up in Washington in June of last year, is prepared to advise its supporters as to where their campaign contributions would be most effective.

The Council is composed of scientists, scholars and men well-versed in practical politics. It includes William Doering, Director of the Division of Science, Yale University; Morton Godzins, Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; and James G. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union. In the last Congressional election the Council recommended to those who sought its advice to concentrate their campaign contributions on three senatorial candidates. Checks were made out directly to the candidate and sent to the Council for transmission. The Council transmitted over \$20,000 to George McGovern, formerly Director of the Food-for-Peace Program, who was running for the Senate in South Dakota. He was elected with a margin of a few hundred votes, the first Democratic Senator in South Dakota in 26 years. I suggest that you read his maiden speech, which is enclosed.

To the other two Senatorial candidates, the Council transmitted over \$10,000 and over \$4,000 respectively, and ^{both} ~~all~~ of them were elected.

On the basis of the experience gained so far, I am inclined to believe that the Council could become the most effective public-interest lobby that ever hit Washington by the time the number of its supporters reaches 10,000.

Regular Supporters of the Council are expected to expend 2% of their income, and Contributing Supporters of the Council are expected to expend 1% of their income or \$100, in support of the work of the Council, including campaign contributions to Congressional candidates.

If you believe that you might wish to become a supporter of the Council, please fill out the enclosed form and mail it to the Council for a Livable World, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C. A pre-paid envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

June 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM

From: Leo Szilard
To:
Subject: Conversation with Dr. Andre Cournand

On June 15th, I discussed with Dr. Andre Cournand the problem of setting up a European laboratory for biology in Geneva. He was very enthusiastic about this possibility and offered to do whatever is necessary to get the French Government interested in the project.

He will be in Paris from July 10th until the 22nd and possibly until the 25th. He offered to arrange for me to see Marechal (Delegue General, Recherche Scientifique et Technique), Pigniol (the former Delegue General) and also Palewsky. He said that it would probably be possible for me to meet Marechal in Chamonix between July 14th and 20th.

I told Dr. Cournand that I shall write him, after the meeting of June 28th in Geneva, at his New York address, 1361 Madison Avenue, New York.

Since it is probably true that nobody is a prophet in his own country, I am perfectly willing to see in Paris whoever Dr. Cournand wants me to see, if this is deemed advisable. I am inclined to think that thereafter somebody from England, either Kendrew or Waddington, ought to take over and maintain contact with the French "Establishment".

We can discuss all this at the Geneva meeting on June 28th. At that time we can also discuss whether perhaps Monod ought to establish and to maintain contact with the British Government.

Cournand is visiting Paris three times a year. His address in Paris is care of Dr. Sauvage, 20 rue Vaneau, Paris 7^e, telephone: Invalides 14-38. As long as he is willing to carry the ball perhaps it would be best to channel everything through him.

We can discuss this issue on June 28th.

Statement

submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate

The Testban Agreement which the Administration has submitted to the Senate for ratification would advance the cause of peace, if, subsequent to its ratification, the Government were to propose to the Soviet Union an agreement providing for an adequate political settlement, which would serve the interests of the Soviet Union and the other nations involved, as well as our own interests, and which the Soviet Union might rightly be expected to accept. If this were not done, however, and if the Government proceeded with an extensive programme of underground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the Testban Agreement would be likely to do just the opposite.

By engaging in this type of testing on a large scale, the United States would force the Soviet Union to conduct numerous bomb tests also. The underground testing of bombs is very expensive, however, and since the Soviet Union is economically much weaker than the United States, it would in the long run be forced to abrogate the Agreement. Such a turn of events would prove my old friend and distinguished colleague, Dr. Edward Teller, to have been right - for the wrong reasons.

The problem of establishing peaceful co-existence between the United States and the Soviet Union involves the rest of the world as much as it involves Europe. It is difficult to visualise a political settlement in which Russia would agree to co-exist with parliamentary governments located in its proximity which look to us for support, while at the same time the United States would continue to maintain its present position that it cannot co-exist with a communist country, located in this hemisphere, which looks for support to the Soviet Union. Any attempt on the part of the Government to arrive at a political settlement with the Soviet Union on such a basis would be an attempt "to eat one's cake and have it too", and few people, if any, have ever accomplished this feat.

If I were a member of the Senate, I think I would want to know at this point how the Government proposes to follow up the conclusion of the Testban Agreement, before casting my vote for the ratification of the Agreement.

I am not speaking here as a scientist who can claim to have special knowledge of the atomic bomb, but rather as a citizen whose political judgement is not obscured by being in possession of "inside information".

Geneva, Switzerland, August 23rd, 1963

Leo Szilard

Roma, 26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM

by Leo SZILARD

The purpose of this memorandum is to explore whether the Vatican might not want to fulfill a constructive and important function by bringing together for conferences scientists from two or more countries whose Governments are at present not able to communicate with each other in a constructive fashion because of the existing political tensions. These scientists would be brought together not in order to discuss science but rather in order to discuss the political problems which cause the political tension between their countries.

The so-called Pugwash meetings, which I have attended for the past six years, have shown that Russian and American scientists were able to discuss dispassionately the political conflicts between their countries, at a time when there was great tension between the Governments.

If the Vatican were willing to examine this general proposition, I should appreciate an opportunity to explain in greater detail what I have in mind to the Secretary of State of the Vatican and if he should think it necessary or advisable, I would hold myself available to see the Holy Father at His convenience.

I am at present professor of Biophysics at the University of Chicago.

In 1939 I was instrumental in inducing the Government of United States to assume the responsibility for the development of atomic energy. The first United States patent issued for the nuclear reactor to the United States Government was issued jointly in the name of Enrico Fermi and myself.

In March 1945 I assumed the leadership of the group of atomic scientists in the United States which tried to persuade the United States Government not to drop atomic bombs on Japan. The enclosed article printed in August of this year in Look Magazine, describes the role which I played in this matter.

I am in Rome on my way home from the Pugwash conference in Dubrovnik. I expect to remain in Rome Friday and Saturday, September 27 and 28th. In Rome I am staying in the Hotel Regina (room 404).

The End .

Leo Szilard

Dec. 11th, 1963

Memorandum for La Jolla

Re: Memanoma

In the case of ~~memanoma~~^{metastases} it is almost certain that ~~pistacossis~~ will appear within a few years and that the patient will die.

Perhaps one ought to do the following:

~~lymphatics~~ After excising the primary tumor one destroys the ~~memanoma~~^{metastases} of the patient. Perhaps this ought to be done by feeding a radioactive compound which is preferentially taken up by the proliferating bone marrow cells plus some external radiation of the spleen and the large bones. Thereafter one would transplant from a donor, marrow and also take in from the same donor those organs which would be damaged by runt disease.

Dec. 11, 1963

Memorandum for La Jolla

Re; Mewbray

There are two applications which come to mind if it/^{be}comes possible to prevent an antibody response to a particulate antigen.

1. In case of an infection with an antibiotic resistance to
Staphylococcus aureus *Mewbray*
...coccus, one might give the ~~mewbray~~ agent and shortly thereafter, one might inject two or three phages against the bacterium. Subsequently, one might inject repeatedly the phages and the ~~mewbray~~ agent together.

2. If one has a virus which grows particularly well in the malignant tumor, one may inject this virus together with ^{the *Mewbray*} ~~mewbray~~ agent and do so repeatedly until the tumor is destroyed.