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DRAFT PROPOSAL

by

Leo Szilard

General and complete disarmament will have to be accomplished step by step. How soon complete disarmament can be agreed upon will depend on how fast the nations involved will be able to agree on adequate means of securing the peace in a virtually completely disarmed world.

It is proposed that the nations involved enter, as soon as possible, into discussions with each other on how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world and it is envisaged that they may set up such studies as may be required to clarify the issues involved. It is envisaged that as soon as the powers reach a meeting of the minds on these issues a treaty providing for general and complete disarmament shall be drafted, signed, and ratified.

It is envisaged that such a treaty shall cover two periods, that the First Period shall start as soon as the treaty is concluded and that its duration shall be fixed by date (perhaps December 31, 1963 or 1964).

During this First Period America and Russia shall eliminate from their stockpiles a certain number of bombs and shall step by step reduce the number of bombs in their possession so as to conform by the end of the First Period to the INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVEL to be specified in the disarmament agreement.

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The guiding principle for setting the INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVEL shall be the consideration of reducing the number of bombs retained by America and Russia to the point where there are not enough bombs left for the adoption of a counterforce strategy, so that neither America nor Russia will need to fear thereafter that their ability to retaliate in kind against a nuclear attack could be destroyed by a surprise attack.

So that it may be possible to appraise and specify in the agreement the appropriate number of bombs that America and Russia shall be permitted to retain within the framework of the INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVEL it will be necessary for America and Russia to state -- prior to the conclusion of the disarmament agreement -- to what extent they wish to rely, for the delivery of bombs, on planes, long-range rockets which may be launched from fixed soft bases, long-range rockets which may be launched from fixed hardened bases, intermediate-range rockets which may be launched from submarines, long-range rockets which may be moved around on railroad cars, or long-range rockets which may be moved around on trucks.

At the outset of the Second Period far-reaching measures of inspection will have to go into effect and some of these might lead to the disclosure of the location of fixed rocket launching bases. Such rocket launching bases might be vulnerable to a surprise attack carried out by bombs

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legitimately retained within the framework of the INTER-MEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVEL specified in the agreement and the disclosure of their location might therefore involve a substantial loss in military security for America or for Russia if they were to rely on fixed soft rocket launching bases.

For this reason Russia and America might wish to reorganize their bomb delivery system and <sup>to shift</sup> prior to the conclusion of the disarmament agreement or during the First Period ~~shift if need be~~, for instance, to rockets that may be launched from mobile bases of various sorts. If in order to accomplish some such shift they need to conduct bomb tests during the First Period, they shall be free to do so by mutual agreement.

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At the outset of the First Period America and Russia shall as a first step dismantle a certain number of bombs and the fissionable material and other ingredients contained in these bombs shall be placed in depots that are under appropriate international supervision (or in the custody of an International Disarmament Administration). The dismantling of each bomb shall take place in the presence of international inspectors and the material shall be transported to the depots under the surveillance of such inspectors. All material derived from the Soviet Union shall be kept in

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depots located on the territory of the Soviet Union and all material derived from America shall be kept in depots located on the territory of America.

Neither America nor Russia would need to disclose at this point how many bombs they possess, but in the case of each nation the number of bombs dismantled in the first step must be larger than one-third of the difference between the number of bombs possessed by that nation at the outset of the First Period and the number of bombs which that nation is permitted to retain at the end of the First Period -- within the framework of the INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE LEVEL to be specified in the agreement.

Similarly -- in the first step -- America and Russia shall remove from their stock of fissionable material (which is not incorporated in bombs) at least one-half of each category of fissionable material and shall transfer these materials to the above-mentioned depots.

At the outset of the First Period America and Russia will be in possession of stocks of material, including compounds of heavy hydrogen which the agreement may specify as bomb ingredients (which have not as yet been incorporated in bombs). America and Russia shall at the outset of the First Period transfer at least half of each category of bomb ingredients to the above-mentioned depots.

*From the outset of the First Period on*  
fissionable materials and bomb ingredients (as specified by the agreement) which are currently produced

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~~from the outset of the First Period on~~, by any nation, shall be currently transferred -- in toto -- to depots under appropriate international supervision.

Throughout the First Period the elimination and control of the means of delivery shall progress in parallel with the elimination and control of nuclear bombs, fissionable materials and bomb ingredients.

From the outset of the First Period all nations shall refrain from transferring to the control of any other nation nuclear weapons and means suitable for the delivery of such weapons, as well as fissionable materials of weapons grade (and such other fissionable materials as may be specified in the agreement) as well as such bomb ingredients as may be specified in the agreement.

At the end of the First Period the nations shall renounce the right to use <sup>of atomic</sup> ~~nuclear~~ weapons for any purpose except in retaliation in case of an attack with such weapons.

X In view of this, ~~during the First Period~~, America, Russia and the other nations involved might need to reorganize their conventional forces <sup>during the First Period</sup> in such a manner that at the end of the First Period they shall be in the position to renounce the use of atomic weapons.

X During the First Period the nations shall step by step readjust their conventional forces so as to reach by the end of the First Period a level that conforms to the

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INTERMEDIATE CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL to be specified in the Disarmament Agreement.

In the process of drafting the Disarmament Agreement it shall be kept in mind that in the absence of adequate means for securing the peace in a disarmed world the INTERMEDIATE CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL to be specified in the agreement must give each nation a reasonable assurance that the nation would be in a position to defend itself, individually or collectively, without resorting to the use of atomic bombs.

Throughout the First Period new means of adequate inspection shall be instituted, and the applications of means instituted shall be expanded, in the measure in which, step by step, <sup>atomic</sup> ~~nuclear~~ bombs are eliminated and stocks of fissionable materials as well as ~~other~~ bomb ingredients are transferred to internationally supervised depots.

At the outset of the Second Period far-reaching measures of inspection shall go into effect. There shall remain no information from then on protected by any government on the ground that it may represent a legitimate military secret -- with the possible exception of the current location of mobile rocket launching equipment.

During the Second Period there shall be a reduction in the number of bombs -- in stages -- and a parallel reduction of the means of delivery. The number of bombs that each nation

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may be permitted to retain at the end of each stage is to be specified in the disarmament agreement.

During the Second Period there shall also be a stage by stage reduction in conventional arms and the level of the conventional forces that each nation is permitted to retain at the end of each stage is to be specified in the disarmament agreement.

The stages relating to the number of legitimately retained bombs and the corresponding means of delivery -- which shall be referred to as N-stages need not coincide with, (and may go into effect quite independently of) the stages which relate to the conventional force level -- which shall be referred to as C-stages.

The rate at which the world may pass on from one N-stage to the next N-stage, i.e., the rate at which nuclear bombs will be eliminated, shall be determined <sup>solely</sup>~~solely~~ by the guiding principle that the number of bombs America and Russia is to be permitted to retain shall be commensurate to the number of bombs that may have been hidden and may have remained up to then undetected. Accordingly, the rate at which bombs would be eliminated would depend solely upon the ability of the Atomic Powers to convince each other that no bombs have been retained by them in secret.

The rate at which the world may pass on from one C-stage to the next C-stage, i.e., the rate at which the

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conventional force level will be reduced, shall be determined solely by the rate at which means are provided for the securing of the peace in a disarmed world.

During the last C-stage the conventional forces of the nations shall be reduced to the MINIMAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL specified in the agreement.

In the process of drafting the Disarmament Agreement it is to be kept in mind that the MINIMAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVEL needs to limit the conventional force of each nation to that necessary for maintaining internal security. As far as the great powers are concerned it is envisaged that this force level may be also sufficient to protect these powers against an external attack by an improvised army. In case of the smaller powers it is envisaged that they may be protected by international police forces against an external attack by improvised armies.

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It is envisaged that disarmament will be carried out under the control of an International Disarmament Administration which either operates under the Security Council of the United Nations or a similar Council of its own, referred to as the High Council of the International Disarmament Administration. It is envisaged that the Soviet Union, the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China (and presumably also certain other nations such as, for instance,

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Britain and France) may have permanent seats on the High Council, while the other seats may rotate among the other nations which are a party to the Disarmament Agreement.

If the United States, the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China conclude a Disarmament Agreement they would presumably have a strong desire to keep the agreement in force. It may be assumed that the agreement could not remain in force if either of these nations should cease to wish to keep it in force.

It is therefore envisaged that these three nations (and perhaps also the other permanent members of the High Council) will have certain Special Rights which are as follows:

1. During the Second Period the change-over from one N-stage to the next N-stage or from one C-stage to the next C-stage shall require a majority vote of the High Council of the Disarmament Administration with the concurring vote of the United States, the Peoples' Republic of China, and the Soviet Union (and perhaps with the concurring vote of the other permanent members of the High Council also.)

2. If either the Soviet Union or the United States or the Peoples' Republic of China (and perhaps also any one of the permanent members of the High Council) or the majority of the High Council remains unconvinced that there are no major violations of the disarmament agreement then each of these individual nations, as well as the majority of the High Council, shall have the right -- upon giving due notice -- to demand

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that the disarmament process be reversed and they shall then be free to revert from the prevailing N-stage to a preceding N-stage. All other nations shall then also be free to revert to the same preceding N-stage.

It is envisaged that the Sanction against secret evasions or open violations of the Disarmament Agreement by x any of the powers who possess the Special Rights listed under x (2), would consist in the reversal of the disarmament process and the step by step moving back from the prevailing N-stage to preceding N-stages at the demand of some other power who possesses the Special Rights listed under (2), or at the demand of the majority of the High Council.

In case of a secret evasion or open violation of x the Disarmament Agreement by a nation, which does not possess x the Special Rights listed under (2), there shall be applied such sanctions as are to be specified in the Disarmament Agreement.

Nations or individuals who in violation of the United Nations Charter, or articles of the Disarmament Agree- x ment, resort to force, and use arms that may have been legiti- x mately or illegitimately acquired or retained by them, shall be subject to sanctions to be specified in the Disarmament Agreement.

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