

AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE BOMB

by Leo Szilard

THE RUSSIANS have exploded one atom bomb. It may be their only bomb. But the plant which was used to make it can turn out others. Within a very short time, ~~one year perhaps~~, the Russians ~~will~~ have bombs in significant quantity—significant at least from the point of view of Western Europe.

Will the Russians also have the means of delivering these bombs anywhere in Europe? They may not yet have V-2 type rockets developed to the stage where they can carry atomic bombs. They may not yet have bombers fast enough to be able to get through without being intercepted. But clearly the time is not far off when, in case of war, Russia will be in a position to deliver bombs anywhere in Western Europe.

If the time thus comes when Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam face destruction within twenty-four hours after the outbreak of war, and when there is nothing that America can do to protect these cities from such a fate, we shall be faced with a situation which we did not envisage when the Atlantic Pact was concluded.

One might argue that the Atlantic Pact would still offer these countries greater security than they would have without it, since Russia, knowing that the United States would go to war if any of them were attacked, would be less likely to attack them. I am willing to let this argument pass for the moment. But can anyone seriously expect the French, Belgians and the Dutch thus to accept for the sake of a lessened probability of war the absolute certainty that in case of war their cities will be utterly destroyed? Will it be much consolation for them to know that some ten or fifteen years after their destruction the US might be victorious and might then help them to rebuild their cities and to reconstruct their devastated countries?

What, then, is the policy we ought to follow in the face of these new realities? It seems to me that there is only one avenue of escape. We ought to release those countries which want to be released from the obligations imposed upon them by the Atlantic Pact. This does not mean that we should abandon them to their fate. We could, for instance, enter into an agreement with France—in which we unilaterally undertake ~~the following obligations~~.

To go to war with Russia if Russia should attack or occupy France; to respect the neutrality of France in ~~land~~

Dr. Leo Szilard, an outstanding atomic scientist, is now at the University of Chicago. A full statement of his views, which are summarized in the accompanying article, will be found in the October issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. We present his views for their intrinsic interest, without editorial endorsement.

case of war as long as her neutrality is respected also by Russia, ~~except if America, without having used them first, is attacked with atomic bombs by Russia or some other nation;~~

To refrain from using atomic bombs and strategic bombing of any kind against France as long as no atomic bombs are produced in her territory even though France may have been forced to surrender to Russia and even though America may be attacked by atomic bombs produced outside of France.

We could enter into similar agreements with Belgium, Holland and certain other countries in Western Europe.

England may be different. England is no less vulnerable to bombs than the rest of Western Europe. But after the fall of France, England decided to fight on in the face of the heaviest odds, and she emerged victorious. England might decide to hold out indefinitely as our ally and, with worse luck this time, perhaps suffer utter destruction in case of war.

Yet England, when she realizes that her geographical position as well as the concentration of her population in London and a few other large cities makes her vulnerable beyond endurance, might also wish to be freed from the Atlantic Pact. If she does, we ought to lend her a helping hand rather than try to obstruct a development that is inevitable.

An England neutral and reasonably well-armed might be the strongest deterrent to Russian invasion. She could even give Russia an assurance to resist, if necessary with force of arms, an American invasion. By giving our consent and approval to a position of this sort which England might wish to take, America could effectively protect England from a Russian occupation. Clearly in case of a war with America, Russia would have a strong incentive to leave England in a neutral position and thus bar the United States from using England as a base of military operations.

The neutralization of all those nations which are at present caught between the strategic aspirations of America and Russia would remove the chief area of conflict in Russian-American relations. Yet if the arms race is permitted to continue, and particularly if Russian atomic-bomb production increasingly threatens the security of the United States, war will ultimately become unavoidable.

Thus the question arises whether within the pattern of the new policy outlined above, Russia and the United

States could agree on some effective method of international control of atomic energy.

International inspection must be an integral part of any such agreement if it is to be effective. In the conditions which existed during the past four years, would it have been in Russia's interest to enter into any agreement on atomic energy that provided for international inspection?

During these past four years we regarded Western Europe as a base for military operations against Russia in case of war. We were engaged in developing long-range rockets and long-range bombers, and we built a considerable fleet of such bombers. In case of war with Russia, it would have been of advantage to us to know the exact locations of the most essential Russian industrial installations, and it was therefore in Russia's interest to keep secret all information relating to them. Thus the Iron Curtain was Russia's most important strategic defense. Such strategic considerations may not have been the only reason for Russia's desire to maintain secrecy, but they are valid and sufficient reasons.

International inspection, if at all effective, is not compatible with maintaining the degree of secrecy which Russia was anxious to maintain in the postwar period and which she was successful in maintaining. In the conditions which existed during the past four years it would not have been in Russia's interest to enter into any agreement *limited to the control of atomic energy* which provided for international inspection.

But even if such an agreement had not provided for international inspection, it would still not have been in the interest of Russia to be a party to it. Under conditions such as those that existed in the past four years, America, by using Western Europe as a base, could bring the war to Russia's territory. She could do this without atomic bombs, merely by using tanks, heavy guns, long-range bombers and other conventional weapons. By agreeing to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments, Russia would deprive herself of the one weapon that might enable her to bring the war to our territory. Russia cannot carry the war to our territory by using long-range bombers carrying ordinary explosives, for, to her, the cost of such an operation would be prohibitive.

My thesis is that in these past four years, Russia has steadfastly refused to consider any international agreement that would effectively eliminate atomic bombs because under existing conditions it was not in her interest to do so.

We must next turn our attention to an issue which is closely related: In the past four years the United States has steadfastly opposed a general reduction of armaments. Why?

Immediately after the war Western Europe was weak and could have been overrun by the Russian army at any time. This might be true even today. But we have been trying to create a situation in which, within a few years, Western Europe would no longer be at the mercy of Russia. We hoped to achieve this by arming Western Europe and by maintaining a high level of armaments ourselves. We hoped that such a course of action would enable us to come to the help of Western Europe within a short period of time if she were attacked by Russia, and that Western Europe would be able to hold out until our help arrived.

Had we then agreed to a substantial general reduction of armaments equally affecting all parties, we would have left Western Europe at the mercy of Russia's enormous reserve manpower. Then, in case of a Russian attack against Western Europe, it would have taken us a long time effectively to enter the war, and in the meantime Russian infantry could have overrun Western Europe.

But the way things are going at present, we may take it for granted that within a short period of time Western Europe will be irretrievably at Russia's mercy, in the sense that, if it were attacked by Russia, we could not possibly bring assistance fast enough to prevent its destruction or prevent it from being forced to surrender. We might then be prepared to neutralize Western Europe and to enter into an agreement with Russia that will stop the arms race by eliminating atomic bombs from national armaments, put limitations on the conventional types of arms, and provide for a substantial reduction of armaments in general.

Such an agreement would still leave Western Europe physically at the mercy of Russia's land armies. But this does not necessarily mean that Western Europe would be in danger of a Russian attack or invasion. Mexico is physically at the mercy of the United States, but under present conditions she has no reason to fear that the United States will violate her integrity.

While the level of armaments to be maintained by us in peacetime would still have to be adjusted to the level of armaments maintained by Russia and other nations, our ability to win a war would be determined by the level of our arms production during the war rather than by the level of our stockpile of arms at its start. Modern weapons become obsolete very fast. Keeping a large stockpile of them in peacetime is a useless drain on any nation's economy.

My argument is that if we adjust our policy to reality and adopt the proposed new policy, the old reasons, which in the past four years led us to oppose general reduction of armaments, will no longer be valid.

An over-all settlement of the outstanding postwar issues may thus become possible. Of these issues, the German problem is perhaps the most difficult. Its solution will remain difficult even if Russia and the United States were to seek it in perfect harmony. But if within the framework of the neutrality of Western Europe, a solution to the German problem and other postwar issues can be found, then general limitation of armaments and the elimination of atomic bombs from national armaments will be in the interest of Russia as well as America.

What particular type of atomic-energy control will then be acceptable to Russia?

In the past, America pushed for international management of all atomic-energy developments delegated to an agency of the United Nations and controlled by a majority vote of that body. This particular solution has some attractive features. But as long as the world remains divided between the allies of Russia and the allies of America, with our allies holding the majority in the United Nations, it will not be in Russia's interest to accept such a solution.

It is conceivable that if the present trend is reversed, countries which are not allies of either America or Russia, and are independent both economically and

politically, may gradually become a majority in the United Nations. "International management" might then become acceptable to Russia.

In the meantime some other form of effective atomic-energy control will have to be adopted, if any control is to be adopted at all.

Can Russia be trusted to keep any such agreement? Yes—as long as it remains in her interest to do so. We can make Russia keep an agreement if we maintain the conditions in which it will remain in her interest to cooperate rather than to abrogate the agreement. It might even be wise to have a provision giving both America and Russia the right to abrogate upon giving due notice.

Let us remind ourselves at this point that what we are discussing here is a truce and not peace. We shall not have peace until we create a structure in which cooperation will be obtained by positive incentives rather than precariously enforced by fear of punishment. We shall not have peace until we have an organized world community.

The Peloponnesian War occurred fifteen years after Sparta and Athens concluded a peace treaty that was to last for thirty. Russia and America will fare no better if they conclude a truce and mistake it for peace.

HERMAN THE UNHAPPY

THIS IS THE STORY of the unhappiest Governor in America—Herman Talmadge, of Georgia, son of the late Eugene Talmadge, nationally and unfavorably known as "Old Gene."

by **Winston Williams**

It is a story of frustration, because he is a victim of his frustrations, personal and political. Only the pressure of his office and of the friends who have state jobs and fear to lose them prevents him from saying now that he will not again be a candidate and retiring to his farm 25 miles south of Atlanta to farm and practise a little law on the side.

When his father lay dying and his father's friends cooked up the scheme to have the legislature elect Herman—as it did in the shamefully violent session of January, 1947—he set out to establish a dynasty. He would go on, with fire and sword, to the place his father had never been able to reach, the United States Senate. The courts took him from office, and for a year he and the legions faithful to Old Gene vowed a vengeance. They found it easy in 1948, against a

politically weak and inept M. E. Thompson, whose only claim to fame was that he had been secretary to Ellis Arnall. Talmadge rode in on a tide of votes. Thousands of Georgians promptly put on sackcloth and hurried to the wailing walls, pouring dust upon their heads.

The legislators, who took his election to mean license, and the Ku Klux Klan element, which assumed it put them above the law, went to work. The legislature produced a flood of bills designed to bar Negroes from the ballot and to give Talmadge's henchmen control of what voting there was to be. The Klan began to burn crosses and intimidate Negroes.

But, after a while, it became apparent that no pressure from the Governor's office was being exerted on the legislature. Roy Harris, Georgia's wise old political bellwether who for years has been leading the legislative sheep into strange pastures and occasionally to the slaughter rooms, was the directing force. The minority—in the legislature and in the body politic—took heart and went to work. When adjournment came, the voters' qualification bill had been so watered down as to be relatively meaningless, save in some of the more

"Winston Williams" is the pseudonym of a well-known Southern journalist.

AMERICA, RUSSIA AND THE BOMB

THE RUSSIANS have exploded one atom bomb. It may be their only bomb. But the plant which was used to make it can turn out others. Within a very short time, one year perhaps, the Russians will have bombs in significant quantity—significant at least from the point of view of Western Europe.

Will the Russians also have the means of delivering these bombs anywhere in Europe? They may not yet have V-2 type rockets developed to the stage where they can carry atomic bombs. They may not yet have bombers fast enough to be able to get through without being intercepted. But clearly the time is not far off when, in case of war, Russia will be in a position to deliver bombs anywhere in Western Europe.

If the time thus comes when Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam face destruction within twenty-four hours after the outbreak of war, and when there is nothing that America can do to protect these cities from such a fate, we shall be faced with a situation which we did not envisage when the Atlantic Pact was concluded.

One might argue that the Atlantic Pact would still offer these countries greater security than they would have without it, since Russia, knowing that the United States would go to war if any of them were attacked, would be less likely to attack them. I am willing to let this argument pass for the moment. But can anyone seriously expect the French, Belgians and the Dutch thus to accept for the sake of a lessened probability of war the absolute certainty that in case of war their cities will be utterly destroyed? Will it be much consolation for them to know that some ten or fifteen years after their destruction the US might be victorious and might then help them to rebuild their cities and to reconstruct their devastated countries?

What, then, is the policy we ought to follow in the face of these new realities? It seems to me that there is only one avenue of escape. We ought to release those countries which want to be released from the obligations imposed upon them by the Atlantic Pact. This does not mean that we should abandon them to their fate. We could, for instance, enter into an agreement with France—in which we unilaterally undertake the following obligations:

To go to war with Russia if Russia should attack or occupy France; to respect the neutrality of France in

by Leo Szilard

case of war as long as her neutrality is respected also by Russia, except if America, without having used them first, is attacked with atomic bombs by Russia or some other nation;

To refrain from using atomic bombs and strategic bombing of any kind against France as long as no atomic bombs are produced in her territory even though France may have been forced to surrender to Russia and even though America may be attacked by atomic bombs produced outside of France.

We could enter into similar agreements with Belgium, Holland and certain other countries in Western Europe.

England may be different. England is no less vulnerable to bombs than the rest of Western Europe. But after the fall of France, England decided to fight on in the face of the heaviest odds, and she emerged victorious. England might decide to hold out indefinitely as our ally and, with worse luck this time, perhaps suffer utter destruction in case of war.

Yet England, when she realizes that her geographical position as well as the concentration of her population in London and a few other large cities makes her vulnerable beyond endurance, might also wish to be freed from the Atlantic Pact. If she does, we ought to lend her a helping hand rather than try to obstruct a development that is inevitable.

An England neutral and reasonably well-armed might be the strongest deterrent to Russian invasion. She could even give Russia an assurance to resist, if necessary with force of arms, an American invasion. By giving our consent and approval to a position of this sort which England might wish to take, America could effectively protect England from a Russian occupation. Clearly in case of a war with America, Russia would have a strong incentive to leave England in a neutral position and thus bar the United States from using England as a base of military operations.

The neutralization of all those nations which are at present caught between the strategic aspirations of America and Russia would remove the chief area of conflict in Russian-American relations. Yet if the arms race is permitted to continue, and particularly if Russian atomic-bomb production increasingly threatens the security of the United States, war will ultimately become unavoidable.

Thus the question arises whether within the pattern of the new policy outlined above, Russia and the United

Dr. Leo Szilard, an outstanding atomic scientist, is now at the University of Chicago. A full statement of his views, which are summarized in the accompanying article, will be found in the October issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. We present his views for their intrinsic interest, without editorial endorsement.

States could agree on some effective method of international control of atomic energy.

International inspection must be an integral part of any such agreement if it is to be effective. In the conditions which existed during the past four years, would it have been in Russia's interest to enter into any agreement on atomic energy that provided for international inspection?

During these past four years we regarded Western Europe as a base for military operations against Russia in case of war. We were engaged in developing long-range rockets and long-range bombers, and we built a considerable fleet of such bombers. In case of war with Russia, it would have been of advantage to us to know the exact locations of the most essential Russian industrial installations, and it was therefore in Russia's interest to keep secret all information relating to them. Thus the Iron Curtain was Russia's most important strategic defense. Such strategic considerations may not have been the only reason for Russia's desire to maintain secrecy, but they are valid and sufficient reasons.

International inspection, if at all effective, is not compatible with maintaining the degree of secrecy which Russia was anxious to maintain in the postwar period and which she was successful in maintaining. In the conditions which existed during the past four years it would not have been in Russia's interest to enter into any agreement *limited to the control of atomic energy* which provided for international inspection.

But even if such an agreement had not provided for international inspection, it would still not have been in the interest of Russia to be a party to it. Under conditions such as those that existed in the past four years, America, by using Western Europe as a base, could bring the war to Russia's territory. She could do this without atomic bombs, merely by using tanks, heavy guns, long-range bombers and other conventional weapons. By agreeing to eliminate atomic bombs from national armaments, Russia would deprive herself of the one weapon that might enable her to bring the war to our territory. Russia cannot carry the war to our territory by using long-range bombers carrying ordinary explosives, for, to her, the cost of such an operation would be prohibitive.

My thesis is that in these past four years, Russia has steadfastly refused to consider any international agreement that would effectively eliminate atomic bombs because under existing conditions it was not in her interest to do so.

We must next turn our attention to an issue which is closely related: In the past four years the United States has steadfastly opposed a general reduction of armaments. Why?

Immediately after the war Western Europe was weak and could have been overrun by the Russian army at any time. This might be true even today. But we have been trying to create a situation in which, within a few years, Western Europe would no longer be at the mercy of Russia. We hoped to achieve this by arming Western Europe and by maintaining a high level of armaments ourselves. We hoped that such a course of action would enable us to come to the help of Western Europe within a short period of time if she were attacked by Russia, and that Western Europe would be able to hold out until our help arrived.

Had we then agreed to a substantial general reduction of armaments equally affecting all parties, we would have left Western Europe at the mercy of Russia's enormous reserve manpower. Then, in case of a Russian attack against Western Europe, it would have taken us a long time effectively to enter the war, and in the meantime Russian infantry could have overrun Western Europe.

But the way things are going at present, we may take it for granted that within a short period of time Western Europe will be irretrievably at Russia's mercy, in the sense that, if it were attacked by Russia, we could not possibly bring assistance fast enough to prevent its destruction or prevent it from being forced to surrender. We might then be prepared to neutralize Western Europe and to enter into an agreement with Russia that will stop the arms race by eliminating atomic bombs from national armaments, put limitations on the conventional types of arms, and provide for a substantial reduction of armaments in general.

Such an agreement would still leave Western Europe physically at the mercy of Russia's land armies. But this does not necessarily mean that Western Europe would be in danger of a Russian attack or invasion. Mexico is physically at the mercy of the United States, but under present conditions she has no reason to fear that the United States will violate her integrity.

While the level of armaments to be maintained by us in peacetime would still have to be adjusted to the level of armaments maintained by Russia and other nations, our ability to win a war would be determined by the level of our arms production during the war rather than by the level of our stockpile of arms at its start. Modern weapons become obsolete very fast. Keeping a large stockpile of them in peacetime is a useless drain on any nation's economy.

My argument is that if we adjust our policy to reality and adopt the proposed new policy, the old reasons, which in the past four years led us to oppose general reduction of armaments, will no longer be valid.

An over-all settlement of the outstanding postwar issues may thus become possible. Of these issues, the German problem is perhaps the most difficult. Its solution will remain difficult even if Russia and the United States were to seek it in perfect harmony. But if within the framework of the neutrality of Western Europe, a solution to the German problem and other postwar issues can be found, then general limitation of armaments and the elimination of atomic bombs from national armaments will be in the interest of Russia as well as America.

What particular type of atomic-energy control will then be acceptable to Russia?

In the past, America pushed for international management of all atomic-energy developments delegated to an agency of the United Nations and controlled by a majority vote of that body. This particular solution has some attractive features. But as long as the world remains divided between the allies of Russia and the allies of America, with our allies holding the majority in the United Nations, it will not be in Russia's interest to accept such a solution.

It is conceivable that if the present trend is reversed, countries which are not allies of either America or Russia, and are independent both economically and

politically, may gradually become a majority in the United Nations. "International management" might then become acceptable to Russia.

In the meantime some other form of effective atomic-energy control will have to be adopted, if any control is to be adopted at all.

Can Russia be trusted to keep any such agreement? Yes—as long as it remains in her interest to do so. We can make Russia keep an agreement if we maintain the conditions in which it will remain in her interest to cooperate rather than to abrogate the agreement. It might even be wise to have a provision giving both America and Russia the right to abrogate upon giving due notice.

Let us remind ourselves at this point that what we are discussing here is a truce and not peace. We shall not have peace until we create a structure in which cooperation will be obtained by positive incentives rather than precariously enforced by fear of punishment. We shall not have peace until we have an organized world community.

The Peloponnesian War occurred fifteen years after Sparta and Athens concluded a peace treaty that was to last for thirty. Russia and America will fare no better if they conclude a truce and mistake it for peace.

HERMAN THE UNHAPPY

THIS IS THE STORY of the unhappiest Governor in America—Herman Talmadge, of Georgia, son of the late Eugene Talmadge, nationally and unfavorably known as "Old Gene."

by Winston Williams

politically weak and inept M. E. Thompson, whose only claim to fame was that he had been secretary to Ellis Arnall. Talmadge rode in on a tide of votes, Thousands of Georgians promptly put on sackcloth and hurried to the wailing walls, pouring dust upon their heads.

It is a story of frustration, because he is a victim of his frustrations, personal and political. Only the pressure of his office and of the friends who have state jobs and fear to lose them prevents him from saying now that he will not again be a candidate and retiring to his farm 25 miles south of Atlanta to farm and practise a little law on the side.

The legislators, who took his election to mean license, and the Ku Klux Klan element, which assumed it put them above the law, went to work. The legislature produced a flood of bills designed to bar Negroes from the ballot and to give Talmadge's henchmen control of what voting there was to be. The Klan began to burn crosses and intimidate Negroes.

When his father lay dying and his father's friends cooked up the scheme to have the legislature elect Herman—as it did in the shamefully violent session of January, 1947—he set out to establish a dynasty. He would go on, with fire and sword, to the place his father had never been able to reach, the United States Senate. The courts took him from office, and for a year he and the legions faithful to Old Gene vowed a vengeance. They found it easy in 1948, against a

But, after a while, it became apparent that no pressure from the Governor's office was being exerted on the legislature. Roy Harris, Georgia's wise old political bellwether who for years has been leading the legislative sheep into strange pastures and occasionally to the slaughter rooms, was the directing force. The minority—in the legislature and in the body politic—took heart and went to work. When adjournment came, the voters' qualification bill had been so watered down as to be relatively meaningless, save in some of the more

"Winston Williams" is the pseudonym of a well-known Southern journalist.

rural and venal counties where they would do as they pleased anyhow. The reregistration bill, which had begun by requiring registration every year, ended with the demand that everyone reregister by May, 1950, after which registration would be permanent. The qualifications were mild.

They were not good bills, but they were not at all what the Talmadge fanatics from Old Gene's legions wanted. It soon became obvious that many of the Talmadge voters would not register under the new bill because of its educational requirements, mild as they are. The Negroes had the ten simple questions, made freely available, and were studying them. Many counties were protesting the reregistration bill because of its expense, and no one was happy about it. The Talmadge people began to say that Herman had not put on enough pressure.

It now looks as if registration may be sharply off in May, 1950, but it will be off as much in the pro-Talmadge counties as elsewhere. In the larger cities, the labor unions, Negro organizations and most newspapers are planning to get out the voters. They see a greatly improved chance to beat the one piece of legislation they had most feared. In the fall of 1950 the people must vote—man by man and not by counties—as to whether they wish to extend the county-unit system to their regular elections. At present the law applies only to primaries. With Georgia's 159 counties mostly rural, an affirmative vote would really end any idea of democracy or the development of a two-party system in the state. Thus, the reregistration law will actually provide a better chance of preventing the adoption of the proposed amendment, and the cities intend to have their say.

After the legislature's adjournment, the state set out on a referendum to levy new taxes to raise \$60 million for schools, hospitals and rural roads. In his campaign, Talmadge had pledged himself to a referendum on all proposals for new taxes. The school people and business, the one wanting and the other fearing a sales tax, sought his favor and support. He stayed out. The referendum failed by a surprisingly large majority, despite the fact that Boss Roy Harris was backing it with a passion for education which is new to him. (He had an eye on the big chance if Talmadge isn't a candidate in 1950.)

The truth is that, after the first flush of being Governor wore off, Herman Talmadge found he didn't enjoy it. From that state of mind, he proceeded to active dislike of the office and its duties. For a time he toyed with the idea of running for the US Senate against the veteran Walter S. George, whose term ex-

pires in 1950. This was not without humor to some of the citizens, notably the CIO organizations.

"My God," they moaned, "what a choice!"

But they laughed to think of themselves supporting Talmadge—which they would do if the choice had to be made. This would be true for two reasons. One is they would want Senator George out of his position of power on committees. Second, and this is not without irony, Talmadge is more liberal than George—admittedly a case of damning with faint praise.

It is believed that Talmadge has abandoned the idea of running against George. Most of his powerful friends, who pay the fare for the political campaigns, also are George's friends. But, more than that, he is sick of being in office. He won't demur, he has told a few friends, if the state constitution is interpreted as barring him from becoming a candidate in 1950. There is argument both ways by good lawyers. If the law does allow him to run, pressure from his friends is likely to force him into the race. But as it is, he is an unhappy and reluctant Governor.

There are a number of reasons for the frustrations which fret him and cause the vultures to peck at his liver.

He is Old Gene's son, and much of his basic philosophy is his father's. Yet not all of it is. He is a curious, contradictory mixture of his father and himself.

He would not object to carefully screened Negroes voting, but he would like to keep down, or be able to control, the heavy Negro vote in south Georgia. Yet he has never been as violently anti-Negro as his father. He has never shouted, "Nigger! Nigger!," as did his father. All through his campaign he spoke only of "bloc voting." He has readily and courteously seen Negro visitors, even critical intellectuals such as Roi Ottley, of New York.

He is not a provincial, as his father was. Aside from two or three gay trips to Havana and one to Mexico, Old Gene had seen nothing else of the world. He had visited only a few of the 48 states. Herman has traveled much of the world, in peace and war. All his experience, and the workings of what is actually a first-rate mind, tell him the truth: that Georgia and the South must face up to the present. The past, the teachings of his father, wrestle with truth and experience in his mind, and this, too, is part of his frustration.

His actual administration has broken no records, but it has been surprisingly quiet and orderly. When Ku Klux violence flared, he urged the sheriffs to enforce the law, and he offered the help of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation. Old Gene in similar circumstances did nothing, merely saying, "Things like that happen

now and then." It is officially on record that one landowner, arrogant and insolent from long years of being bigger than the law in his rural county, recently appealed to Governor Talmadge for help in a racial controversy in which he had brought about the arrest of Negro tenants. He didn't get it. "Damned if I don't believe Herman is getting to be a nigger-lover," said the white man, defeated and stripped of "face" in his own county.

Talmadge has made some excellent appointments, and has surprised everyone by refusing to interfere with the actions of his subordinates. While there have been the usual number of cases of patronage, some of them involving raw firings, there has been little granting of special privilege, and no looting—partly because Herman dislikes his job and detests making decisions.

He is happiest on the 1,000-acre farm his father left

him. The farm, a \$25,000 gift from grateful admirers to Old Gene, which was left to Herman in bad physical condition, lies two miles from Lovejoy, a whistle stop 25 miles south of Atlanta. Old Gene had ruthlessly cut the timber from it and left the soil badly eroded. The 110-year-old house was in sorry state. Young Talmadge remodeled the house, and today the farm is one of the finest in Georgia. There has been no effort to make a show place of it. His cattle are not highly bred, but a good, money-making herd that constantly is improving. It is here that Herman is happiest; he is a natural farmer, as his father was not.

To be sure, the Governor is still a Talmadge, still basically a reactionary, a paradox whom Capitol reporters, who like him, call a fugitive from a psychiatrist's couch. What he will be in 1950 is a question neither he, his friends, nor his enemies can answer today.

THAILAND: PEACE AND PROSPERITY

AMERICANS WERE STARTLED the other day by a statement made by a doctor from Thailand (Siam, if you are old-fashioned) who is now visiting this country. Dr. Sem Pring-Puang-Geo said that the Thailand authorities are disturbed because so many people in that country eat too much. Disorders of the digestive system are high on the national list of maladies.

Surprising as this may seem to most Americans, it is no news to those who have visited Thailand, one of the few bright spots in Southeast Asia. It has the highest standard of living in this part of the world. The people share the fruits of a flourishing national economy—based on rice, rubber, teak and tin—that last year earned four times as many American dollars as the country spent. You do not need to work very long or hard to earn the cost of a bowl of rice and a sarong; everyone has plenty of time to spend at the convivial temple fairs.

Alone in Southeast Asia, Thailand has escaped even an attempt at a Communist uprising. Red flags abound, to be sure, but they indicate government liquor stores. There are but a handful of Siamese Communists, and they seem ineffectual. Bangkok has the only Russian diplomatic mission in this part of the world, and it is merely a legation. Western diplomats, scrutinizing the Russians with a cold eye, have been unable to specify any improper action.

by **Walter L. Briggs**

In recent years, control of the country has alternately been in the hands of Field Marshal Phibun Songgram and Nai Pridi Phanomyong. Phibun has been in power since 1947, despite various attempts by Pridi to take control by violence. Songgram has a black mark on his record, the fact that he collaborated with the Japanese; he was compelled to do so, he says. Pridi, on the other hand, was leader of the underground resistance to the Japanese. The situation is complicated by the fact that Pridi, now in exile, is wanted for the murder of King Ananda Mahidol in 1946.

Phibun has surprised Western observers with the moderation of his administration. (When he was previously in power he was a good deal of a martinet.) Thailand has only the rudiments of Western democracy, but these Phibun has preserved in some degree. A special problem is the three million Chinese immigrants, one-sixth of the total population. Most of them have been Nationalists, but with the Communist victory in China, they might easily swing over to the hammer and sickle. Phibun has restricted further Chinese immigration and has tightened control of the borders of Malaya, Burma and French Indo-China.

More real than the Communist threat, to most Siamese, is the failure of their young king, Phumiphon Aduldet, to come home from Switzerland to rule them. Phumiphon is the brother of the late King Ananda, and many believe he is stringing out his Swiss schooling for fear of meeting his brother's fate.

Walter L. Briggs is a free-lance writer who recently made an extended tour of the Orient.

HAROLD L. ICKES: Responsibility for a Strong Bench

IN NOMINATING Governor William H. Hastie of the Virgin Islands for the US Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia, and former Solicitor General Charles Fahy of New Mexico for the District Circuit Court, President Truman could not have done better. From every point of view, the nominees are outstanding. Appointments such as these, as well as those of John F. X. McGohey as US Judge for the Southern District of New York and H. Nathan Swaim, to succeed Justice Sherman Minton on the 7th Circuit bench in Chicago, are such as to give the people greater confidence in the federal courts.

When these appointments are contrasted with certain others during preceding years, they are little less than brilliant. I am willing to assume that a number of the other recent nominations have been at least of a good average. However, the very fact that it has been possible to find judges of the stature and caliber of Fahy and Hastie makes the savor of a Bazelon all the more unpleasant.

David L. Bazelon has been nominated for the US Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia. What a choice was this, my countrymen! When the Supreme Court had to make a forced landing so that Tom C. Clark might step aboard, I took comfort in the thought that every future appointment to the federal courts would represent an upturn from that all-time low.

As an Assistant US Attorney General, Bazelon has been in charge of Alien Property. The Judiciary Committee of the Senate ought to, but will not, require an explanation of this appointment. Attorney General Clark labored mightily last winter to place Bazelon upon the US Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago. He telephoned frantically to Colonel Jacob M. Arvey, Cook County Democratic chairman, Mayor Martin H. Kennelly and former Mayor Edward J. Kelly, in behalf of Bazelon. In Washington, he laid siege to Senators Lucas and Douglas of Illinois. None of these yielded to his demands. The opinion of many political leaders in Illinois, as well as of numerous lawyers, was that Bazelon lacked the qualifications to be a US Circuit Court Judge.

Although rejecting Bazelon, the two Illinois Senators were willing to accept for the Circuit Court in Chicago a man who, although of good character, was generally regarded as lacking the necessary legal background for that important post. The fortunate candidate happened to be the brother of the editor of a Chicago newspaper who, understandably, actively pro-

moted a candidacy about which he might have had doubts if it had not been for the fraternal tie.

Recently, Congress passed a law creating a number of new federal judgeships, several of them in the District of Columbia. Even after he had himself been made a member of the Supreme Court, Clark continued to wage a political campaign in behalf of Bazelon. Surprisingly, Senators Lucas and Douglas were quite willing to endorse for the Circuit Court in Washington the Bazelon whom they did not regard as being qualified for the same court in Chicago. This, despite the fact that the Circuit Court of the District is much more important than that of Chicago. It would seem that a particular obligation lay upon the Illinois Senators to protect the important District bench from a Chicago reject. When it came to the Bazelon nomination, Senators Lucas and Douglas observed a moratorium of their duty to the people. "Am I my brother's keeper?" they queried in unison. They even ignored the fact that, in 1948, Bazelon gave money to the Senatorial candidate of the Chicago *Tribune*, "Curly" Brooks. They were able to rise above the remissness of Bazelon in contributing (as he hoped) to the defeat of Senator Douglas and therefore, necessarily, to that of President Truman.

So far as this deplorable appointment is concerned, I feel that President Truman has been imposed upon. One can hardly feel critical of the President for yielding to Justice Clark and Senators Lucas and Douglas on a candidate for a high judicial office as to whom they were probably lacking in frankness. It was also understandable that Attorney General McGrath would hesitate to question a nomination in which his predecessor, for some reason not yet explained, was so deeply interested. The most disturbing aspect of the whole matter is that Associate Justice Clark should continue to play politics from the Supreme Court and that two leading Democratic Senators should help to palm off on the highly important District Circuit Court a man who was not good enough for Chicago.

Certainly, the Senate would do well to investigate closely Bazelon's conduct of the Office of Alien Property while, at the same time, scrutinizing carefully Justice Clark's almost feverish eagerness to kick one of his former assistants upstairs. But, of course, the Senate will do nothing of the sort in view of the fact that Senator McCarran of Nevada is still its boss and has a candidate for the lush job that Bazelon will vacate.

HAROLD L. ICKES

BOOKS IN REVIEW

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

WHEN FEUDAL SOCIETY was disintegrating, Adam Smith analyzed the workings of the rising capitalist society, and showed its superiority in economy, morals and education. There is need for a similar theorist of socialism today, and many of his friends hope that Paul Sweezy, who (in Seymour Harris' words) is "the lead-

SOCIALISM, by Paul M. Sweezy
(McGraw-Hill; \$3.50).

ing Marxian in the United States," will yet do the job. The present book, *Socialism*, is a preliminary effort along these lines, with reference especially to current developments in Europe.

In his clear, non-technical style, Sweezy describes the present operations of socialism in the Soviet Union, Great Britain and Eastern Europe. His account of the history, economics and philosophy of the socialist movement is a masterly summation. The concluding chapters are an attempt at answering the basic questions whether socialism can allocate its resources rationally, provide adequate incentives for work and achieve an expansion of human freedom.

The future of socialism, as Sweezy sees it, lies with the Soviet model. He welcomes its total planning, and does not take seriously such efforts as those of Oscar Lange to devise a combination of competitive mechanism with public ownership. There is an immanent tendency, Sweezy holds, "for partial planning to become comprehensive planning."

This preference for total planning leads Sweezy to a low estimate of the prospects for British socialism. The Labour Government, in his opinion, has no underlying program of economic planning, and has accepted only those measures of nationalization which British capitalism can digest. Sweezy regards the nationalization of the iron and steel industry as the cru-

by Lewis S. Feuer

cial test of the Labour Party, but believes that "the process of socialization has already come to a halt." His final conclusion is that the Labour Party has renounced socialism in favor of economic dependence on the United States.

Sweezy's hope for the future of international socialism is translated into the faith that the Cominform will be a meeting place for "more or less equal parties in a common enterprise." Cominform policy, he believes, will tend toward a further appreciation of human liberties, for its headquarters is in Belgrade, "which, in east-west terms, is about halfway between Moscow and Paris." The greatest achievement of the Communist movement however, has not been in Europe: as Sweezy notes, its historic contribution has been to introduce socialist ideas into the colonial and backward regions of the world.

Those who accept the rigid axioms of orthodox Marxian ideology will be sympathetic to Sweezy's analysis; most American liberals will judge that his work does not jibe with their sense of evidence. History has plural lines of development, and the Cominform ideology does not seem to fit the patterns of change in advanced, democratic countries. Stalin was less doctrinaire than Sweezy when he told a Labour Party delegation that Britain was traveling toward socialism in a "roundabout British way" and with the advantages of peaceful transition.

The Cominform meanwhile has evolved in a manner that has scarcely justified Sweezy's confidence. Sweezy placed much hope in Gomulka's theory of people's democracy as a synthesis of socialist economics and the values of liberal-bourgeois democracy. Some months before this book was published, Gomulka's theory was dis-

carded, and "people's democracy" was redefined as a dictatorship in which the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party is acknowledged. And the Cominform has moved to Bucharest.

Sweezy's chapter on socialism in Eastern Europe is confined to a description of economic planning in Poland. His omission of socialism in Yugoslavia is a curious one, because that country raises sharply the problems of international trade between socialist countries. What does the theory of international socialism make of Tito's statement that, so long as capitalist trade exists among socialist states, one of them may try to profit at the expense of another, more backward country? These are the problems which one expects to be clarified by a socialist theorist with a sense of the future.

Sweezy's theoretic base approximates a form of economic determinism, which leads to what we might call "the fallacy of the economic technician." He is not much concerned with problems of civil and intellectual liberties, because he assumes that with a stable, planned, socialist economy, such issues will dissolve. When, for example, Sweezy discusses how socialism will deal with discrimination, he writes: "The socialist answer is simple. Discrimination is never economically beneficial to a community as a whole." The latter statement is an admirable truism, but it is of little avail against the fact that a planned economy could discriminate to the benefit of one racial group as against others. The racial bias, for example, of South African labor makes one skeptical of any doctrine that envisages the automatic, altruistic functioning of socialist economy.

The Marxian theory of the state is likewise accepted wholeheartedly by Sweezy. It takes on for him something of the status of an unverifiable dogma. On the basis of this theory, Marxians

At last—the
"classic biography"
of the "most contro-
versial character of
our time"***

STALIN

A Political Biography

by ISAAC DEUTSCHER

FRANZ HOELLERING: "Expert and student alike will study his work with great profit... a thorough study of the most controversial character of our time."

—The Nation**

W. G. ROGERS: "Stalin becomes here a whole man; most of the mystery is taken out of him."

—Associated Press

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN: "It makes Stalin intelligible. It makes the whole fascinating and fearful drama of the USSR comprehensible."

—Chicago Sun-Times

EDWARD CRANKSHAW: "Deutscher has produced what will remain the classic biography... uniting the cool precision of the analyst with the passion of the artist... The reader is positively swept off his feet!"

—N. Y. Times Book Review*

LEWIS GANNETT: "It bears the stamp of authority; it is richly documented; it opens perspectives. It explains some things about Stalin that had hitherto seemed inexplicable... It is, to this reader, convincing."

—N. Y. Herald Tribune

THE NEW YORKER: "A fascinating treatment... Mr. Deutscher has presented the story with almost passionate objectivity and regard for fact."

With 22 photographs; bibliography and index, 600 pp.

At all bookstores • \$5.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
114 Fifth Avenue • New York 11

in 1942 generally predicted that the elimination of Nazism would be followed by the relaxation of Soviet state control over intellectual and political life. Although Soviet developments have belied this forecast, Marxians adhere to the doctrine, which then becomes more of a rationalization than a scientific theory. It cloaks the strident tone which leads even Sweezy to declare that the Bolsheviks, as serious builders of socialism, cannot afford to think of individual liberties.

Total planning, as Sweezy says, can be "rational" in its allocation of resources. Nevertheless, we must stop to notice that "rational" is used in a technical sense which does not exclude the employment, for instance, of coolie or forced labor, and it is unfortunate that Sweezy is little interested in alternative modes of planning that offer greater promise for human freedom.

A body of socialist theory is evidently developing whose connection with actualities is as remote as that which held between laissez-faire theory and capitalist realities. Sweezy believes that he can be a scientist of revolution. Would it were so. But, in human affairs, if you rely unguardedly on a general theory, you will find that even a minor flaw may lead to catastrophe. Such, for instance, were the reflections of Jewish Marxians in the Warsaw ghetto who had entrusted their people's lives to a faith in the revolutionary capacities of the international working class.

After 1945, with the defeat of virulent fascism, liberals no longer could be confronted with an either-or choice. The problem now became: what kind of socialism do we want? Just as there have been different kinds of capitalist societies, so there are a variety of socialist forms. While the fascist incubus was present, the question of the defects of Soviet socialism was subordinate. Liberals are now recovering areas of free choice. The task of socialist theory is, then, to work out safeguards for individual liberties instead of exorcising the problem by verbal formulas.

Lewis S. Feuer is assistant professor of philosophy at Yassar College.

HOMESICK O'HARA

A RAGE TO LIVE, by John O'Hara
(Random House; \$3.75).

IF JOHN O'HARA had not overestimated the power of a woman his new, jumbo novel might well have been worth the honest effort and all the hard, clear writing he has put into it. Fifteen years ago, with the publication of *Appointment in Samarra*, he showed that he was already the master of a frugal, penetrating style which could make brilliant use of idiom, that his ear was the best in the business, and that he had a sure, instinctive knowledge of the dog beneath the skin. He has put all of these things into *A Rage to Live*, as he put them into that first novel, but with the difference that there they were integrated and useful, fitted indispensably into the falling arc of Julian English's life; in this new book they are scattered and unassimilated, divided between what was intended to be a sort of *Middletown in Transition* and a heroine whose rage to live, it would seem, was more specifically a rage to love.

Grace Caldwell Tate was a high-born lady with a low boiling point. For two generations the Caldwells had been the leading county family and the social arbiters of Fort Penn, a Pennsylvania town which, except for O'Hara's somewhat truculent disclaimer, might easily be mistaken for Harrisburg. Although the Caldwells lived on a farm, they lived in solid elegance; they owned the local newspaper, their holdings went deep into the city and, as far as Fort Penn was concerned, their example was absolute. When Grace Caldwell married an impeccable New Yorker named Sidney Tate in 1903, the Tates continued the tradition.

By 1917 Grace was a handsome matron, mother of two children, "with Pleasures too refin'd to please; with too much spirit to be e'er at ease." When she arrogantly embarked upon an affair with a local building contractor, Sidney disdainfully withdrew from her and, shortly after, died of polio, an elegant, upright and embittered man

who welcomed death because his way of life had fallen into disuse and his way of marriage could not rationalize infidelity. For Grace, widowhood proved more stimulant than sedative, and when the book ends she has been driven from Fort Penn by the open scandal of her affair with a married newspaperman. On the last page, however, in a brief telephone conversation reported by O'Hara, she gives every indication that her Indian summer will show little drop in temperature.

The astonishing thing about *A Rage to Live* is that O'Hara, who has almost always written with such insight that I had begun to think that no one was safe from him, could have done such a thin job on his heroine. She is neither wholly understood nor satisfactorily explained, and all the good writing and the precise, disclosing dialogue that have been spent on her do not succeed in making her come alive. O'Hara knows so much about his own generation, and he can do so much so superbly with so little, that one would think he could handle a lady like Grace Tate. She emerges as a refurbished cliché, a remodeled Iris Storm; a miscast leading lady who spoils what might have been a good play.

There is a lot of good writing in this book. It is set in O'Hara's country; he came from there, and at times he can be brilliantly homesick. He can use the straight, brutal, board-fence sexual idiom with such honesty that, while it shocks, it is not offensive. There are a great many minor characters; some of them are wonderful and all of them are better than the heroine. But a lot of the local boys around Fort Penn were impressed by Grace Tate, and I'd say one of them was O'Hara. JOHN WOODBURN

VIA CASTLE GARDEN

IMMIGRANT LIFE IN NEW YORK CITY:
1825-1863, by Robert Ernst (The
Columbia University Press; \$4.50).

IN FEWER THAN two hundred pages, this sober, scholarly book illuminates one of the most dramatic episodes in our history. Robert Ernst's theme is

the process of "Americanization," of which many of us today are a product. It has been dealt with in an extensive literature of autobiographies and novels, largely unfamiliar to contemporary readers, but it has been notably ignored by modern social historians, most of whom have done little more than state that such a process took place. The merit of Ernst's study is that it shows how Americanization actually operated.

In 1825, the Erie Canal first joined New York City with the West. Manhattan's population was then slightly in excess of 150,000, of whom about 11 percent were aliens. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Manhattan had more than 800,000 residents, and 48 percent of them were foreign born. During the intervening 35 years, New York had become the world's greatest immigrant port and the nation's commercial metropolis. The opening of the Erie Canal accounted for the be-

ginning of this transformation. The outbreak of the savage draft riots of 1863, with which Ernst closes his study, was an expression of working-class discontent in which the immigrants, a preponderant majority of that class, demonstrated their resentment of an underprivileged status.

The process of Americanization—of assimilation into a society itself in a state of flux—was thus neither as swift nor as immediately successful as patriotic tradition makes out. The journey from Castle Garden, through the brutalizing squalor of the slums, to comparative economic security and social acceptance often took the lifetime of three generations. In a series of vividly written chapters, Ernst traces its principal stages: the immigrant's arrival and settlement; tenement life; employment as unskilled labor and subsequent penetration into industry; the gaining of a foothold in trade, business and the professions.

His discussion of the relations of



I say advisedly that this is one of the most brilliantly written, highly informative and fascinatingly interesting books ever published about the South.

Anniversary

SOUTHERN POLITICS

by V. O. KEY, Jr.

An on-the-scene, off-the-record, panoramic, state-by-state survey of the realities of Southern politics today—by Southerners for all Americans to read and ponder.

Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas, North Carolina, Mississippi and Texas. Nearly 700 fascinating pages.

\$6.00 wherever books are sold

Write for the Borzoi fall catalogue

ALFRED A. KNOPF, Publisher

501 Madison Avenue, New York 22

immigrant and native workers, and the developing pattern of labor organization is excellent. He is especially interesting in describing the formation of "foreign" enclaves within the city; the complex effects produced by church, school, foreign-language press and libraries; the methods by which the Democratic Party enlisted the immigrant vote. A talent for the selection of relevant detail, and for lively characterization of many forgotten but significant personalities, distinguishes Ernst among research scholars.

LLOYD MORRIS

Lloyd Morris is the author of *Not So Long Ago*, just published, *Postscript to Yesterday* and *The Rebellious Puritan*, a biography of Nathaniel Hawthorne.

BRIEF COMMENT

The Rock Pool, by Cyril Connolly (New Directions; \$1.50).

People familiar with Cyril Connolly as the editor of *Horizon* are reminded, by its republication, of a novel he wrote about fifteen years ago. A young Oxford man with literary pretensions, one Edward Naylor ("neither very intelligent nor especially likeable"), is vaca-

tioning on the Riviera when he comes across a colony of assorted bohemians which he feels worth looking into. He looks into it, from the superior position of the detached observer, as into a rock pool, "a microcosm cut off from the ocean by the retreating economic tide." The stranded contents of the pool are the usual bizarre lot, collectively familiar and difficult to distinguish one from another. What it all comes to is that they, immersed in their native element, somehow survive, while Naylor, immersed but not acclimated, is lost. When they shift to winter quarters, he stays behind, broke and imbibing Pernod at an accelerating rate.

The book is a chic little piece whose language admirably controls its tone (e. g., "The sky was a spittoon full of small phlegm-coloured clouds"). It is often amusing, always arch and clever, and usually wrong—not so much in its pronouncements (which are many), but wrong like a witticism that doesn't quite come off.

Many Dimensions and War in Heaven, by Charles Williams (Pellegriani and Cudahy; \$3 each).

With these books, four novels of the late Charles Williams are now published in this country. For want of a better descriptive term, they have been called religious, but they are not on conventional religious themes, they are not exactly allegories, they are not ex-

actly preachments. They are contemporary fantasies moving between (and often equating) the poles of natural psychology and Christian dogma. The conflict is between the good (usually the religious) man and the evil—not the irreligious in the sense of the unbeliever, the agnostic or the merely indifferent—for the opposite number to the God-fearing is the Satanist. The struggle is always well-defined: in *Many Dimensions* it is for a fabulous stone, brought to England from the (mysterious) East, and conferring on its possessor godlike powers. In *War in Heaven* the object of contention is the Holy Grail, discovered in a rural vicarage, stolen, pursued and recovered.

Of the author's available novels these two seem the weakest. They may be so in fact (although it is hard to distinguish among books so similar), but I suspect it is rather that as it grows familiar, Williams' spell wears thin. T. S. Eliot has recommended the books as "thrillers"—and they certainly qualify in the conventional sense, even to such props as the Evil Scientist. But the thrills, while occasionally genuine, depend too heavily on "something extreme and terrible," specified only by abstractions in capital letters. While the positives of the novels, though more specific, are even less dramatically convincing, they are discovered as an ingenious, though bluff, commonsensible Christianity, reminiscent of the eminent Chesterton at his worst. J. F.

ON THE AIR: Color for What?

TELEVISION has brought rapture to Washington. It happened while the Federal Communications Commission, flanked by assorted scientists, technologists and other experts, was trying to decide between the conflicting claims of RCA and CBS.

Each of these firms—others are in the battle also—contends that its system of broadcasting television in full color is superior. To prove their claims, the two giants broadcast special color programs for the FCC and a chosen few others.

During one of its innings, CBS called upon esthetics to aid science and commerce. A lovely model, featuring a bright-red, billowy skirt with generous flare, whirled and pirouetted

before the special cameras. Offset against the primary colors which made up her costume were delicately tinted veils which she waved gracefully, proving the camera's sensitivity to pastels. She took one extra turn. Maybe a cable or some other piece of studio equipment was in the way. The skirt came off. The blue of her panties and the pink of her confusion came through faithfully.

Thus, television's second season of full-scale commercial existence, and the first from which exciting program developments might have been expected, starts off as the Year of the Big Blush. So far, not an experimental deviation has marked video's straight path toward radio's general mediocrity.

Except for isolated instances which occupy a pitifully small segment of the broadcast day, radio has on the whole been given over to a race between merchants and moral innocents. Now television is going the same way.

Eighty-eight percent of the country's broadcast audience still tunes in only to radio. There are yet only 82 television stations on the air and they cover only the larger cities. The radio listeners are suckers, allowing their interests to be neglected by the broadcasters. But the biggest losers are the potential TV audiences of tomorrow. Sooner or later there will be color TV, and around the corner is the three-dimensional picture. TV's possibilities, all agree, are limitless as a medium for the enrichment of American culture and as a tool for education. But what interests our TV planners most is putting war paint on Milton Berle.

Berle, if you are interested, has slipped. By default, he is still the No. 1 star of television. But he won't stay there long. His program this year is only a reprise of all the high-pressure, borscht-circuit yaks that it was a year ago. And it's not so funny the second time. This year, in all probability, the funniest TV comedian will be Ed Wynn, who has started off in a relaxed mood with a new program on CBS (Thursdays at nine). But it is significant that once more TV has had to go to the shelf for its talent.

There are a few good programs on TV. The best of these, in the drama department, are NBC's "Philco Television Playhouse" (Sundays at nine); two full hours on CBS: "Ford Theatre," every other Friday at nine; and "Studio One," every Monday at ten. The best thing about these programs is, as a rule, the acting and production. The plays are always adaptations.

Writing is being overlooked by television. Joseph Liss was allowed recently to tinker with F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Last Tycoon*. The script, therefore, was billed as a work "based upon" (not "adapted from") the original. But that happened only because Fitzgerald never finished his last novel. And even here, in apparent

fear of losing an iota of glamor, the scripter's credit was carefully avoided, only Fitzgerald being featured as the writer. As noted here before, television doesn't want scripts built by artists; it wants only carpenters.

"Studio One" put on Kipling's "The Light That Failed" (amusingly enough, for Westinghouse), while "Ford Theatre" dug up the dated Ben Hecht-Charles MacArthur satire, "Twentieth Century." Another time, "Studio One" gave "The Storm." Marsha Hunt did an excellent job as the star in the adaptation of the McKnight Malmar story, but that fatuous excursion into quasi-psychology was hardly worth the efforts of Miss Hunt or the excellent production techniques spent on it by the program's head man, Worthington Miner.

The television networks are willing enough to pay for music. They have

just made a contract with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, pledging a hefty percentage of gross annual income for the privilege of using musical scores and lyrics licensed by ASCAP. I submit that dramatic writing is worth as much. Or does TV fear that original dramatic writing might prove too adult for the sponsors?


There is some mature fare on the TV screen; but far from enough to pile into a sizable sop. "The Author Meets the Critics," now on ABC-TV, Mondays at 7:30, often produces intelligent discussion of current books. Authors on the mat recently have been Max Lerner, Merle Miller and Mil-lard Lampell. Sometimes the discussion grows hot, and, on the whole, this is a sensible and grown-up way of bringing book talk to the air.

SAUL CARSON

Harold J. Laski enters the current

American debate over union policy with this timely and provocative volume. He explores the past and present attitudes of society toward unions; examines the impact of mass production, social security, and a planned economy on the workingman; and out-

lines the role of government in disputes. Of crucial importance to all Americans concerned with democracy's future, is his argument—based on English experience—about the desirability of labor activity in politics. \$3.00



THE VIKING PRESS
18 East 48th St., New York 17

★ YALE ★
What's behind the new strikes? Read—
Unions and Capitalism
by CHARLES E. LINDBLOM
A brilliant young Yale professor "has brought into the open a problem which demands careful exploration by all concerned with or interested in the end-product of the power drive of American trade unionism. This, in fine, means all of us."
—Saturday Review
At all bookstores • \$3.75
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS
★

MOVIES: The Imitative Muse

THE BEST ENTERTAINMENT on the screen at present is "The Heiress," Paramount's handsomely produced, excellently cast transcript of the stage play from Henry James's *Washington Square*. Ralph Richardson dominates the narrative in the role of the eminent New York physician who thinks irony a useful tone to employ toward a daughter who is failing to come forward as rapidly as he had hoped. Perhaps from his example, perhaps from the direction of William Wyler, Olivia de Havilland, as the very plain Miss Sloper, and Montgomery Clift, as her too amiable suitor, both surpass themselves. Since, in any case, they enjoy two of the best talents in Hollywood, the level of "The Heiress" is sensationally good.

But even though it is a pleasant novelty to recommend a big Hollywood picture, it is impossible to work up any real enthusiasm for "The Heiress." It is admirably done, it is superior entertainment; it is also a literal translation of a play that was itself a dubious adaptation. The authors of "The Heiress," in order to fashion something that would "play," had to coarsen a story whose quality lay in the delicacy of its perceptions and the quietness of its torments. Emotional violence was introduced to provide action, and the characters, particularly Catherine Sloper, were forced into implausible gestures to provide good curtains.

Of course, none of this is the responsibility of the movie makers, who are merely walking in the footsteps of their Broadway masters. That is what is so discouraging. When Hollywood is content to spend its best energies on producing an imitation of an approximation of an acknowledged work of art, its imagination and daring are not likely to make your blood pound.

When it was made, which was some years ago, "Strangers in the House" was conceived as a quick and

sure-fire money maker. It offers in combination Raimu, one of France's most effective actors, and Georges Simenon, one of France's best mystery writers, and it displays both men performing almost contemptuously below their abilities. The yarn of the sodden criminal lawyer who forswears the bottle to save his daughter's fiancé from the gallows and who takes the occasion of his spectacular rehabilitation to flay his enemies and tormenters is the ultimate set-up for a man of Raimu's gifts. He walks through the part with the eyebrow-wagging scorn that good actors usually bestow on tripe.

There are some good moments in "Strangers in the House" because Raimu cannot be consistently uninteresting and because, when he is in a picture, the supporting cast must be better than average if it is not to look idiotic. But as long as Raimu was alive and might yet make another fine pic-

ture, the American distributors would have hesitated to jeopardize his reputation with this potboiler. Now it is merely a question of squeezing his name dry.

"Master of Bankdam" is also second-rate, another of those Victorian family epics that the manufacturers of Galsworthy imitations turn out for J. Arthur Rank at so much the yard. Brother's hand is raised against brother through generations of a great mill-owning dynasty until finally sturdy honesty prevails over scheming self-pride. You can pass the time by guessing the details in advance, but it's a paltry amusement.

Be warned against "Blue Lagoon," Rank's current Technicolor offering. This monument to unbecoming innocence concerns the adventures of a pair of English tykes who are washed up on a deserted tropic island and who have the devil's own time working out the facts of life when they attain an age for such data. The picture also contains one octopus trained to wrestle, a pair of rascally pearl hunters and a treetop apartment that would grace *House Beautiful*. ROBERT HATCH

MUSIC: Foreign Records

RECORDINGS made abroad and marketed under hitherto unfamiliar labels are now reaching American record stores in staggering numbers. The magnificent "full frequency range recordings" of the English Decca company have been renamed "London *ffrr*," and the whole catalogue is rapidly being made available on long-playing discs (33 1/3 r.p.m.), at a much lower price scale than that of the former 78 r.p.m. albums. Cetra-Soria, which has made many of the best full-length recordings of Italian operas, is now offering its repertory exclusively in 33 1/3 r.p.m. form, having decided that the bulky two and three-volume sets are a thing of the past. Capitol, which began some months ago to re-press many valuable prewar German Telefunken records in

78 r.p.m. albums, is also beginning to provide the same works in 33 1/3 r.p.m. format.

From the technical standpoint, the London *ffrr* records are the best in the world. The upper frequencies are captured with remarkable fidelity, the balance between highs and lows is expertly adjusted, and the acrid stridency that afflicts many American-made high-frequency recordings is agreeably absent. Even the new 45 r.p.m. RCA Victor reproduction, which in general achieves a rounder and fuller body of tone than the best of the 78 r.p.m. results, seldom attains the brightness and animation of most of the London records. None of Columbia's output, as far as I know it, has approached the level that is run-of-the-mill for the London engineers. You do not need a

large, expensive machine to profit from the advances of the British technique; the improvement is as noticeable on an everyday model.

The artistic merits of the London recordings complement the technical ones. A recent batch of releases is characteristic: Ernest Ansermet, the greatest of all Debussy conductors, gives performances, with the Orchestre de la Suisse Romand, of the three orchestral "Images" ("Rondes de Printemps," "Ibéria," "Gigues") that are wonderful in their clarity of texture, lyric expressivity, and pulsating movement. Eduard van Beinum, with the Concertgebouw Orchestra of Amsterdam (still one of the world's finest ensembles), provides an equally definitive version of Bartók's eloquent "Concerto for Orchestra." The D'Oyly Carte Opera Company sets forth "Trial by Jury" and "The Pirates of Penzance" with great gusto and full knowledge of the 70-year-old Gilbert and Sullivan traditions—though the voices of some of the elder statesmen in the company are getting a bit frayed. A "recorder and harpsichord recital" of Elizabethan and Baroque pieces, played by Carl Dolmetsch and Joseph Saxby, recaptures the slender tone of the old instruments with unusual success, and presents the music with appropriate artlessness.

Cetra-Soria entered the long-playing field with a superb account of Verdi's "La Forza del Destino," in which Maria Caniglia makes touching use of the "pathetic" style of highly inflected Italian theatrical singing, which by now has all but disappeared from the inadequately cast productions of Italian opera in the United States. The recording as a whole gives a vivid feeling of the opera house, even when the placement of the microphone disturbs a proper balance between voices and orchestra. Equally satisfactory in its over-all effect, though less commandingly sung, is Puccini's "Turandot," contained almost complete on three LP discs. The composer's last opera (the final scene was completed after his death by Franco Alfano),

"Turandot" is an imposing Chinese spectacle-piece, with massed sonorities rivaling those of "Aida" in the scene in which the Princess propounds three riddles for the Prince to solve if he would win her hand and escape execution. Other recent Cetra-Soria releases, all authoritatively presented by capable artists from the chief Italian opera houses, are Bellini's "Norma" (with Gina Cigna and Ebe Stignani), Donizetti's "Lucia di Lammermoor" (with the admirable coloratura, Lina Pagliughi), and Mascagni's milk-toast sentimental romance, "L'Amico Fritz" (made attractive to American buyers, presumably, by the contributions of Ferruccio Tagliavini and his wife, Pia Tassinari, in the leading roles).

Capitol has been rather indiscriminate in its choice of the Telefunken recordings it hopes the American public may want to own. Since the original masters are all a number of years old, the texture is generally unsatisfying to ears accustomed to higher frequencies and a clearer delineation of timbres. But only Capitol can provide the magisterial performances of Willem Mengelberg, one of the greatest of all conductors. When Mengelberg conducts Strauss's "Ein Heldenleben," which was dedicated to him, or Beethoven's "Eroica" Symphony, or even Tchaikovsky's "1812" Overture, the music attains a stature and completeness few other musicians have ever been able to give it. And connoisseurs of orchestral playing will find that the expert style and expressive warmth of the prewar Concertgebouw Orchestra rival, and perhaps even surpass, the execution of any orchestra in America today. It pays to tolerate obsolete recording methods for the sake of hearing such exemplary ensemble playing.

Apart from the Mengelberg interpretations, the Capitol-Telefunken list is not yet very interesting, with one exception—the supremely beautiful Mass in C Minor, by Anton Bruckner, admirably presented by the Hamburg State Opera Chorus and Orchestra, under the direction of Max Thurn.

CECIL SMITH

RESORTS



ARROWHEAD

PLANS A PERFECT
THANKSGIVING WEEKEND
RESERVE NOW
FULL SOCIAL STAFF
LEO MILLER'S ORCHESTRA
ARROWHEAD • Ellenville, N. Y.
Phone: Ellenville 502-503 City Phone: GR 7-1267

Green Acres LODGE

CENTRAL VALLEY, N. Y. Tennis • Golf
Swimming Pool • Television • Unexcelled
Music and Book Library • An adult resort
45 miles from N. Y. Tel. Highland Mills 3071.

BOOKS

ATHEIST BOOKS. 32-page catalogue free.
Truth Seeker Co., 38 Park Row, N. Y. C. 8.

CIGARETTES

CIGARETTES—Popular brands \$1.51 per
carton postpaid. West of Mississippi add 7¢
per carton. Min. order 3 cartons. Send check
or money order. King Co., Elkton 2, Md.

DRUGS

MALE HORMONES, average 30-day supply
\$4.40; also female hormones, vitamins at low
prices. Specify your requirements. Ace Mail
Order Co., East Orange 8, N. J.

GEIGER COUNTER

MAKE your next vacation trip profitable as
well as enjoyable. Take a GEIGER COUNTER
along. You may yet win that \$10,000.00 for
locating Uranium ores. \$54.50 postpaid. Great
Lakes Plastic Chemical Co., Leaf River 1,
Illinois.

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS

SCIENTIFIC HANDWRITING analysis.
Alfred Krafer, 62 Leroy St., N. Y. C. Tel.
WA 4-1575. Cooperating with doctors; psychol-
ogists, schools, firms, industries. Lessons. By
appointment, or mail. Marital, educational,
vocational, psychological problems. Fee \$3.00.

LANGUAGES

LINGUAPHONE MAKES LANGUAGES
EASY. At home learn to speak Spanish, Por-
tuguese, Italian, French, German, Russian,
by quick, easy Linguaphone Conversational
method. Save time, work, money. Send for
FREE book. Linguaphone Institute, 86 RCA
Bldg., New York

LITERARY SERVICES

WRITERS—Efficient sales service for your
books, short stories, articles, plays. Free
booklet. Write today! Daniel S. Mead Liter-
ary Agency, 419 4th Ave., New York 16, N. Y.


POSITION WANTED

RADIO NEWS EDITOR—tired of keeping
opinions to self. Wants publicity job with
labor or liberal group. Thoroughly exper-
ienced all phases publicity. Box 836, The New
Republic.

Classified Rates

Per word once 12 cents
Per word 6 times 11 cents
Per word 13 times 10 cents


NEW REPUBLIC



This is how Chic Young, the cartoonist, makes a first rough sketch for the famous strip.



Then when each panel in a strip meets his approval, he makes a careful pencil rendering as above.



After this, the pencil rendering is carefully inked in, as you see here.

STEP BY STEP...

that's the way it's done successfully!

AS YOU CAN SEE, Chic Young, who draws the popular "Blondie" comic strip, goes through many steps to arrive at a finished cartoon.

And, cartoonist Chic Young, together with millions of other smart Americans, will tell you that the step-by-step method is the easiest, surest way of doing anything worth while.

Particularly, saving money.

One of the easiest and surest ways to

set aside any worth while amount of money is to buy United States Savings Bonds the step-by-step method—

So set aside a *regular* amount week after week, month after month, year after year. Then in 10 short years you will have a mighty nice nest egg tucked away for you and your family.

Get started now. Get your Bonds through Payroll Savings or at your bank or post office.

AUTOMATIC SAVING IS SURE SAVING—U.S. SAVINGS BONDS



Contributed by this magazine in co-operation with the Magazine Publishers of America as a public service.

20¢ OCTOBER 31, 1949

New Republic

LEO SZILARD:

AN ATOMIC PHYSICIST TELLS
HE THINKS THE U. S. SHOULD
NOW THAT RUSSIA HAS THE

A PEACE TREATY FOR JAPAN

HERMAN TALMADGE

OLD GENE'S UNHAPPY HEIR

Y YEAR - 1950

a series of four articles

PERCY WINNER

The coming Christmas season a Jubilee of the Roman Catholic will begin in Rome. All of 1950 will be a Jubilee—or Holy Year. Percy Winner, Foreign Affairs Editor of the *New Republic*, has written a 12,000-word article which will be published in four installments, starting next week. Mr. Winner has been writing about the Church for the past six months.

The year of 1950 he believes will be decisive for the consciences of Catholics, worried about their church's use of temporal power and the threat of religious punishments. Catholics and non-Catholics alike are concerned that Vatican City ranks with Washington and Moscow on the same levels of political influence. The Pontiff, a worldly ruler to whom all ambassadors are personally accredited, directs the policy of a small state in area, yet majestic in power and wealth.

Percy Winner points out, the Church, in preparation for the Holy Year, is fighting *for* as well as *against*. Questions of freedom and liberties, which trouble the defenders of democracy, are also the church's. Both are engaged in an implacable struggle against Communism and both are aware, to some degree at least, of the dramatic institutions arising from the protracted conflict.

As the Cold War moves to Rome in 1950, the anxieties of Catholics and non-Catholic, will be, for the time, transferred to a massive show of power—the millions of faithful followers of St. Peter's—will demonstrate the remarkable recovery of the Church no less than the gigantic armaments of the military might with which Washington is prepared to meet Stalin. The survival of democratic principles is linked to both.

Percy Winner traces with scholarly insight the history of the Church. The Jubilee was proclaimed by Pope Boniface VIII in 1300. With this he describes the present struggles to distinguish between the secular and spiritual in the pursuit of Christian aims. It is a finely balanced work of political and religious interpretation written by one who has the values at stake in a civilization that faces peril.

To see all of the series which begins next week, you may order a convenient form below offers you a 24-week

New Republic

OCTOBER 31, 1949

WASHINGTON

CONTENTS FOR OCT. 31, 1949

- 5 A Peace Treaty for Japan:
An Editorial
- 7 The Week:
- 7 Just Bullheadedness?
- 7 The Communist Sentences
- 8 The Basing-Point Bill
- 8 Herblock Cartoon
- 8 Wallgren and Mead
- 9 Dewey, the Greek
- 9 Outside America
- 11 America, Russia and the Bomb
by Leo Szilard
- 13 Herman the Unhappy
- 15 Thailand: Peace & Prosperity
by Walter L. Briggs
- 16 Harold L. Ickes
- 17 Books:
- 17 International Socialism's
Future, by Lewis S. Feuer
- 18 Homesick O'Hara
by John Woodburn
- 19 Via Castle Garden
by Lloyd Morris
- 20 Brief Comment
- 20 Radio and Television
- 22 Movies
- 22 Music

EDITOR: Michael Straight

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR: Bruce Bliven

PUBLISHER: Daniel Mebane

MANAGING EDITOR: Jack Weeks

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Malcolm Cowley,
John Farrelly, Harold L. Ickes, Joseph P.
Lash, Max Lerner, James R. Newman, Gus
Tyler

FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDITOR: Percy Winner

WASHINGTON BUREAU: Helen Fuller (Political
Editor), Jean Begeman

THE COAL and steel strikes are approaching a showdown. Obviously the President can't let the national economy go to pot, and the stock market's behavior shows that Wall Street has bet on a fairly quick settlement. The steel union has accepted every recommendation of the fact-finding board, even those to its own serious disadvantage; the steel companies have rejected them. With the CIO convention starting this Sunday in Cleveland, Murray couldn't give an inch more if he wanted to. We see no way out for President Truman but to crack down on Big Steel and its banker-bosses.

The CIO convention will probably eject the 11 left-wing unions, including the Electrical Workers, remaining in its membership. The ousted unions are apt to start a third US labor federation with perhaps half a million members. Its life expectancy is short. The CIO will also send delegates to join with the British Trades Union Congress (and the AFL) to form a new non-Communist international labor federation to replace the Moscow-dominated WFTU.

T. R. B., Oct. 17: . . . The developing Soviet drive on Yugoslavia . . . is serious. What Russia seems to be planning is to ring Tito with a series of guerrilla invasions based just over the boundary.

Time, Oct. 24: The State Department last week received reports that the Communists were about to start guerrilla warfare across the border in Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia.

is actu
in his

Com
speed

Cong

and o
work
session
mecha

organi



impos

political

and w

reject

civil-r

will k

man's

Two

opme

House

of its

the se

went

clock

clous

of Re

GOP

41 vo

the U

Co

on fa

tions.

man

back

CORRESPONDENCE

Due Process on the Campus

SIR: Henry Steele Commager's article on "Red-Baiting in the Colleges" (July 25), suggests that more harm than good is done to academic freedom when a university tracks down and dismisses the "subversives" on its campus. He was taking as his example the recent trial of six faculty members at the University of Washington which resulted in the dismissal of three persons (two of them acknowledged members of the Communist Party) and placing the remaining three on "probation." Mr. Commager expressed several misconceptions about the trial that it is important to correct.

1. He assumes the University of Washington was investigating subversive activities among its faculty members.

The University did *not* investigate subversive activities, and there was no hearing on the competence, honesty, integrity, scholarship or neglect of duty, as such, of any of the six persons accused. Early in the hearings the administration attorneys were asked: "Is there factually any contention to be advanced in this case that any of the persons charged are incompetent in the sense that they do not possess the necessary scholarship in their particular field?" The answer was: "No, except as that is implied from their participation in the Communist Party."

In a sense the defendants did not get a hearing at all, for the administration was trying the Communist Party, and presented as its major witnesses strangers to the University and its faculty. They sought Budenz, but had to be satisfied with Joe Zack Kornfeder and Benjamin Gitlow. Rebuttal witnesses were discredited by President Allen and the administration with this logic: (a) a present member of the Communist Party cannot be believed; (b) a Marxist who has not been a party member cannot know the facts; (c) only expelled members of the Communist Party can give credible and relevant testimony, even though they may be shown to be lying.

2. Mr. Commager asserts that at least the hearings meticulously followed "due process" and the accused had every right. This was true only in a very narrow technical sense, as seen by these two illustrations:

After the first defendant had presented colleagues and students as witnesses in his behalf, Attorney Hilien, for

the administration, remarked: "We haven't objected to this testimony for the reason that we . . . felt that the respondents should be permitted, if they wished, as a matter of self-satisfaction, to go into that sort of testimony. It is immaterial." (Transcript, p. 1554.) The primary charge against me was alleged membership in the Communist Party. Since the evidence did not sustain the false charge, recommendations for my dismissal were based on other grounds, on which there had been no direct hearing and no opportunity directly to answer.

New York City RALPH H. GUNDLACH

The Baruch Plan

SIR: . . . The burden of your editorial ("The Soviet Bomb," October 3) was that the Baruch Plan is "completely out of date" since it was "based on our monopoly of atomic energy. . . . It placed the Russian and other nations on probation: if they proved themselves capable of accepting world control, we would gradually relinquish our stockpile of atomic weapons."

This makes the head swim. Mr. Baruch proposed that a system of control be agreed upon and effectuated, the final stage of which would be the disposal of existing stockpiles. . . . A few critics argued that this part of the Baruch Plan was unfair: having a monopoly, the US would retain it until all other measures of control, including geographic surveys and mining and production controls, had been established.

Whatever its earlier validity (dubious, in my opinion), that criticism has no foundation whatever now that the Soviet Union is accumulating its own stockpile. According to the Baruch Plan, *all* existing stockpiles would be disposed of *simultaneously*. In short, the effect of Soviet bomb-making is precisely the reverse of what your editorial claims. . . .

Your other comments on the Baruch Plan are only a few degrees less baffling. You state that there is already "substantial agreement on inspection." "Substantial" is substantially ambiguous. The Russians have never agreed to more than the inspection of *declared* facilities, except for *ad hoc* inspections in case of specific instances of suspected violations. . . .

You offer the suggestion that a convention be concluded by which the signatory nations agree not to use the atomic bomb unless they are first attacked. This would be a mere pledge, the latest version of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. If this is to be relied on, why bother about a control system? If it is not to be relied on, why propose it? . . .
Balduin, N. Y. ROBERT TILOVE



VOLUME 121, NUMBER 18, ISSUE 1822, NEW YORK CITY, OCTOBER 31, 1949

New Republic

A PEACE TREATY FOR JAPAN

FOUR HUNDRED MILLION PEOPLE can be surrendered far more easily than a few fatal prejudices.

Life magazine, whose responsibility for the China disaster is greater than that of any single force outside China, responds to the bankruptcy of its policies by proposing that they be intensified. We must "get busy," says *Life*. "We could hold all key coastal and offshore positions in Asia. . . . We could [coördinate] U. S., British, Dutch, French and Portuguese policy in Asia. . . . We could react warmly and constructively to Quirino's idea of a Pacific Pact. . . . We could offer military help and advice to all areas under active or imminent attack by Communist-led forces, such as South China and Indo-China."

With equal realism the AFL convention calls for resurrection and full support of the Nationalist clique which today is earning even greater hatred among Chinese by civilian bombing and blockade.

These odd bedfellows in foreign policy are victims of Chiang's Disease—an inability to face unpleasant truths. There is nothing left of the Nationalists. There is nothing left of Dutch, French and Portuguese imperialism that can be saved. Quirino himself is doing his best to forget the turkey of a Pacific Pact which Chiang Kai-shek foisted on him and which amounts to a project for an international arms lobby for dispossessed generals who have nothing to fight for, nothing to fight with, and no desire to fight. As for the idea of occupying "all key coastal and offshore positions in Asia," if America should be mad enough to undertake this act of illegal aggression that *Life* proposes, we would immediately consolidate all of Asia, including India, against us, making the Communists the champions, and the Russians the new defenders, of Asia's independence.

If we are to construct a new policy for Asia, we need first to sweep this old rubbish away. We need to sweep away its basic premise on which American policy has foundered in Asia. America, like Russia, has tried to move Asia as a pawn in an external struggle. America, like Russia, has failed because the pawn dwarfs the two contestants and will not be moved.

A new program for Asia means a shift in America's concern, away from our interest, toward Asia's interest.

Because Asia's problems are economic, military or strategic, it means a shift in security to those of economic and social.

We have argued that support of means emphasis on constructive national investment. Yet the problem of military remains. It does not primarily concern whose chief method of expansion is primarily concern the Chinese Communist already desperately overextended in principally the protection of Japan, Asia against Japan.

At Potsdam the Allies declared that security in the Pacific required that Japan democratic, economically stable, strong. America was directed to secure these occupying power. After four years of the occupation has disappeared and basis is fast disappearing. Yet the occupation have not been secured and the cold war continues.

Politically, the presence of institutions democratic nations does not make Japan "Liberty," as Judge Learned Hand of the hearts of men and women. Where constitution or law, no court can see there it needs no constitution, no law. "MacArthur knows this. His answer left in Japan "a complete vacuum, and physically, and into this vacuum cratic way of life. This revolution offers no thin veneer to serve the present. It represents an unparalleled the social history of the world." This has seen a "growing consciousness responsibility in the conduct of public provides the ethical basis of a free Arthur is speaking to Japanese and beckoning them on by describing attitudes rather than demonstrable realities. should end tomorrow, then of MacArthur it can be said that the liberation of distribution of the land would be

ong but not secure; freedom of government would turn on economic stabilization program promoted by and for the Allied Powers is not SCAP'S goal of self-sufficiency for be unattainable. The reasons are Before the war Japan supported a billion by exploiting her colonies. ies or markets, Japan's population ing by six percent a year toward billion. Already Japanese farmers, are down to three acres apiece. re democracy could hardly with- on pressures, which force economic people will voluntarily undergo. all MacArthur's reforms, Japan is ansionist. She must expand com- em is to keep her expansion from military forms.

apan must expand commercially is land. In prewar years China alone an's foreign trade; buying most of textiles, supplying a third of her of her pig iron and coal, and most oil cake. Today SCAP is counting and purchases in China of \$200 internal collapse in China, or an China in pursuit of the strategic r, will leave Japan in bankruptcy or inuing American aid. Yet Japanese and Russia may raise strategic prob- ot prepared to face.

in suffers from being a key area— ingboard for war," MacArthur's close to Soviet territory in the a few hundred miles from Soviet- ertia and from Korea, which soon mmunist control. Japan by herself ecause she lacks materials and can y blockade, as the last war proved. a air strip Japan can threaten Russia an, backed by Russian and Chinese ten all Asia and America.

MacArthur conceived Japan's future of Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese ver in their constitution the right to Arthur this renunciation of war was onomic and political salvation of njection into a desperate world of to furthering Christian values.

concept conformed to Soviet and

Western policies. But as the cold war grew more intense, the idea of neutrality became repugnant to both sides. The Communists have offered Japan salvation in alliance with their world. MacArthur has curbed the left-wing unions and the opposition press. In Washington the Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposing the concept of a disarmed and defenseless Japan. They see Japan as an American protectorate: a larger Philip- pines. They intend to hold Japan. They believe that it can best be held by American air bases in Japan, and by a Japanese defense force. With growing bitterness the Russians charge that we are violating the Potsdam Agreement and the statutes of the occupation.

Under these circumstances the occupation is entering its fifth year. It is turning sour. The dangers of casting Japan adrift under present conditions are great. The dangers of continued occupation may be still greater. The continuing violation of the Potsdam Agreement, which promised independence to a responsible Japanese government, is bound to rekindle aggressive national- ism. The continued presence of well-paid, overbearing US soldiers must turn the Japanese people against the American people. The lack of final responsibility de- lays the further development of democracy in Japan, just as our underwriting of her economy—with \$400 million this year—delays the growth of economic ini- tiative among Japanese. As long as we remain in Japan, the materials and the markets of other nations are closed to her, while for America the temptation is ir- resistible to use Japan as a weapon in the cold war.

General MacArthur once declared that no successful occupation ever lasted for more than three years. He has steadily transferred authority from military gov- ernment to the Japanese. Yet only a peace treaty can end the occupation.

Two years ago, America, as the chief occupying power, invited the eleven nations of the Far Eastern Commission to a preliminary discussion of the peace conference. The Russians refused, quoting the minutes of the Potsdam Conference to prove that the Council of Foreign Ministers was the proper peace-making au- thority. The deadlock on procedures continues.

Must it continue forever? The Americans and Brit- ish rightly argue that all the peoples whom Japan attacked should have a voice in the peace settlement. The Russians hold to the Council of Foreign Ministers, which offers them a veto power and a less conspicuous minority position. They hold a general scorn of small nations. They have been driven into an exaggerated attitude of legalism and obstruction by the unilateral nature of the occupation and the arrogant disregard of SCAP for the Far Eastern Commission.

The experience of the joint negotiations for the Austrian treaty is certainly discouraging. Yet the Rus- sians have everything to gain by a treaty for Japan. If there is agreement on the substance of a peace settle- ment, disputes on procedure cannot prove to be in- surmountable.

If, in the substance of the settlement, we insist on the concept of Japan as an American protectorate, then neither the Russians nor the Chinese will sign the treaty. The Australians and Filipinos alone will pre- vent its being a "soft" treaty. The Russians and the Chinese will then counter with a more favorable treaty of their own. In Japan, as in Germany, the specter of aggression will arise again, with the Japanese Right exploiting the conflict of Russia and the West to reconquer its conquerors.

Even this danger may be less than continued occupation. But first we c peace to try once more for a peace con by the Council of Foreign Ministers association with all the nations of Asi to MacArthur's first concept of a new democratic rights and strategic indepe anteed by a control agency of the Ur it should fail, then, holding to the s should continue without Russia. Mea chance of success is to assume that su Rightly, the Chinese proverb says: "It one candle than to curse the darkness.

This is the last of a series of three e with United States policy toward Asia

THE WEEK

JUST BULLHEADEDNESS?

By last weekend federal officials, and many other people, were talking about an industrial crisis if the steel and coal strikes continued another 10 days. Railroads with less than 25 days' coal supply on hand were ordered to cut passenger service 25 percent. The steel shortage would soon bring many industries, notably autos, to a grinding halt: Detroit, alone, anticipated layoffs of 300,000. The trouble in coal and steel meant employment was down by about a million, including those on strike.

In coal, negotiations between John L. Lewis and the Southern operators were continuing, but those with the Northern and Western mineowners had been broken off. There was talk of a federal injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act.

In steel, the disputants were still far apart, and intervention by President Truman seemed likely. Many people would agree with Mayor O'Dwyer of New York City, who wrote Benjamin Fairless, president of US Steel, de- manding that he accept the recom- mendation of the President's Fact- Finding Board, and agree to non-con- tributory pensions. O'Dwyer pointed

out that many executives in the steel industry enjoy such pension payments; that the system is in effect now for employees of two big steel companies, Jones & Laughlin and Bethlehem, as well as the Ford Motor Company and many other large firms; that Andrew Carnegie, a founder of US Steel, had introduced such a plan; that *Iron Age*, trade journal of the steel industry, had given it tacit approval. "I ask you, Mr. Fairless," wrote the Mayor, "is this the kind of issue on which to paralyze the economy of this country? "Is this a matter of principle or just bullheadedness?"

PAY THE PIPER

No one should have been surprised when President Truman last week in- dicated that he will ask the next ses- sion of Congress for a substantial increase in taxes. The national budget is in the red by several billion dollars annually. The fixed expenses are alone about \$35 billion—almost all of it payment for past or future wars. It is perfectly certain that, as things are going, our military expenditures will continue to increase.

Will the President get his way in 1950? He is likely to ask for heavier

imposts on corporation profits, estate and gift taxes, as well as higher rates on incomes in the upper and middle brackets. These are all unpopular with the conservatives of both parties, and especially in a year when the whole House and one-third of the Senate must run for reelection. Instead of in- creasing taxes, the lawmakers want to reduce them further in one particular field—the so-called luxury taxes left over from the war, which should have been repealed at its close. Congress is not yet ready to face the bitter truth that as long as mankind insists on living in a world under the threat of war, peaceful prosperity is impossible. It is more than ever true that Goering was wrong, and that you can't have both guns and butter.

THE COMMUNIST SENTENCES

The case of the 11 Communist lead- ers is now on its way to the US Su- preme Court. That is the principal fact to be remembered in considering the sentences meted out by Judge Harold Medina—five years in prison and a \$10,000 fine for every defend- ant except one man, whose prison term was reduced by two years because of his brilliant record in the Second

highest court will
stitutionality of the
the fairness of the
hope it is both. It
if it refused to take
case, for that action
ly uphold the verdict.
the wording of the
dants were in fact
d tried for, treason.
a Soviet Russia lay in
and the Communists
portant, not as mem-
tively small group of
onaries, but as agents
and saboteurs—of a
If they were actually
the sentences in-
were moderate by
the standards, as the
have in recent years put
so many people to death on similar
charges, should be the first to agree.
Our readers know that we believe the
Smith Act is an unconstitutional inva-
sion of legitimate civil liberties, and
that the recent trial failed to prove
secret conspiracy constituting "a clear
and present danger" to the state in the
terms of Justice Holmes's famous dic-
tum. We hope and believe that the
Supreme Court will take this view.

THE BASING-POINT BILL

George Norris once said that Con-
gress has three Houses—the Senate,
the House, and the Conference Com-
mittee. The power of that third House
was displayed during the last hours
before adjournment when the special
Senate-House Conference Committee
stripped from the basing-point bill the
amendments protecting small business
against price discrimination. The
House passed the conference bill, 200
to 140, but the Senate voted to post-
pone action on the controversial meas-
ure until January 20, following a bitter
fight led by Democratic Senators
Douglas (Ill.), Long (La.) and
O'Mahoney (Wyo.).

The basing-point bill, which was
"must" legislation on the agendas of
the big steel and cement interests,
would permit the use of freight ab-
sorption and delivered pricing. It had
previously passed both Houses with
amendments by Senator Estes Kefauver
(D, Tenn.) and Representative John
Carroll (D, Colo.) that would have
continued to make discriminations car-
ried out through freight absorption
(and phantom freight) illegal where
the effect of the discrimination would

be substantially to less-
en competition. The
Senate-House conferees
—headed by Senators
Wiley (R, Wis.), and
O'Connor (D, Md.)—
so weakened the amend-
ments that the bill, ac-
cording to Senator
Douglas, would "strike
the Robinson-Patman
Act off the statute
books . . . a plunge
back into the dark ages
of big industry before
any anti-trust laws were
passed."

The conference re-
port eliminated the Ke-
fauver-Carroll amend-
ment so that in cases
involving price discrim-
ination a seller must
show only that he dis-
criminated "in good

faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor." This "good-faith" clause
drew particular fire from opponents of
the report, who pointed out the diffi-
culty of proving bad faith.

The report also changed the lan-
guage of the bill in such a way that
it would place an insuperable burden
of proof upon the Federal Trade Com-
mission. The Robinson-Patman Act
declares discrimination unlawful where
the effect "may be" substantially to
lessen competition. The Conference
Committee changed the wording from
"may" to "will" and added that there
must be "reliable, probative, and sub-
stantial evidence of the specified ef-
fects." That means that the FTC is
prevented from restraining discrimina-
tory acts before they occur. "This
bill," said Senator Douglas, "by per-
mitting the absorption of freight, and
permitting one competitor to charge
the same price that other alleged com-
petitors are charging, legalizes the
three essential features of the basing-
point system." Charging that the bill
would foster big monopolies and
threaten "the whole industrial future
of this country," Douglas moved for
postponement and the Senate agreed
by voice vote.

Senator O'Mahoney, author of the
original bill, said he was glad the
Senate had postponed action. "By ac-
cepting the conference report," he said,
"we would be opening the door to mo-
nopolistic practices and we would be
doing precisely what we do not want
to do. . . . We would be putting the
consumers of the country into the
hands of monopolists who wish to
use freight absorption and delivered
prices in connection with collusive
agreements in restraint of trade."

WALLGREN AND MEAD

The nominations of Mon C. Wall-
gren to the Federal Power Commission
and James M. Mead to the Federal
Trade Commission passed the Senate
last week in less time than it would
take a messenger to travel from the
White House to the Capitol by trolley.
Only a week before, the Senate, end-
ing months of delay and a week of

hostile hearings before a committee,
had refused to reappoint Leland Olds,
who had served 10 years on the FPC
in the interest of the public. The
ostensible reason for rejecting Olds
was that he had written some radical-
sounding things 20 years ago. The
real reason, as we have already re-
ported ("Insull Rides Again," the
NR, October 24), was that Olds had
stood for the consumers' interest,
fighting the high rates asked by the
public utilities.

The appointments to the FTC,
which is the "watchdog" over mo-
nopoly, and the FPC, which regulates
utilities, have unusual importance be-
cause of the balance of liberals and
conservatives on the five-member
boards. The public was protected as
long as FPC Commissioners Olds,
Claude L. Draper and Thomas C.
Buchanan steadfastly voted in its in-
terest. This majority was needed since
Nelson Lee Smith and Harrington
Wimberly, the two other Commis-
sioners, have consistently yielded to
the utilities industry. Wallgren's re-
cord in the Senate shows that he sup-
ported legislation which made possible
many of the hydroelectric-power proj-
ects now in operation throughout the
country. As former Governor of
Washington, he has a deep concern for
public power in the Northwest. There
is some hope that he will maintain
the three-to-two balance of the FPC,
but this "deserving" Democrat is
hardly a substitute for Leland Olds.

With the appointment of Mead,
whose record as a Senator (N. Y.)
was extremely creditable, the FTC is
perceptibly strengthened. It has suf-
fered from conservatism as well as old
age. The FTC is headed by a Repub-
lican member, Lowell B. Mason, who
has been outspokenly tender toward
industry on anti-monopoly questions.
One Democratic member, Ewin L.
Davis, died last Sunday at 73, after 16
years' service; another Democrat, Wil-
liam A. Ayres, is over the age limit
and could be retired at any time. The
fifth member, John Carson, is a re-
cent addition, an independent politi-
cally, and an outspoken liberal. Mead
replaces Garland S. Ferguson, a Demo-

crat, on the Commission for the re-
mainder of a seven-year term that
will expire September 26, 1955.

DEWEY, THE GREEK

John Dewey's 90th birthday was
celebrated in many ways, including a
special issue of the *New Republic*
(October 17) and a dinner in his
honor in New York City. Dewey him-
self spoke at the dinner, and said that
of all the tributes to him on this oc-
casion, none had pleased him more
than that of Dr. Alvin Johnson, former
New Republic editor and President
Emeritus of the New School for Social
Research. Said Dr. Johnson:

To John Dewey, latest of great Greek
philosophers:

But have you not been fighting the
Greek philosophers? So you have: Greek
philosopher has fought Greek philoso-
pher since before Thales and Heraclitus
the Obscure. But in one thing you, John
Dewey, and the Greeks are one. You
have all fought Fear.


Fear, not of the tiger in the bush,
whom man can meet with good spear
or repeating rifle. Not of the hostile
armies, that can be defeated by armies.
But vague fears of the night, the star-
less black night when ghosts walk; the
blacker night of the mind, where habits,
traditions, abstractions, assumptions,
prejudices, hatreds at large, dance a
Walpurgis Night dance over the pros-
trate soul of man.

You, John Dewey, and your fellow
Greek philosophers are the supreme ex-
orcists of fear. One who has sat at your
Greek feet, fears not the lurking demon,
the malevolent spirit of the men of other
ideas, the alleged corruption of morals,
the vast bogeys of ideologies. Your
followers accept with gratitude the
green earth under the wide blue sky,
fearing nothing, least of all death, the
one opiate of the people.

Life is sweet, sweeter because of you,
John Dewey. Life is significant, more
significant because of you, John Dewey.
Life is brave because of you.

Ninety years have stood between you
and immortality. Ninety times ninety
will go by before men can think of for-
getting John Dewey. And then they
will have a second thought. Who taught
them to live without fears that have no
ground? And John Dewey will live for
them yet again.

With the deepest homage of
ALVIN JOHNSON
New York City



A change in Soviet

ern Europe is in the
dication was the timi
protest against the cre
ern German state at
delayed to coincide
severance of official
Chiang Kai-shek's
ernment; with its fo
of Mao Tse-tung's P
and with its move to
by the other in the UN

The Soviets have been on the de-
fensive in Europe since the Czecho-
slovak putsch. The Western powers,
led by the Americans, have been on
the offensive since the Italian and
French national elections of the spring
of 1948. A "peace offensive" covered
the Soviet retreat, which reached its
climax in the lifting of the Berlin
blockade last spring. The apparent
purpose of the withdrawal was the
need for the Soviets to concentrate
their power in the Eastern European
satellite countries and in China. Now
the Soviet retreat appears to be coming
to an end. The obvious reason is the
consolidation of the situation in favor
of Moscow both in China and in the
satellites.

The Soviet "peace offensive" is to
continue, but apparently its target has
shifted from Washington to Vatican
City. Whoever controls Germany, the
Soviets believe, has the power to dom-
inate Europe; and at this time the con-
trol of Germany is in the hands of
Dr. Konrad Adenauer's Christian
Democrats, who work closely with the
Vatican. Moreover, the cartellists of
the Ruhr are being courted openly by
the French and secretly by the British.
French High Commissioner André
François-Poncet, formerly allied with
the Comité des Forges, French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman, even Gen-



"There—everything fits"

Gaulle, have recently
ward a Franco-German
these Frenchmen have
s with the Vatican's

et policy of direct in-
rmany and in Western
ed to break the grow-
olitical elements under
the clerical Right. The
te objective is to make
any parties, ranging
to the extreme Right,
help the Communists
clerical governmental

n the Soviet attitude
at least, to an oppor-
take advantage of the
e of recent events with
impolitical, psychological
and economic implications. These are
the Anglo-American economic and po-
litical negotiations, the monetary de-
valuations and the announcement that
Russia also possesses atomic bombs.

In terms of geopolitics the role of
Western Europe in the duel between
Moscow and Washington has sud-
denly become minor. It is possible for
the New York *Herald Tribune* to
write that:

The first lesson of Russia's success
[in making atomic bombs] is the over-
whelming importance of the military
assistance bill, whose whole object is to
create a military balance in Europe that
will not have to be sustained by the
terrible and incalculable effects of
atomic bombing.

This is an American point of view.
Western Europeans, even those who
strongly favor the "Atlantic Commu-
nity," do not entirely agree. They be-
lieve that Europe is no longer an area
in which balances—military or other
—can be achieved by the Americans.

Now Paris, Brussels, Berne and
Rome are less vulnerable, less exposed,
in a way, than Chicago, Detroit, New
York and Washington. The plains of
Western Europe might still be an area
of infantry battle for European foot
soldiers trying to delay the Red Army.
But two major psychological factors
which helped the Americans mobilize

European opinion (and potential mili-
tary coöperation) against the Soviets
have changed. The Western Europeans
are less afraid of a war on their soil.
And they are less sure now that if the
dreaded infantry war does take place
there, the Americans will be ready and
willing to come to their assistance in
time. Thus the Kremlin has a psycho-
logical advantage it has not had in
support of its European political pur-
poses since Hiroshima.

Other psychological advantages have
been handed to the Soviets by the
Americans and British. The secrecy
with which the Washington talks were
conducted, then the ineptitude with
which the devaluation was announced,
left many Europeans with the impres-
sion, however false it may be, that (a)
the British stand in a special relation-
ship of favor with the Americans,
based perhaps on secret agreements,
(b) the British are insincere and un-
trustworthy in their attitude toward



European coöpera-
tion and federalism,
(c) the British are
betraying the "At-
lantic Community,"
(d) the British are
willing (perhaps
even maliciously
pleased) to force a lower standard of
living on the Western Europeans.

There are deep and old distrusts of
Britain in continental Europe, and the
Soviets can use them as well as the
Fascists and Nazis did. In France these
attitudes were stirred up by the col-
laborators' distortion of the meaning
of Dunkirk and Dakar; and they are
kept alive by the need of these col-
laborators now to cope with their sense
of guilt or to justify their conduct. In
Italy, the psychological heritage of
Fascism—still very real and politically
important—blames the English of the
days of the Ethiopian sanctions for
Italy's present political meaningless-
ness on the world scene.

But it is in the area of economics—
in the dread that devaluation will re-
duce the standard of living, that the
Americans will abandon Western Eu-
rope to its own economic devices and
to the harshest austerity—that the

Soviets can best operate to intervene in
the domestic politics of the Western
European countries.

It is bad enough for the prospects
of a continuing "Atlanticization" of
Western Europe for the British to
shift away from the Old World to a
role of (what continentals consider)
subservience to the New World; and
for the French rightists to move to-
ward a deal with the rightist Germans
—men who still have the ideas of the
Junkers and the Nazis. It is far worse
for Western Europeans (and naturally
better for the Soviets) to see signs that
the lifeline which was called variously
Lend-Lease, UNRRA, ECA, and even
MAP may be pulled back from Wash-
ington. Perhaps there is no connection
between the end of Western Europe
as a factor in an American policy of
"containment" of the Soviet Union,
and the possible end of ECA in 1950
instead of 1952. Europeans, however,
see such a link and dread its implica-
tions. In countries which have not
given their people what the Labour
Government has given the British in
the fields of economic and social se-
curity, the prospect of austerity is a
factor of major political leverage
against the present pro-American coa-
lition governments.

The new Soviet policy in Western
Europe starts with great advantages.
Most of them, however, are negative.
Moscow's path back toward the Euro-
pean West is being cleared by a Brit-
ish and American retreat—or the ap-
pearance of one. The precedents of
the last few years suggest that the
Kremlin might change its mind if the
men on Capitol Hill (and in Downing
Street) reconsider the folly of aban-
doning Europe. Of course, it may be
that Western Europe is no longer im-
portant to Washington and London.
If so, the sad fact is that the old con-
tinent is really equally unimportant to
the Soviets—that is, the values in it
that are important to the Western
Europeans themselves are not to the
Soviets. A Europe left to the Commu-
nists may not be destroyed by atomic
bombs, but Europeans are old-fash-
ioned enough to fear other destructions
even more.

PERCY WINNER