December 17, 1963

Alistair Buchan, Esq. Institute of Strategic Studies John Adams Street Strand London, W. 1

Dear Mr. Buchan:

I am enclosing an article which I wrote with publication in England in mind. Could you cable me whether you would want to publish this article in SURVIVAL and at what date the article would appear in print, if you published it.

Independently of whether or not you may want to print this article, I could send you mimeographed copies of the enclosed manuscript for distribution to those in England who in your judgment might be interested in reading it. I should greatly appreciate your advising me whether you would want me to send you a number of such copies and if so, how many you could use.

Until January 1st, communications will meach me fastest if: addressed to me at the Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington, D.C. 20036.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

Leo Szilard

The Institute for Strategic Studies

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31st December, 1963

Mr Leo Szilard, The University of Chicago, The Enrico Fermi Institute for Nuclear Studies, Chicago 37, Illinois, USA.

for the Systemal.

Thank you for your letter of 17th December and for letting me see your article on "The Sting of the Bee". As I cabled to you today, I am afraid we cannot use it in <u>Survival</u>. This is partly because <u>Survival</u> is primarily devoted to reprints of material that has been printed elsewhere and partly because the March/April issue, which goes to press at the beginning of February, is already full up.

I have read your paper with interest. In my view you do not make a very convincing case for independent nuclear forces in Europe. For one thing Britain and France are not interested in what you call "semi-neutrality". The purpose for which they have designed nuclear forces is primarily to give themselves a certain amount of independence of diplomatic action in times of peace and a minimal insurance against a break-down of alliance command and control arrangements in the event of war. Whether their forces can attain these objectives for them or are worth the resources which they consume is another matter, but to talk of "semi-neutrality" misses the whole point of the European/American debate. In the second place you overlook the existence of some 700 MRBMs, and an increase in IRBM forces, targetted on Western Europe, which makes it less and less likely that there could be any such thing as a purely Soviet/American nuclear exchange, especially while a large number of American means of delivery capable of reaching targets in Eastern Europe and Western Russia remain based in Europe. A Third, ideas about a Franco/British nuclear force overlook the extremely difficult problem of command and control as between two sovereign entities,

who have a very unsatisfactory record of mutual co-operation. χ Incidentally, England ceased to be a sovereign country in 1707 when it became part of the United Kingdom.

I hope you will find these comments of some use.

Alastair Buchan

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28 January, 1964

Alastair Buchan, Esq., The Institute for Strategic Studies 18 Adam Street London W.C.2., England

Dear Mr. Buchan:

Many thanks for your letter of December 31. I am puzzled

by a passage which reads:

"Third, ideas about a Franco/British nuclear force overlook the extremely difficult problem of command and control as between two sovereign entities, who have a very unsatisfactory record of mutual co-operation."

I did not propose the setting up of a Franco/British nuclear force under joint command and I wish to draw your attention to the underlined passage on page 7, which I enclose.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

LS: jm

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