

*Hutchins*

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 ILLINOIS

THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS *Chancellor*  
ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL *President*  
R. G. GUSTAVSON *Vice-President*  
*and Dean of Faculties*  
W. C. MUNNECKE *Vice-President*  
NEIL H. JACOBY *Vice-President*  
WILLIAM BENTON *The Assistant to the Chancellor*

July 26, 1945

Dear Mr. Szilard:

The petition looks good to me. I hope it may be effective.

As I understand it, the Psychological Corporation--or maybe it is Fortune Magazine--is developing a poll of experts which is supposed to represent informed public opinion. The University of Denver also has a foundation working in this general field, which releases its results to the public.

I think Mr. Marschak is right about the difficulties. Nevertheless, through Professor Samuel Stouffer, who will return to the University at the end of the war, we are beginning to lay plans for some kind of a development in this area. I shall keep you informed.

I regret that you have not recently had any reason to come to see me.

Sincerely yours,



Mr. Leo Szilard  
Metallurgical Laboratory  
Faculty Exchange

August 8, 1945

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Could you possibly look over the text of the enclosed letter and advise me about it by Saturday when I shall get in touch with your office?

The paragraph which particularly requires your attention reads as follows: "May I take this opportunity to ask you whether in principle the President would be prepared to see a small group, perhaps three men, from the University of Chicago headed by its chancellor, R. M. Hutchins. It is not proposed, however, actually to request such an interview until the first excitement over the atomic bomb dies down and unless the importance of the issue seems to warrant it."

The situation still changes rapidly at present but by Saturday it should be possible to make up our minds whether or not it is advisable to include some such paragraph.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

LS:sw

enc.

August 28, 1945

Robert M. Hutchins  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

I sent Connelly a text of the petition on August 17, 1945 asking him to let me know by August 24 if he considered its publication undesirable. Since I did not hear from him on that date, I telephoned the White House and received in response to my inquiry the following telegram:

REFERENCE YOUR TELEPHONE CALL THE PRESIDENT HAS  
YOUR LETTER UNDER ADVISEMENT. I WILL BE GLAD  
LET YOU KNOW HIS DECISION LATER. REGARDS.

MATTHEW J. CONNELLY, SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT.

Shortly afterwards, Captain Murray of the Manhattan District Military Intelligence called me to say that General Groves wants the petition classified secret.

Captain Murray confirmed that he authorized me last Monday to "declassify" the petition in a long letter which I received today and in which I am ordered to reclassify the petition secret.

My inclination is to oblige the White House, but I do not think I can reclassify the petition secret at the request of the Manhattan District.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

*I enclosed Capt Murray's letter.*

File L. Szilard D  
Daniels x

August 29, 1945

METALLURGICAL LABORATORY  
P. O. Box 5207, Chicago 80, Ill.  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

AUG 30 1945

A.M. P.M.  
7|8|9|10|11|12|1|2|3|4|5|6

Dr. R. M. Hutchins,  
Chancellor,  
University of Chicago.

Dear Dr. Hutchins:

In July of this year, a petition was sent to the President which was signed by 67 scientists employed by the University of Chicago. After the use of the atomic bomb, I advised the Manhattan District that the petition would no longer be treated as "Secret" and obtained the approval of the Manhattan District for this decision. I am now asked by the Manhattan District to reclassify the text of this petition as "Secret."

In a letter dated August 28, 1945, of which I enclose a copy, the Manhattan District asserts that I would be violating my employment agreement with the University of Chicago if I disclosed the text of the petition.

The Manhattan District's definition of "Secret" includes "information that might be injurious to the prestige of any governmental activity," which is, of course, very different from the definition adopted by Congress in passing the Espionage Act.

A separate telephone call received last Saturday from the Manhattan District advised me that I might be violating my employment contract with the University if I were to publish any article or release anything to the press relating to the problems arising out of the development of the atomic bomb, without first obtaining the approval of the Manhattan District.

The unauthorized disclosure of any scientific or technical information which is in fact secret is, of course, covered by the Espionage Act.

It so happens that I personally have been persistently opposed even to the authorized release of such information at the present time and warned against the publication of the Smyth Report as inconsistent with the attitude taken on other related issues by the Government.

It so happens that I personally believe that we should all fully cooperate with the Government at present since it is presumably striving to negotiate some international arrangement aimed at the control of the manufacture of atomic bombs. This cooperation on our part might require restraint in the public utterances of the scientists who have been connected with this development. Such restraint, however, must be voluntary and cannot be successfully achieved by coercion.

Coercion in this respect ought, in my opinion, to be resisted by the scientists and I, for one, am not willing to submit to it.

There was no intention of releasing for publication the text of the petition without checking first with the White House, and I have in fact been in communication with the White House on this subject. Apart from a possible release of the text of the petition, I have not contemplated sending any articles to magazines or making any releases to the press.

When I signed my employment contract with the University I was not aware of the possibility that this contract might be interpreted along the lines now indicated to me by the Manhattan District. The purpose of this letter is to raise the question whether the University intends to take the position that my contract implies the restriction of my freedom of action which the Manhattan District thinks it does.

Does the University intend to take the position that I <sup>would</sup> ~~violated~~ the contract with the University if I made the text of the petition public, assuming that the text contains no disclosure of secret scientific or technical information or anything which, according to the definition of our laws, is in fact a military secret, and taking into consideration that the Manhattan District now chooses to consider the text of the petition as "secret"?

If I wrote articles or made press releases without previous approval of the Manhattan District, would the University wish to take the position that my action would violate my employment contract, assuming that those articles did not contain any technical, scientific or military information which is in fact secret but were considered, on other grounds, undesirable or "secret" by the Manhattan District?

I regret to have to raise this issue and take your time and attention, but I hope that you will consider this special case as part of the broader issue which is involved.

Very sincerely yours,

*signed*  
*Lev Hillard*

Hist-B

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NEIL H. JACOBY *Vice-President*

WILLIAM BENTON *The Assistant to the Chancellor*

September 17, 1945

Dear General Groves:

The conference to which you refer in your letter of September 15 was called in response to Chapter XIII, paragraph 8 of the Smyth Report, sponsored by the Manhattan District.

As we informed your office on the Campus some days ago, this conference is to be private. None of its discussions will be open to the public or the press. There are no plans for releasing any of its conclusions. The conference will deal only with matters of common knowledge, facts known before the war, and those set forth in the Smyth Report and official releases.

Since the President's note requests editors and broadcasters to withhold information, it has, of course, no application to a conference at which no editors or broadcasters will be present. I shall, however, call the note to the attention of the conferees as you suggest. I shall be glad to read your letter to the conference if you wish me to do so.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

Major General L. R. Groves, USA  
War Department  
P.O. Box 2610  
Washington, D. C.

cc: Messrs. Gustavson, Bartky, Szilard, and Redfield

October 11, 1945

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
Office of the President  
Faculty Exchange

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

When it was arranged that Mr. Redfield would concern himself with the political implications of the atomic bombs I was under the impression that it was your intention to free him of part of his other duties. It is my understanding that he is giving three courses, two of which are more or less routine courses, and I wondered whether you could persuade him to drop at least two out of the three courses. As it is, his schedule is exceedingly crowded and either imperiling his health or seriously interfering with his activities arising out of his interest in the implications of the atomic bomb.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

P. S. I am leaving for Washington at 4 p.m., where I shall meet Dr. Condon tomorrow morning. We intend to spend one week there and can be reached at any time through Mr. Shils.



NOT FOR RELEASE!

THE FOLLOWING IS PART OF A LETTER SENT BY DR. LEO SZILARD TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER THE DATE LINE OF OCTOBER 25, 1947:

Enclosed is a copy of an article entitled "Letter to Stalin" which I have submitted to the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS for publication.

If it were in every respect proper for me to do so, I would write a letter to Mr. Stalin embodying the thoughts contained in the enclosed article and would seek some way of transmitting such a letter to him through the good offices of some prominent person who is known to him. It would be my hope that if my letter were transmitted to Mr. Stalin in such a manner he would perceive the genuine anguish which prompted my writing it and that he might therefore give consideration to its contents.

If such a letter were in fact to be transmitted to Mr. Stalin through some proper and desirable channel I would probably want to postpone indefinitely the publication of the article.

The enclosed article does not touch on any specific dispute or controversy with the United States and the letter which I would send to Mr. Stalin would merely follow its text, possibly shortened by omissions. You may, in the circumstances, think that the transmission of such a letter would not come under the Logan Act of 1799. On the other hand, you might think that the transmission of such a letter might come under the Logan Act or some other similar act and therefore, in accordance with the Logan Act, I am herewith making the formal request for permission or authority of the Government for the transmission of such a letter in the meaning of the Act.

LETTER TO THE EDITORS

November 10, 1947

Dear Sirs:

I am releasing the article "Letter to Stalin" for publication today since I no longer have much hope that it will be possible ultimately to obtain the government's permission requested in my letter addressed to the Attorney General. I had discussed this article with quite a number of persons outside the atomic scientists movement, and perhaps some of the questions raised, and the objections made, deserve to be recorded here.

One objection took the stereotyped form of "Why do you address yourself to Stalin? Why don't you write to President Truman?" Curiously enough, this very same phrase was used by two groups of persons -- those whose outlook is close to that of the Administration and those "left wingers" who oppose the foreign policy of the Administration. While these two groups use the very same phrase, they do not, of course, mean the same thing at all.

The "left wingers" mean that by writing such a "Letter" I am acknowledging that Stalin is the real obstacle to peace and I am neglecting to mention that actions on the part of our own Administration have contributed to, or have been largely responsible for, the present disturbing situation.

Those sharing the Administration's point of view seem to feel that, by addressing myself to Stalin, I am acknowledging that Stalin has a greater desire for peace, or has a greater ability to recognize the right path to peace, or else has a greater power to bring about a change than President Truman or his administration. These men will also say to me that those who are in charge of guiding American foreign policy are men of great ability who have an intense desire for peace. And if I accept this view as correct -- they say to me -- then I ought to propose to Stalin (if I must propose anything to him at all) that he make a comprehensive offer to the Administration, rather than that he address himself to the American people.

My answer to them is, of course, that their view of our policy-makers -- which incidentally is shared by the majority of the American people, as stated in

my "Letter" -- is irrelevant, for Mr. Stalin will base his actions on his own views rather than on ours. In my "Letter" I have, therefore, suggested a course of action which Mr. Stalin can follow even though his view may differ from ours. I suggested that if and when he has a case -- and at present there is no case before us -- he can take it to the highest authority in America -- the American people.

Why did I not <sup>write</sup> ~~write~~ to Mr. Truman? First of all, because I cannot say to Mr. Truman that if he made a comprehensive offer for settlement of the post-war issues the Russian government would respond favorably. I cannot possibly have any basis for knowing how the Russian government would respond to any such approach. On the other hand, I can say how I believe the American people would respond to a new approach on the part of the Russian government.

Moreover, while I would not wish to say that the conduct of our own foreign policy could in no way be improved upon under present circumstances, I do not believe that the problem which faces the world today can be solved at the level of foreign policy in the narrow sense of the term by the Administration; nor do I believe that it is within the power of the Administration to offer to the world a satisfactory solution of this problem without the full support of the American people for a bold and constructive solution. Since I have developed these thoughts in a previous article -- "Calling for a Crusade" which appeared in the April-May issue of the BULLETIN -- I need not again go into this point here. But I might perhaps add that today it no longer seems likely that popular support or popular pressure for a bold and constructive solution will be forthcoming unless the people would have reason to believe that they could expect the Russian government to be cooperative.

Leo Szilard

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "LETTER TO STALIN" WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION TO THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS BY DR. LEO SZILARD. IN THIS ARTICLE DR. SZILARD MAKES AN APPEAL FOR STALIN TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND ADOPT A NEW LINE OF APPROACH --NEW BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND METHOD -- TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, CULMINATING IN A COMPREHENSIVE OFFER ON STALIN'S PART FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE WORLD.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

I take the step of writing this "Letter" because I am deeply concerned about the deterioration of Russian-American relations, and also because I believe that the general sentiment which moves me to this action is shared by the majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy.

The steady deterioration of Russian-American relations has many disturbing aspects, but perhaps none is as serious as the lasting effect which it may have on the minds of the American people, as well as the minds of the people in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Here in America more and more men will say to me in private conversation that war with Russia is inevitable. These are men who are capable of thinking independently and are not guided by whatever editorials they may read in their newspapers. To me their attitude is a symptom of grave danger because once the American people close their minds on this subject war, in fact, will have become inevitable.

There are those who argue that there is no danger of an early war because at present Russia is too weak to start one and there is no precedent for the United States embarking on a preventive war. That there is no such precedent is, of course, true; but neither have the American people ever before been in a position where they had to fear that if they remain passive during a protracted period of uneasy peace they

may live to see the day when war -- if it breaks out -- will be brought to their homeland.

I do not mean to say that the United States may start a preventive war against Russia within the next six months; what I mean to say is that if the present trend continues for six months, a fateful change might take root in the minds of the American people and the situation would then be beyond remedy. Thereafter it would be merely a question of time -- a few short years, perhaps-- until the peace would be at the mercy of some Yugoslav general in the Balkans or some American admiral in the Mediterranean who may willfully or through bungling create an incident that will inevitably result in war. If the present trend continues for six months, more likely than not, the further course of events will be out of the control of the two governments involved.

The main reason for the present trend is the fact that two years have passed since the end of the war and no appreciable progress has been made toward a settlement. Russia and the United States have reached a deadlock.

All this does not come as a surprise to most of us who had worked in the field of atomic energy during the war and had time to adjust our thinking to the implications of the bomb. It was clear from the start that the existence of the bomb and the manner in which it was used would not make the settlement easier but rather more difficult. We knew that the world could be saved from another war only if both the United States and Russia were able to rise above the situation and before this can come to pass one of them will have to take the lead.

Situations of this general type are not without precedent in history; they occur also on occasion in the lives of individuals, and the story of one such occurrence made a very deep impression on me. In 1930, twelve years after the end of the First World War, I met a classmate of mine and we talked of what had happened to us

since we had separated. He had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and in the last days of the war in the Carpathian Mountains he was in charge of a patrol. One morning they heard by way of rumor that an armistice had been concluded, but being cut off from communications they were unable to obtain confirmation. They rode out on patrol duty as usual, and as they emerged from the forest, they found themselves standing face to face with a Russian patrol in charge of an officer. The two officers grabbed their guns and, frozen in this position, the two patrols remained for uncounted seconds. Suddenly the Russian officer smiled and his hand went to his cap in salute. My friend returned the salute, and both patrols turned back their horses. "To this day," my friend said to me, "I regret that it was not I who saluted first."

Perhaps by writing this "Letter" today I may make some slight amends for my friend's tardiness, for in these troubled times it is not without some personal risk for an American scientist to write a "Letter" such as this one.

Today Russia and America find themselves standing face to face, each of them fearful of what may be the other's next political move. The American people want peace. The Russian people want peace also.

As I see it, Russia wants peace - as does the United States - not only for the next five or ten years, she wants peace for good. And if I am correct on this point then peace can yet be saved; it can be saved by you, yourself.

#### THE APPROACH SUGGESTED.

It is within your power to resolve the deadlock and thereby to permit a change in the course of United States foreign policy, but you can do this only if you decide to throw off the self-imposed shackles of the old-fashioned, and also of the new-fangled forms of diplomacy.

Russia and the United States are deadlocked on almost every point on which they have negotiated in the recent past. On every such point, Russia may have very good

reasons for not yielding, and the United States may also have very good reasons for not yielding. I am not going to suggest that you should now yield on this point or that one, or that you should now "appease" the United States.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" are a series of interconnected steps which are within your power to take. Because they are most unusual steps, these suggestions may appear quixotic to many and ridiculous to some.

What I am suggesting in this "Letter" may come somewhat as a shock to you. It may also come as a shock to some of my fellow-Americans who will read these lines. But this is not the time to hold back for fear of being exposed to ridicule or unwarranted accusations.

My first specific suggestion is that you speak directly and personally to the American people. What you may say to them, and you might wish to speak to them once a month, will be news, and because it will be news, it will be carried by the radio stations in the United States and will be reprinted in the newspapers. Naturally you would want to speak in Russian, but your interpreter could convey your speech sentence by sentence in English. Your speech could be recorded and released simultaneously in Russia and America.

The American people listen to their presidents because what the President says to them may affect their lives, and they will listen to you for exactly the same reason. But there is one important difference; you will be speaking to them as the head of a foreign state; your speech will be without effect with them unless it is believed to be one hundred per cent sincere. The sincerity of your expression, as well as the other tokens of sincerity which you may be able to present to the American people, will determine whether your speeches will strike home.

If your speeches to the American people were given full publicity in Russia, you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that you mean what you are saying to them.

And you would go a long way towards convincing the American people that they may expect fair play from you if you invited the President of the United States to address the Russian people just as often as you speak to the American public and accorded just as much publicity to his speeches in Russia as is given to yours in America.

All the machinery through which the American public is being kept informed in the United States would be at your disposal, and it would remain at your disposal in the absence of any attempt to use it for purposes of propaganda.

That you would be heard by the American people is certain; but how your speeches would affect them would depend both upon the substance and the tenor of these speeches.

What indeed should be the substance of your speeches?

What I suggest, in the first place, is that in your speeches you present to the American people a clear picture of a general settlement within the framework of a post-war reconstruction of the world, a settlement that would enable Russia and the United States to live in peace with each other.

At first you will be able to give such a picture in rough outline only; gradually you may be able to fill in more and more of the details. You might convey the details, perhaps, by issuing from time to time supplementary official reports.

By the time you have filled in the details, you will have given the American people more than merely a picture of a possible post-war world; you will have presented them with something that will amount to an offer for a post-war settlement.

You might well ask at this point, because it is indeed a crucial question, whether such a unilateral offer on your part, if it is generous, would not put you at a disadvantage from the point of view of later negotiations. You could easily make



it clear, however, that your offer has to be taken as a whole, that you are perfectly willing to modify any one single point to meet the wishes of the United States Government, but that for every point that the United States wants to have modified in her favor, you may ask that some other point be modified in Russia's favor. As long as this is clearly understood, you need not, and should not, hold back for the sake of later bargaining.

Such are the means through which you may be able to convince the American people that--in your view as well as in fact -- private enterprise and the Russian economic system and also mixed forms of economic organization can flourish side by side; that Russia and the United States can be part of the same world; that "one world" need not necessarily be a uniform world. Until such time as the American people as well as the Russian people shall be convinced of this all-important point, we shall remain headed towards war and not towards peace.

I am told that these days the opposite thesis is presented by authoritative writers in Russia. And if this opposite thesis should be accepted as correct in America as well as in Russia -- if it should be generally believed that there is indeed some inexorable law which, in the long run, makes war between your country and ours inevitable, then those in the United States who are now working for the preservation of peace would begin to feel that they are merely delaying the war which will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

#### THE RESPONSE EXPECTED.

Naturally you would want to know how the American people would respond if you should decide to take the initiative and adopt a new line of approach towards the United States. Would you really be able to break the present deadlock and thereby bring about a change in the course of United States foreign policy?

There is a vast body of men and women in the United States who view with genuine concern the rapid deterioration of Russian-American relations. Many of them have

grave doubts in their heart as to the general wisdom of the present course of United States foreign policy, while they regard with equal misgivings the Russian counterpart of this policy. If they do not at present take a stand in favor of changing the course steered by their own government, it is first of all because they do not see with sufficient clarity any practicable alternative course under present circumstances. Moreover they may believe that any attempt to bring about a change must necessarily come to naught as long as the speeches of your delegates will continue to follow a line of reasoning which is unacceptable to the large majority of the American public.

If you succeed in the difficult task of formulating in your own mind a practicable solution of the post-war issues and in conveying your picture of such a solution to the American public, then gradually, as you make statement after statement and issue report after report, a complete picture of an acceptable post-war settlement may unfold before the American people. By the time you will have filled in the details, and thus have implicitly extended a comprehensive offer, you also will have removed the block which had caused the deadlock.

This should have a direct and immediate effect on the foreign policy of the United States. Most Americans believe that those who are at present in charge of guiding American foreign policy were driven to the present policy because none other appeared practicable to them in the circumstances. It is generally believed that they are men of good will, who can be expected to change the present course the very moment they see a satisfactory way out of the present impasse.

You may or may not concur with this opinion. But in any case it is clearly within your power to give the American people a choice between two alternative courses of foreign policy. And if they do have a choice, the American people will exercise their choice--this I fervently hope--in favor of a course which may lead to peace. They will exercise their choice through all the mechanisms by which public opinion influences government policies in America. And those who are at present in charge of steering the course of American foreign policy may, to borrow a phrase of Mr. Stimson's,

"either change their minds or lose their jobs."

In this "Letter" I am trying to cope with a difficulty of communications which might be insurmountable. We in America have a crude and oversimplified picture of how political decisions come about in Russia. You in Russia may have a similar picture concerning America. It might be therefore difficult for a Russian to go along with the basic assumption of this "Letter", that in America the most important factor for political decisions is not a public opinion created by the press but rather the attitudes and opinions of the individuals who constitute the American public, and that these attitudes and opinions may become the controlling factor in certain circumstances. But if this "Letter" had not one chance in a thousand of receiving serious consideration in Russia, I still would want to write it rather than to face the charge of seeing the approaching catastrophe without even raising a hand trying to avert it.

If the conclusion were reached that the measures advocated in this "Letter" would be effective, if adequately implemented, it would become necessary to face the difficulties of implementation. The difficulties of formulating an adequate solution to the post-war issues which would be acceptable to both Russia and the United States, as well as the rest of the world, are greatly increased by the absence of any interchange of thought between Americans and Russians who are not encumbered by the responsibility of representing the views of their Governments. It is perhaps understandable that atomic scientists should particularly stress this point and that they should discuss with each other whether there is any proper way in which they could help to bring about such an interchange of thought. The difficulties which stand in the way of achieving this or even a reasonable substitute thereof are obvious. But in view of their special responsibility it is perhaps not unnatural that atomic scientists should wish to assist in the implementation of some significant endeavor aimed at the permanent establishment of peace.

The majority of the atomic scientists who take an active interest in matters of public policy are free from any anti-Russian bias and they do not include Communists, either in the narrow or wider sense of the term. The general sentiment underlying this "Letter" is, I know, shared by <sup>them</sup> ~~the majority~~, but the specific thoughts embodied in it and the decision of writing this "Letter" are my own and I am not speaking for any other person or persons.

EDITORIAL NOTE:

The following are excerpts from a memorandum prepared by Dr. Leo Szilard in March, 1945. This memorandum was to be placed before President Roosevelt, but owing to his sudden death, it did not reach him. Referred by the White House to James F. Byrnes it was placed before him by the author in a personal interview on May 28, 1945 (six weeks before the first bomb was tested in New Mexico). These excerpts contain none of the secret information which may have been embodied in the original document. It is believed that this was the first document which discussed the implications of the atomic bomb with respect to our future relations with Russia and the question of international control of atomic energy. It also contained the original suggestion of denaturing fissionable materials for the purpose of making more difficult their use for the manufacture of bombs.

ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE POSTWAR POSITION OF  
THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD

by Leo Szilard

The development of the atomic bomb is mostly considered from the point of view of its possible use in the present war and such bombs are likely to be available in time to be used before the war ends. However, their role in the ... years which will follow can be expected to be far more important and it seems that the position of the United States in the world may be adversely affected by their existence. The following might very well turn out to be the future course of events:

Before the end of the war we shall use atomic bombs against Japan. These bombs will be much less powerful than we know could be made and which in all likelihood will be made within ---- years: yet the first bomb that is detonated over Japan will be spectacular enough to start a race in atomic armaments between us and other nations.

In a few months Russia's war with Germany may be over. The work on uranium will then undoubtedly be given a high priority there but it will perhaps still not be carried out on a large industrial scale until we detonate our first atomic bomb and thus demonstrate the success of this development. For a few years after that we shall almost certainly be ahead of Russia. But even if we assume that we could keep ahead of her in this development all the time, this may neither offer us protection from attack nor necessarily give us substantial advantage in case of war ... years from now.

... years from now Russia may have accumulated enough of some of the active elements which may be used for constructing atomic bombs to have an equivalent to - - - - -  
- - - - -  
- - - - -

Clearly, if such bombs were available, it is not necessary to bomb our cities from the air in order to destroy them. All that is necessary is to place a comparatively small number of such bombs in each of our major cities and to detonate them at some later time.

The United States has a very long coast-line which will make it possible to smuggle in such bombs in peacetime and to carry them by truck into our cities. The long coast-line, the structure of our society, and our very heterogeneous population may make an effective control of such "traffic" virtually impossible. One can easily visualize how a "friendly" power in time of peace may have such bombs placed in all of our major cities under the guidance of agents. This might be done free from aggressive intent. Such a power might know or suspect that we have accumulated a quantity of atomic bombs and fear our defenses are so strong that after the outbreak of hostilities it would be difficult to reach our cities by air. In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult for its "government" to refuse to take "precautions" which its "army" considers necessary. . . .

So far it has not been possible to devise any methods which would enable us to detect hidden atomic bombs buried in the ground or otherwise efficiently protected against detection.

If there should be great progress in the development of rockets after this war, it is conceivable that it will become possible to drop atomic

bombs on the cities of the United States from very great distances by means of rockets.

The weakness of the position of the United States will largely be due to the very high concentration of its manufacturing capacity and of its population in cities. Thirty million people live here in cities of over 250,000. This concentration is so pronounced that the destruction of the cities may easily mean the end of our ability to resist. Keeping constantly ahead of the Russians in our production of these heavy elements will not restore us to a strong position. No quantity of these "active" materials which we may accumulate will protect us from attack and so far as retaliation is concerned, we might not be able to do more than to destroy the large cities of Russia which are few in number and the economic importance of which is in no way comparable to the economic importance of our own cities. Thus it would appear that we would not gain an overwhelmingly strong position in a war with Russia merely by accumulating an enormous quantity of these elements or by increasing, as we might, the efficiency of our bombs from ----- to a much higher value.

The strong position of the United States in the world in the past thirty years was essentially due to the fact that the United States could out-produce every other country in heavy armaments. It takes a very large number of tanks, airplanes and guns to bring about a decision in a war and as long as tanks, airplanes and guns are the major instruments of war the large production capacity of the United States gives it an advantage which may be considered decisive.

The existence of atomic bombs means the end of the strong position of the United States in this respect. From now on the destructive power which can be accumulated by other countries as well as the United States can easily reach the level at which all the cities of the "enemy can



be destroyed in one single sudden attack. The expenditure in money and material which is necessary to reach this level is so small that any of the major powers can easily afford it provided . . . For us to accumulate active materials in quantities beyond that necessary to destroy the cities of the "enemy" would probably give us some advantage in the war, but it is difficult to say whether the importance of such "excess" amounts of material would be really substantial. Out-producing the "enemy" might therefore not necessarily increase our strength very much.

The greatest danger arising out of a competition between the United States and Russia, which would lead to a rapid accumulation of vast quantities of atomic bombs in both countries, consists in the possibility of the outbreak of a preventive war. Such a war might be the outcome of the fear that the other country might strike first and no amount of good will on the part of both nations might be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of a war if such an explosive situation were allowed to develop.

One of the questions that has to be considered is whether it might be possible to set up some system of controls of the production of these active materials. Such controls would ultimately have to extend to every territory on the earth. Whether it is politically and technically feasible to set up effective controls and what we could do to improve our chances in this respect are questions that urgently require study and decisions. Some further remarks on these questions are made below, but other considerations might be put forward as soon as the question receives the attention of the Government.

A system of controls could be considered successful only if we could count on a period of grace in case the controls were denounced or obstructed by one of the major powers. This means that the system would have to be of such a nature that at least . . . would lapse between the time the nations began to convert their installations for the purpose of manufacturing atomic bombs and the time such bombs became available in quantity.

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## SYSTEMS OF CONTROL OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED

From a formal point of view all countries may be considered as potential enemies, but it is perhaps not too optimistic to assume that we may disregard the possibility of a war with Great Britain in the next fifteen years. It appears, however, rather unlikely that jointly with Great Britain we could police the world and thus prevent by force the manufacture of all of the "active materials" anywhere in the world, including Russia.

It might perhaps be possible to set up jointly with Great Britain and Russia some sort of joint control of the manufacture of the active materials everywhere in the world if we could get Russia to agree to such a control which of necessity would have to extend to her territory. The purpose of such a control would be to prevent the active elements from becoming available in a form in which they could be used for the manufacture of atomic bombs. This would not necessarily mean that the development of atomic power has to be suppressed but only that the elements involved must not be prepared in certain forms and degree of purity.

This point raises the following question: What forms of atomic power can we permit to be organized if we want to make sure that the available materials and facilities cannot easily be converted for the manufacture of atomic bombs? Some thought has already been given to this question with the following result.

There are two types of active materials. Materials of the first type can be diluted by the abundant isotope of uranium in such a way as to rule out the possibility of using them for atomic bombs while leaving unimpaired the usefulness of the materials for industrial purposes. A chemical separation from the diluting material would be impossible and a conversion into materials which can be used for atomic bombs would take . . .

Material of the second type which can be used for atomic bombs can be "denatured" by . . . Whether more elaborate methods can be worked out which will permit the detonation of the denatured material is a question which would have to be carefully scrutinized. These lines merely serve to indicate that there might perhaps be a satisfactory solution

to the problem of reconciling the requirements of safety of the United States with the desire not to hamper the development of atomic power for industrial purposes. Unfortunately it is by no means sure that a satisfactory solution of this problem is in fact possible. It would be much easier, safer, and would require a much less tight control to arrest the development of atomic power by scrapping and outlawing the large and easily visible installations which characterize the first stage of this development.

#### CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS COULD BE CONSIDERED

If Russia, the United States and other countries were willing to forego the use of atomic power for peacetime purposes, one could have a system of control that would be fairly simple since it would be almost sufficient to control the movements of raw materials. Ores of uranium would have to be mined under control and transported to some "neutral" territory. Whether or not it would be permitted to have in a neutral territory installations belonging to . . . and atomic power plants, is a question of minor importance. It appears likely that if the major powers were willing to forego the use of atomic power, a system of controls could be set up without encountering too great difficulties.

#### AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF CONTROLS WOULD HAVE TO BE MUCH TIGHTER

On the other hand, if the United States, Russia, and other countries should have atomic power installations within their territory, a very tight system of control would be needed in order to make sure that the nations would not have to face a sudden attack by atomic bombs. For a control of this sort to be effective, it would be necessary that our agents and the agents of Great Britain move freely around in Russia, be permitted to keep contacts with Russian civilians, secretly employ Russian civilians for the purpose of obtaining information, and have entry into every factory or shop throughout the vast territory of Russia.

That there may be dangerous loopholes in control systems which might be set up is illustrated by events that took place in Germany after the first World War. At that time, there were many Germans who were willing to give information to the Inter-Allied Commission about violations of the control regulations, but those who actually did so were publicly tried under the German Espionage Law and were given heavy sentences. The Treaty of Versailles did not stipulate that the German Espionage Law must be revoked.

Clearly, it would be desirable to create a situation which would permit us to appeal in various ways to physicists and engineers everywhere for information that would uncover violations of the controls. This would give us additional assurance that such violations would be detected but it presupposes that we succeed in creating conditions in which we would guarantee the personal safety of those who volunteer such information and the safety of their families.

Since Russia cannot be expected to agree to such a control unless she obtains the same rights of control in the United States and Great Britain the question whether Congress and the people of the United States are willing to agree to such a control might become of paramount importance.

#### HOW COULD RUSSIA BEST BE PERSUADED?

As to our chances of persuading the Russians to accept mutual control, much may depend on the proper timing of our approach to Russia. It would appear that such an approach would have to be made immediately after we demonstrated the potency of atomic bombs.

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Events may be expected to move so fast that if it is intended to reach an agreement with Russia and other countries such an agreement would have to be complete before the next presidential elections.

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IF THE CONTROL IS INTERFERED WITH

While it may be a great step forward to establish a tight control on the atomic power development by a reciprocal agreement with Great Britain and Russia and extend it to all territories of the world, yet we cannot disregard the possibility that one of the major powers, for instance Russia, after a few years - during which the controls may have operated quite successfully - may begin to place difficulties in the way of an effective control of activities conducted in its own territory. It would be quite essential that the people of this country and the world be brought to understand from the start that any difficulties which any nation may place in the way of the established controls would have to be considered as tantamount to a "declaration of war".

Such a "declaration of war" would have the effect that the United States and other countries involved would at once begin to manufacture atomic bombs. If up to that time the control had been effective, it would take ---- to convert the materials and installations involved in the utilization of atomic power to the manufacture of bombs. In such an "armament race" in which all countries would have to start, so to speak, from scratch, the position of the United States might be quite favorable, provided the development of atomic power had been kept up at a high level.

Clearly if any major power deliberately wants to start a war, there will be a war and all that we can hope to achieve by the reciprocal control which we have discussed is that a war may not break out as a result of an armament race.

Still, it would seem that if the situation were generally understood there might be some hope that having succeeded in setting up a system of reciprocal control and having kept it in operation for a few years,

neither the United States nor Great Britain nor Russia would attempt to interfere with this system of control in such a manner that its acts would be considered by the other partners as a menace. We would then perhaps have a chance of living through this century without having our cities destroyed.

An attempt to manufacture atomic bombs undertaken by any of the smaller countries would be of minor importance since it could be met by immediate armed intervention using ordinary methods of warfare such as tanks and airplanes.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS

In discussing our postwar situation the greatest attention was given in this memorandum to the role that Russia might play. This was not done because it was assumed that Russia may have aggressive intentions not rather because it was assumed that if an agreement can be reached with Russia, it will be possible to extend the system of controls to every country in the world.

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(End)

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MPTH

FROM THE HUTCHINSES



*hurr.*

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois

April 19, 1948

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
20 North Wacker Drive  
Chicago 6, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

I am writing to ask whether you would care to take the initiative in bringing into existence a group that would make an effort in the next few months to divert this nation from its present course, which is clearly headed for war. I am thinking of a group which would be able to provide leadership for those (and there must be many) who by now realize that the course which the United States government has pursued at Potsdam and since Potsdam cannot lead to peace.

This policy might lead to an early war, if Russia adopts the philosophy that offense is the best defense, and it will lead to a late war, if Russia is inclined to compromise and we are thus lead into a period of armed peace. To the extent that we can foresee the form, scope, and duration of an early war with Russia, we are faced with <sup>a</sup> the most disconcerting forecast. On the other hand, no one can foresee the scope of a late war, to which an armed peace would eventually lead; all we know with certainty in this respect is that such a war will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

In suggesting the formation of such a group I do not have in mind one which thinks in terms of a truce between Russia and the U.S., but rather a group which recognizes the need for a stable peace, and has some conception of the prerequisites of such a peace. A truce may be obtained through appeasement, but generosity exercised at the expense of other nations, which is the very essence of appeasement, does not form a sound basis for a stable peace. Nor is the transformation of democracies like Czechoslovakia into police states compatible

April 19, 1948

with enduring peace.

Our best hope of obtaining a stable peace would lie in a fresh approach to Russia, which a new Administration might undertake, after this year's elections. ~~In a sense, the American people must not be held accountable for the policies of the Truman administration, since they did not elect Mr. Truman as their president, and the new administration could and should take the position that cooperation with Russia has not failed, but rather that it has never really been tried. The new administration could go back to where matters stood at the time of Roosevelt's death; and should perhaps go back further, to where they stood before Yalta, or even before Teheran.~~

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The new approach to Russia should start from the basic premise that a stable peace can be established only if we create conditions under which Russia has strong incentives for continued cooperation with the U.S. and the countries in western Europe. Agreements to which Russia is a party will safeguard the peace only if we have created conditions in which Russia would be willing and eager to renew these agreements each year, even though she had a legal right to abrogate them.

It should be possible to create such conditions within the framework of a large scale economic reconstruction of the whole of Europe, American assistance to this reconstruction on a twenty years basis, re-establishment of trade relations between eastern and western Europe at an early date, and the settlement of the problem of the international control of atomic energy, not as an isolated issue, but within the framework of general disarmament.

The measures of inspection which must necessarily accompany any disarmament agreement will impose on Russia conditions which are difficult for her to accept, for as long as war between Russia and the U.S. is considered probable, the iron curtain remains Russia's most important strategic defense. Inspection, being essential, we cannot give in on this point; but we could make many concessions to

April 19, 1948

Russia along the lines of general disarmament which would alleviate Russia's fears of being attacked, and thereby make inspection acceptable to her. We could make *such* concessions, for the strength of the U.S. does not lie in a large standing army, or in weapons which may be stockpiled in peacetime. The strength of the U.S. lies in her production capacity which, given a unity of purpose, offers her a reasonable assurance that, if the disarmament agreement were abrogated, and an armament race were to start from scratch, the U.S. would not be defeated in the long war that would ensue.

From its very beginning at Potsdam the Truman administration ~~showed its~~ *instead*  
~~utter unconcern~~ *of showing concern* for the welfare of Russia, and approached Russia as a potential enemy.

XXX  
 If the new administration were to approach Russia in a different spirit, if it were to approach her as a potential friend, showing concern for the welfare of Russia, showing willingness to create a situation in which Russia would have an important stake in the economic reconstruction of Europe, indicating determination to build up an organized world community of which Russia would be an important part, then the new approach might have some chance of meeting with a favorable Russian response, and of leading to a stable peace.

But, however sincere and wholehearted the new approach may be, none of us can say with certainty that it would succeed. In this respect, all we can say is that if a really adequate attempt to establish peace met with an unfavorable Russian response, and we had failed to remove the danger of war, and war came, at least such a war would be fought on our side by a country which was united, rather than by a country where a large section of our population *from* opposes the war, and another large section supports it, but does so with a guilty conscience.

The group which I have in mind ought to focus its attention on the main issue, and should not be diverted from it by dealing with secondary problems. The

April 19, 1948

group should not, for instance, take issue with requests of the Truman administration for increased military appropriations. These appropriations are asked for by the present Administration in order to implement their foreign policy, which we think is a bad one. Our task should be to change that policy, rather than to grumble about its implementation, or to criticize the details of implementation on the grounds of expediency.

Increased military appropriations are asked by the present Administration on the grounds that preparedness will keep the peace. This, we know, preparedness will not do. But preparedness of a certain kind may help to win the war to which the present policy may lead in the near future, and which, after all, our group might not be able to prevent. If we cannot prevent such a war, we would rather win it than lose it, and we should not create the impression that we feel otherwise.

The specific tasks to which the group could devote itself, are the following:

1. Carry to the public in the next few months the gospel of peace. The view that a stable peace is necessary and possible can be effectively presented only if we are willing explicitly to condemn the policy which the present Administration followed at Potsdam and since Potsdam. This the group should be willing to do.

The group should try to reach the public

- a. by speeches given, at the outset, on the campuses of the major universities
  - b. by press releases
  - c. by conferences with the editorial staffs of newspapers, and columnists
2. Enlighten the public as to the form, scope, and duration of the

April 19, 1948

war in which we might find ourselves entangled in the near future.

3. Help to promote and encourage serious studies of the prerequisites of a stable peace with Russia, which would take into account the real needs of Russia and the U.S., as well as of other countries involved.
4. Keep in personal contact with those who are genuinely concerned that the next President upon taking office make an adequate attempt to bring about a stable peace, and <sup>who</sup> are in a key position with respect to the nominations and elections. Keep in personal contact, also, with the presidential candidates, both declared and potential.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois

April 26, 1948

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Dear Mr. Hutchins:

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This policy might lead to an early war, if Russia adopts the philosophy that offense is the best defense, and it will lead to a late war, if Russia is inclined to compromise and we are thus lead into a period of armed peace. To the extent that we can foresee the form, scope, and duration of an early war with Russia, we are faced with a disconcerting forecast. On the other hand, no one can foresee the scope of a late war, to which an armed peace would eventually lead; all we know with certainty in this respect is that such a war will be all the more terrible the later it comes.

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Our best hope of obtaining a stable peace would lie in a fresh

April 26, 1948

approach to Russia, which a new Administration might undertake, after this year's elections. A new Administration could and should take the position that cooperation with Russia has not failed, but rather that it has never been really tried. The new Administration could go back to where matters stood at the time of Roosevelt's death; and should perhaps go back further, to where they stood before Yalta, or even before Teheran.

The new approach to Russia should start from the basic premise that a stable peace can be established only if we create conditions under which Russia has strong incentives for continued cooperation with the U.S. and the countries in western Europe. Agreements to which Russia is a party will safeguard the peace only if we have created conditions in which Russia would be willing and eager to renew these agreements each year, even though she had a legal right to abrogate them.

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But, however sincere and wholehearted the new approach may be, none of us can say with certainty that it would succeed. In this respect, all we can say is that if a really adequate attempt to establish peace met with an unfavorable Russian response, and we had failed to remove the danger of war, and war came, at least such a war would be fought on our side by a country which was united, rather than by a country where a large section of our population opposed the war, and another large section supported it, but did so with a guilty conscience.

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Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

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do. It is a certain kind of help to win the war to which the present Administration is committed. If we cannot prevent such a war, we would rather win it than lose it, and we should not create the impression that we feel otherwise. The specific tasks to which the group could devote itself, are the

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- Charles B. ...
- James ...
- Morris Wafford
- Clyde Kluckhohn
- Russell
- Quinn D...
- Goodrich
- Langdon Curran
- Lubin
- Marshall ...
- Doris P. ...
- Hubert ...
- Frederic ...
- W. H. ...
- F. J. White

Pratt's oil  
 Vincent's

List attached to letter from Dr. Szilard to Mr. Hutchins of April 26, 1948

Mark van Doren	Nelson Rockefeller
James Patton	Robert LaFollette
Charles Merriam	Simon <del>Rockefeller</del> <i>Rockford</i>
Henry B. Cabot	Al Paul Lafton
John Cowles	Chester Bowles
Paul C. Smith	Abe Spanel
Jonathan Daniels	Walter Reuther
John Dicke	Palmer Hoyt
Frank Graham	Max Radin
Hazard	Whitelow Reed
Mark Etheridge	Frank Aydelotte
Abe Fortas	Laughlin Currie
Archibald McLeish	Henry Seidel Canby
Gilbert White	R. M. Hutchins
Michael Straight	Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Robert Young	Felix Frankfurter
Chester Barnard	Chat Patterson
Robert Redfield	Dick Bowling
Clarence C. Pickett	Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.
Bishop Oxnan	Stringfellow Barr
Albert Einstein	
Humphrey	
Wilson Wyatt	
Jerome Frank	
James P. Warburg	
Frank Murphy	
Stettinius	

List attached to letter from Dr. Szilard to Mr. Hutchins of April 26, 1948

*Dr. Fran [unclear]*

*Gen. H. [unclear]*

Mark van Doren

James Patton

Charles Merriam

Henry B. C. bot

John Cowles

Paul C. Smith

Jonathan Daniels ✓

John Dick ✓

Frank Graham ✓

Hazard

Mark Etheridge

Abe Fortas

Archibald McLeish

Gilbert White

Michael Straight

Robert Young ✓

Chester Barnard ✓

Robert Redfield

Clarence C. Pickett

Bishop Oxnan ✓

Albert Einstein

Humphrey ✓

Wilson Wyatt ✓

Jerome Frank

James P. Warburg ✓

Frank Murphy

~~Watt~~

Nelson Rockefeller

Robert LaFollette ✓

Simon Rekind

Al Paul Lafton

Chester Bowles ✓

Abe Spanel

Walter Reuther

Palmer Hoyt ✓

Max Radin

Whitelow Reed

Frank Aydelotte

Laughlin Currie

Henry Seidel Canby

R. M. Hutchins ✓

Hamilton Fish Armstrong ✓

Felix Frankfurter

Chat Patterson

Dick Bowling

Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.

Stringfellow Barr

*Anna Rosenberg [unclear] \**  
*444 [unclear] \**  
*Prinzberg [unclear] \**

*[Summer Welles]*

*[Observer Lee]*

*Henry Kober*  
*Boston*

*Barbara*

[Handwritten bracket]

*Morris Rosenfeld*

*Arthur Paul*

*Mylo Perkins*

*(A.D.A.)*

*Robert Wagner jr.*  
*(unclear)*

*Arthur Schlesinger jr.*  
*(D.P.A.)*



1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois

June 8, 1948

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
20 North Wacker Drive  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

I regret to say that so far I have done very little towards exploring effectively with what response the creation of a peace mongering organization would be expected to meet. The reason for this is that biology became rather demanding, since we had to finish up the current experiments to meet a deadline.

In the meantime Edward Shils is getting more and more impatient with the fact that no one is saving the world, and we have repeatedly had conversations about the advisability of trying to arrange a three day discussion concerning the prerequisites of a stable peace with Russia, on the assumption that it would be possible to get Eisenhower to sit in on the last day.

Clearly the probability that Eisenhower will be the next President is small, and moreover the probability that his sitting in on such a discussion would make him "see the light" is not too high either; but in this business of saving the world, we necessarily have to operate within the narrow margin of small probabilities.

I am enclosing a list of persons whose participation would be desirable if such a meeting were in fact held, and I should like to raise with you the following questions:

1. Do you think that such a meeting would be desirable, if possible?

*T up with  
Lilkin  
Northbrook  
Richard Fogarty  
W. W. ...  
April ...  
Chris ...  
Linn ...*

Mr. R. M. Hutchins

-2-

June 8, 1948

2. Do you see any way to bring it about, and get Eisenhower to attend the last day of the meeting?
3. Would you be willing to take the initiative for the calling of such a meeting?

I wonder whether your conversation with Chester Bowles brought forward any new points of view in connection with any of the things we have discussed.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS:am  
Enclosure  
cc: Edward Levi  
Edward Shils

List Attached to Letter to Mr. Hutchins of June 8, 1948

Chester Bowles

James P. Warburg

Jerome Frank

Harris Wofford

Abram Bergson (Russian Institute, Columbia)

Clyde Kluckhohn (Russian Institute, Harvard)

David Gre~~ne~~

Lauchlin Currie

Marshall McDuffie

James Patton

F. G. White (Haverford)

Joseph Barnes

*Strong fellow Barr*

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois

June 16, 1948

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
20 North Wacker Drive  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Many thanks for your note of the 14th. I shall advise Ed Shils accordingly.

I am trying to figure out whether this business of saving the world is being left undone because it is too difficult for most of us, or rather because of the doubt in our minds whether the world is worth saving.

Enclosed you will find something I wrote for my own amusement. It is of no importance, and probably too "indelicat" to be printable.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS:am  
Enc.

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois

June 16, 1948

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
20 North Wacker Drive  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Many thanks for your note of the 14th. I shall advise Ed Shils accordingly.

I am trying to figure out whether this business of saving the world is being left undone because it is too difficult for most of us, or rather because of the doubt in our minds whether the world is worth saving.

Enclosed you will find something I wrote for my own amusement. It is of no importance, and probably too "ind<sup>x</sup>delicate" to be printable.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS:am  
Enc.

x? Grand Ambal Terminal

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO  
CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS  
THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS • *Chancellor*  
ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL • *President*  
R. W. HARRISON • *Vice-President*  
*and Dean of Faculties*  
W. C. MUNNECKE • *Vice-President*  
LYNN A. WILLIAMS, JR. • *Vice-President*


June 24, 1948

Dear Mr. Szilard:

I have read with admiration your latest scientific paper and think it by all odds the best that has come out of the Institutes yet.

Let us have more.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert Hutchins". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Mr. Leo Szilard".

Mr. Leo Szilard  
Institute of Radiobiology and Biophysics  
Faculty Exchange

3815 00

1724 60

3468 13

---

9008 70

---

Copy

THE QUADRANGLE CLUB  
CHICAGO

Dec 22 / 48

Dear Mr Hubelins

enclosed are two checks

totaling \$5000 and dated Dec 22/48  
and Jan 3<sup>rd</sup> /49 respectively. Please  
feel free to use them if in your  
judgment it is necessary or advisable  
to do so in order to put across  
the transaction which you  
mentioned to me today. I fully  
understand that they may be  
used ~~not~~ as an investment but  
a contribution which may or  
may not be deductible from  
taxable  
income.

As to <sup>(the question whether)</sup> I am  
able to afford such a  
contribution, of course I am  
not able to "afford" it since  
this sum represents more than



THE QUADRANGLE CLUB  
CHICAGO

1/3 of ~~my~~ <sup>the</sup> savings upon which  
I am at present drawing at a  
rate of \$1000 per year. But I feel  
<sup>that</sup> even less can we afford to  
let this transaction fall through  
for lack of funds.

Sincerely yours

L. R.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or preceding the address.

# WESTERN UNION

JOSEPH L. EGAN  
PRESIDENT

1201

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LC=Deferred Cable

NLT=Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

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NAO17 PD=UG CHICAGO ILL DEC 30 1244P=

LEO SZILARD, KINGS CROWN HOTEL=

420 WEST 116 ST=

VERY SORRY AM FORCED TO RETURN YOUR CHECKS BECAUSE AN INDIVIDUAL HAS APPEARED WHO IS WILLING TO PUT UP THE ENTIRE ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR THE COAL MINE. I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU. YOU ARE AN IDEAL PROFESSOR HAPPY NEW YEAR=

ROBERT M HUTCHINS=

210P.

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
July 12, 1949

Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins  
Administration Building 502  
Faculty Exchange

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Enclosed is the memorandum which I said I would send you. It concerns a question which was touched upon in a conversation I had with you before Christmas. The gist of the memorandum is that the institution of tenure should be no obstacle to a general reduction of the staff of the University by, say, 25% provided those who have tenure and are nevertheless required to leave the University would share the benefit of such a reorganization.

Enclosed is also another memorandum suggesting that the present retirement plan be cancelled and replaced by a plan of an entirely different type.

Both memoranda are in need of an apology having been written somewhat hastily in an attempt to get away from Chicago for the summer as soon as possible.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

m  
Encl.

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
January 30, 1950

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
Office of the Chancellor  
Administration Building  
University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Tomorrow I am leaving for New York, but next week when I am back, I would like to tell you about some further correspondence with Rusk, a letter from Kennan, and conversations with Archibald S. Alexander.

I am enclosing a memorandum which I sent to Dr. Coggeshall after discussing the matter with Hogness. Dr. Coggeshall suggested that I also talk to someone from the Central Administration, so I propose to make an appointment with Mr. Colwell sometime next week.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
February 7, 1950

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
Office of the Chancellor  
Administration Building  
University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

May I see you sometime this week at your convenience about the H-bomb and related matters?

Enclosed is a memorandum which I sent to Dr. Coggeshall after discussing the matter with Mr. Hogness. Coggeshall suggested that I also talk to someone from the Central Administration, and therefore I propose to make an appointment with Mr. Colwell this week.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

# BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

1126 EAST FIFTY-NINTH STREET

CHICAGO 37, ILLINOIS



November 11, 1947

MIDWAY 0800 EXTENSION 1785  
MIDWAY 10052

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
HM W 11  
Faculty Exchange

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Enclosed is an article entitled "Letter to Stalin", a memorandum written in 1945, a letter to the Editors dated November 10th and a copy of a letter addressed to the Attorney General dated October 25th, which are scheduled for publication in the BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Since the BULLETIN will probably make a release at an early date, and since it is expected that the article will be widely criticized and strongly attacked by a large section of the press, I felt that I ought to transmit to you a copy of the authentic text in advance of its publication.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

DATE April 1, 1950

TO R. M. Hutchins

DEPARTMENT

FROM Leo Szilard

DEPARTMENT

IN RE:

*Leo Szilard  
D. and class*

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Enclosed are--

- 1) copy of a letter to Mr. Einstein, your homework for Tuesday afternoon if your time permits, or otherwise for your files;
- 2) "Niccolai Machiavellnikow," written before the Russians had the bomb, for your amusement and edification;
- 3) "Kathy and the Bear," also written last summer, for the amusement of Mrs. Hutchins.

Leo Szilard

WV

April 7, 1950

Chancellor R. M. Hutchins

Leo Szilard

Presumably you have not yet come to a decision on the issue which Harry Brown and I raised a few days ago. Tomorrow, Saturday, at 11 a.m., I am leaving for Denver; and if I don't hear from you by then, Harry Brown will contact you on his return from New Orleans in the middle of next week. This will at least give you one weekend for thinking the matter over. Enclosed is, for your convenience, another copy of the memorandum.

If your decision is favorable, and if Harry and I can get together with you Monday, the 17th, I would return from Denver to Chicago on Sunday, the 16th; otherwise I wouldn't get back to Chicago until Monday, 7:50 p.m.

If necessary, I could also get back to Chicago by Saturday, the 15th, 6:30 or 7:50 p.m.

Leo Szilard



April 27, 1950

Robert M. Hutchins

Chancellor

Leo Szilard

Inst. Radiobiology and Biophysics

Enclosed is a letter which came yesterday. I am quite impressed with the earnestness of it.

While you are gone Harry Brown and I could see Marshall Field and get his acceptance (I had seen him once before). Would you ask your secretary to phone me and let me know if we should? I would then call his office for an appointment for Harry and me either for next week, in New York, or after our return from the East in Chicago.

LS/sds

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# WESTERN UNION

1201

**SYMBOLS**

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LC = Deferred Cable

NLT = Cable Night Letter

Ship Radiogram

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

The filing time shown in the date line on telegrams and day letters is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

COPY

CHICAGO  
APRIL 10, 1950JAMES PATTON  
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FARMERS UNIONVERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GENEROUS WORDS. I AM THINKING THINGS  
OVER AS CAREFULLY AS I CAN.

ROBERT M. HUTCHINS

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL  
IN THIS COLLECTION

1155 East 57th Street  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
July 11, 1950

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
Office of the Chancellor  
5801 Ellis Avenue  
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Enclosed is a letter which I have sent to Mr. Colwell, asking for reconsideration of a memorandum which I sent to him early this year.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

WV

*Aspen*

January 4, 1953

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins  
c/o Ford Foundation  
914 East Green St.  
Pasadena 1, California

Dear Mr. Hutchins,

Fred K. Hoehler has been looking for me while I was out of town and when I called him yesterday he told me that you had called him from Pasadena about a possible date for Tuesday, January 13. He said that he will see Stevenson tomorrow, January 5, and let me know if anything is arranged. I am leaving for New York on the 6th, but could be back any time if necessary and I shall leave my New York address both with Hoehler and your office in Pasadena.

Now, the purpose of this letter is merely to say that, contrary to what you might think, I am not clear of where Hoehler's ideas or wishes end and those of Stevenson begin, why Stevenson wanted to meet you, and what precisely Hoehler had in mind when he said that Stevenson would like the four of us to meet. There is of course no doubt as to Hoehler's good intentions.

The ignorance which I here profess is born out by the following record:

When I was in touch with Hoehler before the elections, at the time when I talked to you over the telephone before visiting Aspen, I had a rather clear conception of what we were talking about.

When Hoehler contacted me after the elections and told me that Stevenson would like us to get together on one of your visits to Chicago and when thereupon I called you in Pasadena, I thought we were still talking about the same thing. After talking to you I told Hoehler that you would let us know when you will be coming here.

When subsequently Hoehler called me and I had not heard from you, I suggested that he call you directly. You were apparently East and he tried to reach you in Washington and New York without success. Thereupon I volunteered to locate you and reached you in Pasadena. You told me of Stevenson's phone call to you in New York and of the tentative date which you had made with him. I relayed this to Hoehler who had not known of that date. At this point I was uncertain whether Stevenson's phone call to you in New York had any connection with the things that Hoehler had discussed with me.

I believe that Hoehler tried to arrange for me to meet Stevenson before your tentative date but no appointment was made and Hoehler told me afterwards that Stevenson did not get to see you.

Since I have not met Stevenson up to now and do not expect to meet him in the near future, I expect that my state of ignorance will be undiminished at the time you plan to pass through Chicago.

Naturally it would be a pleasure to see you whether for a good purpose or to no purpose, either in Chicago or in New York, if your time permits.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

LS/llt

*copy original  
from C-6*

University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois  
November 6, 1950

Dear Mr. Oppenheimer:

I talked to Mr. McDonnell, the benefactor in St. Louis, who I mentioned to you. He expressed great interest in financing a conference to be held at the Institute for the purpose of exploring possible next steps.

I am very grateful to you for your kindness at the luncheon with Chester Barnard and Mortimer Adler.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Robert M. Hutchins

Mr. J. R. Oppenheimer  
The Institute for Advanced Study  
Princeton, N. J.

November 5, 1954

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL  
IN THIS COLLECTION

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
Fund For The Republic  
1 East 54th St  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

I hope to catch you one of these days on one of your <sup>MacDuffie</sup> trips East. ~~In~~ <sup>MacDuffie</sup> the meantime, I am writing you about Marshall ~~MacDuffie~~ whom you, perhaps, remember, since he was at the second conference on Atomic Energy which we had at the University of Chicago, and ~~he~~ spoke there about his experiences with the Russians in the Ukraine. He was Director of the <sup>UNRRA</sup> ~~UNRRA~~ <sup>Central</sup> Commission in the Ukraine after the war. ~~I~~ <sup>MacDuffie</sup> have known him for a long time and found him to be a very useful citizen, intelligent, upright <sup>well balanced in his views</sup> and always ready to serve.

~~He~~ <sup>MacDuffie</sup> is now thinking of going into law practice but I do not believe that this is really a wise thing for him to do, since I doubt that it will give him the feeling that he is doing something meaningful. ~~I~~ <sup>MacDuffie</sup> do not know <sup>of course</sup> whether the Fund for the Republic can qualify under the title of <sup>from this point of view</sup> "doing something meaningful" or even whether anything useful can be done these days with a <sup>lot</sup> ~~bank~~ full of money with any kind of strings attached. ~~But~~ <sup>if you do know where you are going</sup> if you do know where you are going, and if you have any further need for key personnel, you might want to have a chat with <sup>MacDuffie</sup> ~~MacDuffie~~. You could reach him ~~either~~ <sup>MacDuffie</sup> through me, or ~~better~~ directly at

Penthouse E  
152 East 94th St  
New York City  
Telephone Fi 8-6396

*P* The enclosed sheet gives you some additional information about <sup>MaeDuffie</sup> ~~McDuffy~~ *you are interested in.*  
With kind regards.

Very sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS/mr  
encl

COPIED FROM ORIGINAL  
IN THIS COLLECTION



*file*

King's Crown Hotel  
420 West 116th Street  
New York, N. Y.  
February 23, 1955

Dr. R. M. Hutchins  
1443 Wentworth Avenue  
Pasadena, California

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

After I left your office, I called at Rockefeller Foundation and found that Warren Weaver will be out of the country until about March 7th. I shall contact him after his return and let you know how I made out.

Enclosed is a copy of the short article which I wrote for the Security (April) issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Perhaps you would wish to send it on to the New York Bar Association for their consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

LS:hw

Encl.

(Identical letter sent to Mr. W. H. Ferry.)

P.S. I plan to be in Denver at 1116 Kearney Street, Denver 20, Colo., telephone FR. 7-9683, until Monday, February 28th, and then go to Chicago for a few days. I shall be in New York by March 5th.

LS

The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

King's Crown Hotel  
420 West 116th Street  
New York, New York

March 18, 1955

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins  
1443 Wentworth Avenue  
Pasadena, California

Dear Dr. Hutchins:

I am somewhat overwhelmed by the response which I got to the Letter to the Editor that appeared in the New York Times on February 6, and it has put me somewhat on the spot. Having appealed to others to do something, now others appeal to me to do something. I believe that I now have to try to set up a project that may have some chance of success, or else show that I cannot do it.

The attached clipping is taken from the Denver Post which reprinted the Letter from the New York Times. Clipped to it is a Memorandum in which I have outlined what I might try to do, if the necessary funds can be obtained. Enclosed also are copies of answers from Marshall MacDuffie, Colin Clark, and Father John Cavanaugh whom I have asked whether they might be willing to serve on the Commission which is described in the Memorandum. I have not yet heard from Colonel Faymonville and Stringfellow Barr, but I had a favorable response from General Hugh B. Hester with whom I talked over the telephone.

It would be my hope that General Hester would act as Secretary of the Commission, if we succeed in setting up the project.

I do not anticipate any difficulty in finding a University or another tax-exempt institution to accept the administration of the funds, if funds can be obtained. However, I am quite skeptical about obtaining funds from the large, old established Foundations for such an unconventional project, and I do not believe that a more conventional approach could bring about the desired result.

The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

King's Crown Hotel  
New York, New York  
March 18, 1955  
If you can think of some private person who might be of help and who is sufficiently interested to wish to discuss this matter in greater detail, would you please let me know?

Dr. Robert M. Hutchins  
1443 Westworth Avenue  
Pasadena, California

I was in Chicago and returned to Denver, but I shall be back at

Dear Dr. Hutchins: I tested the very latest address on March 25th at my New York

I am somewhat overwhelmed by the response to the letter to

the Editor that appeared in the New York Times on February 6, and it has put

me somewhat on the spot. Having appealed to others to do something, now others

appeal to me to do something. I believe that I now have to try to set up a

Leo Szilard

project that may have some chance of success, or else show that I cannot do it.

Enclosures

The attached clipping is taken from the Denver Post which reprinted the

letter from the New York Times. Clipped to it is a Memorandum in which I have

outlined what I might try to do, if the necessary funds can be obtained.

Enclosed also are copies of answers from Marshall MacDuffie, Colin Clark, and

Father John Cavanaugh whom I have asked whether they might be willing to serve

on the Commission which is described in the Memorandum. I have not yet heard

from Colonel Raymondville and Stringfellow Barr, but I had a favorable response

from General Hugh B. Hester with whom I talked over the telephone.

It would be my hope that General Hester would act as Secretary of the

Commission, if we succeed in setting up the project.

I do not anticipate any difficulty in finding a University or another tax-

exempt institution to accept the administration of the funds, if funds can be

obtained. However, I am quite skeptical about obtaining funds from the large, old

established Foundations for such an unconventional project, and I do not believe

that a more conventional approach could bring about the desired result.

**T H E F U N D F O R T H E R E P U B L I C , I N C .**

1444 WENTWORTH AVENUE, PASADENA 5, CALIFORNIA      MAIL ADDRESS: BIN H, PASADENA 15, CALIFORNIA

SYCAMORE 3-6121


March 25, 1955

Mr. Leo Szilard  
King's Crown Hotel  
420 West 116th Street  
New York, New York

Dear Leo:

I will think. I don't think much of  
the foundations. You know the individuals  
as well as I. I'll be glad to help if you  
let me know what you want done.

Sincerely yours,



Robert M. Hutchins  
President

THE FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, INC.  
1444 WENTWORTH AVENUE, PASADENA 2, CALIFORNIA MAIL ADDRESS: BIN H. PASADENA 12, CALIFORNIA

SYCAMORE 2-2121

March 22, 1955

Mr. Leo Ballard  
420 West 115th Street  
New York, New York

Dear Leo:


NY Rosenblatt

EN 23723

Work

ENC 7 8748

Sincerely yours,



Robert M. Hutchins  
President

August 1, 1955

Mr. R. M. Hutchins  
Fund for the Republic  
1 East 54th Street  
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

Humphrey is Chairman of the Sub-Committee and he asked me for lunch today, no doubt as a result of your telegram.

On those other matters, the present plan is to try to arrange for a 2-weeks conference, including those who are potentially members of the "working group" and to decide at the conference whether the inquiry should be set up, as well as to see whether a sufficiently strong group can agree on premises upon which the "working group" might base its deliberations and also agree to serve on the "working group."

Attached you will find a write-up of the project, including my own personal version of what the premises could be. Enclosed also is a rough draft of a paper which is only loosely connected with this project.

With many thanks and best wishes for your trip to Europe.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

LS:srr

P.S.

Enclosed is a list of names whose availability for the conference I am slowly exploring. I have written to Tawney mainly because both you and Colin Clark thought so highly of him.

# Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California — WOODLAND 9-3281

New York Office

133 East 54th Street, New York 22, New York — PLaza 3-1340


December 11, 1959

Prof. Leo Szilard  
The New York Hospital  
New York, New York

Dear Leo:

I have a report from my daughter, who is married to one of your disciples, that you are not feeling well. I hope very much that she is misinformed. I want you to know that I am thinking and worrying about you. When you get out of the hospital, why don't you come out to Santa Barbara at our expense and recuperate? It would be wonderful to see you again.

As ever yours,



Robert M. Hutchins  
President

acknowledged ✓  
Hofel Jan 6/60  
12-14-59

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California

January 8, 1960

Mr. Leo Szilard  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois

Dear Leo:


I don't like the way you talk. I  
think you had better hop on a jet and come out  
to see me. Delightful climate. Luxurious  
accommodations. Rejuvenating conversation.  
Flow of reason. Feast of soul.

Also many fine doctors.

Also many admirers.

Make it soon.

As ever yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bob", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Robert M. Hutchins  
President



August 17, 1960.

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins,  
Box 4068,  
Santa Barbara, Calif.

Dear Mr. Hutchins,

Enclosed is my political testament, written in fictional form, which might perhaps amuse you. What I am sending you is an unedited version, still exceedingly rough but, apart from having it edited, I do not plan any major revisions. This piece will be published, together with some other short, whimsical pieces, by Simon & Schuster.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Enclosure

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions

The Fund for the Republic, Inc.

Box 4068, Santa Barbara, California

August 23, 1960

Dr. Leo Szilard  
The Enrico Fermi Institute  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago 37, Illinois


Dear Leo:

All I can say about your political testament, and there is no higher praise, is that it is the pure milk, or cream, of the Szilardian word.

I laughed and cried at the same time. I laughed because it was funny, and I cried because it was true. I also cried because I was reminded in every line of all the conversations we had had and of all the instruction and pleasure you have given me.

I hope you won't mind if I come to see you when I am next in New York.

Sincerely yours,



Robert M. Hutchins  
President

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PROFESSOR LEO SZILARD, HOTEL DUPONT PLAZA

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GLAD TO SEE YOU ON JANUARY 22ND OR 23RD OR BOTH

BOB HUTCHINS.

*file engagement*

Washington, D.C.  
1 January 1962

Mr. Robert M. Hutchins  
Box 4068  
Santa Barbara, California

Dear Mr. Hutchins:

You may have heard of the experiment which I am conducting to determine whether a certain kind of political action would have enough support to be effective. Enclosed is the current version of my Speech which I give in front of student audiences. I am going to rewrite it before I have it printed.

All I can say at present is that the press comments are quite uniformly favorable. There was an extensive write-up in the New York Times based on the erroneous assumption that I have started a Movement. There was a correct and very friendly report on one of the 6 o'clock ABC Television News Reports, broadcast coast-to coast from New York. A clipping from Commonweal is attached.

I would very much like to discuss all this with you and get your advice when I am on the West Coast. My wife and I could visit Santa Barbara leaving from Los Angeles in the morning or

early afternoon on Saturday, January 20th and stay over the weekend and leave either Monday or Tuesday.

I wonder if you could send me a telegram to my Washington address to let me know if this time would be convenient to you. If it is convenient I would still check with you over the telephone, calling from Los Angeles on January 17th in order to see if your plans have changed.

Sincerely,

Leo Szilard  
Hotel Dupont Plaza  
Washington 6, D.C.