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STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1965-69 DEFENSE PROGRAM AND 1965 DEFENSE BUDGET

JANUARY 27, 1964

STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES

The Strategic Retaliatory Forces are designed to carry out the long-range strategic mission and to carry the main burden of battle in general nuclear war. These forces include the long-range bombers, the air-to-ground and decoy missiles, and the refueling tankers; the land-based and submarine-based strategic missiles; and the systems for their command and control. They do not include certain other U. S. nuclear forces capable of reaching targets well inside the Communist Bloc - namely, the deployed tactical air units and carrier-based attack aircraft. Although the targeting of these forces is coordinated with those of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces, they are not taken into account in computing the requirements for the latter because they are intended primarily for other purposes.

A. THE REQUIREMENT

The size and character of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces are influenced importantly by the basic strategy they are designed to support. This strategy has been the subject of a great deal of public discussion during the last year - as it most properly should be, considering its grave importance. But the wide differences in perspective that this discussion has revealed would seem to indicate that we have failed to convey, at least to certain important sections of the American public, the basic fundamentals of the strategic problem confronting our Nation in this nuclear age.

At one extreme there are the proponents of the "overkill" theory who argue that the United States already has enough nuclear weapons to destroy all of the major cities of the Soviet Union several times over, even after absorbing the first blow and that, therefore, no further investments in the Strategic Retaliatory Forces are required or can be justified. At the other extreme there are the proponents of what one might call the "full first strike" theory who believe that we should build a strategic force that would enable us, if we struck first, to so reduce Soviet retaliatory power that the damage it could then do to U.S. population and industry would be brought down to an "acceptable" level, what ever that might be.

The proponents of the "overkill" theory would, in effect, restrict our strategic forces to those required for retaliation against cities only - with the calculation assuming near optimum conditions. This is not a new concept. I understand that it has been debated within the Defense Department for many years before I came to the Pentagon, but I know of no responsible official within the Department who would support it today. To serve as a maximum deterrent to nuclear war, our Strategic Retaliatory Forces must be visibly capable of fully destroying the Soviet society under all conditions of retaliation. In addition, in the event that such a war is forced upon us, they should have the power to limit the destruction of our own cities and population to the maximum extent practicable.

It is quite likely that the Soviet Union, in an attack upon the U.S. and Western Europe would not fire all of its strategic nuclear weapons in a "salvo launch". Regardless of whether the Soviets struck first at our cities or first at our military installations or at both simultaneously, it is probable that the launching of their bombers and missiles would extend over a sufficient period of time for us to receive the first blow, to strike back not only at Soviet cities, if that be our choice, but also at the elements of their forces that had not yet been launched. To achieve this capability, we must have a force considerably larger than that which might be needed simply to destroy Soviet cities.

Believers in the "overkill" theory, however, argue that the U.S. would have already been gravely damaged by the initial attack, that it would be very difficult to destroy the enemy's residual forces, and that in any event we could not know which of their missiles had not been fired and which were the "empty holes". Therefore, they conclude that we should not even try to destroy the enemy's residual forces.

Certainly, the U.S. would be greatly damaged by the initial wave of a nuclear attack. And certainly, as time goes on and the Soviet Union continues to harden its missile sites and continues to build missile-firing submarines, it will become increasingly difficult to destroy a substantial portion of the residual forces. I have made no attempt in any of my statements to the Congress to "sugar-coat" these hard facts of life in the nuclear age. Indeed, I was chided in some quarters for applying the term "grim prospect" to this reality. But it is one thing to recognize the facts of life; it is quite another to throw up one's hands and not even make the attempt to save what we can of our Nation and our society.

Over the last two and one-half years we have made many comprehensive studies of alternative U.S. strategic retaliatory force structures employed in a nuclear exchange with a wide range of possible Soviet forces and under a wide variety of assumptions pertaining to the outbreak of war and U.S. and Soviet operational factors. In every pertinent case we found that forces in excess of those needed simply to destroy Soviet cities would significantly reduce damage to the U.S. and Western Europe. And the extent to which damage to ourselves can be reduced depends importantly on the size and character of our own forces, particularly the surface-to-surface missiles such as MINUTEMAN that can reach their targets quickly. I will discuss this latter aspect in greater detail later in the statement in connection with the analysis of the overall adequacy of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces we recommend for the fiscal year 1965-69 period.

But even an assured and persuasive "cities only" capability would require forces much larger than those implied by the "overkill" theory. It is not simply a matter of calculating the number of "Hiroshima equivalents," i.e., 20 kilotons equals 100,000 fatalities and, therefore, 10 megatons equals 50 million fatalities. Carried to that extreme we would need just one 10 megaton weapon. Obviously, many other factors must be taken into account: numbers of targets and their defenses, numbers of weapons required to saturate defenses or to assure penetration, damage to our forces from enemy attack, the readiness and reliability of our own weapons, etc.

Each of these factors involves varying degrees of uncertainty, particularly when we are projecting our forces into the future. And, to cover these uncertainties, extra insurance must be provided in the program. We must be completely sure, and the Communists must be completely sure, of our ability at all times to retaliate decisively against Soviet cities, even under the worst of circumstances.

While a "cities only" strategic retaliatory force would, in our judgment, be dangerously inadequate, a full first strike" force, as I defined it earlier, is, on the basis of our estimates of the Soviet nuclear strike forces in the fiscal year 1967-69 period, simply unattainable. Moreover, I know of no responsible Pentagon official, certainly none of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who proposes such a force.

As I pointed out last year, the Soviets are hardening some of their ICBM sites and are building missile-launching submarines. Although we could have an effective capability to sink enemy submarines in a protracted war of attrition at sea, we could not have any realistic prospect of being able to destroy the major part of a Soviet submarine missile force in one quick first strike. Neither could we count, with any reasonable degree of assurance, on destroying all or almost all of the Soviet's hardened missile sites, even if we were to double or triple our forces.

Finally, a 'full first strike" capability would have to be accompanied by vast programs of anti-missile, anti-bomber, and civil defense. Even then our calculations show that fatalities would still run into tens of millions. Thus, the paramount conclusion supported by all of our studies is that for any level of force we might practicably build, and even under the most favorable circumstances to us, a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would do enormous damage to both sides.

Thus, a "damage-limiting" strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow. Such a strategy requires a force considerably larger than would be needed for a limited "cities only" strategy. While there are still some differences of judgment on just how large such a force should be, there is general agreement that it should be large enough to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination, of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites as national societies, under the worst possible circumstances of war outbreak that can reasonably be postulated, and in addition, to destroy their war-making capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our Allies.

B. PRESENT U.S. STRATEGIC RETALIATORY CAPABILITIES

By June of this year the number of ICBM and POLARIS missiles will, for the first time, just about equal the number of manned bombers in the force. During the three-year period from end fiscal year 1961 through end fiscal year 1964, the number of weapons in the alert forces will have been increased about two and one-half times and the megatonnage of these weapons almost three times, even though a large number of B-47's will have been phased out of the force during the same period.

On the basis of the latest estimates of Soviet strategic forces, I can again tell this Committee -- "There is no question but that today our strategic retaliatory forces are fully capable of destroying the Soviet target system, even after absorbing an initial surprise attack.

C. FUTURE STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES

One of the major determinants of the size and character of our future Strategic Retaliatory Forces is, of course, the size and character of the strategic forces and defensive systems our opponents are likely to have over the next several years. As I pointed out last year, because of the long leadtimes involved in bringing strategic weapon systems to operational status, we must plan our forces well in advance of the time when they will be needed and, indeed, we now project our programs at least five years ahead. For the same reason, we must also project our estimates of the enemy's forces over at least the same time period. These longer-range projections of enemy capabilities must necessarily be highly uncertain, particularly since they deal with a period beyond the production and deployment leadtimes of enemy weapon systems. We are estimating capabilities and attempting to anticipate production and deployment decisions which our opponents, themselves, may not as yet have made.

With these long range projections of Soviet forces as background, I would now like to discuss the Strategic Retaliatory Forces we propose to build and maintain through fiscal year 1969.

1. Bomber Forces

We plan to continue a mixed force of missiles and manned bombers throughout the entire planning period, fiscal years 1965-69. Although most of the aiming points in the Soviet target system can be best attacked by missiles, the long-range bombers will continue to be used in the follow-up attack, particularly against hard missile sites and against the targets which need not be attacked within minutes, e.g., weapon storage sites.

The present B-52 and B-58 forces will be continued through the program period with only a slight reduction in the number of B-58's, reflecting expected attrition. The B-47 force will be phased out on the same schedule I presented to you last year. All available HOUND DOG's will be retained in the force.

Although no new B-52 bombers have been procured since fiscal year 1961 (with last delivery in fiscal year 1963), substantial funds have been and will continue to be required for those aircraft modifications needed to keep the force both safe and effective. Through the current fiscal year, $1.6 billion will have been invested in this program for structural strengthening and newly developed equipment designed to enhance the B-52's ability to perform its combat mission and adapt to new tactical concepts. An additional $306 million is requested for such modifications in fiscal year 1965.

Half of the bombers will continue to be maintained on a 15-minute ground alert with a small number on airborne alert. As you know, we already have an on-the-shelf capability (engines and other spare parts) to fly one-eighth of the B-52 force on airborne alert for about one year, but we will continue to need the special provision contained in Section 512B of the Fiscal Year 1964 Defense Appropriation Act to pay for the operating costs if we have to do so. This is the provision which authorizes the Secretary of Defense, upon determination by the President that such action is necessary, to provide for the cost of an airborne alert as an excepted expense.

Although we have yet to use the financial provisions of this Section, we have from time to time, notably during the early phases of the Cuban crisis in the fall of 1962, temporarily increased the scale of airborne alert operations. The importance of this provision to the survivability of the manned bomber force will increase as the Soviet Union acquires more nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines since we could expect to receive very little tactical warning of a submarine-launched missile attack. This provision should certainly be retained in the law.

2. Surface-to-Surface Missiles

Our strategic missile forces, which almost tripled in fiscal year 1963 and will have more than doubled again in fiscal year 1964, will increase more slowly during the fiscal year 1965-69 period when we will be modernizing the force and replacing first generation missiles.

a. ATLAS and TITAN

During the next fiscal year, we will begin to phase out the earlier squadrons of ATLAS ICBM's. The ATLAS D's will be phased out in fiscal year 1965, and the ATLAS E's and TITAN I's sometime later.

Since the MINUTEMAN force is increasing rapidly, the need for these slow reacting and more highly vulnerable older missiles is declining.

Their contribution to the planned force will no longer be worth their very high cost of operation and maintenance, estimated at about $1 million per year per missile, compared with only about $100,000 per year for a MINUTEMAN.

b. MINUTEMAN

We had planned last year a total program of 800 MINUTEMAN I plus a large number of the improved MINUTEMAN II missiles. The first 160 MINUTEMAN I's were in place at the end of fiscal year 1963. By June of this year we expect to have 600 in place, and by June 1965, 800. Funding for the first increment of 150 MINUTEMAN II's was included in the fiscal year 1964 budget.

With another year of experience behind us, we are now proposing a major revision in the planned MINUTEMAN force, a revision which we believe will greatly increase combat effectiveness, and which will cost about $500 million more through fiscal year 1969. MINUTEMAN I and MINUTEMAN II squadrons will be integrated into a single system through the "internetting" of their communications and control system, thus greatly enhancing the targeting flexibility of the force as a whole. This will be achieved both by retrofitting a large number of MINUTEMAN I silos in the first five wings with MINUTEMAN II, and by co-locating additional MINUTEMAN II's with those five wings. The first wing of the MINUTEMAN II's authorized in fiscal year 1964 is being separately sited.

MINUTEMAN II, as now conceived, will provide increased range or payload; a smaller CEP; a much greater flexibility in the choice of pre-assigned targets; the capability of being launched by radio from an airborne command post; and a hardened power supply permitting a much greater post-attack sustainability.

To get these major revisinns in the MINUTEMAN program underway promptly and in an orderly fashion, we propose to start only 50 new silos in fiscal year 1965. Essentially, the choice is between: (1) a faster build-up with a slower rate of retrofit of the earlier model with the MINUTEMAN II; and (2) a slower rate of build-up with a faster rate of retrofit.

We have tentatively programmed the funding of additional MINUTEMAN II silos after fiscal year 1965, but the actual number to be started will depend upon the situation prevailing a year or two years from now.

One final matter concerning the MINUTEMAN program -- last year I informed the Committee that the Air Force had called to my attention very late in our review of the fiscal year 1964 budget a possible cost increase of as much as $400 million in fiscal years 1963 and 1964. We have now determined that this cost increase will amount to about $175 million. Reprogramming actions covering fiscal year 1963 increases were approved by the Congress last Spring. Reprogramming actions covering fiscal year 1964 increases are being forwarded to the appropriate committees.

c. POLARIS

The POLARIS forces are on nearly the same schedule discussed here last year. The more rigid inspection procedures put into effect after the loss of the THRESHER have delayed the actual and estimated operational dates of some SSBN's by a few months. However, this modest slippage will be fully made up during fiscal year 1965 and by the end of that year we will be back on the original schedule.

The last six of the planned fleet of 41 submarines were fully funded in the fiscal year 1964 budget. Nine POLARIS submarines carrying 144 missiles were deployed at sea by the end of fiscal year 1963. The entire force of 41 submarines and 656 missiles will become deployable by the end of fiscal year 1967.

The first five POLARIS submarines are equipped with the 1,200 n.m. A-1 missile. The 6th through the 18th submarine will be equipped with the 1,500 n.m. A-2 missiles, and the 19th through the 41st, with the 2,500 n.m. A-3. Last year we had planned to equip eventually all 41 submarines with the A-3 missile and to begin this summer with the replacement of the missile tubes of the first five submarines in order to accommodate the larger missile. We still plan to replace the A-1 missile with A-3's but we do not believe that it will be necessary to replace the A-2's with A-3's, at least for a number of years. While the range of the A-3 is considerably greater than the A-2, a large fraction of the targets is well within the range of the latter. Thus a force consisting of 28 submarines equipped with A-3 missiles and 13 submarines equipped with A-2 missiles should be able to handle effectively the targets assigned to the POLARIS force. We estimate that a total of about $425 million can be saved as a result of the postponement of the A-2 retrofit.

The presently planned POLARIS force will require a supporting fleet of six tenders, six resupply ships, and a number of floating drydocks and other support ships. A total force of six tenders has been programmed in order to ensure that at least five of the six will be available for continuous deployment for the support of the five squadrons into which the POLARIS force will be organized. Five tenders and four supply ships were funded through fiscal year 1964. The fiscal year 1965 program contains $63 million for the sixth tender and $8 million for the conversion of another resupply ship. The last resupply ship is programmed for fiscal year 1966. This program is the same as presented last year.

d. Dependability of Strategic Systems

In discussing this matter, a sharp distinction should be drawn between mechanical reliability, in the sense of the incidence of mechanical malfunction, and the dependability with which a vehicle in the Strategic Retaliatory Forces accomplishes its mission -- the destruction of assigned enemy targets. Reliability in this sense is only one of the factors determining system dependability. Equally important are the factors of readiness, survivability, and penetration. The readiness rate is the proportion of the force that is ready to launch on schedule; the survivability rate is the proportion of the force which can be expected to survive, in operating condition, an initial enemy attack; and the penetration rate is the proportion of the launched force which can be expected actually to reach and destroy its targets.

All of these and many other factors must be taken into account in measuring the system dependability of the various elements of our Strategic Retaliatory Forces. To illustrate this point we have made a simplified calculation which applies the four factors of readiness, survivability, reliability and penetration to the number of B-52's and MINUTEMAN missiles we plan to have in the force at end fiscal year 1964 in order to estimate the number of each weapon system which may be expected to reach and destroy their targets, under both optimistic and pessimistic assumptions. To reflect this range of circumstances we used, in most cases, a range of operational factors; the greater the uncertainty, the greater the range.

We will have a total of 630 B-52's and 600 MINUTEMAN missiles in the force on June 30, 1964. However, only 50 percent or 315 of the B-52's can be expected to be maintained on ground alert ready to be launched within 15 minutes, the warning time we can expect from BMEWS. While some of the non-alert aircraft may survive the initial attack, we cannot count on them for the initial retaliatory strike.

In the case of the solid fuel, quick reacting MINUTEMAN, we must also expect that at any given time some missiles would not be ready for launch. Accordingly, we have used readiness rates somewhat less than 100 percent. The range is reasonable and based on our experience to date as determined from operational logs and an unannounced operational readiness inspection of MINUTEMAN Wing I. In this inspection, the missiles which were not ready were undergoing technical order changes or scheduled maintenance and, of the ready missiles, the combat crews were actually able to count down almost all. For POLARIS, another solid fuel missile, statistics drawn from a large number of submarine patrols indicate that a very high proportion of the 16 missiles aboard each submarine on patrol were ready for launch at all times.

But much more important, MINUTEMAN missiles are dispersed, one to a site, in hardened silos, and are, therefore, far less vulnerable to a surprise nuclear attack than the aircraft on the ground. And this, as I have pointed out on previous occasions, is one of our greatest concerns with respect to manned bombers. A single H-bomb on a SAC base will destroy all the bombers on that base. This great uncertainty is reflected in the wider range of survival rates we have applied to the B-52's in our calculation, as compared with MINUTEMAN.

With regard to reliability, the B-52's have, of course, been in the force for many years, and we have acquired a considerable amount of operational experience. Therefore, the reliability rate of the surviving alert force -- the probability that a bomber will not abort because of mechanical malfunction -- can be established within a relatively narrow range at a rather high level. The MINUTEMAN, on the other hand, is just coming into the force and we have as yet acquired very little operational experience. Operational test firings through the middle of January indicate a fairly high reliability rate, but the number of firings is too small to serve as a base for a firm estimate. Accordingly, for purposes of our calculation we have used a wide range of reliability estimates for the MINUTEMAN.

As a result of our penetration aids and numerical superiority, we can be sure that once our missiles are launched and on their way they would destroy their targets. There is greater uncertainty about the proportion of the bombers that will get through because of the extensive Soviet air defense. We believe the proportion will be high, but there is a substantial range between the optimistic and pessimistic estimates.

Two striking conclusions emerge from this calculation. The first is that in both the optimistic and pessimistic cases a higher proportion of the MINUTEMAN force than of the B-52 force can be counted upon to reach targets in a retaliatory strike. I am not suggesting that the choice between bombers and missiles can be made on the basis of such a calculation. Each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages that are not reflected in these calculations. The bombers which penetrate, for example, can carry multiple weapons and would have the opportunity to destroy more than one target. Surface-based missiles, however, can reach their targets far more quickly, and this is critical importance in attacking some types of targets.

The second striking conclusion is that there is greater uncertainty about the systems dependability of the B-52, although it is an old and experienced aircraft, than about the MINUTEMAN, a brand new missile system. I believe that this conclusion has general applicability to comparisons between aircraft and surface-based missiles. The survivability of the soft bombers and their ability to penetrate enemy defenses are intrinsically much more difficult to estimate in advance than the factors affecting missile dependability.

Although we have used a rather wide range of reliability rates for the MINUTEMAN in this calculation, we believe the reliability of the missiles now in place is closer to the upper limit of the range. The POLARIS A-2, which is much further along than MINUTEMAN, has had a high percentage of successful shots. The MINUTEMAN at the present stage of operational testing compares favorably with the POLARIS A-2 experience. Most new weapon systems have a low reliability when they first become operational -- aircraft as well as missiles (you will recall our recent difficulties with the B-58 and the "Century" series fighters). However, the MINUTEMAN and the POLARIS A-2 appear to be exceptions to this rule.

As we continue our operational tests of the strategic missiles we plan to maintain in the force beyond fiscal year 1967, we expect these reliability rates to increase still further. To ensure that the reliability goals are achieved and that confidence in the results is fully established, we are allocating a large number of missiles for operational test firings, principally during the next 18 months.

Moreover, to assure continued reliability of the systems during operational deployment, follow-on operational tests are planned and a sizable percentage of the MINUTEMAN and POLARIS inventory will be expended annually in this follow-on program.

We should not expect and, indeed, we should not attempt to achieve 100 percent reliability in our strategic missiles or, for that matter, in any other weapons system. The cost of doing so, if it could be done at all, would be prohibitive, and beyond a certain point not worth the cost in view of the other important factors affecting systems dependability. Instead, we simply buy more missiles and thus provide a combat reserve, just as we do in the case of aircraft, to cover the targets of those vehicles which abort for any reason whatsoever. In this respect, the MINUTEMAN II with its multiple target flexibility will contribute greatly to the overall combat effectiveness of the force, as I indicated earlier.

Therefore, on the basis of the evidence already in hand and our plans for the future, I have no hesitancy whatsoever in saying that the missile force we have programmed can be depended upon to carry out its military mission under all of the conditions we can foresee, and indeed, that we can predict the results of a missile attack with greater confidence than those of a bomber attack.

e. Penetration Aids

A great deal of progress has been made during the last three years, particularly in gaining a better understanding of the physical effects which accompany the re-entry of ballistic missile warheads into the atmosphere and various methods which might be used to simulate these effects and to confuse anti-ballistic missile defense systems in other ways. There are a large number of different techniques which can be used. Each has its particular advantages and disadvantages. However, many of the shortcomings can be overcome to a considerable extent by employing these techniques in appropriate combinations, and this is what we are doing wherever possible.

The penetration aids research program is a costly one requiring much sophisticated instrumentation at the test ranges. Accordingly, we have made every effort to take advantage of related work being done in connection with our own R&D efforts on anti-ballistic missile defense, particularly the NIKE-ZEUS, the NIKE-X, and DEFENDER projects. Obviously, the problems of the offense are the converse of those of the defense, and information obtained from our penetration aids research has greatly influenced our thinking on the anti-ballistic missile defense problem, which I discuss in the next section of my statement.

3. Other Strategic Retaliatory Forces Programs

There are a number of other systems supporting the Strategic Retaliatory Forces. Except for the RB-47, RC-135, and REGULUS, these forces are the same as those presented to the Committee last year.

a. RB-47

Last year we programmed a number of RB-47's through fiscal year 1965. One squadron was utilized for weather observation for the B-47 bomber force. Other systems now available have eliminated the need for this squadron and it was deleted from the force last year. The remaining RB-47's will be phased out as originally scheduled. By that time we will have the full planned force of RC-135's in operation.

b. REGULUS

We now have five operational REGULUS submarines with a total of 17 missiles aboard. Three of these submarines (8 missiles) will be phased out in fiscal year 1965.

D. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Achievement of our overall national objective requires that our Strategic Retaliatory Forces be kept continually under the control of the constituted authorities, from the President on down to the commanders of the forces -- before, during, and after a nuclear attack. To support this requirement, we are developing a world-wide military command and control system, both on the national level and within our deployed military forces. The National Military Command System provides intelligence and communications for the high-level command at all levels of crises as well as a number of alternative locations for the President or others in the national chain of command. These alternate facilities include widely separated and protected land sites, dispersed command ships, and aircraft.

At this point I would like to discuss only those portions of the system included in the Strategic Retaliatory Forces program. I will discuss the overall system and other elements in the section of my statement dealing with General Support.

Two years ago we initiated a study of the feasibility of building a deep underground support center for the Strategic Air Command. Initially, we proposed $31 million in the fiscal year 1964 budget to begin construction this year. Subsequent study indicated that the center would cost more than previously estimated ($220 million vs. $85 million) and that serious operational problems were likely to be encountered. As a result, last April the Air Force and the JCS advised me that the project should not go forward at this time, a judgment in which I concurred. The funds were not included in the Fiscal Year 1964 Military Construction Appropriation Act.

We do intend to continue development of improvements to the airborne command system which is already in operation. This system consists of specially equipped KC-135 Command Post aircraft and B-47's equipped as communications relay aircraft. The Command Post aircraft are being re-equipped with an improved integral electronics system which will considerably enhance their overall effectiveness. One of these Command Post aircraft is kept in the air at all times.

E. NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

In addition to the MINUTEMAN II which I described earlier, we also have in the R&D program a number of other strategic missile projects -- for example, studies and an exploratory development program of an advanced ICBM which was initiated last year. We are also studying the possibility of an improved version of POLARIS beyond the A-3 and are doing a great deal of work on improved propulsion, structures, guidance, etc., for land-based missiles which will contribute to the improvement of existing missiles or the design of new advanced missiles. Also, the Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) system is being developed for possible use in a European sea-borne force or elsewhere in the world.

We have also included in the fiscal year 1965 budget $5 million to examine the technical feasibility and military value of possible new advanced strategic aircraft which would serve as airborne missile platforms.

Despite the delay in the B-70 program, caused by technical difficulties encountered with the sealing of the fuel tanks and with the fabrication of the wing-fuselage joint, we plan to continue the test program. The first flight has already been delayed by more than one year; and the cost will be increased by at least $200 million, from $1.3 billion to at least $1.5 billion for the three test aircraft.

Together, all of these projects, which I shall discuss in greater detail later in connection with the Research and Development program, provide for the development of a broad base of technology for future strategic retaliatory weapons systems. One or more may actually reach the production and deployment stage before the end of the programmed period, fiscal year 1969, but until a decision is made to produce and deploy these systems, they are shown only in the R&D program.

F. ADEQUACY OF THE PROPOSED FORCES

The Strategic Retaliatory Forces programmed through fiscal year 1969 are, in our judgment, fully adequate to accomplish the objectives which I discussed earlier. Furthermore, a rapidly increasing portion of this force will consist of hardened and dispersed ICBM's and submarine-based missiles, all with very high probabilities of survival under nuclear attack. The effective offensive power of the force will be further enhanced by the addition of penetration aids and the introduction of the greatly improved MINUTEMAN missiles. Further quantitative increases in the large forces already programmed would provide only marginal increases in capability in relation to their additional cost.

These conclusions, as I pointed out before, have been tested by a careful analysis of a wide range of alternative U.S. and Soviet forces employed under a wide variety of different assumptions as to the manner in which a strategic nuclear exchange might take place and the operational capabilities of U.S. and Soviet weapon systems, i.e., readiness, survival, reliability and penetration rates. In all such studies, of course, the situations assumed have to be defined by simplifying the assumptions. There are innumerable variables and uncertainties involved in these situations; and, relatively, only a few, although the major ones, can be taken into account in any one analysis. Nevertheless, these studies do provide as good a measure as possible of the relative effectiveness of different size forces under different sets of circumstances.

As I noted earlier, our Strategic Retaliatory Forces under all foreseeable conditions, including a well-planned and executed surprise attack on the United States, must have such an unquestionable capability to inflict destruction on the Soviet Union, that no Soviet planner could ever conclude that such an attack could be other than disastrous to the Soviet Union. This is the ultimate deterrent to a calculated, deliberate Soviet nuclear attack and we must be certain that at all times and under all foreseeable conditions we have at least this minimum capability. Accordingly, we have tested a number of alternative forces against the most pessimistic set of assumptions we could reasonably postulate for the end of the programmed period, 1969. I want to emphasize that these assumptions are so pessimistic that it is most unlikely that they would ever occur simultaneously.

Even so, our conclusion is that the recommended forces would still have the capability of inflicting very heavy damage on Communist industrial capacity and population. The results do not vary to any significant degree for alternative MINUTEMAN forces greater than those I am recommending.

Thus there is the highest degree of assurance that the recommended forces will provide an extremely strong deterrent against a deliberate first strike attack on the United States.

But, as I noted earlier in my discussion of "The Requirement," our Strategic Retaliatory Forces should also be large enough to destroy the opponent's war-making capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our Allies. There are many facets to this problem, including not only the size and composition of our offensive forces but also the defensive measures available to us, which I will discuss in the next section of the statement.

All of these facets have been considered in our analyses and our conclusion is that, given the size and kind of strategic offensive forces we project both for the Soviet Union and for ourselves, grave damage to both sides in an all-out nuclear exchange could not be avoided under any conceivable circumstances. This would be true no matter how many MINUTEMAN missiles (within practical limits) or, for that matter, how many of any other offensive or defensive weapon systems, we were to add to our forces.

An interesting and important result of these studies was the clear demonstration of the great contribution that an adequate fallout shelter program could make to our damage-limiting capability. The analyses indicated:

(1) That a properly planned nationwide fallout shelter program would contribute far more to the saving of lives per dollar than an increase in MINUTEMAN missiles beyond the level we recommend.

(2) That even if the Soviets were to attack only our military installations, without an adequate fallout shelter program, fatalities from fallout would be very high -- about three times higher than they would be with an adequate civil defense program.

Obviously, these judgments are based on our present estimates of the probable make-up of Soviet forces during the program period. As I noted earlier, for the more distant years these estimates must be considered quite tentative since, in part, they rest on assumptions regarding decisions which the Soviet leadership may not as yet have had to make. Our presently planned program retains for us sufficient flexibility to make changes in time to meet any Soviet program shift.

We have ample manufacturing capacity for POLARIS and MINUTEMAN, both of which will be in production for some years to come. If more are needed in future years, we should be able to procure them in time.

G. FINANCIAL SUMMARY

The Strategic Retaliatory Forces I have outlined will require Total Obligational Authority of $5.3 billion for fiscal year 1965. A comparison with prior fiscal years is shown below:

($ Billions, Fiscal Years)

	1962 Original	1962 Final	1963 Actual	1964 Estimated	1965 Proposed
Total Obligational Authority	7.6	9.1	8.4	7.3	5.3

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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 110 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 1964 No. 56

Senate

FOREIGN POLICY—OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, there is an inevitable divergence, attributable to the imperfections of the human mind, between the world as it is and the world as men perceive it. As long as our perceptions are reasonably close to objective reality, it is possible for us to act upon our problems in a rational and appropriate manner. But when our perceptions fail to keep pace with events, when we refuse to believe something because it displeases or frightens us, or because it is simply startlingly unfamiliar, then the gap between fact and perception becomes a chasm, and action becomes irrelevant and irrational.

There has always—and inevitably—been some divergence between the realities of foreign policy and our ideas about it. This divergence has in certain respects been growing, rather than narrowing; and we are handicapped, accordingly, by policies based on old myths, rather than current realities. This divergence is, in my opinion, dangerous and unnecessary—dangerous, because it can reduce foreign policy to a fraudulent game of imagery and appearances; unnecessary, because it can be overcome by the determination of men in high office to dispel prevailing misconceptions by the candid dissemination of unpleasant, but inescapable, facts.

Before commenting on some of the specific areas where I believe our policies are at least partially based on cherished myths, rather than objective facts, I should like to suggest two possible reasons for the growing divergence between the realities and our perceptions of current world politics. The first is the radical change in relations between and within the Communist and the free world; and the second is the tendency of too many of us to confuse means with ends and, accordingly, to adhere to prevailing practices with a fervor befitting immutable principles.

Although it is too soon to render a definitive judgment, there is mounting evidence that events of recent years have wrought profound changes in the character of East-West relations. In the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the United States proved to the Soviet Union that a policy of aggression and adventure involved unacceptable risks. In the signing of the test ban treaty, each side in effect assured the other that it was prepared to forego, at least for the present, any bid for a decisive military or political breakthrough. These occurrences, it should be added, took place against the background of the clearly understood strategic superiority—but not supremacy—of the United States.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the character of the cold war has, for the present, at least, been profoundly altered: by the drawing back of the Soviet Union from extremely aggressive policies; by the implicit repudiation by both sides of a policy of "total victory"; and by the establishment of an American strategic superiority which the Soviet Union appears to have tactly accepted because it has been accompanied by assurances that it will be exercised by the United States with responsibility and restraint. These enormously important changes may come to be regarded by historians as the foremost achievements of the Kennedy administration in the field of foreign policy. Their effect has been to commit us to a foreign policy which can accurately—though perhaps not prudently—be defined as one of "peaceful coexistence."

Another of the results of the lowering of tensions between East and West is that each is now free to enjoy the luxury of accelerated strife and squabbling within its own domain. The ideological thunderbolts between Washington and Moscow which until a few years ago seemed a permanent part of our daily lives have become a pale shadow of their former selves. Now instead the United States waits in fascinated apprehension for the Olympian pronouncements that issue from Paris at 6-month intervals while the Russians respond to the crude epithets of Peiping with almost plaintive rejoinders about "those who want to start a war against everybody."

These astonishing changes in the configuration of the postwar world have had an unsettling effect on both public and official opinion in the United States. One reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact that we are a people used to looking at the world, and indeed at ourselves, in moralistic rather than empirical terms. We are predisposed to regard any conflict as a clash between good and evil rather than as simply a clash between conflicting interests. We are inclined to confuse freedom and democracy, which we regard as moral principles, with the way in which they are practiced in America—with capitalism, federalism, and the two-party system, which are not moral principles but simply the preferred and accepted practices of the American people. There is much cant in American moralism and not a little inconsistency. It resembles in some ways the religious faith of the many respectable people who, in Samuel Butler's words, "would be equally horrified to hear the Christian religion doubted or to see it practiced."

Our national vocabulary is full of "self-evident truths" not only about "life, liberty, and happiness," but about a vast number of personal and public issues, including the cold war. It has become one of the "self-evident truths" of the postwar era that just as the President resides in Washington and the Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immutably in Moscow. We have come to regard the Kremlin as the permanent seat of his power and we have grown almost comfortable with a menace which, though unspeakably evil, has had the redeeming virtues of constancy, predictability, and familiarity. Now the Devil has betrayed us by traveling abroad and, worse still, by dispersing himself, turning up now here, now there, and in many places at once, with a devlish disregard for the laboriously constructed frontiers of ideology.

We are confronted with a complex and fluid world situation and we are not adapting ourselves to it. We are clinging to old myths in the face of new realities and we are seeking to escape the contradictions by narrowing the permissible bounds of public discussion, by relegating an increasing number of ideas and viewpoints to a growing category of "unthinkable thoughts." I believe that this tendency can and should be reversed, that it is within our ability, and unquestionably in our interests, to cut loose from established myths and to start thinking some "unthinkable thoughts"—about the cold war and East-West relations, about the underdeveloped countries and particularly those in Latin America, about the changing nature of the Chinese Communist threat in Asia and about the festering war in Vietnam.

The master myth of the cold war is that the Communist bloc is a monolith composed of governments which are not really governments at all but organized conspiracies, divided among themselves perhaps in certain matters of tactics, but all equally resolute and implacable in their determination to destroy the free world.

I believe that the Communist world is indeed hostile to the free world in its general and long-term intentions but that the existence of this animosity in principle is far less imporant for our foreign policy than the great variations in its intensity and character both in time and among the individual members of the Communist bloc. Only if we recognize these variations, ranging from China, which poses immediate threats to the free world, to Poland and Yugoslavia, which pose none, can we hope to act effectively upon the bloc and to turn its internal differences to our own advantage and to the advantage of those bloc countries which wish to maximize their independence. It is the responsibility of our national leaders both in the executive branch and in Congress, to acknowledge and act upon these realities, even at the cost of saying things which will not win immediate widespread enthusiasm.

For a start, we can acknowledge the fact that the Soviet Union, though still a most formidable adversary, has ceased to be totally and implacably hostile to the West. It has shown a new willingness to enter mutually advantageous arrangements with the West and, thus far at least, to honor them. It has therefore become possible to divert some of our energies from the prosecution of the cold war to the relaxation of the cold war and to deal with the Soviet Union, for certain purposes, as a normal state with normal and traditional interests.

If we are to do these things effectively, we must distinguish between communism as an ideology and the power and policy of the Soviet state. It is not communism as a doctrine, or communism as it is practiced within the Soviet Union or within any other country, that threatens us. How the Soviet Union organizes its internal life, the gods and doctrines that it worships, are matters for the Soviet Union to determine. It is not Communist dogma as espoused within Russia but Communist imperialism that threatens us and other peoples of the non-Communist world. Insofar as a great nation mobilizes its power and resources for aggressive purposes, that nation, regardless of ideology, makes itself our enemy. Insofar as a nation is content to practice its doctrines within its own frontiers, that nation, however repugnant its ideology, is one with which we have no proper quarrel. We must deal with the Soviet Union as a great power, quite apart from differences of ideology. To the extent that the Soviet leaders abandon the global ambitions of

Marxist ideology, in fact if not in words, it becomes possible for us to engage in normal relations with them, relations which probably cannot be close or trusting for many years to come but which can be gradually freed of the terror and the tensions of the cold war.

In our relations with the Russians, and indeed in our relations with all nations, we would do well to remember, and to act upon, the words of Pope John in the great Encyclical, Pacem in Terris:

> "It must be borne in mind," said Pope John, "that to proceed gradually is the law of life in all its expressions, therefore, in human institutions, too, it is not possible to renovate for the better except by working from within them, gradually. Violence has always achieved only destruction, not construction, the kindling of passions, not their pacification, the accumulation of hate and ruin, not the reconciliation of the contending parties. And it has reduced men and parties to the difficult task of rebuilding, after sad experience, on the ruins of discord."

Important opportunities have been created for Western policy by the development of "polycentrism" in the Communist bloc. The Communist nations, as George Kennan has pointed out, are, like the Western nations, currently caught up in a crisis of indecision about their relations with countries outside their own ideological bloc. The choices open to the satellite states are limited but by no means insignificant. They can adhere slavishly to Soviet preferences or they can strike out on their own, within limits, to enter into mutually advantageous relations with the West.

Whether they do so, and to what extent, is to some extent at least within the power of the West to determine. If we persist in the view that all Communist regimes are equally hostile and equally threatening to the West, and that we can have no policy toward the captive nations except the eventual overthrow of their Communist regimes, then the West may enforce upon the Communist bloc a degree of unity which the Soviet Union has shown itself to be quite incapable of imposing—just as Stalin in the early postwar years frightened the West into a degree of unity that it almost certainly could not have attained by its own unaided efforts. If, on the other hand, we are willing to reexamine the view that all Communist regimes are alike in the threat which they pose for the West—a view which had a certain validity in Stalin's time—then we may be able to exert an important influence on the course of events within a divided Communist world.

We are to a great extent the victims, and the Soviets the beneficiaries, of our own ideological convictions, and of the curious contradictions which they involve. We consider it a form of subversion of the free world, for example, when the Russians enter trade relations or conclude a consular convention or establish airline connections with a free country in Asia, Africa, or Latin America—and to a certain extent we are right. On the other hand, when it is proposed that we adopt the same strategy in reverse—by extending commercial credits to Poland or Yugoslavia, or by exchanging Ambassadors with a Hungarian regime which has changed considerably in character since the revolution of 1956—then the same patriots who are so alarmed by Soviet activities in the free world charge our policymakers with "giving aid and comfort to the enemy" and with innumerable other categories of idiocy and immorality.

It is time that we resolved this contradiction and separated myth from reality. The myth is that every Communist state is an unmitigated evil and a relentless enemy of the free world; the reality is that some Communist regimes pose a threat to the free world while others pose little or none, and that if we will recognize these distinctions, we ourselves will be able to influence events in the Communist bloc in a way favorable to the security of the free world.

It could well be argued * * *—

Writes George Kennan—

> That if the major Western Powers had full freedom of movement in devising their own policies, it would be within their power to determine whether the Chinese view, or the Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal than either would ultimately prevail within the Communist camp—George Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1964, page 178.

There are numerous areas in which we can seek to reduce the tensions of the cold war and to bring a degree of normalcy into our relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries—once we have resolved that it is safe and wise to do so. We have already taken important steps in this direction: the Antarctic and Austrian treaties and the nuclear test ban treaty, the broadening of East-West cultural and educational relations, and the expansion of trade.

On the basis of recent experience and present economic needs, there seems little likelihood of a spectacular increase in trade between Communist and Western countries, even if existing restrictions were to be relaxed. Free world trade with Communist countries has been increasing at a steady but unspectacular rate, and it seems unlikely to be greatly accelerated because of the limited ability of the Communist countries to pay for increased imports. A modest increase in East-West trade may nonetheless serve as a modest instrument of East-West detente—provided that we are able to overcome the myth that trade with Communist countries is a compact with the Devil and to recognize that, on the contrary, trade can serve as an effective and honorable means of advancing both peace and human welfare.

Whether we are able to make these philosophic adjustments or not, we cannot escape the fact that our efforts to devise a common Western trade policy are a palpable failure and that our allies are going to trade with the Communist bloc whether we like it or not. The world's major exporting nations are slowly but steadily increasing their trade with the Communist bloc and the bloc countries are showing themselves to be reliable customers. Since 1958 Western Europe has been increasing its exports to the East at the rate of about 7 percent a year, which is nearly the same rate at which its overall world sales have been increasing.

West Germany—one of our close friends—is by far the leading Western nation in trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc. West German exports to bloc countries in 1962 were valued at $749.9 million. Britain was in second place—although not a close second—with exports to Communist countries amounting to $393 million in 1962. France followed with exports worth $313.4 million, and the figure for the United States—consisting largely of surplus food sales to Poland under Public Law 480—stood far below at $125.1 million.

Our allies have made it plain that they propose to expand this trade, in nonstrategic goods, wherever possible. West Germany, in the last 16 months, has exchanged or agreed to exchange trade missions with every country in Eastern Europe except Albania. Britain has indicated that she will soon extend long-term credits to Communist countries, breaching the 5-year limit which the Western allies have hitherto observed. In the light of these facts, it is difficult to see what effect the tight American trade restrictions have other than to deny the United States a substantial share of a profitable market.

The inability of the United States to prevent its partners from trading extensively with the Communist bloc is one good reason for relaxing our own restrictions, but there is a better reason: the potential value of trade—a moderate volume of trade in nonstrategic items—as an instrument for reducing world tensions and strengthening the foundations of peace. I do not think that trade or the nuclear test ban, or any other prospective East-West accommodation, will lead to a grand reconciliation that will end the cold war and usher in the brotherhood of man. At the most, the cumulative effect of all the agreements that are likely to be attainable in the foreseeable future will be the alleviation of the extreme tensions and animosities that threaten the world with nuclear devastation and the gradual conversion of the struggle between communism and the free world into a safer and more tolerable international rivalry, one which may be with us for years and decades to come but which need not be so terrifying and so costly as to distract the nations of the world from the creative pursuits of civilized societies.

There is little in history to justify the expectation that we can either win the cold war or end it immediately and completely. These are favored myths, respectively, of the American right and of the American left. They are, I believe, equal in their unreality and in their disregard for the feasibilities of history. We must disabuse ourselves of them and come to terms, at last, with the realities of a world in which neither good nor evil is absolute and in which those who move events and make history are those who have understood not how much but how little it is within our power to change.

Mr. President, in an address on February 18 at Bad Godesburg, the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, Mr. George McGhee, spoke eloquently and wisely about the character and prospects of relations between the Communist and the free worlds. I ask unanimous consent that Ambassador McGhee's address, "East-West Relations Today," be inserted in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Latin America is one of the areas of the world in which American policy is weakened by a growing divergency between old myths and new realities.

The crisis over the Panama Canal has been unnecessarily protracted for reasons of domestic politics and national pride and sensitivity on both sides—for reasons, that is, of only marginal relevance to the merits of the dispute. I think the Panamanians have unquestionably been more emotional about the dispute than has the United States. I also think that there is less reason for emotionalism on the part of the United States than on the part of Panama. It is important for us to remember that the issue over the canal is only one of a great many in which the United States is involved, and by no means the most important. For Panama, on the other hand, a small nation with a weak economy and an unstable government, the canal is the preeminent factor in the nation's economy and in its foreign relations. Surely in a confrontation so unequal, it is not unreasonable to expect the United States to go a little farther than halfway in the search for a fair settlement.

We Americans would do well, for a start, to divest ourselves of the silly notion that the issue with Panama is a test of our courage and resolve. I believe that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, involving a confrontation with nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, was indeed a test of our courage, and we acquitted ourselves extremely well in that instance. I am unable to understand how a controversy with a small and poor country, with virtually no military capacity, can possibly be regarded as a test of our bravery and will to defend our interests. It takes stubbornness but not courage to reject the entreaties of the weak. The real test in Panama is not of our valor but of our wisdom and judgment and commonsense.

We would also do well to disabuse ourselves of the myth that there is something morally sacred about the treaty of 1903. The fact of the matter is that the treaty was concluded under circumstances that reflect little credit on the United States. It was made possible by Panama's separation from Colombia which probably could not have occurred at that time without the dispatch of U.S. warships to prevent the landing of Colombian troops on the isthmus to put down the Panamanian rebellion. The United States not only intervened in Colombia's internal affairs but did so in violation of a treaty concluded in 1846 under which the United States had guaranteed Colombian sovereignty over the isthmus. President Theodore Roosevelt, as he boasted, "took Panama," and proceeded to negotiate the canal treaty with a compliant Panamanian regime. Panamanians contend that they were "shotgunned" into the treaty of 1903 as the price of U.S. protection against a possible effort by Colombia to recover the isthmus. The contention is not without substance.

It is not my purpose here to relate the events of 60 years ago but only to suggest that there is little basis for a posture of injured innocence and self-righteousness by either side and that we would do much better to resolve the issue on the basis of present realities rather than old myths

The central reality is that the treaty of 1903 is in certain respects obsolete. The treaty has been revised only twice, in 1936 when the annual rental was raised from $250,000 to $430,000 and other modifications were made, and in 1955 when further changes were made, including an increase in the annual rental to $1.9 million, where it now stands. The canal, of course, contributes far more to the Panamanian economy in the form of wages paid to Panamanian workers and purchases made in Panama. The fact remains, nonetheless, that the annual rental of $1.9 million is a modest sum and should probably be increased. There are other issues, relating to hiring policies for Panamanian workers in the zone, the flying of flags, and other symbols of national pride and sovereignty. The basic problem about the treaty, however, is the exercise of American control over a part of the territory of Panama in this age of intense nationalist and anticolonialist feeling. Justly or not, the Panamanians feel that they are being treated as a colony, or a quasi-colony, of the United States, and this feeling is accentuated by the contrast between the standard of living of the Panamanians, with a per capita income of about $429 a year, and that of the Americans living in the Canal Zone—immediately adjacent to Panama, of course, and within it—with a per capita income of $4,228 a year. That is approximately 10 times greater. It is the profound social and economic alienation between Panama and the Canal Zone, and its impact on the national feeling of the Panamanians, that underlies the current crisis.

Under these circumstances, it seems to me entirely proper and necessary for the United States to take the initiative in proposing new arrangements that would redress some of Panama's grievances against the treaty as it now stands. I see no reason—certainly no reason of "weakness" or "dishonor"—why the United States cannot put an end to the semantic debate over whether treaty revisions are to be "negotiated" or "discussed" by stating positively and clearly that it is prepared to negotiate revisions in the canal treaty and to submit such changes as are made to the Senate for its advice and consent.

I think it is necessary for the United States to do this even though a commitment to revise the treaty may be widely criticized at home. It is the responsibility of the President and his advisers, in situations of this sort, to exercise their own best judgment as to where the national interest lies even though this may necessitate unpopular decisions.

An agreement to "negotiate" revisions is not an agreement to negotiate any particular revision. It would leave us completely free to determine what revisions, and how many revisions, we would be willing to accept. If there is any doubt about this, one can find ample reassurance in the proceedings at Geneva, where several years of "negotiations" for "general and complete disarmament" still leave us with the greatest arsenal of weapons in the history of the world.

The problem of Cuba is more difficult than that of Panama, and far more heavily burdened with the deadweight of old myths and prohibitions against "unthinkable thoughts." I think the time is overdue for a candid reevaluation of our Cuban policy even though it may also lead to distasteful conclusions.

There are and have been three options open to the United States with respect to Cuba: first, the removal of the Castro regime by invading and occupying the island; second, an effort to weaken and ultimately bring down the regime by a policy of political and economic boycott; and finally, acceptance of the Communist regime as a disagreeable reality and annoyance but one which is not likely to be removed in the near future because of the unavailability of acceptable means of removing it.

The first option, invasion, has been tried in a halfhearted way and found wanting. It is generally acknowledged that the invasion and occupation of Cuba, besides violating our obligations as a member of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, would have explosive consequences in Latin America and elsewhere and might precipitate a global nuclear war. I know of no responsible statesman who advocates this approach. It has been rejected by our Government and by public opinion and I think that, barring some grave provocation, it can be ruled out as a feasible policy for the United States.

The approach which we have adopted has been the second of those mentioned, an effort to weaken and eventually bring down the Castro regime by a policy of political and economic boycott. This policy has taken the form of extensive restrictions against trade with Cuba by United States citizens, of the exclusion of Cuba from the inter-American system and efforts to secure Latin American support in isolating Cuba politically and economically, and of diplomatic efforts, backed by certain trade and aid sanctions, to persuade other free world countries to maintain economic boycotts against Cuba.

This policy, it now seems clear, has been a failure, and there is no reason to believe that it will succeed in the future. Our efforts to persuade our allies to terminate their trade with Cuba have been generally rebuffed. The prevailing attitude was perhaps best expressed by a British manufacturer who, in response to American criticisms of the sale of British buses to Cuba, said: "If America has a surplus of wheat, we have a surplus of buses."

In cutting off military assistance to Great Britain, France, and Yugoslavia under the provisions of Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, the United States has wielded a stuffed club. The amounts of aid involved are infinitesimal; the chances of gaining compliance with our boycott policy are nil; and the annoyance of the countries concerned may be considerable. What we terminated with respect to Britain and France, in fact, can hardly be called aid; it was more of a sales promotion program under which British and French military leaders were brought to the United States to see—and to buy—advanced American weapons. Terminating this program was in itself of little importance; Britain and France do not need our assistance. But terminating the program as a sanction against their trade with Cuba can have no real effect other than to create an illusory image of "toughness" for the benefit of our own people.

Free world exports to Cuba have, on the whole, been declining over recent years, but overall imports have been rising since 1961.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be inserted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks two tables provided by the Department of State showing the trade of selected free world countries with Cuba from 1958 to 1963.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2).

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the figures shown in these tables provide little basis for expecting the early termination of free world trade with Cuba. The export table shows U.S. exports to Cuba in both 1962 and 1963 exceeding those of any other free world country. These American exports consisted almost entirely of ransom payments for the Bay of Pigs prisoners and should not be confused with normal trade.

There is an interesting feature to this table, which may not be well known. It is that the exports from Cuba to various allies of ours, particularly Japan, the United Kingdom, Morocco, and others have been going up, and have been very substantial. This reflects, I believe, the importation from Cuba of sugar to a great extent, and also accounts for the accumulation by Cuba of substantial foreign aid as a result of the dramatic increase in the price of sugar during the past couple of years.

The exports from the free world to Cuba have been going up in similar instances, in the case of Japan, but generally speaking they have not been increasing. Of course, since 1958, when we accounted for more than half of Cuba's exports, they have gone down rather dramatically. In any case, the tables will speak for themselves.

I should like to make it very clear that I am not arguing against the desirability of an economic boycott against the Castro regime but against its feasibility. The effort has been made and all the fulminations we can utter about sanctions and retaliation against free world countries that trade with Cuba cannot long conceal the fact that the boycott policy is a failure.

The boycott policy has not failed because of any "weakness" or "timidity" on the part of our Government. This charge, so frequently heard, is one of the most pernicious myths to have been inflicted on the American people. The boycott policy has failed because the United States is not omnipotent and cannot be. The basic reality to be faced is that it is simply not within our power to compel our allies to cut off their trade with Cuba, unless we are prepared to take drastic sanctions against them, such as closing our own markets to any foreign company that does business in Cuba, as proposed by Mr. Nixon. We can do this, of course, but if we do, we ought first to be very sure as apparently Mr. Nixon is, that the Cuban boycott is more important than good relations with our closest allies. In fact, even the most drastic sanctions are as likely to be rewarded with defiance as with compliance. For practical purposes, all we can do is to ask other countries to take the measures with respect to Cuba which we recommend. We have done so and in some areas have been successful. In other areas, notably that of the economic boycott, we have asked for the full cooperation of other free world countries and it has been largely denied. It remains for us to decide whether we will respond with a sustained outburst of hollow and ill-tempered threats, all the while comforting ourselves with the myth that we can get anything we want if we only try hard enough—or, in this case, shout loud enough—or we can acknowledge the failure of our efforts and proceed, coolly and rationally, to reexamine the policies which we now pursue in relation to the interests they are intended to serve.

The prospects of bringing down the Castro regime by political and economic boycott have never been very good. Even if a general free world boycott were successfully applied against Cuba, it is unlikely that the Russians would refuse to carry the extra financial burden and thereby permit the only Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere to collapse. We are thus compelled to recognize that there is probably no way of bringing down the Castro regime by means of economic pressures unless we are prepared to impose a blockade against nonmilitary shipments from the Soviet Union. Exactly such a policy has been recommended by some of our more reckless politicians, but the preponderance of informed opinion is that a blockade against Soviet shipments of nonmilitary supplies to Cuba would be extravagantly dangerous, carrying the strong possibility of a confrontation that could explode into nuclear war.

Having ruled out military invasion and blockade, and recognizing the failure of the boycott policy, we are compelled to consider the third of the three options open to us with respect to Cuba: the acceptance of the continued existence of the Castro regime as a distasteful nuisance but not an intolerable danger so long as the nations of the hemisphere are prepared to meet their obligations of collective defense under the Rio Treaty.

In recent years we have become transfixed with Cuba, making it far more important in both our foreign relations and in our domestic life than its size and influence warrant. We have flattered a noisy but minor demogog by treating him as if he were a Napoleonic menace. Communist Cuba has been a disruptive and subversive influence in Venezuela and other countries of the hemisphere, and there is no doubt that both we and our Latin American partners would be better off if the Castro regime did not exist. But it is important to bear in mind that, despite their best efforts, the Cuban Communists have not succeeded in subverting the hemisphere and that in Venezuela, for example, where communism has made a major effort to gain power through terrorism, it has been repudiated by a people who in a free election have committed themselves to the course of liberal democracy. It is necessary to weigh the desirability of an objective against the feasibility of its attainment, and when we do this with respect to Cuba, I think we are bound to conclude that Castro is a nuisance but not a grave threat to the United States and that he cannot be gotten rid of except by means that are wholly disproportionate to the objective. Cuban communism does pose a grave threat to other Latin American countries, but this threat can be dealt with by prompt and vigorous use of the established procedures of the inter-American system against any act of aggression.

I think that we must abandon the myth that Cuban communism is a transitory menace that is going to collapse or disappear in the immediate future and face up to two basic realities about Cuba: first, that the Castro regime is not on the verge of collapse and is not likely to be overthrown by any policies which we are now pursuing or can reasonably undertake; and second, that the continued existence of the Castro regime, though inimical to our interests and policies, is not an insuperable obstacle to the attainment of our objectives, unless we make it so by permitting it to poison our politics at home and to divert us from more important tasks in the hemisphere.

The policy of the United States with respect to Latin America as a whole is predicated on the assumption that social revolution can be accomplished without violent upheaval. This is the guiding principle of the Alliance for Progress and it may in time be vindicated. We are entitled to hope so and it is wise and necessary for us to do all that we can to advance the prospects of peaceful and orderly reform.

At the same time, we must be under no illusions as to the extreme difficulty of uprooting long-established ruling oligarchies without disruptions involving lesser or greater degrees of violence. The historical odds are probably against the prospects of peaceful social revolution. There are places, of course, where it has occurred and others where it seems likely to occur. In Latin America, the chances for such basic change by peaceful means seem bright in Colombia and Venezuela and certain other countries; in Mexico, many basic changes have been made by peaceful means, but these came in the wake of a violent revolution. In other Latin American countries, the power of ruling oligarchies is so solidly established and their ignorance so great that there seems little prospect of accomplishing economic growth or social reform by means short of the forcible overthrow of established authorities.

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

We would do well, while continuing our efforts to promote peaceful change through the Alliance for Progress, to consider what our reactions might be in the event of the outbreak of genuine social revolution in one or more Latin American countries. Such a revolution did occur in Bolivia, and we accepted it calmly and sensibly. But what if a violent social revolution were to break out in one of the larger Latin American countries? Would we feel certain that it was Cuban or Soviet inspired? Would we wish to intervene on the side of established authority? Or would we be willing to tolerate or even support a revolution if it was seen to be not Communist but similar in nature to the Mexican revolution or the Nasser revolution in Egypt?

These are hypothetical questions and there is no readily available set of answers to them. But they are questions which we should be thinking about because they have to do with problems that could become real and urgent with great suddenness. We should be considering, for example, what groups in particular countries might conceivably lead revolutionary movements, and if we can identify them, we should be considering how we might communicate with them and influence them in such a way that their movements, if successful, will not pursue courses detrimental to our security and our interests.

The Far East is another area of the world in which American policy is handicapped by the divergence of old myths and new realities. Particularly with respect to China, an elaborate vocabulary of make believe has become compulsory in both official and public discussion. We are committed, with respect to China and other areas in Asia, to inflexible policies of long standing from which we hesitate to depart because of the attribution to these policies of an aura of mystical sanctity. It may be that a thorough reevaluation of our Far Eastern policies would lead us to the conclusion that they are sound and wise, or at least that they represent the best available options. It may be, on the other hand, that a reevaluation would point up the need for greater or lesser changes in our policies. The point is that, whatever the outcome of a rethinking of policy might be, we have been unwilling to undertake it because of the fear of many Government officials, undoubtedly well founded, that even the suggestion of new policies toward China or Vietnam would provoke a vehement public outcry.

I do not think the United States can, or should, recognize Communist China, or acquiesce in its admission to the United Nations under present circumstances. It would be unwise to do so, because there is nothing to be gained by it so long as the Peiping regime maintains its attitude of implacable hostility toward the United States. I do not believe, however, that this state of affairs is necessarily permanent. As we have seen in our relations with Germany and Japan, hostility can give way in an astonishingly short time to close friendship; and, as we have seen in our relations with China, the reverse can occur with equal speed. It is not impossible that in time our relations with China will change again—if not to friendship, then perhaps to "competitive coexistence." It would therefore be extremely useful if we could introduce an element of flexibility, or, more precisely, of the capacity to be flexible, into our relations with Communist China.

We would do well, as former Assistant Secretary Hilsman has recommended, to maintain an "open door" to the possibility of improved relations with Communist China in the future. For a start, we must jar open our minds to certain realities about China, of which the foremost is that there really are not "two Chinas," but only one—mainland China; and that it is ruled by Communists, and is likely to remain so for the indefinite future. Once we accept this fact, it becomes possible to reflect on the conditions under which it might be possible for us to enter into relatively normal relations with mainland China. One condition, of course, must be the abandonment by the Chinese Communists, tacitly, if not explicitly, of their intention to conquer and incorporate Taiwan. This seems unlikely now; but far more surprising changes have occurred in politics, and it is quite possible that a new generation of leaders in Peiping and Taipei may put a quiet end to the Chinese civil war, thus opening the possibility of entirely new patterns of international relations in the Far East.

Should such changes occur, they will open important opportunities for American policy; and it is to be hoped that we shall be able and willing to take advantage of them. It seems possible, for instance, that an atmosphere of reduced tensions in the Far East might make it possible to strengthen world peace by drawing mainland China into existing East-West agreements in such fields as disarmament, trade, and educational exchange.

These are long-range prospects, which may or may not materialize. In the immediate future, we are confronted with possible changes in the Far East resulting from recent French diplomacy.

French recognition of Communist China, although untimely and carried out in a way that can hardly be considered friendly to the United States, may nonetheless serve a constructive long-term purpose, by unfreezing a situation in which many countries, none more than the United States, are committed to inflexible policies by long-established commitments and the pressures of domestic public opinion. One way or another, the French initiative may help generate a new situation in which the United States, as well as other countries, will find it possible to reevaluate its basic policies in the Far East.

The situation in Vietnam poses a far more pressing need for a reevaluation of American policy. Other than withdrawal, which I do not think can be realistically considered under present circumstances, three options are open to us in Vietnam: First, continuation of the antiguerrilla war within South Vietnam, along with renewed American efforts to increase the military effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army and the political effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government; second, an attempt to end the war, through negotiations for the neutralization of South Vietnam, or of both North and South Vietnam; and, finally, the expansion of the scale of the war, either by the direct commitment of large numbers of American troops or by equipping the South Vietnamese Army to attack North Vietnamese territory, possibly by means of commando-type operations from the sea or the air.

It is difficult to see how a negotiation, under present military circumstances, could lead to termination of the war under conditions that would preserve the freedom of South Vietnam. It is extremely difficult for a party to a negotiation to achieve by dipolmacy objectives which it has conspicuously failed to win by warfare. The hard fact of the matter is that our bargaining position is at present a weak one; and until the equation of advantages between the two sides has been substantially altered in our favor, there can be little prospect of a negotiated settlement which would secure the independence of a non-Communist South Vietnam.

Recent initiatives by France, calling for the neutralization of Vietnam, have tended to confuse the situation, without altering it in any fundamental way. France could, perhaps, play a constructive mediating role if she were willing to consult and cooperate with the United States. For somewhat obscure reasons, however, France has chosen to take an independent initiative. This is puzzling to Americans, who recall that the United States contributed $1.2 billion to France's war in Indochina of a decade ago—which was 70 percent of the total cost of the conflict. Whatever its motivation, the problem posed by French intervention in southeast Asia is that while France may set off an unforeseeable chain of events, she is neither a major military force nor a major economic force in the Far East, and is therefore unlikely to be able to control or greatly influence the events which her initiative may precipitate.

It seems clear that only two realistic options are open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future: the expansion of the conflict in one way or another, or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale. The matter calls for thorough examination by responsible officials in the executive branch; and until they have had an opportunity to evaluate the contingencies and feasibilities of the options open to us, it seems to me that we have no choice but to support the South Vietnamese Government and Army by the most effective means available. Whatever specific policy decisions are made, it should be clear to all concerned that the United States will continue to meet its obligations and fulfill its commitments with respect to Vietnam.

These, I believe, are some, although by no means all, of the issues of foreign policy in which it is essential to reevaluate longstanding ideas and commitments in the light of new and changing realities. In all the issues which I have discussed, American policy has to one degree or another been less effective than it might have been because of our national tendency to equate means with ends and therefore to attach a mythological sanctity to policies and practices which in themselves have no moral content or value except insofar as they contribute to the achievement of some valid national objective. I believe that we must try to overcome this excessive moralism, which binds us to old myths and blinds us to new realities and, worse still, leads us to regard new and unfamiliar ideas with fear and mistrust.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable" things. We must learn to explore all of the options and possibilities that confront us in a complex and rapidly changing world. We must learn to welcome rather than fear the voices of dissent and not to recoil in horror whenever some heretic suggests that Castro may survive or that Khrushchev is not as bad a fellow as Stalin was. We must overcome our susceptibility to "shock"—a word which I wish could be banned from our newspapers and magazines and especially from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

If Congress and public opinion are unduly susceptible to "shock," the executive branch, and particularly the Department of State, is subject to the malady of chronic and excessive caution. An effective foreign policy is one which concerns itself more with innovation abroad than with concilliation at home. A creative foreign policy—as President Truman, for one, knew—is not necessarily one which wins immediate general approval. It is sometimes necessary for leaders to do unpleasant and unpopular things, because, as Burke pointed out, the duty of the democratic politician to his constituents is not to comply with their every wish and preference but to give them the benefit of, and to be held responsible for, the exercise of his own best judgment.

We must dare to think about "unthinkable things," because when things become "unthinkable," thinking stops and action becomes mindless. If we are to disabuse ourselves of old myths and to act wisely and creatively upon the new realities of our time, we must think and talk about our problems with perfect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wilson said, that "The greatest freedom of speech is the greatest safety because, if a man is a fool, the best thing to do is to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking."

file: Arms Control

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE?

In 1960 Secretary of State Herter first proposed creation of a NATO multilateral strategic nuclear force. When Premier de Gaulle made manifest his break with the United States and his determination to develop a French nuclear force, the Administration's response was a strong espousal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. The MLF was intended as a face-saving device for the United States, which would quiet claims in England and Germany for independent nuclear capability by the offer of a nuclear "partnership" among the allies who hold out against de Gaulle's unilateralist policy.

The initial lukewarm reaction among our NATO allies and here at home, has induced the belief within the last year that the MLF is a dormant proposal. That belief is erroneous. Having won the formal approval of the Administration, plans to activate the MLF have progressed under the leadership of a contingent in the State Department for whom MLF is a major preoccupation. The Navy, too, has become interested because of the potential accretion to its operations with the fleet of nuclear vessels contemplated by the MLF. Meanwhile, President Johnson's proposal for a nuclear freeze to be negotiated with the Soviets has been stalled at Geneva by the Russians who point out that we cannot coincidentally activate a freeze and build a strategic nuclear fleet. Moreover, while it was anticipated that the opposition of the Labor Party in Great Britain would preclude activation of the MLF, there is growing doubt whether the Labor Party will hold to its present position if it wins the elections. In sum, MLF plans are proceeding in the face of disinterest both among our allies and at home, while opponents within our own Government cannot effectively exert their influence as long as our official policy remains wedded to the MLF.

What is the MLF? Essentially, it is a "partnership" in the operation of a fleet of vessels equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. The Polaris-armed vessels would be manned by mixed forces from various NATO participants, with a veto by anyone of the major participating nations on the firing of the weapons. Of course, the veto renders the "partnership" unequal, since the United States with its nuclear forces in Europe thereby remains the only country which can independently of its allies activate a nuclear exchange. Accordingly, some German advocates of the MLF hope that ultimately the veto will be removed, and Germany will thus obtain its own nuclear force through the MLF. We have encouraged this hope by assurances that MLF is only the beginning of a "true European" force. That was the suggestion made by Deputy Assistant Secretary Schaetzel in a presentation in September 1963 in Oxfordshire, England. Yet such a veto-free MLF would be quite contrary to our present proposals at Geneva for a nuclear freeze and an agreement against further proliferation, with the result that there exists a present inconsistency in our overt representations to the Soviets and our thinly veiled promises to NATO countries.

This memorandum examines the principal argument advanced by the proponents of the MLF, reviews countervailing considerations, and suggests some alternative courses of conduct for the Administration, should it be determined that the present insistent United States advocacy of the MLF is not in the national interest:

A. THE PROPONENTS' MAJOR ARGUMENT: STOPPING NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

A principal argument advanced by proponents of the MLF is that England, Germany, and possibly other nations will follow de Gaulle's independent force example unless we can offer these nations a larger nuclear role within the NATO Alliance. Initially, it might be questioned whether the modest nuclear capability which France will attain is more troublesome in its military and political implications than the prospect of a large European strategic force with Germany a predominant participant. Exposition of the view that such a development would be less disturbing than the political and military implications of the MLF, appears in the March 1963 issue of The Reporter in an article by Henry A. Kissinger, and it will not be repeated here. We examine here in its short and its long-term implications the "anti-proliferation" argument made for the MLF:

1. MLF in the Short Run. It is clear that for the 1960s, MLF proponents vastly over-estimate European desire for a larger nuclear role. It is said that without MLF the Germans would soon follow the example of de Gaulle in developing an independent nuclear capacity. But with respect to Germany, not only would an independent nuclear force violate the existing treaties, it would cause a reaction by the Russians, as well as the United States, of a dimensisn which would give the Germans serious pause before entering on a provocative and expensive nuclear program.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the Germans presently desire a nuclear force of their own. What the Germans do desire in the short run is assurance that the United States is committed to employing its nuclear forces in Europe to forestall any form of aggressive action from the East, and that our weapons are targeted so as to assure that a nuclear exchange would also involve Russian territory, not just German soil. Yet for this modest German concern, the MLF goes too far. Bringing technical personnel from European nations into a second-level role in the targeting and deployment of our existing strategic missiles, would go most of the way towards meeting existing German concern about the United States nuclear umbrella. The MLF, on the other hand, will create an entirely new nuclear force at sea, which is both expensive and unnecessary in strategic military terms. Moreover, it may kindle rather than quiet nuclear aspirations among our European allies, and thus propel the very aspirations it is claimed the MLF would foreclose - the aspiration for independent nuclear capability. If we expouse the view that our allies' self-respect requires parity of nuclear participation with us, it will not be long before they espouse the same view. By contrast, without our active salesmanship, nuclear arms development may remain unpopular in Germany, England, and other nations.

2. MLF in the Long Run. While the MLF is more than is needed to meet the present concern of our allies, on the other hand it is inadequate to meet what are likely to be the long-term aspirations of NATO nations. As Kissinger's analysis points out, the force of de Gaulle's position for independent nuclear capability is based upon the realization of some fundamental differences of outlook between the United States and European nations. Thus, as much as our nuclear posture in Europe serves to preserve our close relations with allies and to hold the line for our positions vis-a-vis the Soviets, we may yet be increasingly disinclined actually to use these weapons in an exchange which could precipitate an all-out war of annihilation between the United States and the Soviets.

Moreover, the glue in the NATO alliance has been the existence of the common enemy in the East, but a predictable progression of closer relationships with the Soviets, fear of a resurgent Germany, and conflicting economic interests such as those reflected in the split over the Common Market, may radically alter the present community of interest between the United States and some of its NATO allies.

To the extent that anticipations of such changes exist in Europe, there will be growing interest in independent nuclear forces or a European nuclear force not subject to a United States veto. In the case of Germany, there will be the added incentive of the role of swing-nation which the pseudo-partnership will not satisfy. In sum, as much as the MLF exceeds the presently-manifested desire for NATO-nation participation in the nuclear deterrent, it will fall short of the long-term European demand for independent nuclear capability.

It may therefore be anticipated that the strongest pressures will ultimately arise for abandonment of the United States veto on the use of the MLF, and that such pressures may in time succeed with the result that the MLF will have paved the way for the very proliferation of nuclear weaponry which it is supposed to forestall. Alternatively, if NATO countries cannot attenuate or force abandonment of the United States veto, they may then proceed with the development of their independent nuclear forces, with the added stimulus and know-how which we ourselves have provided through the MLF. It seems clear, therefore, that the MLF is not a proper answer either to the existing or to the longer range nuclear aspirations of our NATO allies, and will more likely hasten than retard the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MLF.

1. MLF As a Bargaining Device. Some Administration officials who are not advocates of the MLF would nevertheless continue on our present course on the theory that in future bargaining with the Soviets over arms control in Europe, the MLF would provide an additional pawn

for trading. Yet as any experienced negotiator knows, one may bargain with assets, but it is difficult to bargain to an advantage with liabilities. If MLF is a free world liability, it cannot become a bargaining asset with the Soviets.

Even more importantly, the "bargaining pawn" argument disregards the fact that if the MLF actually comes into being, it may be impossible to convince our own allies to give it up for an arms control agreement. Once a strategic European force is in existence, our NATO allies may say with some credibility that if it was worth creating for the collective security, it is worth keeping and ought not to be surrendered short of a complete and general disarmament agreement. It is therefore probable that while creation of the MLF may provide an additional pawn for trading with the Soviets in an European arms control agreement, it would represent a pawn which our own allies will refuse to trade.

2. MLF As a Mere Multilateral Substitute for Bilateral Controls. Proponents urge that the MLF multilateral control with vetoes by major participants, is not materially different from the existing bilateral controls over tactical and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. These proponents argue that with respect to the present nuclear weapons in Europe there is already a system of shared control with the situs nation, and that all the MLF will do is to add more trigger fingers whose concurrence would be necessary for the firing of the weapons.

Apart from some question whether the MLF controls will in fact not give increased leverage to other nations with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, this argument blurs the critical distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. The decision that our NATO allies should share in the deployment and control of tactical weapons located in Europe may have been right or wrong; but it was a radically different decision from that posed by the MLF. For a decision to fire the missiles in the MLF would be to launch an attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of medium range so deployed as to be able to reach Soviet targets. In such an event there would ensue a nuclear war in which countless millions of Soviet and American citizens would perish. By contrast, the decision to give our NATO allies bilateral controls over tactical weapons was only a determination that a nuclear exchange initiated within the boundaries of NATO nations properly requires their participation in the decisional process. Accordingly, the MLF cannot be passed off as a mere extension of a bilateral control system to a multilateral control system, for the weapons of strategic war deployed in the MLF have radically different significance for the United States from the Nuclear weapons over which we presently share controls with NATO allies.

3. MLF as Step Toward a Western European Strategic Force. A final argument made by some proponents, is the converse of the principal "non-proliferation" rationale for the MLF. Under this argument, it would be desirable to move toward a Western European alliance possessing its own strategic nuclear weapons free of United

States control and United States responsibility. The proponents who welcome such a force, urge that the MLF is desirable not because it will end the spreading of nuclear weapons but because it will promote it.

To the extent that this view rests on the desire for a Western European unity it may, for sake of argument, be conceded that such a force would in fact promote some accretion in the unity of the NATO alliance. Yet the chief reason for such unity would be not fear of the Soviets, but fear of the Germans - the anticipation that without participation by other allies, the MLF would be a German-American nuclear alliance. Certainly, this is a fragile base for European "unity." Moreover, the price paid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the destabilization of the nuclear balance between the Soviets and the United States by this third force," is a price too high to be paid. In the last analysis, the integrity of the MLF proposal itself becomes subject to question when it is advertised simultaneously as a device which will contain and a device which will promote strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

C. UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR MLF SUPPORT.

There are five major unfavorable aspects to the continuing United States insistence upon creation of the MLF:

1. Nuclear Freeze and Non-Proliferation Agreements Imperiled. President Johnson's proposals at Geneva for nuclear freeze and non-proliferation agreements, have been imperilled by our support of the MLF. The Russians quickly seized upon the MLF, pointing out that we could not both stand still and move ahead at the same time, and would have to abandon the MLF if we are serious about the proposed agreements. The Russian claim of inconstancy is somewhat confirmed by William Foster's quoted statement in the Herald Tribune of January 24, 1964 that the United States freeze proposal would not include the MLF. And as the editorial in the Washington Post of February 12, 1964 points out, there is some inconsistency between our offering NATO the MLF as the beginning of a European force and our asserting to the Soviets that it is consistent with a nuclear freeze.

2. De-emphasis of Conventional Force Expansion in Europe. Replacement of nuclear with conventional defensive capability in Europe has been a major policy of the Administration. To the extent that the MLF will be costly to our NATO allies and emphasize their continued protection through nuclear response, it militates against the Administration's stress on the need for conventional capability among our NATO allies.

3. Production of European Rift Rather Than Unity. Our European allies are not requesting the MLF but are having it forced upon them by our insistence. (1) With the exception of some element in Germany, the MLF is not welcomed among the other nations, who must join it from fear of German predominance. The MLF is thus a rift-producing issue among our allies. And it is also causing serious internal political friction in NATO countries since it requires them to cast their lot unequivocally either with the United States or de Gaulle. Such a sharp choice situation has unfavorable consequences upon West Germany, and by drawing another divisive line among our allies, disserves the European unity and settlement aspirations entertained by many within our Administration. As the Kissinger analysis in The Reporter pointed out: "The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest - least of all West Germany's - to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Societ thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not - in its own interest - be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy."

(1) USIA Research and Reference Service report, dated April 5, 1963: "The reaction of the Western European press to U. S. Ambassador Merchant's recent trip indicated an overwhelming rejection of the kind of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the United States. Editorial comment was heaviest and most negative in West Germany. The rejection of the multilateral nuclear force within the NATO framework was commonly based on the belief that the United States was offering a hastily improvised and confused politically motivated and exorbitantly expensive device which would afford West Europe neither increased security nor increased voice in nuclear decisions. Supporters of the United States suggestion, for the most part a minority of Italian, British, and Scandinavian voices, saw it as the lesser of two evils and a possible starting point for discussions. By the end of the Merchant trip, most papers were openly speculating that the multilateral nuclear force plan in its present form would be scrapped with the debate continuing on the central issue of nuclear interdependence within the Western Alliance. Hopes were also expressed that the United States would find a way to dispel the confusion aroused by its original multilateral force proposals."

4. Political Repercussions in the Congress. It also seems clear that the MLF is not presently favored in the Congress, or likely ultimately to win its support. It probably violates or strains the McMahon Act by giving nuclear information to other countries. It gives concern to those who have worried about a re-emerging Germany as a predominant European power which controls European fortunes. It is not favored by those who value our nuclear monopoly and the direct controls which we have retained upon the strategic weapons of potential annihilation. Meanwhile, the Administration has completely by-passed the Congress. The closer we approach activation of MLF, the larger will be the cumulative weight of these Congressional concerns.

5. Nuclear Race Escalation. Following the test ban, there have been widespread hopes that a way would be found to reach a plateau in the nuclear arms race in which there would be a leveling off of nuclear forces within present limits, and no expansion of weaponry to countries which are nuclear-free today. Apart from the additional numbers of strategic weapons and nations with such weapons which the MLF would involve, it is today the single proposal for a new advance which stands in the way of a leveling off of the nuclear arms race. This is a serious new ground for a reassessment of the MLF proposal.

D. THE LARGER CONTEXT: ENDING THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY OF ARMAMENTS.

Almost all current debates about the MLF are limited to the existing political and military relationship in Europe. All are predicated upon the assumption that there remains a military threat in Europe from the East which requires degrees of nuclear capability in Western Europe. First, however, it must be noted that except for the special problem of Berlin, conventional forces are demonstrably adequate for the defense of Western Europe against conventional force attack. Moreover, the very hypothesis of an attack upon Western Europe becomes less and less credible as the years pass. Without Soviet participation, such an attack would be meaningless in military terms and therefore unlikely of initiation; with Soviet participation it would unquestionably initiate a world war, which again provides a highest level deterrent. Nor is it clear just what Soviet hope would impel such an attack. Our present military posture in Europe is based on a threat which no one believes.

The fact is that we have continued to give a preemptive position to military policy and nuclear power in Europe, in an era when the real problems of Europe are economic and political rather than military. Our continuing diplomacy of weaponry, both against the Soviets and vis-a-vis de Gaulle, stands in the way of the traditional diplomacy, prevents desired economic and cultural exchange, and other normal adjustments between countries as well as the necessary political developments within them. The MLF perpetuates obsession with military response to rifts with the Soviets and between the Allies, in an era which calls not for an arms polemic but for the progression of relationships between sovereign states.

Those who would promote a detente and ultimately a settlement in Europe, must look beyond such merely military alignments such as the pseudo-partnership of the Multilateral Nuclear Force.

For the nuclear arms race and the diplomacy of armaments in Europe will not cease as long as the United States itself is the chief promoter of new nuclear weapons systems. On the other hand, a return to the traditional international diplomacy in Europe would foster a climate in which national possession of nuclear arms would appear less vital either for national prestige or national security. As long as the United States remains ready to employ its nuclear strength against a nuclear attack in Europe, there is in fact no security necessity for national nuclear forces. And the demand for nuclear arms in NATO countries attributable to the desire for national prestige and self-esteem, reflects a desire which we ourselves are fostering when we proclaim by devices such as the MLF that our NATO allies must have a first-ranking role in the operation of a strategic weapons system. In short, the only way in which our NATO allies can be induced not to strive for a strategic nuclear system of their own is if we ourselves cease our obeisance to nuclear power as the cornerstone of European policy and European defense.

Today we welcome agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America and other areas where they are not presently deployed. One may hope that tomorrow we may recognize that in Europe, too, the proper goal is not an accretion in nuclear armaments but the replacement of the nuclear confrontation by political and economic settlements and conventional forces adequate to assure that they are honored. At a time when we should seek to move away from the nuclear arms race, the multilateral nuclear force is a move in precisely the wrong direction.

E. ALTERNATIVES TO UNITED STATES PROMOTION OF THE MLF.

There are essentially three alternatives to the present United States position:

1. Abandoning the MLF. While this may constitute long-term wisdom for the United States, it is unlikely that we would renounce the MLF in the near future without at least a serious quid pro quo from the Soviets. It should be noted that if the United States abandons the MLF, it may continue to adhere to its opposition to the independent development of nuclear capability by Germany, and other nations, and we may expect some success in holding our allies to that position at least for the next few years.

2. Initiating a Slow-Down of MLF Activation. This seems the most desirable immediate step, but there is always difficulty in taking the first step away from an established course. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings might serve as a temporary brake. A slow-down should pave the way toward ultimate recession by the United States from the MLF proposal.

3. A Replacement for MLF. A more modest nuclear "partnership" might be proposed to meet the present concerns of NATO allies. Second level technical people could be brought into the targeting and planning phases of our existing strategic nuclear force, to give added assurance of our readiness to employ the nuclear umbrella. To the extent that we are, in fact, ready to employ that umbrella, it seems highly desirable that our allies be assured that this is so. By this means we may satisfy some present concerns among our NATO allies without creating a new strategic striking force in Europe and opening the door to an independent European nuclear "third force" with its troublesome political and military implications.