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Geneva, September 6th, 1959.

Nikita S. Khrushchev
President of the Council of the U.S.S.R.
M o s c o w
U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

Attached is a draft manuscript which discusses a major problem that faces both America and the U.S.S.R., as the result of the bombs stockpiled in both countries.

I am sending a copy to the White House marked for the attention of General Persons, and I am requesting that it be referred for study to someone responsible for "policy planning" with the instruction that an oral report be rendered to President Eisenhower, if this appears to be warranted.

In sending you the attached manuscript, I take the liberty to suggest that a similar procedure might, perhaps, be adopted by you also.

America and Russia are in much the same predicament in respect to the main issue which I am discussing. Through attending four of the Pugwash Meetings, I came into contact with several members of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and the discussions I had with them have convinced me that I ought to publish this manuscript simultaneously in Russia and America. With this end in mind, I am sending a copy to the General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Academician Alexander Topchiev.

I am sending this letter to the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. with the request that it be transmitted to you.

In the postwar years, (more perhaps than at any previous period of time) foreign policy in America was largely made by those who

were actually operating, rather than by those who were supposed to be engaged in "policy planning". However, the attention of those who operate is mostly focused on the day to day problems and they have no time and little inclination to think about the long term implications of the policies which they pursue. This may perhaps explain why American foreign policy has been pursuing unattainable objectives in the postwar years.

I plan to spend the month of October in Washington, and to discuss with certain members of the State Department the issues raised in the attached manuscript, which are semi-political, as well as semi-technical.

Afterwards, I shall write you again to ask whether it might be possible to arrange for me to discuss these issues in Moscow with a few men (designated either by your office or by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.) who are engaged in thinking about problems of this sort and who may act in a policy-advisory capacity to the Government of the U.S.S.R.


Very truly yours,

Leo Szilard

R e c o m m a n d é



Москва, В-71
ЛЕНИНСКИЙ ПРОСПЕКТ
АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК
СССР.



Professor L.Szilard

Профессор Л.Сцилард

Room 812, Memorial Center

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444 East, 68-th St.

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Нью-Йорк 21, Н.И., США



г. Москва, Ленинский проспект, 14
Академия наук СССР



9th June, 1960.

N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.,
Moscow,
U.S.S.R.

Sir,

It is my belief that, informal discussions between American and Russian scientists could make a major contribution to the solution of the problem which the bomb poses to the world, provided that this is fully understood both by the Government of the Soviet Union and the United States, at the very highest level. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of putting forward certain considerations in this regard and I should be very grateful for your advising me whether you agree with them.

In the post-war period I first came into contact with Russian colleagues through a meeting held in 1957 on the estate of Mr. Cyrus Eaton at Pugwash, Canada. These contacts convinced me that Russian and American scientists are capable of discussing dispassionately the problem which the bomb is posing to the world, even though political, as well as technical, considerations are inextricably involved.

The solution of this problem will require imagination and resourcefulness and these are more likely to be displayed in informal conversations between men who have no direct governmental responsibility, than in inter-governmental negotiations.

If an issue becomes subject to governmental negotiations, before there has been sufficient intellectual preparation through informal private discussions, the solutions proposed are likely to be rather pedestrian solutions.

This might perhaps explain why such a pedestrian approach has been adopted in the Geneva negotiations on the cessation of bomb tests with respect to the detection of illicit explosions, and why such irrelevant issues as the possibility of testing bombs illicitly behind the moon were raised.

Even though the President's Science Advisory Committee has been in existence for sometime, initially none of its members served on a full-time basis and the work of the Committee did not amount to very much. After Sputnik, however, Dr. George B. Killian was appointed as a full-time Chairman of the Committee and a number of distinguished scientists were drawn into the work of the Committee. By the spring of 1958 there were in America a substantial number of scientists deeply interested in the problem posed by the bomb and aware of the political, as well as the technical, aspects of the problems involved.

At the time of the first Pugwash Meeting, it was difficult to obtain the participation of an adequate number of knowledgeable American scientists, but by the time of the second Pugwash Meeting, held in April 1958 at Lac Beauport near Quebec, Canada, a sufficient number of such scientists were available and they recognized that informal discussions with their Russian counterparts might be of great value. If it had been possible to obtain an advance assurance that these men would meet with their Russian counterparts at Lac Beauport, it would have been possible to assemble a very knowledgeable and influential group of American participants.

During the Lac Beauport Meeting it became obvious that it would not be possible to go sufficiently deeply into the questions involved at an international meeting of this general character, to accomplish very much. Therefore, I asked Mr. Alexander Topchiev, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, whether he thought that it might be possible to carry out a study of the world security problem through informal conversations between Russian

and American scientists, that might be arranged through the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.

Upon my return to America I found that this idea met with enthusiastic support on the part of many of my colleagues, which resulted in the appointment of a Committee by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston under the Chairmanship of John Edsall and an Operating Sub-Committee under my Chairmanship.

Our concrete suggestion, for the first meeting to be held in Moscow at the end of July 1958, met with a favourable response on the part of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union but we had to ask for a postponement of the meeting until September and finally had to call off the meeting because of the restrictions put upon us by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government was generally sympathetic to the thought of achieving clarification of the issues and discovering possible new avenues towards their solution through informal discussions. It stipulated, however, that no one active in a policy advisory capacity should participate in these informal discussions.

For the Russian and American governments to derive real benefit from such conversations it is necessary that at least some of those who participate in the formulation of government policy should participate in the conversations. Only through direct participation in such discussions would it be possible for advisors of the government to clarify their own minds concerning the merits of the proposals that might emerge. Therefore, when we found that this could not be arranged we called off the meeting that we had proposed.

The quality of the American participants in the subsequent Pugwash Meetings demonstrated the increasing desire among American scientists of having informal conversations with those of their Russian colleagues who have given real attention to the problem of world security.

I have no reason to believe that the restrictions which the United States Government imposed upon our participation in such informal conversations in

1958 would again be imposed upon us today, particularly if we did not aim at the holding of informal conversations within the framework of a formal "conference".

If a formal "conference" were held it would be difficult to avoid giving the false impression that somehow we are negotiating, rather than merely exploring ideas for the purpose of making future negotiations more promising. But if the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union were to invite individual scientists for the purpose of visiting various scientific institutions, the Academy could then arrange for the informal discussions here envisaged, to take place after the official part of the visits are over. Alternatively, if American scientists were invited to participate in some conference of general interest held in Russia, a limited number of them could then stay over for the purpose of holding informal discussions.

We, over here, do not know, of course, whether scientists play a policy advisory role in the Soviet Union to the same extent as they do, at the present time, in America. There is no reason, however, why informal conversations in Russia should be restricted to scientists and if you deem^{it}/advisable they could well be extended to a limited number of non-scientists, who act in a policy advisory capacity to the Government of the Soviet Union.

I assume that the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union would be in a position to arrange for such informal discussions, if their real purpose is fully understood and meets with the full approval of the Government of the U.S.S.R., at the highest level. I shall be very grateful for your advising me through your Embassy in Washington whether the holding of such informal discussions would meet with your full approval. Should this be the case, then you may want to transmit a copy of my letter, and your answer to it, to the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and we could then turn to them for the making of such arrangements as are deemed to be appropriate.

Because I am not well I would not be in a position again to assume responsibility for the making of the arrangements, but I would transmit your reply to those of my colleagues who may be in a position to do so.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard.

Copy

27th June, 1960.

N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Moscow,
USSR.

Sir:

It is my belief that informal conversations between politically knowledgeable Russian and American scientists might make a major contribution to the solution of the problem which the bomb poses to the world, provided that their purpose and function is fully understood at the highest level by the governments of both the Soviet Union and the United States. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of putting forward certain considerations which are relevant in this regard and I should be very grateful for your letting me know whether you think that I ought to pursue this matter further.

In the post-war period, I first came into contact with Russian colleagues through a meeting held in 1957, on the estate of Mr. Cyrus Eaton at Pugwash, Canada. These contacts convinced me that Russian and American scientists are capable of discussing dispassionately the problem which the bomb is posing to the world even though political as well as technical considerations are inextricably involved.

The solution of this problem will require ~~and~~ imagination and resourcefulness and these are more likely to be displayed in informal conversations between men who have no direct governmental responsibility, than in inter-governmental negotiations.

If an issue becomes subject to governmental negotiations, before there has been sufficient intellectual preparation through informal private discussions, the solutions proposed are likely to be rather pedestrian solutions. This might perhaps explain why such a pedestrian approach has been adopted in the Geneva negotiations on the cessation of bomb tests with respect to the detection of illicit explosions, and why such irrelevant issues, as the possibility of testing bombs illicitly behind the moon, were raised.

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Upon my return to America I found that this idea met with enthusiastic support on the part of many of my colleagues, which resulted in the appointment of a Committee by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston under the Chairmanship of John Edsall and an Operating Sub-Committee under my Chairmanship.

Our concrete suggestion, for the first meeting to be held in Moscow at the end of July 1958, met with a favourable response on the part of the Academy of Sciences of

the Soviet Union but we had to ask for a postponement of the meeting until September and finally had to call off the meeting because of the restrictions put upon us by the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government was generally sympathetic to the thought of achieving clarification of the issues, and discovering possible new avenues towards their solution, through informal discussions. It stipulated, however, that no one active in a policy advisory capacity should participate in these informal discussions.

For the governments involved to derive real benefits from such conversations, it is necessary that some of those who have influence on the formation of governmental policy should participate in the conversations. Only through direct participation in these conversations is it possible for such men to clarify their own minds concerning the merits of proposals that might emerge. Therefore, when we found that this could not be arranged we called off the meeting that we had proposed.

Recently, some politically knowledgeable American scientists visited various scientific institutions in the Soviet Union, at the invitation of the Academy of Sciences, and through the good offices of the Academy they were able to have conversations with a few politically knowledgeable Russian colleagues, without risking that their conversations might be mistaken for negotiations. I believe that discussions between Russian and American scientists arranged in this manner, on a sufficiently large scale, could come to grips with the basic difficulties of the problems involved.

The next Pugwash Meeting is scheduled to be held in Moscow in the first half of September and the next meeting thereafter may be held in the United States. I understand that a number of politically knowledgeable Russian scientists are scheduled to participate in the Moscow meeting. This is very gratifying news indeed, and I know that my colleagues who are taking an active interest in this matter will make a very serious effort to have the Americans match, as far as possible, the Russian participants. I hope they will succeed, even though it is somewhat late in the season. I also hope and pray that the difficulties which frustrated our efforts in 1958 may not arise again.

The September meeting could afford an opportunity of the kind of informal conversations between Americans and Russians which we planned to have in 1958. Perhaps, some such conversations could take place during the meeting; moreover, a number of the American participants might be able to stay over after the meeting - for a week or two perhaps - in order to continue their conversations.

We, in America, do not know whether in the Soviet Union scientists play a policy advisory role to the same extent as they do here at the present time. For this reason it would be wrong for me to suggest that the Russians who participate in these discussions should all be scientists. It might well be that non-scientists, who may advise the government of the Soviet Union on policy, ought to be drawn into these discussions also. One would presumably want to stop short, however, of involving Russian and American officials who operate on the decision making level, or act as spokesmen for their government.

I take the liberty of writing you this letter because I am convinced that conversations of this sort would be much more productive if the Russian and American governments were prepared to go beyond merely giving their consent for the conversations to take place; the scientists involved would need to be actively encouraged and made to feel that these discussions have the full approval of the governments.

In these circumstances, I should be very grateful to you for writing me whether the general approach outlined in this letter meets with your full approval.

If it does, then you may also want to transmit to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR a copy of your answer, together perhaps with a copy of my letter.

Because I am not well I can no longer assume responsibility for making the necessary arrangements; instead, I would transmit your reply to those of my American colleagues who are taking an active interest in these matters. Presumably, they would see to it that the function and purpose of the informal discussions here envisaged is fully understood at the level of the White House. This being an election year, they would presumably also want to discuss the matter - depending on the timing of your reply - either with the Nominees of the Democratic and Republican Conventions, or the President

Elect. For the making of any specific arrangements they would, undoubtedly, turn to the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

Yours very truly,

Leo Szilard.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

COPY

August 16th, 1960.

Mr. N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Moscow, USSR.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I understand that you might be coming to New York about September 20th and I wondered whether you might find it possible to spend a few hours with me in Memorial Hospital in New York. Since you might not know who I am, I am asking Mr. Marshall MacDuffie to transmit this letter to you, with such comments of his own as he may wish to make.

I have given some thought to the problem of what it would take to avoid a war between America and Russia which neither of them want and I think that perhaps it might interest you to hear what I may be able to say on this subject.

In this context, we might also examine to what extent the issues involved could be clarified by arranging for informal discussions between American and Russian scientists who have given thought to this subject. The danger of a technological accident, that could lead to war, is increasing rather rapidly at present and such discussions would almost certainly be productive in the case of this particular issue. But other important issues - in which political and technological considerations are involved in an inseparable fashion - might be clarified also by such informal discussions.

I can be contacted over the telephone at Memorial Hospital, New York, at extension 133, TRafalgar 9 - 3000. My address is Room 812, The Memorial Hospital, 444 East 68th Street, New York 21, N.Y.

I should be very grateful for your advising me whether you think it likely that you may be able to schedule a visit with me, as soon as it is definitely settled that you would be coming to New York in September.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

copy

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON 6, D.C.

September 1, 1960.

Professor Leo Szilard,
Room 812,
Memorial Hospital,
444 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N.Y.

My dear Professor:

I have the pleasure of forwarding to you Russian text and unofficial English translation of a letter by N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, addressed to you.

The original of the letter will be sent to you at a later date.

Sincerely yours,

Mikhail A. Menshikov
Ambassador

COPY

Unofficial translation

Dear Professor Szilard,

I received your letter and read it with interest.

In the letter you are raising the question about a joint meeting of prominent Soviet and American Scientists to be held in Moscow after the forthcoming Pugwash conference for an unofficial discussion of the problem of international security in connection with the existence of nuclear weapons in the world and for clarifying the disputable issues, dividing our countries.

Giving credit to your noble efforts aimed at the improvement of the mutual understanding and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, I welcome your new initiative. In my opinion the more frequently and broadly representatives of science, culture and public of various countries will meet with each other to discuss urgent international problems and the more concern they will display for the fate of peace, the greater will be guarantee that peoples' struggle for complete and universal disarmament, for final removal of war from human life and for peaceful co-existence will be crowned with success.

The Soviet people highly value their scientists not only for their universally known scientific discoveries, but also for their standing in the first ranks of fighters for peace and happiness of people. These noble activities for peace of our scientists find ardent support and approval on the part of the Soviet people and their government.

I believe that Soviet scientists will respond to your new proposal and will make practical arrangements for its realization.

I wish you success in carrying out your important initiative.

With respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Moscow,
August 30, 1960.

Professor Leo Szilard,
Department of Biophysics,
University of Chicago,
Chicago 37, Ill.

Уважаемый профессор Сцилард,

получил Ваше письмо, которое я прочел с интересом.

В своем письме Вы поднимаете вопрос о проведении в Москве после предстоящей Пагуошской конференции совместной встречи видных советских и американских ученых для неофициального обсуждения проблемы международной безопасности в связи с наличием в мире ядерного оружия и для раз'яснения спорных вопросов, разделяющих наши страны.

Отдавая должное Вашим благородным усилиям, направленным на улучшение взаимопонимания и отношений между Советским Союзом и Соединенными Штатами, я приветствую Вашу новую инициативу. По моему мнению, чем чаще и шире будут встречаться между собой представители науки, культуры и общественности различных стран для обсуждения актуальных международных проблем и чем большую озабоченность они будут проявлять за судьбы мира, тем больше гарантий того, что борьба народов за полное и всеобщее разоружение, за окончательное устранение войн из жизни людей, за мирное сосуществование увенчается успехом.

Советский народ высоко ценит своих ученых не только за их всемирно известные научные открытия, но и за то, что они стоят в первых рядах борцов за мир и счастье людей. Эта благородная деятельность наших ученых в пользу мира горячо поддерживается и одобряется советским народом и его правительством.

Я полагаю, что советские ученые откликнутся на Ваше новое предложение и конкретно договорятся о его практическом осуществлении.

Желаю Вам успеха в осуществлении Вашей важной инициативы.

С уважением

Москва
30 августа 1960 года

Н. ХРУЩЕВ

Профессору Лео Сциларду,
Департамент биофизики,
Чикагский университет,
Чикаго 37, шт. Иллинойс.

Dear Professor Szilard,

I received your letter and read it with interest.

In the letter you are raising the question about a joint meeting of prominent Soviet and American scientists to be held in Moscow after the forthcoming Pugwash conference for an unofficial discussion of the problem of international security in connection with the existence of nuclear weapons in the world and for clarifying the disputable issues, dividing our countries.

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С уважением

Москва
30 августа 1960 года

Н. ХРУЩЕВ

Профессору Лео Сциларду,
Департамент биофизики,
Чикагский университет,
Чикаго 37, шт. Иллинойс.

September 12, 1960.

Mr. N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
c/o Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Washington 6, D.C.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I wish to thank you for your very heartening reply of August 30 to my letter of June 27. It is gratifying to see that the Government of the USSR understands, at its highest level, the nature of the unofficial discussions that have been envisaged and shares the hope that such discussions might lead to constructive proposals.

What we now need is a clear and enduring recognition on the part of the U.S. Government that one must look upon such informal discussions as a more or less continuous process, constantly aimed at the clarification of the relevant problems. Accordingly, once such discussions are started, they must not be interrupted or postponed either because of some setbacks in the inter-governmental negotiations or because inter-governmental negotiations on some major issue appear to be imminent or may actually be in progress.

My colleagues will undoubtedly wish to discuss this matter, after November 7, with the President-Elect - in the light of your letter of August 30. Concerning practical arrangements for the realization of such discussions, they will keep in contact with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

On August 16, prior to receiving your reply to my earlier communication, I wrote you a letter of which you will find a copy attached. Together with a covering letter of Mr. Marshall MacDuffie,

it was transmitted to you by Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov. I take this opportunity to reiterate my desire to see you when you are in New York, provided that your time permits to make arrangements for an unhurried conversation.

It would not be necessary for you to see me in the hospital; at this time, I feel very well and would have no difficulty to meet you at the place that is most convenient to you. This improvement in my condition is likely to last for weeks and it might last for months; I can now be away from the hospital for days at a stretch.

Even though my hospital is located on Manhattan Island, the recent regrettable stipulations of the State Department restricting your freedom of movement, might make a visit to the hospital embarrassing to you, to the State Department or to the hospital. As for me, it does not embarrass me to do what I regard as the right thing to do.

My address is Room 812, The Memorial Hospital, 444 East 68th Street, New York 21, N.Y. I can be reached over the telephone from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. at extension 133, TRafalgar 9-3000.

Yours very sincerely,

Leo Szilard

Attachment

М Е М О Р А Н Д У М

30 сентября 1960 г.

Никите С.Хрущеву,
Председателю Совета Министров С.С.С.Р.

От: Лео Сциларда

На завтраке, устроенном г.Сайрусом Итоном 26 сентября, вы^{ли}сказали, что неофициальное обсуждение частными ^{лицами} ~~людьми~~ спорных ^{международных} вопросов может оказаться полезным, потому что ^{оно} может дать продуктивные результаты, которые затем могут быть подвергнуты рассмотрению, как русским и американским, так и другими заинтересованными правительствами. Я тоже полагаю, что подобного рода неофициальные обсуждения могут оказаться очень полезными, но только в том случае, если принимающие в них участие ^{лица} ~~люди~~ будут так же осведомлены в обсуждаемых вопросах, как и руководящие правительственные деятели, от которых зависит принятие решений.

Если мне предоставлена будет возможность говорить с Вами, то мне хотелось бы как раз затронуть вопрос о том, где в Америке и России можно найти таких осведомленных людей.

В настоящий момент в Америке имеется много ученых, понимающих значительное число этих проблем, и объясняется это следующими обстоятельствами. В последние годы, особенно после Спутника, правительство США пригласило на службу много ученых для ~~планирования~~ ^{работы} обороны Америки. Выдающиеся ученые уделяют часть своего времени ~~деятельности~~ в качестве членов Научного ^{Совета} при Президенте. Другие, более молодые и, может быть, менее известные, но, возможно, не менее способные, уделяют все свое время работе в таких центрах, как Рэнд Корпорэйшен в Санта Моника, в лабораториях имени Линкольна при Технологическом институте Массачузетса в Лексингтоне, Авиационном испытательном центре Кембридж в Бедфорде и т.д.

Эти люди начали свою работу с ^{целью} ~~попытки~~ улучшить оборону Америки,

~~Во время~~
но ~~в~~ ~~курсе~~ своей работы большинство из них пришло к заключению, что Америка не может чувствовать себя в безопасности, если будет продолжаться гонка вооружений. По мере того, как это убеждение стало расти среди них, люди эти начали проявлять интерес к вопросу о разоружении.

(Еще совсем недавно, два или три года тому назад, большинство этих людей полагало, что Америка может вести войны в географически отдаленных ^{блх} районах, ^{ах} использовать ^{уд} атомные бомбы в ^{только} районе, где ведется война, ^и к ^{таким} ^{образом} не дать войне распространиться. Сегодня, среди всех этих людей, мне известны только два человека, верящие попрежнему в эту возможность).

Можно себе представить, что через год или два, точка зрения ~~этих~~ ученых воздействует на все круги администрации в Вашингтоне. Потребуется, однако, не только перемена взглядов администрации, но и Конгресса, ^{чтобы} пока Америка ^{сможет} согласиться на заключение ~~выполни-~~ ~~мого~~ договора, предусматривающего далеко идущее разоружение.

Когда в 1959 или в 1960 году ~~кажется возможным~~ созыв совещания ^{кажется возможным,} на вершине, ^и меня спросил один из русских коллег, не могут ли ученые в Америке использовать свое влияние в пользу созыва такого совещания. Я сказал ему тогда, что давление общественного мнения может больше, чем что-либо другое заставить американское правительство принять участие в совещании на вершине, но, что, как говорится в Америке, "вы можете подвести лошадь к воде, но не можете заставить ее пить".

Американское правительство можно заставить сесть за стол и вести с Россией переговоры о разоружении, но такие переговоры не дадут желательных результатов, пока много влиятельных американцев в Конгрессе и вне его считают полное и всеобщее разоружение неприемлемым. Поэтому я хочу обсудить с Вами, если только представится возможность, вопрос об истинных причинах сопротивления влиятельных американцев ^{согласию} ^и ^и ^{причинам} ^и разоружения. Когда это ^и ^{станет} ^{ясным} ^и

можно будет приступить к обсуждению того, что должно^{6c} сделать американское и русское правительства^α для того, чтобы убрать с дороги эти препятствия к разоружению.

Одной из причин, почему много американцев отказываются от разоружения, является убеждение, что Россия не согласится дать удовлетворительные гарантии, если будет достигнуто соглашение о далеко идущем разоружении. В этом отношении большинство моих американских коллег, с которыми я обсуждал этот вопрос, согласились со мною^й по следующим двум пунктам. Мы полагаем, что

(а) Если вообще и действительно полное разоружение станет приемлемым для Америки и если первый шаг в сторону разоружения зайдет так далеко, что для Америки и России станет ненужным ограничивать ~~взаимные~~ ^{поступление} ~~поток~~ определенного ^{67x} ~~вида~~ информации, тогда, вероятно, станут приемлемыми для России меры, которые необходимы, как гарантия против ^{тайных} ~~секретных~~ нарушений соглашения о разоружении.

(б) Ошибочно полагать, что ^{дел} ~~обнаружение~~ ^я серьезных ^{тайных} ~~секретных~~ нарушений соглашения о разоружении потребует ^{св. работа} ~~действительности~~ значительного числа инспекторов на русской и американской территориях и ~~будет~~ также ошибочно полагать, что отправка значительного числа инспекторов на американскую и русскую территории обязательно приведет к раскрытию ^{тайных} ~~секретных~~ нарушений, если такие нарушения будут иметь место. Для России и Америки будет, однако, возможным создать условия, при которых Россия сможет быть уверенной, что ^{тайные} ~~секретные~~ нарушения соглашения Америкой будут сообщаться американскими гражданами международной контрольной комиссии, и Америка ^{может} ~~сможет~~ быть ^{тайные} ~~уверенной~~, что ~~секретные~~ нарушения соглашения, ^{могут} ~~имеющие~~ место на русской территории, будут ^{также} сообщаться советскими гражданами международной контрольной комиссии.

Один из вопросов, который Вам был задан на завтраке, данным г. Сайрусом Итоном, касался этого последнего пункта. Это был последний адресованный^К Вам вопрос и задан он был молодым физиком. Он спросил у Вас, согласится ли советское правительство, в случае подписания соглашения о всеобщем и полном разоружении, обратиться к своему народу с призывом сообщать о ~~секретных~~^{тайных} нарушениях соглашения, которые могут иметь место на советской территории. Вы дали утвердительный ответ на этот вопрос, но присутствовавшим на завтраке осталось неясным, был ли правильно сформулирован этот вопрос ^{были ли} и Вам ~~стали~~ понятны вытекающие из этого вопроса ~~следствия~~.

Если мне представится возможность, я ~~поддержу~~^{продолжу} Ваши обсуждения^и этот вопрос во всех деталях. Мне хотелось бы это сделать, потому что я полагаю, что Вы желаете сделать заявление для опубликования, которое должно убедить американскую публику, что Вы полностью понимаете этот вопрос и что Вы находитесь в полном согласии со мною^и касательно положения, изложенного в пункте (б). Опубликовав заявление по этому вопросу, Вы сделали бы большой шаг на пути к устранению убеждения, широко распространенного в Америке, что удовлетворительная гарантия далеко идущего разоружения является неприемлемой для России.

Я убежден^и однако, что много влиятельных американцев будут противиться всеобщему и полному разоружению даже в том случае, если они окажутся удовлетворенными гарантиями Советского Союза ~~тайных~~^{тайных} против ~~секретных~~ нарушений соглашения. При всеобщем и полном разоружении, Америка не сможет выполнить свои обязательства^и по защите районов, находящихся далеко от Америки, и для многих влиятельных американцев всеобщее и полное разоружение будет приемлемо, если Америка сможет освободиться от обязательств по защите таких, далеко расположенных районов. Единственным средством для ~~решения~~^{и задачи} этой трудности^и явится создание международных полицейских сил, опе-

рирующих под эгидой Объединенных Наций, которые возьмут на себя задачу по защите малых государств в ряде беспокойных районов мира. Это ~~ведет~~ ведет к вопросу, который Вы подняли в Генеральной Ассамблее о том, кто должен командовать полицейскими силами ООН. Ясно, что международная полицейская сила, находящаяся под командой генерального секретаря Объединенных Наций, не будет, при создавшемся положении, приемлема для Советского Союза и может стать неприемлемой для Соединенных Штатов в последующие годы при изменившихся обстоятельствах. В течение последних пяти лет, я серьезно занимался этим вопросом и перед тем, как заниматься им далее, хотел бы обсудить его с Вами, если представится к тому возможность.

В настоящий момент много моих американских коллег серьезно обеспокоены тем, что случайное или несанкционированное нападение местного командующего может привести ^к атомной войне между Америкой и Россией, которую не хочет ни одно из государств. Как несанкционированное нападение, организованное старшим американским офицером, может привести ^к ~~к такой~~ войне, живо описано в американской книге, получившей широкое распространение ("Красная тревога" Питера Брайанта, Эйс Бук № Д-350, Эйс Бук Инк., 43 Вест 47 улица, Нью Йорк 6, Н.И.). ~~Ввиду~~ того, что книга эта вышла три года назад, ~~теперь она~~ запоздала. Тем не менее, в ней правильно описано, как трудно принять меры против несанкционированного нападения так же, как и против случайного, и ~~одновременно, охранять базы~~ ^{в то же время следит за} с которых могут быть запущены бомбы ^{в защиту от} ~~нападений~~ ^{станет} еще труднее, если главная оборона Америки будет покоиться на подводных лодках, способных запускать ракеты.

Любое обсуждение способов, которые могут быть использованы для предупреждения случайной или несанкционированной атаки, должно быть, само собою разумеется, очень детальным и высоко техническим. Возможно, что неофициальные обсуждения между американскими и рус-

скими учеными, занимавшимися этой проблемой, приведет к некоторым положительным результатам в этой области и ^{потому} такого рода обсуждения должны иметь место. Я лично думаю, однако, что в настоящий момент Президентом Соединенных Штатов или Вами может быть принята ^{следующая} ~~одна~~ простая мера. Когда я справлялся в последний раз ^{о том} сколько времени понадобится Президенту Соединенных Штатов и Председателю совета министров Советского Союза наладить между собой телефонный контакт, в случае случайного или несанкционированного нападения на американский ~~город~~ или на русский город для ведения срочных переговоров, мне сказали, что на это потребуется несколько часов. Если это верно, то Америка или Россия должны в настоящий момент взять на себя инициативу для ^{установки прямого} ~~инсталляции~~ телефонного сообщения, которое даст им возможность немедленно наладить в случае нужды контакт.

Принимая во внимание, что время настоящего разоружения находится, может быть, уже не за горами и ^{это} разоружение это пойдет дальше ^{так} ~~не~~ ^и под контролем вооружений и ^и ~~окажется~~ ^{это} приемлемым для Америки, американским и русским ученым следовало бы теперь начать неофициальные переговоры, ^{о том} как далеко должен пойти первый шаг по сокращению вооружений и ^и ~~и~~ ^{быть} при этом приемлемым для России в отношении необходимых гарантий. Много моих американских коллег посвятили ^и много времени этому вопросу и будут поэтому в состоянии обсудить его со своими русскими коллегами. Но когда мы пытались в прошлом обсудить эту проблему с нашими русскими коллегами, ^{то} ~~и~~ наиболее крупные из них, пользующиеся большим уважением, как в Америке, так и в Советском Союзе, уклонялись от этого обсуждения. Очевидно, они уклонялись от этого, ^{обсуждения} ~~потому~~ что не считали себя достаточно компетентными в этом вопросе, чтобы высказать свое ^и ~~мнение~~ ^я. На следующей конференции Пугвош, которая должна собраться в Москве, мы можем попробовать, и может быть это нам удастся, заинтересовать этих русских коллег в этих вопросах, ^и ~~и~~ ^и затем советское правитель-

ство может поддерживать этот интерес, время от времени спрашивая у них совета и таким образом победить их сосредоточить свое внимание на этих проблемах.

Весьма возможно, что число тех, кто задумывается над этими проблемами так же велико, а может быть и больше, в Советском Союзе, нежели в Америке, но в противоположность Америке, среди заинтересованных этими вопросами, в России ~~и там~~ нет видных ученых, международно известных, благодаря своим достижениям в области науки. Если это соображение правильно, то нам потребуются Ваши указания о том, как мы можем наладить контакт с людьми, которые, может быть не являются членами Академии Наук СССР, но советы которых Вы цените и к которым Вы время от времени обращаетесь.

Среди срочных вопросов имеется, конечно, и вопрос о Берлине. Вопрос этот я неохотно затрагиваю, потому что он является срочным и не входит в компетенцию ученого. Случилось, однако, так, что три года тому назад мне предложили пост директора Института ядерной физики, постройка которого кончается в Западном Берлине. В связи с этим, я провел много месяцев в Берлине и по этой причине не могу забыть проблемы о Берлине. Мне кажется, что имеются возможности разрешения этой проблемы, которые до сих пор не были использованы заинтересованными правительствами и, если мне представится возможность, я буду благодарен, если сумею поговорить с Вами по этому вопросу.

К О Н Е Ц

MEMORANDUM

September 30, 1960.

To: Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

From: Leo Szilard

At the luncheon given by Mr. Cyrus Eaton on September 26, you said that informal discussions by private citizens of the controversial issues might be useful because they might produce constructive proposals, which subsequently could be examined by the Russian and the American Governments as well as the other governments involved. I too believe that such informal discussions could be very productive but only if the private citizens who participate understand the problems involved just as thoroughly as do the government officials who are in a decision-making position.

Just where one would find these well informed people in America and Russia is one of the points that I would want to discuss with you, if there is an opportunity to do so.

At present there are in America many scientists who understand a good number of these problems and the reason for this is as follows: In recent years, and particularly after Sputnik, the U.S. Government has drawn on the services of many scientists for the planning of America's defence. Distinguished scientists have been working on a part-time basis as members of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Other men, younger and less distinguished perhaps, but not necessarily less able, have been working on a full-time basis in such centers as the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Lexington, the Air Force Cambridge Research Center in Bedford, etc.

These men started out by trying to improve America's defences, but most of them have discovered in the course of their work that America cannot become secure by keeping ahead in the arms race. In the measure in which this

recognition has begun to sink in, such men have begun to take a serious interest in the problem of disarmament.

(As recently as two or three years ago, most of these men still believed that America could fight a war in a geographically remote area, use atomic bombs against troops in combat within the contested area and keep the war limited. Today, I personally know only of two men within this set of people who still hang on to this belief.)

It is conceivable that, within a year or two, the thinking of these scientists will influence the thinking of the Administration in Washington at all levels. However, there will have to be a change not only in the thinking of the Administration, but also in the thinking of Congress before America can accept a workable agreement providing for far-reaching disarmament.

At the time when it appeared possible that a Summit meeting might be held either in 1959 or in 1960, I was asked by one of our Russian colleagues whether scientists in America might not exert their influence in favor of holding such a Summit meeting. I told him, at that time, that pressure of world opinion, more than anything else could force the American Government to go into a Summit meeting, but that - as they say in America - "you can lead a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink".

The American Government can be forced to sit down and negotiate with Russia on disarmament but such a negotiation cannot possibly lead to a workable agreement as long as many influential Americans in and out of Congress find general and complete disarmament unacceptable. Therefore, I would want to discuss with you, if there is an opportunity to do so, the question of what are the real reasons behind the reluctance of influential Americans to accept disarmament. Once this is clear then one can examine what the American Government and the Russian Government could do to eliminate these obstacles to disarmament.

One of the reasons why many Americans would not accept disarmament is the belief that Russia would not agree to set up satisfactory safeguards if far-reaching disarmament were agreed upon. In this regard, most of my American colleagues with whom I discussed this particular issue are in agreement with me on two points. We believe that:

- (a) If general and virtually complete disarmament becomes acceptable to America and if the first step towards disarmament goes far enough so as to eliminate the need for America and Russia to restrict the flow of a certain type of information, then the measures which are necessary to safeguard against secret violations of the disarmament agreement would probably be acceptable to Russia.
- (b) It would be a mistake to believe that the detection of serious secret violations of the disarmament agreement would require the operation of a large number of inspectors on Russian and American territory and also it would be a mistake to believe that sending a large number of inspectors into American and Russian territory would necessarily lead to the discovery of secret violations if such violations did occur. It should be possible, however, for Russia and America to create conditions in which Russia could be certain that secret violations of the agreement by America would be reported by American citizens to an international control commission, and America could be certain that secret violations of the agreement occurring on Russian territory would be reported by Soviet citizens to an international control commission.

One of the questions which you were asked at the luncheon given by Mr. Cyrus Eaton touched upon this last point. This was the last of the

questions addressed to you and it was addressed to you by a young physicist. He asked you whether in case of an agreement, providing for general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Government would be willing to appeal to its own people to come forward and to report secret violations of the agreement that might take place on Soviet territory. You gave a positive answer to this question, but those who attended the luncheon remained uncertain whether the question was phrased in such a manner that you were able to understand its implications.

I would want to discuss this question with you in some detail, if there should be an opportunity to do so. I would want to do this because I believe that you might wish to make a statement for publication which would convince the American public that you understand this question fully and that you are in agreement with the views I have summarized under (b). By issuing a statement on this question, you could go a long way towards eliminating the belief - widely held in America - that satisfactory safeguards of far-reaching disarmament would not be acceptable to Russia.

I am convinced, however, that many influential Americans would oppose general and complete disarmament even if they were satisfied that the Soviets Union would offer adequate safeguards against secret violations of the agreement. Under general and complete disarmament, America would not be in a position to fulfil her commitments to protect areas which are geographically remote from America and, to many influential Americans, general and complete disarmament will be acceptable only if America can somehow free herself of her commitment to protect such geographically remote areas. One way to solve this difficulty would be to create international police forces, operating under United Nations auspices, which would take over the task of protecting the small nations in certain troubled areas of the world. This leads to the question which you have raised in the General Assembly of who shall

command such U.N. police forces. Clearly, a world police force, under the central command of the Secretary General of the United Nations, would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union in the present circumstances and it might not be acceptable to the United States in the circumstances that might prevail a few years hence. In the past five years, I have given serious consideration to this problem and before going any further in this direction I would want to discuss it with you, if there is an opportunity to do so.

At present, many of my American colleagues are seriously concerned about the possibility that an accidental or unauthorized attack by a local commander might lead to an all-out atomic war between America and Russia which neither country wants. How an unauthorized attack by an American commanding officer might start such a war has been vividly described in an American book that has been fairly widely read ('Red Alert' by Peter Bryant, Ace Book no. D-350, Ace Books Inc. 43 West 47th Street, New York 6, N.Y.) Because this book was written three years ago, it is rather out of date. Still, it correctly describes just how difficult it is to devise safeguards against an unauthorized attack, as well as an accidental attack, and, at the same time, to keep the bases from which the bombs may be launched protected against attack. This will become even more difficult as America begins to rely for her defence on submarines capable of launching rockets.

Any serious discussion of the methods that might be used to safeguard against an accidental or an unauthorized attack must, of necessity, be detailed and highly technical. It is possible that informal discussions between American and Russian scientists who have concerned themselves with this problem might lead to some constructive proposals in this area and such discussions should certainly be held. I myself can think, however, only of one simple measure which could be initiated at this time either by the President of the United States or by yourself. When I last enquired

how long it might take for the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union to contact each other over the telephone in case an accidental or unauthorized attack on an American city or on a Russian city should make it necessary that they urgently consult with each other. It was told that this might take several hours. If this should indeed be true, then either America or Russia ought to take the initiative at this time to arrange for the installation of telephone connections that would be readily available in case of an emergency.

Because the time may not be too far off when genuine disarmament, going beyond controlled arms limitation, might be acceptable to America, American and Russian scientists should now begin informally to discuss how far the first step of arms reduction would need to go in order to make it possible for Russia to accept the necessary safeguards. Many of my American colleagues have given enough thought to this problem to be able to discuss it intelligently with their Russian counterparts. But when we attempted to discuss this type of problem in the past with our Russian colleagues, I noticed that some of the best minds among them, held in high esteem in America as well as in the Soviet Union, kept aloof from the discussion. Apparently, they kept aloof because they did not feel they knew enough about this problem to express an opinion. At the next Pugwash Meeting, which is scheduled to be held in Moscow, we could try, and we might perhaps succeed, to get these Russian colleagues to take an interest in these problems and, thereafter, the Soviet Government could keep their interest alive by asking from time to time for their advice and thereby induce them to continue to give their attention to the problems involved.

Quite possibly, the number of those who think about these problems is just as large, or perhaps even larger, in the Soviet Union than in America, but perhaps, in contrast to America, the Russians who concern themselves with

this problem are not to be found among the eminent scientists who are internationally known through their achievements in the field of basic science. If this were the case, then we would need your guidance on just how we can come into contact with those, who might not be members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, but whose advice on policy you value and seek out from time to time.

Among the acute issues, there is, of course, the issue of Berlin. This issue I approach with hesitation, both because it is an acute issue and also because a scientist has no special competence to deal with it. However, it so happens that three years ago I was offered ~~the~~ directorship of an Institute of Nuclear Physics which was about to be built in West Berlin. On that occasion, I spent several months in Berlin and therefore I could not help thinking about the problem of Berlin. I believe that there are types of solutions which have so far not been explored by the governments involved, and, if there is an opportunity to do so, I should be grateful if we could compare notes on this issue also.

THE END

partial
early draft of
MEMO Sept 30, 1960
to Khrushchov -
Final version
Xeroxed already

~~At present there are in America many scientists who understand the need~~
~~for disarmament.~~ Many of these men started out by trying to improve America's defences
and only to discover in the ~~xxxxx~~ course of their work that America cannot become secure by
keeping ahead in the arms race. In the measure in which this recognition has begun to sink
in, such men have begun to take a serious interest in the problem of disarmament. ~~In~~
recent years, and particularly after Sputnik, the U.S. Government has drawn on the services
of many scientists for the planning of America's defence. ~~Distinguished~~ Distinguished
scientists have been working on a part-time basis as members of the President's Science
Advisory Committee. Other men, younger and less distinguished perhaps but not necessarily
less able, have been working on a full-time basis in such centers as the Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, The Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in
Lexington, the Air Force Cambridge Research Center in Bedford, etc. In this circumstances,
there ~~is~~ ^{are in America} a considerable number of scientists ^{around} available who are familiar with the technological
problems ^{of the arms race} ~~which are raised by the issue of disarmament.~~ ^{Public interest recent} Before America can accept a
~~workable agreement providing xx for far-reaching disarmament there will have to be a change~~
~~not only in the thinking of the Administration xx but also in the thinking of Congress.~~ At
the time when it appeared possible that a Summit meeting might be held either in 1959 or in
1960, one of my Russian colleagues asked me whether scientists in America ought not to exert
their influence in favor of holding such a Summit meeting. I told him at that time that
pressure of world opinion more than anything else could force the American Government to go
into a Summit meeting but, as they say in America, "you can lead a ~~xx~~ horse to the water but
you cannot make him drink".

The American Government can be forced to sit down and negotiate with Russia on
disarmament but such a negotiation cannot possible lead to a workable agreement as long as
many influential Americans in and out of ~~Cong~~ Congress ^{find} ~~felt~~ general and complete disarmament
unacceptable. Therefore it is necessary to examine what are the real reasons behind the
reluctance of influential Americans to give serious consideration to the possibility of
disarmament. Once we have determined the real reasons for this reluctance, we can then
examine what it would take to eliminate them.

Many influential Americans have doubts on two scores:

- (a) They doubt that disarmament is possible on the ground that Russia might not agree to set up satisfactory safeguards ~~if far-reaching disarmament were agreed upon.~~
- (b) They doubt whether general and virtually complete disarmament would be ~~acceptable~~ ^{desirable} even if Russia ~~could~~ ^{could} make it possible by agreeing to satisfactory safeguards against secret violations of the disarmament agreement.

P I shall discuss this second point first because, clearly, no progress can be made towards disarmament unless all the Great Powers involved regard disarmament as desirable.

General and ~~virtually~~ ^{virtually} complete disarmament does not automatically guarantee peace. Even in a ~~disarmed~~ ^{disarmed} world, virtually completely disarmed, armies equipped with machine guns could spring up, so to speak, over night. Neither Russia nor America could be ~~not~~ successfully invaded by such improvised ~~armies~~ ^{armies} and these nations would be militarily secure in such a disarmed world.

In a ~~disarmed~~ ^{disarmed} world ~~America and Russia would still be strong enough to extend~~ ^{the other two} military protection to their neighbors and the military sphere of influence of America and ~~Russia~~ ^{Russia} would inevitably extend to their neighbors. America could not extend effective military protection to the neighbors of Russia and Russia could not extend effective military protection to the neighbors of America. The nations which are geographically adjacent to Russia could not be protected in a disarmed world against Russia, nor would they need to be protected if, under the prevailing conditions, Russia would have no incentive for any military intervention. The same holds ~~for~~ ^{not} true for the nations which are in the geographical proximity of America.

The main threat to the peace of the world in such a disarmed world would reside in certain disturbed areas of the world which are ~~in~~ ^{not} the immediate geographical proximity of either Russia or America. If there is a resort to force in some such area and if America and Russia intervene on the opposite sides, even though such a war would be initially fought with machine guns it might not take long before atomic bombs would reappear, for the world may get rid of the bombs that have been stockpiled but it cannot get rid of the knowledge of how to make the bomb. Thus, what might start out as a local conflict might end in an all-out atomic catastrophe. If the Great Powers were ^{able} to shift the responsibility for the protection of the smaller nations in the disturbed areas of the world to some international

In such a disarmed world, the nations neighbouring on America would inevitably be within America's military sphere of influence, such as Mexico or ~~Ci~~ Cuba, and, similarly, the nations neighbouring on Russia, such as Turkey or Poland, would inevitably be in Russia's ~~sphere~~ sphere of influence. In such a disarmed world, America would have frankly to admit that she could not extend effective military protection to Russia's neighbours against Russia, and Russia would have frankly to admit that she could not extend effective military protection to America's neighbours against America. ~~It~~ This would not necessarily mean that Poland, Turkey, Mexico or Cuba would be less secure in such a disarmed world in the absence of protection than they would be in the so-called atomic stalemate with protection, ~~and~~ ^{do not} I believe that the security of the nations which are the neighbours of one or the other of the Great Powers would not represent a major problem in a disarmed world. ~~nor would~~, ^{do I believe that} as a matter of fact, the security of Europe ^{is not} ~~present~~ such a problem. In a world disarmed down to machine guns even primitive fortifications with guns in fixed positions would represent an almost impregnable defence against the onslaught of an improvised army equipped with machine guns. Even properly built improvised trenches would be exceedingly difficult to take either with machine guns or even with light tanks. Thus, Western Europe would not have to fear that she might be overrun ^{an} by/improvised army that might spring up overnight from Eastern Europe, nor would Eastern Europe have to fear that she might be overrun by such an army from Western Europe.

The threat to world peace in such a disarmed world might however arise in some of the disturbed areas of the world which are geographically remote from either Russia or America. If there were a resort to force in some of these areas, and if America and Russia were to intervene on the opposite sides, even though the resulting war would initially be fought with machine guns it would not take long before heavy mobile weapons would also be used. In the end, either America or Russia or both might resort to the use of atomic bombs, for the world may get rid of the bombs that have been stockpiled but it cannot get rid of the knowledge of how to make them. Thus, what ~~might~~ start out as a local conflict in a disarmed world, might ^{then} end up in an all-out atomic catastrophe. ~~P~~ In my view, disarmament would solve the problem posed by the bomb only if it excludes war between the Great Powers. ~~Clearly,~~ ^T the Great Powers might be able to exclude war among themselves by shifting all responsibility for the security of the nations located in the disturbed areas which are remote from American and Russian territory to highly mobile international police forces equipped with machine guns and perhaps light tanks. Such international police forces would presumably operate under UN auspices. This raises a problem for which we have no ready-made solution at present. Under what control could such international police forces

America and Russia would now need to reach a meeting of the minds on what would constitute an acceptable set-up under which international police forces might be maintained under U.N. auspices. I personally believe that it might be easier to find a solution to this problem which is acceptable to the Great Powers if we do not think in terms of setting up a world police force operating under a central command, but rather in terms of setting up separate regional police forces, a different police force in each of the disturbed regions of the world which would operate under U.N. ~~auspices~~ auspices under some set-up of the following

type. The responsibility for operating the different regional police forces would be vested in different groups of ~~nations~~ ^{say police the nation} ~~say a group of five to nine nations~~, not necessarily drawn from the region itself, and, in the case of each region, the slate of the nations ^{from} ~~in control~~ responsible would need to have the approval of the Security Council with the concurrence

of the five permanent members of the Security Council. ^{for which} ~~There might be for each disturbed region a slate of controlling nations~~ ^{Interpreting the early} ~~region a regional secretariat of the United Nations which would be staffed by the~~

~~controlling~~ ^{there would be a regional} ~~nations who participate in the responsibility for maintaining peace in the region and who~~ ^{the controlling nations} ~~would~~ ^{appoint} ~~the~~ ^{commander-in-chief} of the regional police force. [A certain fraction

of the cost of operating the regional police force would have to be borne by the participating nations themselves while the rest of the ~~acceptance~~ expenses could come from a general fund set up for the purpose.]

There would be little point for the Great Powers to agree on such a mode of operation in principle unless they ^{are} ~~are~~ ^{able} ~~able~~ ^{to} ~~to~~ ^{reach an agreement} ~~reach an agreement~~ ^{with each other at the same time on} ~~with each other at the same time on~~

the regions where such international police forces would be set up and on ^{which} ~~which~~ the participating nations would be for any such region. Clearly, to reach such an agreement

would require negotiations with a certain amount of give and take and the final outcome of these negotiations would obviously represent a compromise. ^{Because} ~~Because~~ ^{a slate of the} ~~a slate of the~~

^{infraction} ~~participating nations~~ for a given region can be set up only with the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Security Council. It is not possible a priori to exclude the

possibility that ^{a/ in} ~~any~~ ^{region} ~~region~~ which a police force operates might come under the influence of one or the other of the Great Powers. ^{since} ~~since~~ ^{it would be clearly undesirable to have a} ~~it would be clearly undesirable to have a~~

regional ~~police~~ police force wage war against a nation located in the region, ^{and therefore} ~~the~~ regional police forces would have to be police forces rather than armies and would have to

for the powers to reach
One might say that ~~reaching~~ an agreement upon the different slates of controlling nations for the different regions would be in a sense tantamount to arriving at a political settlement. *If* If a nation located within a disturbed area ~~xx~~ should actually endanger the security of another nation, one still would not want the regional police force to wage war against that ~~nation~~ *offending* and therefore the regional police forces would have to be organized as police forces rather than armies and would have to be in a position to arrest individual members of the government of an offending nation. This means however that the regional police force would have the capability of intervening in the internal affairs of the nations located in the area of the operation. *If* The possibility that the regional police force may intervene in the internal affairs of a nation can therefore not be excluded if a regional police force is actually maintained in ~~the~~ *an* area where it has been set up on paper. It may be assumed, however, that the controlling nations would not want actually to maintain a regional police force - when no nation located in the region endangers the security of other nations - if they would have to assume an appreciable fraction of the cost of maintaining such a police force in the region. *if share of* Thus, ~~the~~ *of maintaining a police force* financial burden that the controlling nations would have to assume if a regional police force were maintained, could serve to check wanton interference on the part of the controlling nations into the internal affairs of nations of the region.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

CHICAGO 37 • ILLINOIS

THE ENRICO FERMI INSTITUTE
FOR NUCLEAR STUDIES

September 30, 1960.

Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
680 Park Avenue,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

When I received your letter dated August 30, of which I attach a copy, I sent word to Vice President Nixon about the possibility of arranging for informal conversations between Russian and American scientists, throughout the term of the next President. He thereupon asked one of his advisers, William C. Foster, to visit me in Memorial Hospital in order to discuss this matter with me. Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Foster wrote me a letter which is attached. In this letter he writes:

"I have reported, as I indicated I would, to Vice President Nixon indicating my own belief that conferences such as you have been suggesting can be useful in making progress toward an understanding between us and the Soviet scientists at least and hopefully, beyond that if it develops properly."

I should have no difficulty similarly to inform Senator Kennedy, particularly since I am personally acquainted with some of his close advisers. My colleagues will, in the meantime, contact our colleagues at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with a view to making the necessary practical arrangements.

When I had the pleasure of meeting you at the luncheon given by Cyrus Eaton, I told you that I had written you a letter inviting you to visit me in the Hospital and another letter saying that I could now meet you at any other place convenient to you, provided your time should permit you to schedule an unhurried conversation.

I think it rather probable that such a conversation could produce useful and conceivably even important results. Because I believe this to be the case, and because it seems rather doubtful that, during your stay in New York, you would find time for such a conversation with me, I am now writing to say the following: If you plan to leave on

board the Baltika and if you think that there might be an opportunity for such a conversation on board, I should be very glad to travel on the Baltika from New York to the next port of call of the boat. I know, of course, that, in the circumstances of the present strained relations between Russia and America, I would not endear myself to my fellow Americans by sailing on the Baltika, but it would be very foolish for a man whose days are numbered to be deterred by such a consideration.

So that you may judge yourself whether or not the kind of conversation which I have in mind would be productive, I am enclosing a short memorandum and list the points which might be discussed. If you advise me to do so, I could then hold myself in readiness to sail on the Baltika at 24 hours notice.

I am under the medical care of my wife, Dr. Gertrud Weiss Szilard, who is a physician, and I would ask her to accompany me on the trip, if the Baltika can accommodate both of us.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Room 812,
The Memorial Hospital,
444 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N.Y.

Telephone: TRafalgar 9-3000 Ext. 133.

Enclosure

30 сентября 1960 года.

Никите С.Хрущеву,
Председателя Совета Министров СССР,
680 Паер Авеню
Нью Йорк, Н.И.

Дорогой г.Хрущев,

Когда я получил Ваше письмо, датированное 30 августа, копию которого я прилагаю, я снесся с вице-президентом Никсоном о возможности организации неофициальных переговоров между русскими и американскими учеными в течение всего пребывания будущего президента на посту. Вице-президент после этого предложил одному из своих советников, Уильяму С.Фостеру, посетить меня в госпитале Мемориал для обсуждения со мною этого вопроса. После своего возвращения в Вашингтон, г.Фостер написал мне письмо, которое я прилагаю. В этом письме он писал:

"Как я Вам обещал, я доложил об этом вице-президенту Никсону и подчеркнул свое убеждение, что конференция, созвать которую Вы предлагаете, может оказаться полезной на пути прогресса к взаимопониманию между нами и советскими учеными и может, будем надеяться, дать еще более благоприятные результаты".

У меня не будет никаких трудностей ознакомить также сенатора Кеннеди, особенно потому, что я лично знаком с некоторыми из его ближайших советников. Мои коллеги, тем временем, войдут в контакт с нашими коллегами из Академии Наук СССР в целях осуществить необходимую практическую подготовку.

Когда я имел удовольствие видеть Вас на завтраке, данном Сайрусом Итон, я сказал, что написал Вам письмо с приглашением посетить меня в госпитале и другое письмо с сообщением, что могу теперь повидаться с Вами в другом удобном для Вас месте, при условии, что

у Вас найдется время подробно со мною поговорить.

Я полагаю, что подобного рода разговор может дать полезные и, может быть, даже важные результаты. Ввиду того, что я верю в это, но сомневаюсь, что во время Вашего пребывания в Нью Йорке у Вас найдется время для беседы со мной, я решил написать Вам следующее: если Вы собираетесь покинуть Нью Йорк на "Балтике" и если Вы полагаете, что на борту парохода у Вас найдется время для разговора со мною, я буду рад сопровождать Вас на "Балтике" до следующей остановки парохода. Я отдаю себе отчет, что при существующих ныне натянутых отношениях между Россией и Америкой, моя поездка на "Балтике" не вызовет восторга у моих сограждан американцев, но полагаю очень неразумным для человека, дни которого сочтены, считаться с подобного рода соображениями.

Чтобы Вы могли судить, будет ли продуктивным разговор, который я собираюсь с Вами вести, я прилагаю короткий меморандум и перечисляю пункты, которые подлежат обсуждению. Прошу Вас предупредить меня за 24 часа до отплытия "Балтики", если Вы примите мое предложение о переговорах на борту парохода.

Я нахожусь под медицинским наблюдением моей жены, доктора Гертруды Вейсс Сцилард, которая по образованию врач. Я попрошу ее сопровождать меня в этой поездке, если на "Балтике" найдется место для нас.

С уважением

Лео Сцилард

Комната 812

Госпиталь Мемориал,

444 Ист 68 улица

Нью Йорк 21, Н.И.

Тел.: ТРАфальгар 9-3000,
Экст. 133.

Приложения

October 8, 1960.

N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

Many thanks for your generous gift of delicious food and two kinds of the most excellent mineral water.

I am sending one bottle of each to my private physician - who, by sheer coincidence, happens to be the private physician of Senator Kennedy also. I am going to tell him of the excellent effect which drinking this water had on me and perhaps he would want to recommend to all of his patients to drink of the same water.

When I inserted the blade in the Schick Injecto razor which I left with you, I encountered some difficulty and it is possible that this particular sample of the razor is defective. To be on the safe side, I am enclosing two further samples.

One of these is to replace the defective sample and the other you may perhaps wish to transmit to the gentleman who acted as interpreter of our conversation. I am very grateful to him that he translated ~~no~~ so many da's and so few nyet's.

I am very grateful to you for having given me the opportunity to have such a conversation.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Room 812,
The Memorial Hospital,
444 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N.Y.

November 24, 1960

N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Moscow.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I am about to leave for Moscow (to attend the "Pugwash meetings" starting on November 27) and I should greatly appreciate having an opportunity to see you while I am there in connection with the following topic:

I mentioned to you when I saw you in New York that I have written a little book covering the history of the world from 1960 to 1985, in which I am attempting to show how it may become possible to stabilize - for a number of years - the so-called atomic stalemate, and how thereafter the stalemate may become so dangerous that the nations involved are forced to accept disarmament. I shall take along with me a Russian translation of a shortened text. The first half of this shortened text deals with an aspect of the so-called atomic stalemate which is apparently not well understood at this time by the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, and which might therefore become the source of serious trouble.

I was wondering whether it might be possible to arrange for you to read in my presence the first half of this shortened text. This might take 45 minutes. Whenever, in reading the text, you come to a point which you do not find convincing, you may then stop, state your objections and this would give me an opportunity to answer your objections.

When I saw you in New York, I expressed the hope that the next Administration would seek to find constructive solutions of the major controversial issues. I feel impelled to say that I am just as hopeful today in this regard, but I must also add that such hope is not based on any factual information available to me; I do not even know at this time who the Secretary of State is going to be.

When I saw you in New York, we discussed the possibility of preparing a small book on disarmament in the form of an exchange of views between American scientists who have no governmental responsibility, and yourself. I find that this idea meets with a very favourable response among those of my colleagues with whom I have discussed it. Since some of them may have governmental responsibilities under the next Administration, it seems advisable now to wait until February with the implementation of this interesting project.

While I shall remain in Moscow, I can be reached through Academician Alexander Topchiev's office at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Respectfully,

LEO SZILARD

24 ноября 1960 г.

Н.С.Хрущеву,
Председателю Совета Министров СССР,
Москва

Уважаемый господин Хрущев!

Я собираюсь в Москву (на "Пагуосскую конференцию", которая откроется 27 ноября) и очень хотел бы иметь возможность повидаться с Вами в это время в связи со следующим обстоятельством:

Во время нашей встречи в Нью-Йорке я сказал Вам, что написал небольшую книгу, повествующую об истории мира с 1960 по 1985 год, в которой я пытаюсь показать, как можно стабилизировать — на несколько лет — так называемый атомный тупик и как затем этот тупик может стать настолько опасным, что страны, которых это непосредственно касается, вынуждены принять разоружение. Я возму с собой русский перевод сокращенного текста. В первой половине этого сокращенного текста речь идет о так называемом атомном тупике, в котором, повидимому, правительства Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов не отдадут себе должного отчета и который поэтому может стать источником серьезной катастрофы.

Может быть, Вы могли бы найти время прочесть в моем присутствии первую половину этого сокращенного текста? Это заняло бы 45 минут. Встречая в процессе чтения места, которые Вам покажутся неубедительными, Вы можете в этом случае останавливаться, высказывать свои возражения, и это позволило бы мне ответить на Ваши возражения.

Когда я Вас видел в Нью-Йорке, я выразил надежду, что следующее Правительство добарается найти конструктивные решения основных вопросов, по которым существуют разногласия. Должен сказать, что сегодня я все так же питаю в этом отношении надежды, но добавлю, что эти надежды не основываются ни на каких известных мне фактических сведениях; я даже не знаю сейчас, кто будет Государственным секретарем.

Во время нашей встречи в Нью-Йорке мы обсуждали возможности создания небольшой книги по проблеме разоружения, которая была бы написана в форме обмена мнениями между американскими учеными, не являющимися официальными представителями государства, и Вами. Я знаю, что эта идея находит благожелательный отклик среди тех из моих коллег, с кем я ее обсуждал. Поскольку некоторые из них могут быть официальными государственными представителями при будущем Правительстве, то в настоящее

Время целесообразно, повидимому, отложить осуществление этого интересного вопроса до февраля.

Во время моего пребывания в Москве меня можно будет найти через канцелярию академика А.Толчьева Академии Наук СССР.

С уважением

Лео Сцилард

V-81
N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Moscow

December 2nd, 1960

Before I left America to come to Moscow, I have been trying to think of a good way for the United States to take the initiative and to take steps to stop the cold war, but I was not able to think of anything that appeared to be really constructive. Since I came to Moscow a week ago, I somehow got into thinking about what the Soviet Union might do in this regard, and a few days ago there occurred to me what seems to be a rather interesting possibility. I should be grateful for an opportunity to present it to you for your consideration.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

Перевод

Н.С.Хрущеву,
Председателю Совета Министров СССР,
Москва

2 декабря 1960 г.

Уважаемый господин Хрущев!

До того, как уехать из Америки в Москву, я пытался продумать вопрос, как лучше Соединенным Штатам взять на себя инициативу и предпринять шаги в направлении прекращения холодной войны, но не нашел никакого действительно конструктивного решения. Приехав в Москву неделю назад, я вдруг задумался над тем, что мог бы Советский Союз сделать в этом отношении, и несколько дней тому назад мне пришла в голову мысль, которая представляет собой, на мой взгляд, довольно интересную возможность. Я был бы Вам благодарен, если бы мне был предоставлен случай довести ее до Вашего сведения.

С уважением

Лео Сцилард

N.S.Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
USSR

Hotel Metropol
Room 505

December 20, 1960.

Dear Mr.Khrushchev,

I was very sorry to hear that you were not well and I hope that you have recovered in the meantime. I shall stay a few more days in Moscow at the Hotel Metropol and then leave for a vacation in Western Europe on my way back to America. Because there seems to be no chance left for my seeing you before I leave, I am writing you this letter in order to submit for your consideration a thought which is set forth below.

In America I have on occasion tried to think of some simple move that the United States could make in order to bring the cold war to an end. Since I came to Moscow three weeks ago I somehow got into thinking of what the Soviet Union might do in this regard. It occurred to me that now that the United States has a new President it might perhaps be appropriate for you to offer him something like a "bridal gift".

The outflow of gold from the United States will present a somewhat embarrassing problem to Kennedy when he takes office. What would happen if you were to offer to him on behalf of the Soviet Union to loan the United States 3 to 4 billion dollars of gold for a period of 3 to 4 years?

When this idea occurred to me I asked Professor Rostow, an advisor to Kennedy who attended the Pugwash Conference in Moscow, for his personal reaction. Professor Rostow thought that if this offer were to be made publicly, it would probably cause resentment. But if it were made privately and if it were accepted by Kennedy, ~~then~~ then this could be a very good thing. Naturally, Professor Rostow was not able

to predict what Kennedy's reaction would be.

If you find that this idea has got some merit and if you want to pursue it, then I assume you would want to use the regular diplomatic channels for exploring it further.

Upon my return to America your Ambassador in Washington can locate me, if necessary, by contacting Dr.M.Fox, the Rockefeller Institute, New York 21, N.Y., Tel.LE-5-9000.

Respectfully

Leo Szilard

September 20, 1961

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev:

When I saw you on October 5 of last year, I expressed the view that no matter whether Nixon or Kennedy gets elected, there will be a serious attempt to improve Soviet-American relations, and you seemed to agree with me. It would appear, in retrospect, that we were both wrong.

I have stayed in Washington since February and have watched things happening at close range. While they are not in a happy state, the picture is not all black. There are many able people who moved in with the Kennedy Administration and who are deeply concerned about making the world more secure. Some of them are working very hard on the problem of how to make sure that there can be no unauthorized attack and there has also begun -- appearances to the contrary -- some serious thinking about general disarmament. I have so far not given up the hope that a constructive approach will be made with respect to the problem of Germany, and I plan therefore to remain in Washington, for the time being.

In October, I presented you with a Schick Injecto Razor and told you at that time that I shall keep you supplied with blades -- as long as there is no war. Accordingly, I am giving a package containing blades, and a new razor, to Academician Topchiev, (who is here on a visit to the National Academy of Sciences,) for transmittal to you. The blades I am sending are a new improved brand which have just become available.

With very best wishes for your health,

Respectfully,



Leo Szilard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D.C.

October 4, 1961

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev:

This letter is a sequel to the good conversation which I had the privilege to have with you on October 3th of last year and which - among other things - touched also upon the so-called Berlin issue.

I have been staying in Washington as a private person since February, and had many serious conversations here on this subject. But, before turning to be serious, I first wish to say the following:

When I was recently interviewed on television, they asked me if I thought that there would be an all-out war over Berlin. I answered that I didn't see why it would be necessary for America to drop hundreds of H bombs on Russian cities and for Russia to drop hundreds of H bombs on American cities in order to settle the Berlin issue, when clearly the issue could be settled by dropping just two H bombs - both of them on Berlin. They asked me thereupon why one H bomb would not be enough to demolish Berlin, and I said that this would not work, because if only one H bomb were to be dropped, then Russia and America would not be able to agree on who should drop that one bomb.

I take the liberty to write you on this subject mainly because it has one important aspect which I had not noticed up to recently, and I think that perhaps it may have escaped your attention also.

Enclosed is a copy of an article on the Berlin issue which just appeared in print. Before publishing this article, I have widely circulated the text in Washington. The article is based on the premise that "in regard to Europe the true, long-term goal of the United States and of the Soviet Union is exactly the same; this goal is to have Europe as stable as possible." Some people in Washington accept this premise as valid; others don't; and those who don't object to the political settlement proposed.

The longer I have thought on the subject, the more I became convinced that creating two free cities, i.e., transforming East Berlin as well as West Berlin into a free city (which would be neutral like Austria) is the key for coming up with a satisfactory political solution, that would make the issue of maintaining foreign troops in Berlin irrelevant. Up to recently, however, I did not recognize that "If the Soviet Union were to offer such a package, then she could accept President Kennedy's challenge and demand that the people of West Berlin be given a free choice between it and some precarious compromise that would need to be safeguarded by the continued presence of American troops in Berlin."

I derive the confidence with which I am making this assertion in my article from an unforgettable experience, that I had in West Berlin three years ago when I went to see a play, "Reunion in Vienna". In this play an Austrian writer celebrates his sixtieth birthday and is visited on this occasion by one son, an engineer who grew up as an American and another son, an engineer who grew up as a Russian. These two boys met for the first time on this occasion, and they do not get on well with each other - the cold war being aggravated by the fact that they court the same girl. At some point, however, they get engrossed in a technical conversation about tractors and they walk arm-in-arm up the staircase. At this point, their father exclaims on the stage, "At last the American and the Russian got together!"

The people applauded and they would not stop applauding. It took several minutes before I understood that the people applauded because they know that West Berlin would be a more liveable city if there were a political accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. I was so impressed by this reaction at that time that I went to see our Cultural Attache about it.

If the Soviet Union were able to offer a package that would create two free cities and free communications between them, then West Berlin would jump at such a solution, and it would be difficult for any of the Western Powers to oppose a solution that the people of West Berlin want.

I am by now fully convinced that if the true, long-term goal of the Soviet Union is to have Europe as stable as possible, then the creation of two free cities would unlock the door to this goal. Therefore, I believe that given an opportunity to do so I would be able to convince you of this also, provided, of course, that you think that my premise is valid.

If you would be willing to think through with me the implications of a political settlement of the general kind proposed in my article, I would be glad to fly to Moscow, at a time convenient to you. I would have to ask my wife, who is also my doctor, to accompany me on the trip, but I am certain that she would do so.

I would probably want to make use of such an opportunity to try to convince you also that there is a need to start at an early date informal conversations between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and of the U.S. on the issue of how to keep to a minimum the amount of destruction - if a war should break out which neither of the two nations wanted. In times of international political tension such a war might break out as a result of an accidental or, more likely, as the result of an unauthorized attack, and it is important that it should be possible to get things under control as soon as possible even if one or two cities were destroyed through an unauthorized attack. It should be possible to take precautions in this regard which could do no harm and might prevent large-scale destruction on both sides.

If you care to communicate with me, you can reach me through your Ambassador in Washington; I shall keep him informed of my whereabouts.

Respectfully,

Leo Sillard
Hotel Dupont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

P.S. A few weeks ago, I sent you a small package through Academician Topchiev, who visited Washington. I trust you have received it in the meantime.

Председателю Совета Министров
СССР, Москва, СССР

Letter
Washington, D.C.
Вашингтон, Д.С.
9 октября 1962 года
October 9, 1962

Dear G-N Khrushchev,
Уважаемый г-н Хрущев,

Когда я имел удовольствие беседовать с Вами в Нью-Йорке в октябре 1960 года, я полагал, что независимо от того, кто будет избран — Никсон или Кеннеди — будет сделана новая попытка достичь взаимопонимания с Советским Союзом, которое положило бы конец гонке вооружений. События пока еще не подтвердили этого. Много молодых и исключительно способных людей пришло в правительство вместе с Кеннеди; многие из них сильно обеспокоены тем, что мы втягиваемся в тотальную гонку вооружений. Но пока положение все еще не изменилось к лучшему. Казалось бы, что следует что-то предпринять в настоящее время, если мы хотим прекратить гонку вооружений, прежде чем будет слишком поздно, и мне кажется, что в данном случае я лично мог бы что-то сделать. Цель настоящего письма заключается в том, чтобы выяснить, одобрите ли Вы полностью то, что я предполагаю сделать.

Во-первых, я хотел бы оказать следующее:

В противоположность существующему мнению, большинство лиц, тесно связанных с правительством, глубоко осознает необходимость избежания тотальной гонки вооружений. Кроме того, среди них имеется ряд лиц, которые находятся "на стороне ангелов" и которые упорно придерживаются мнения, что США должны быть готовы отказаться от некоторых своих временных преимуществ ради того, чтобы достичь соглашения с Советским Союзом, которое положило бы конец гонке вооружений. В настоящее время эти "ангелы" не имеют решающего влияния в Вашингтоне, но при наличии определенных благоприятных условий их влияние могло бы быть весьма значительным и, пожалуй, решающим. Некоторые из этих "ангелов" занимают ответственные посты в правительственных органах, другие занимают менее ответственные посты в Белом доме, Государственном департаменте и Министерстве обороны и пользуются влиянием не благодаря занимаемому посту, а благодаря своим способностям и упорству; а некоторые другие являются советниками правительства и пользуются

Затем я связался в отдельности с каждым из приблизительно 10-ти "ангелов" с целью выяснить вопрос о их возможном участии в предполагаемой дискуссии. Поскольку ответы были весьма обнадеживающими, я теперь готов предпринять следующий шаг. Я встречу с послем Добрыниным, рассмотрю с ним некоторые детали в отношении которых мне нет необходимости Вас беспокоить, и попрошу передать Вам это письмо.

Если Вы полностью одобрите этот проект, я бы хотел незамедлительно предпринять дальнейшие шаги. В связи с предстоящими в Америке выборами было бы нежелательно, чтобы это мероприятие состоялось до 8 ноября. Однако было бы желательно провести эту встречу как можно раньше после этой даты с тем, чтобы она состоялась до того, как берлинская проблема достигнет стадии кризиса.

Если бы я мог обсудить этот проект лично с Вами, я бы мог с полной уверенностью заявить в Вашингтоне, что со стороны Советского правительства нет недопонимания в отношении этого мероприятия и что оно не рассматривается как переговоры, если можно так сказать, через черный ход. Это в значительной мере увеличило бы шансы в деле обеспечения участия тех, кто — среди лиц, с которыми я говорил — имеют наибольшее влияние в Вашингтоне.

Как я понимаю, Вы, возможно, прибудете в Нью-Йорк, и в этом случае я хотел бы надеяться иметь возможность встретиться с Вами там. Однако, если бы это означало отсрочку более, чем на 2 недели, и если бы Вы смогли принять меня в Москве раньше, то я бы предпочел вылететь в Москву во избежание такой задержки.

Приглашение участникам с американской стороны будет направлено мною либо в качестве частного лица, либо в качестве председателя комитета Американской академии искусств и наук в Бостоне, неправительственного учреждения, которое последнее время выступало инициатором Пагуошских конференций.

Ваш ответ я мог бы получить быстрее, если бы получил его через Вашего посла в Вашингтоне.

С уважением
With respect
(or esteem)

Leo Stsilard
Лео Сцилард
Отель Дюпон, Плаза, Вашингтон,
6-й округ Колумбия



American Academy of Arts and Sciences

280 Newton Street

Brookline Station, Boston 46, Massachusetts

Telephone: JAmatica 2-2400

Washington, D. C.

October 9, 1962

N. S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev:

When I had the privilege of talking to you in New York, a year ago last October, I thought that no matter whether Nixon or Kennedy were elected, a fresh attempt would be made to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union that would end the arms race. Events have not borne me out so far. With President Kennedy, a number of young and exceptionally able men moved into the Administration; many of them are deeply concerned about our drifting into an all-out arms race, but so far matters have not taken a turn for the better. It would seem that something would have to be done at this time if the arms race is to be halted before it reaches a point of no return and it would appear that there is perhaps something that I myself could undertake at this particular point. The purpose of this letter is to find out whether what I propose to do would meet with your full approval.

First, I wish to say, if I may, the following:

Contrary to what one might think, most people closely connected with the Administration are keenly aware of the need of avoiding an all-out arms race. Moreover, there are a number of men among them who are "on the side of the angels" and who have consistently taken the position that the United States should be prepared to give up certain temporary advantages it holds, for the sake of attaining

an agreement with the Soviet Union that would stop the arms race. These "angels" do not dominate the scene in Washington at present but, given certain favorable circumstances, their influence could be very considerable and perhaps decisive. Some of these "angels" hold key positions in the Administration; others hold junior positions in the White House, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and owe their influence not to their rank but to their ability and perseverance; and still others are consultants to the Government and owe their influence to the high respect in which their opinions are held.

Recently, I attended the Pugwash Conference in Cambridge, England, where I had good conversations with some of our Russian colleagues. Upon my return to Washington, I met with some of the "angels" who hold key positions and found that they were groping in the dark. They were quite uncertain just how far-reaching the reduction of armaments in the first stages of any proposed disarmament agreement would have to go and what form it would have to take in order to make the proposals acceptable to the Soviet Union. Moreover, some of them have begun to doubt whether Russia would accept any reasonable disarmament proposal, even if it were to provide for a very far-reaching reduction of armaments in the first stages.

In the past, many of these men have worked very hard trying to persuade the Government to put forward proposals in Geneva which the Soviet Union would be able to accept, as a basis of negotiations. On many occasions, they did not prevail in Washington, and on the occasions when they did prevail, it turned out that the proposals which they had drafted were not acceptable to Russia. If their proposals are to be accepted in Washington, these men must put in long hours of work, must be willing to quarrel with their friends, must risk being politically exposed and must be ready to resign their jobs, if necessary. One

cannot expect them to go on indefinitely putting up a fight again and again only to find, if they prevail in Washington, that their proposals are not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The "angels" have not as yet given up the fight but they are rather close to it, and if they were to give up, we would be in serious trouble; for if these men cease to exert themselves in Washington, then there can no longer be any useful negotiations on disarmament.

In order to appraise the chances of the Geneva negotiations we must first of all realize that even though America may submit a good draft agreement on general and complete disarmament in Geneva, it would at present be impossible to give the Soviet Union any real assurance that America would in fact go through, stage by stage, all the way to general and complete disarmament; as long as Russia and America do not reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, the later stages of any draft agreement will remain couched in such general terms as to be virtually meaningless. (It is impossible to say how long it might take for Russia and America to reach a meeting of the minds on this issue, but something should be done now in order to prepare the ground for a constructive discussion of this problem. I have touched upon this point in a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin and hope to pursue this topic with him further.)

At the present time, only the provisions of the first few stages of a disarmament agreement can be defined clearly enough to offer reasonable assurance that if the agreement were accepted, the provisions would be implemented on schedule. Therefore, the immediate concrete task before us is to try and devise a draft for an agreement which might be acceptable to America and which would provide in the first, clearly defined, stages for sufficiently far-reaching arms reduction to make the agreement attractive to Russia - even in the absence of

any real assurance that disarmament would proceed beyond these first few stages in the predictable future.

The project which I propose to discuss addresses itself exclusively to this issue. Assuming your full approval, I would invite three of the American "angels" to meet for a period of two or three weeks with three of their Russian counterparts. I would not include among the American participants anyone who holds a key position in the Administration. Rather, I would select the American participants from among the consultants to the Government and those who hold a junior position in the Government. They would be expected to draft, together with their Russian counterparts, a proposal for the first stages of the disarmament agreement which they personally would be willing to advocate in Moscow and Washington. Presumably, they would examine various alternative proposals in the course of their discussions and they would be expected to state in each case frankly whether they are personally opposed to a particular proposal and, if so, why, or whether they would be personally in favor of a given proposal but would be unwilling to advocate it because they saw no chance of being able to persuade their government to accept it. The draft agreement that would emerge would commit no one, except those who prepared it; they would be expected to advocate and, if necessary, to fight for the provisions which it contains.

The Russian participants would be expected to fulfill much the same function as the American participants. I propose to discuss tentatively the identity of the American participants with Ambassador Dobrynin and if the project is approved, I would need later on to discuss with him the precise instructions which the Russian and the American participants would have to receive in order to make it likely that the discussions would be productive.

Such a project would be bound to fail if either the participants, or their governments, were to regard these discussions as a negotiation. Certain

precautions will have to be taken in order to avoid this pitfall and I would be somewhat reluctant to invite anyone holding a rank above that of a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Government to participate in the discussions on the American side.

I explained what I proposed to do to a number of men in high positions in the Administration whose opinions I respect. I made it clear to them that I am not seeking at this point the permission of the Government to go forward with this project. (Naturally, if invited to participate, Americans who are connected with an agency of the Government would need to clear their own participation with that agency.)

Having listened to what these men had to say, I saw Ambassador Dobrynin on September 18, told him what I proposed to do and had a good conversation with him.

Thereafter, I approached individually about ten of the "angels" about their possible participation in the proposed discussion. Because I met with a very encouraging response, I am now ready to take the next step. I shall see Ambassador Dobrynin, discuss with him some of the details with which I do not need to trouble you here and ask him to transmit this letter to you.

If this project meets with your full approval, I would want to go forward with it at once. Because of the forthcoming American elections, it would not be advisable to try to hold the meeting before November 8. It would be, however, desirable to hold the meeting as soon as possible thereafter, so that it may take place before the Berlin issue reaches a crisis stage.

If it were possible for me to discuss this project with you personally, I would be able to state in Washington with full assurance that the project is not being misunderstood by the Soviet Government and that it is not looked upon as a negotiation, so to speak, through the back door. This would greatly improve

the chances of securing the participation of those who, among the men I have approached, have the greatest influence in Washington.

I understand that you might be coming to New York and, in this case, I would hope to have an opportunity to see you there; however, if this would mean a delay of more than two weeks, and if you were able to see me in Moscow at an early date, then I would prefer to fly to Moscow for the sake of avoiding such a delay.

The invitation to the American participants would be issued by me either personally or in my capacity as the Chairman of a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston - a non-governmental institution which has been lately sponsoring the Pugwash meetings.

A reply would reach me fastest in care of your Ambassador in Washington, D.C.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard
Hotel DuPont Plaza
Washington 6, D. C.

Председателю Совета Министров
СССР, Москва, СССР

Вашингтон, Д.С.
9 октября 1962 года

Уважаемый г-н Хрущев,

Когда я имел удовольствие беседовать с Вами в Нью-Йорке в октябре 1960 года, я полагал, что независимо от того, кто будет избран — Никсон или Кеннеди — будет сделана новая попытка достичь взаимопонимания с Советским Союзом, которое положило бы конец гонке вооружений. События пока еще не подтвердили этого. Много молодых и исключительно способных людей пришло в правительство вместе с Кеннеди; многие из них сильно обеспокоены тем, что мы втягиваемся в тотальную гонку вооружений. Но пока положение все еще не изменилось к лучшему. Казалось бы, что следует что-то предпринять в настоящее время, если мы хотим прекратить гонку вооружений, прежде чем будет слишком поздно, и мне кажется, что в данном случае я лично мог бы что-то сделать. Цель настоящего письма заключается в том, чтобы выяснить, одобрите ли Вы полностью то, что я предполагаю сделать.

Во-первых, я хотел бы оказать следующее:

В противоположность существующему мнению, большинство лиц, тесно связанных с правительством, глубоко осознает необходимость избежания тотальной гонки вооружений. Кроме того, среди них имеется ряд лиц, которые находятся "на стороне ангелов" и которые упорно придерживаются мнения, что США должны быть готовы отказаться от некоторых своих временных преимуществ ради того, чтобы достичь соглашения с Советским Союзом, которое положило бы конец гонке вооружений. В настоящее время эти "ангелы" не имеют решающего влияния в Вашингтоне, но при наличии определенных благоприятных условий их влияние могло бы быть весьма значительным и, пожалуй, решающим. Некоторые из этих "ангелов" занимают ответственные посты в правительственных органах, другие занимают менее ответственные посты в Белом доме, Государственном департаменте и Министерстве обороны и пользуются влиянием не благодаря занимаемому посту, а благодаря своим способностям и упорству; а некоторые другие являются советниками правительства и пользуются

влиянием благодаря тому весу, которое имеет их мнение.

Недавно я присутствовал на Пагуошской конференции в Кембридже, в Англии, где я имел интересные беседы с некоторыми из наших русских коллег. По возвращении в Вашингтон я встретился с некоторыми из тех "ангелов", которые занимают ответственные посты, и узнал, что они пребывают в неведении. Они не знали, насколько должны быть сокращены вооружения на первых этапах любого предполагаемого соглашения по разоружению и какую форму оно должно принять для того, чтобы эти предложения были приемлемы для Советского Союза. Кроме того, некоторые из них стали сомневаться в том, примет ли Россия какое-либо разумное предложение по разоружению, если даже оно и предусматривает весьма значительное сокращение вооружений на первых этапах.

В прошлом многие из этих людей приложили немало усилий, пытаясь убедить правительство внести в качестве основы для переговоров в Женеве такие предложения, которые Советский Союз мог бы принять. Много раз они не достигали своей цели в Вашингтоне, а когда они добивались ее, то оказывалось, что предложения, которые они разработали, были неприемлемы для России. Для того, чтобы их предложения были приемлемы в Вашингтоне, эти люди должны много потрудиться, должны быть готовы поссориться с друзьями, должны рисковать своей политической карьерой и, если необходимо, должны быть готовы уйти в отставку. Нельзя ожидать, чтобы они бесконечно продолжали бороться только для того, чтобы увидеть, что когда им удастся добиться своей цели в Вашингтоне, их предложения оказываются неприемлемыми для Советского Союза.

"Ангелы" еще не прекратили борьбы, но они довольно близки к этому, и если бы они это сделали, то мы бы оказались в трудном положении, ибо если эти люди перестанут оказывать влияние в Вашингтоне, то более не будет возможности проводить в дальнейшем каких-либо полезных переговоров по разоружению.

Для того, чтобы оценить те возможности, которые могут дать переговоры в Женеве, мы должны прежде всего понять, что даже если Америка и может представить в Женеве хороший проект соглашения по всеобщему и полному разоружению, все же в настоящее время невозможно было бы дать Советскому Союзу какую-либо реальную

гарантию в том, что Америка действительно пройдет все этапы разоружения один за другим по пути всеобщего и полного разоружения. Пока Россия и Америка не придут к соглашению относительно путей обеспечения мира в разоруженном мире, положения любого проекта соглашения о более поздних этапах останутся сформулированными в столь общих выражениях, что будут фактически бесполезными. /Невозможно сказать, сколько времени может потребоваться России и Америке для того, чтобы прийти к соглашению по этому вопросу, но уже сейчас что-то должно быть сделано с тем, чтобы подготовить почву для конструктивного обсуждения этой проблемы. Я затронул этот вопрос в беседе с послом Добрыниным и надеюсь в будущем продолжить с ним разговор на эту тему/.

В настоящее время лишь положения, касающиеся первых нескольких этапов соглашения по разоружению, могут быть достаточно четко сформулированы с тем, чтобы предоставить разумную гарантию того, что если соглашение будет принято, то его положения будут выполнены в срок. Следовательно, наша непосредственная и конкретная задача состоит в том, чтобы попытаться разработать такой проект соглашения, который был бы приемлем для Америки и который обеспечил бы на первых, точно определенных, этапах такое значительное сокращение вооружений, которое сделало бы это соглашение приемлемым для России, даже при отсутствии какой-либо реальной гарантии в том, что в обозримом будущем разоружение будет продолжаться и после завершения этих первых нескольких этапов.

Предложение, которое я выдвигаю для обсуждения, связано исключительно с этим вопросом. При наличии Вашего полного одобрения я бы организовал встречу трех американских и трех русских "ангелов", которая продолжалась бы 2-3 недели. В число участников с американской стороны я бы не включил никого из лиц, занимающих ответственные правительственные посты. Я бы выбрал участников с американской стороны из числа советников правительства и тех, кто занимает второстепенные правительственные посты. Они должны были бы совместно с русскими участниками составить проект предложения относительно первых стадий соглашения по разоружению, который они лично были бы готовы отстаивать в Москве и Вашингтоне. Очевидно, во время дискуссий они рассмотрели бы различные

альтернативные предложения и должны были бы в каждом отдельном случае откровенно сказать, возражают ли они лично против того или иного предложения, и если возражают, то на каких основаниях, или сказать, что хотя они лично и поддерживают данное предложение, они не готовы отстаивать его, так как не видят возможности того, что они смогут убедить свое правительство принять его. Выработанный в результате дискуссий проект соглашения не связывал бы никого, за исключением тех, кто его подготовил; они должны были бы отстаивать его, и если необходимо, бороться за содержащиеся в нем положения.

Участники с русской стороны должны будут выполнять почти ту же функцию, что и участники с американской стороны. Я предлагаю предварительно обсудить кандидатуры участников с американской стороны с послом Добрыниным и в случае, если этот проект будет одобрен, мне будет необходимо обсудить с ним точные инструкции, которые должны быть получены участниками с русской и американской стороны с тем, чтобы успех дискуссий был наиболее вероятным.

Такое мероприятие было бы обречено на провал, если бы участники или их правительства рассматривали эти дискуссии как переговоры. Необходимо принять некоторые меры предосторожности с тем, чтобы избежать такой опасности, и мне бы не хотелось приглашать кого-либо, занимающего должность выше помощника заместителя министра, входящего в состав правительства, принять участие в дискуссиях с американской стороны.

Я разъяснил ряду лиц, которые занимают высокие посты в правительственных органах и мнение которых я уважаю, что я собираюсь предпринять. Я ясно объяснил им, что в настоящее время я не стремлюсь получить разрешение правительства на дальнейшие шаги в осуществлении этого мероприятия. /Естественно, что, будучи приглашенными участвовать в мероприятии, американцы, связанные с правительственным учреждением, должны будут согласовать вопрос о своем участии с этим учреждением/.

Выслушав мнение этих людей, 18 сентября я встретился с послом Добрыниным, сообщил ему, что я собираюсь делать, и имел с ним полезную беседу.

Затем я связался в отдельности с каждым из приблизительно 10-ти "ангелов" с целью выяснить вопрос о их возможном участии в предполагаемой дискуссии. Поскольку ответы были весьма обнадеживающими, я теперь готов предпринять следующий шаг. Я встречу с послом Добрыниным, рассмотрю с ним некоторые детали, в отношении которых мне нет необходимости Вас беспокоить, и попрошу передать Вам это письмо.

Если Вы полностью одобрите этот проект, я бы хотел незамедлительно предпринять дальнейшие шаги. В связи с предстоящими в Америке выборами было бы нежелательно, чтобы это мероприятие состоялось до 8 ноября. Однако было бы желательно провести эту встречу как можно раньше после этой даты с тем, чтобы она состоялась до того, как берлинская проблема достигнет стадии кризиса.

Если бы я мог обсудить этот проект лично с Вами, я бы мог с полной уверенностью заявить в Вашингтоне, что со стороны Советского правительства нет недопонимания в отношении этого мероприятия и что оно не рассматривается как переговоры, если можно так сказать, через черный ход. Это в значительной мере увеличило бы шансы в деле обеспечения участия тех, кто — среди лиц, с которыми я говорил — имеют наибольшее влияние в Вашингтоне.

Как я понимаю, Вы, возможно, прибудете в Нью-Йорк, и в этом случае я хотел бы надеяться иметь возможность встретиться с Вами там. Однако, если бы это означало отсрочку более, чем на 2 недели, и если бы Вы смогли принять меня в Москве раньше, то я бы предпочел вылететь в Москву во избежание такой задержки.

Приглашение участникам с американской стороны будет направлено мною либо в качестве частного лица, либо в качестве председателя комитета Американской академии искусств и наук в Бостоне, неправительственного учреждения, которое последнее время выступало инициатором Пагуошских конференций.

Ваш ответ я мог бы получить быстрее всего через Вашего посла в Вашингтоне.

С уважением

Лео Сцилард
Отель Дюпон, Плаза, Вашингтон,
6-й округ Колумбия

Уважаемый господин Сцилард,

Ваше письмо получил и был очень рад услышать, что Вы здоровы и полны новых идей. Должен сказать, что я прочел Ваше письмо с большим удовлетворением. Мне было особенно приятно узнать, что Вы проявляете большую озабоченность в связи с усилением гонки вооружений и ищете пути к обеспечению мира.

Международный кризис, который мы только что пережили, особенно остро напоминает всем людям доброй воли, насколько актуальным и неотложным является вопрос о разумном решении проблемы разоружения. Разоружение необходимо для того, чтобы исключить угрозу истребительной, разрушительной термоядерной войны, а в эти дни мир находился буквально на пороге такой войны.

Меня заинтересовало то, что Вы пишете о Ваших "ангелах", которые сознают всю опасность продолжения всепоглощающей гонки вооружений и проявляют чувство ответственности перед историей.

Уже много лет между правительствами на разных уровнях ведутся переговоры по разоружению, но эти переговоры не дают никаких результатов. По-видимому, основная причина такого положения заключается в том, что силы, которые определяют политику в странах капиталистического мира, чувствуют большую неуверенность за свое будущее. Они, видимо, боятся, что разоружение может, так сказать, приблизить их конец, и надеются, что гонка вооружений, увеличение вооруженных сил, которые они создали, могут продлить существование капиталистического строя.

Это, конечно, опасное заблуждение. Как можно рассчитывать на то, чтобы силой оружия, вопреки воле самих народов, задержать смену одного общественного строя другим!

В век ракетно-ядерного оружия только сумасшедший мог бы ставить задачу достижения своих политических целей путем развязывания термоядерной войны. Война между государствами привела

бы к полному разгрому агрессора. Но она принесла бы неисчислимые бедствия всем народам мира, потому что это была бы ядерная война, и она, вероятно, быстро разрослась бы в мировую войну.

Но некоторые государственные деятели, видимо, недостаточно понимают, к каким последствиям приведет современная война. А если они и понимают это, то не могут преодолеть те силы, которые действуют в негативном направлении, да и сами не хотят приложить необходимые усилия, потому что эти деятели являются продуктом той же среды, и им свойственны те же заблуждения.

Я ознакомился с Вашим предложением о проведении неофициальной советско-американской встречи на неправительственной основе для обмена мнениями и изучения возможности прийти к соглашению о разоружении. Мне это предложение понравилось. У меня тоже возникала мысль, что, может быть, следовало бы организовать встречу по вопросу о разоружении с участием ученых или общественных деятелей. Как я понимаю, во встрече, которую Вы имеете в виду, должны участвовать люди, не являющиеся официальными лицами и не представляющие правительства своих стран. Их работа должна проходить, так сказать, без посторонних ушей, без микрофонов, без стенографисток, без журналистов, без представителей телевидения и радиокорпораций. А выводы, к которым они придут, должны рассматриваться как их личное мнение. Но в то же время это должны быть люди, которые пользуются уважением и доверием у общественного мнения их стран. Иначе такая встреча могла бы превратиться в пустое чаепитие и времяпровождение, и никто не придавал бы значения достигнутой на ней договоренности.

Другое дело, если это будут люди, которые имеют определенную репутацию в глазах общественности. В этом случае они могли бы провести серьезную работу. Их выводы могли бы оказать немалое влияние на общественное мнение, и к ним вынуждены были бы прислушаться даже официальные лица и правительства.

Если Вы беретесь за это дело — я бы сказал, довольно тяжелое дело, — то мы приветствуем Вашу идею и готовы испытать

и эту возможность для упрочения дела мира. Как конкретно это сделать, — оставляем на Ваше усмотрение. Вы можете изложить свои дальнейшие соображения нашему послу в Вашингтоне, а если захотите, как Вы пишете, приехать в Москву, мы будем рады приветствовать Вас на московской земле и встретиться с Вами.

С уважением

Н.ХРУЩЕВ

4 ноября 1962 года



Dear Dr. Szilard,

I have received your letter and I am very glad that you are healthy and full of new ideas. I should say that I have read your letter with great satisfaction, I was especially pleased to learn that you display great concern over the intensification of the armaments race and seek ways toward safeguarding peace.

The international crisis that we have just survived reminds to all people of good will in a very acute form how actual and urgent is the question of a reasonable solution of the disarmament problem. Disarmament is necessary to exclude the danger of a destructive and devastating thermonuclear war, and during those days the world was practically on the brink of such a war.

I was interested in what you write about your "angels" who realize all the dangers of the continuing all-absorbing armaments race and feel responsibility before history.

For a great many years the disarmament negotiations have been carried on among the Governments at various levels but these negotiations bring no results whatsoever. It appears that the main reason for such a situation lies in the fact that the forces which determine the policy in the countries of capitalist world feel great uncertainty about their future. They seem to be afraid that disarmament may, so to say, bring nearer their end and they hope that the armaments race and the building up of the armed forces which they have created can prolong the existence of the capitalist system.

This is, of course, a dangerous delusion. How can one expect to retard the succession of one social system by another by the force of arms, against the will of the peoples themselves?

In the era of rocket and nuclear weapons only a madman could pursue the objective of reaching his political ends by unleashing a thermonuclear war. The war between the states

would lead to the total defeat of the aggressor. But it would bring untold sufferings to all the peoples of the world, because it would mean a nuclear war which would probably quickly develop into a world war.

But some statesmen seem to underestimate the consequences to which a war of to-day might lead. But even if they realize it they are unable to overpower the negative forces. Moreover, they themselves have no desire to make the necessary efforts for they are the product of the same environment and they are subject to the same delusion.

I have considered your proposal for an unofficial Soviet-American meeting at a non-governmental level to exchange views and examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on disarmament. I like this proposal. I also thought that perhaps there should be held a meeting on the disarmament problem with the participation of scientists or public figures. My understanding is that the participants of the meeting which you have in mind are not to be officials or representatives of governments of their respective countries. They are to hold their discussions without, if I may say so outsiders, without microphones, without shorthand typists, without correspondents, without representatives of television or radio corporations. And the conclusions to which they would come are to be considered as their personal views. But at the same time they are to be the people enjoying respect and confidence of the public opinion in their countries. Otherwise such a meeting could turn into an idle tea party talk and pastime and nobody would attach any importance to the agreement reached there.

It would be another matter if these persons were people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them.

If you are willing to undertake this task which, I would say, is rather a difficult one, - we welcome your idea and we are ready to try this as another possibility of strengthening the cause of peace. We leave it to you to decide how this could be done. You may forward your further considerations to our Ambassador to Washington, and should you wish, as you write, to come to Moscow, we shall be glad to welcome you on the Moscow soil and to see you.

With respect

N.KHRUSHCHEV

November 4, 1962



N.S. Khrushchev,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Moscow.

Geneva, 15th November 1962

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I was very much moved by your kind letter of November 4th which reached me last night in Geneva. Since I can imagine how disturbing the recent crisis must have been for you I am all the more grateful that you found the time to answer my letter of October 9th.

Your answer raises the issue of who the American participants in the proposed project ought to be in order to make the project really effective. You will find the names of those among whom I would propose to choose the American participants - and some other relevant information - in the Appendix which is attached to this letter.

As you will see most of those named are consultants to the Department of State, Department of Defense and the White House. Because of their special relationship to the US Government they could be very effective in fighting for specific disarmament proposals which would make sense, if the proposed project were carried out. However, because of this relationship they would have to fight for any such proposals in Washington and they would not be in a position to influence the Government through the pressure of public opinion. In spite of this limitation these men could be effective, I believe, because so many key people inside of the Administration know by now that America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in the arms race.

If what I am saying makes sense to you, then I would propose to go from Geneva first to Moscow and to return thereafter from Moscow to Washington. In Moscow I would want to discuss with someone designated by you who the American and Russian participants ought to be in order to make the project as effective as possible. In a preliminary conversation

which I had with Ambassador Dobrynin on this subject we discussed the difficulty of finding the exact Russian counterparts to the American participants, which arises from the fact that the Soviet Government has very few, if any, consultants in the field of disarmament. I believe that Ambassador Dobrynin has communicated at that time with Federov, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in this matter, and perhaps you would want me to talk to Federov also.

It is my thought that if I could discuss these matters in Moscow with someone designated by you, and if I were able to see you also, then on my return to Washington I would be in a good position to help the Americans invited to participate in the project in clearing their participation with the Governmental Agency with which they are connected. This is my main reason why I would prefer to visit Moscow before I return to Washington.

I trust that you will let me know if there is a date in the near future when you could be reasonably sure that you could see me, if I came to Moscow for a few days. My wife, who also functions as my doctor, would accompany me on the trip.

Your letter of November 4th was transmitted to me by Mr. Moliakov, Permanent Representative of the USSR, to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. I am now asking him to transmit my letter to you and to transmit a copy of it to Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Moliakov could transmit a reply from you to me in Geneva.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

File Moscow

Moscow

.SDA099 (B WAA018) PD=WALTHAM MASS MAR 3 914AME=
DR LEO SZILARD=

=CARE DEL CHARRO HOTEL LA JOLLA CALIF=

=AMERICAN ACADEMY MAILING DOCUMENTS TODAY TO ROVELLE
COSMOS CLUB

WEISNER NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT HILL OR LARSEN
SUGGEST SETTLING ROVELLE ISSUE FIRST AND THEN HELPING
HIM FIND ADDITIONAL HELP HE NEEDS=

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Page
fact
W. P. Marshall
1950

Женева, 19 ноября 1962 года

Памятная записка.

От Лео Сциларда
Председателю Совета Министров
Н.С.Хрущеву

Соединенные Штаты связали себя официальными обязательствами в отношении всеобщего и полного разоружения, однако в настоящее время мало кто из американцев, занимающих ответственные посты, искренне поддерживает эту идею. Разоружение автоматически не обеспечило бы мир и в настоящее время никто не может определить, имеются ли возможности того, что Америка и Россия смогут прийти к согласию по вопросу о путях обеспечения мира в разоруженном мире. Пока не будет устранена неуверенность в этом вопросе, до тех пор и не будет решающего сдвига в направлении всеобщего и полного разоружения.

Комитет Американской Академии Искусств и Наук, председателем которого я являюсь, предлагает изучить этот вопрос, создав для этой цели неправительственный орган, состоящий из 5-7 американцев и 5-7 русских, которые в течение короткого периода времени занимались бы исключительно этой проблемой, проведя половину этого срока в России и половину в Америке.

В задачи этого исследования не входила бы разработка рекомендаций относительно того, каким образом следует обеспечить мир в разоруженном мире, а скорее составление рабочего документа, в котором перечислялись бы некоторые возможные подходы к этой проблеме, обсуждение в каждом случае слабых сторон того, или иного варианта решения и тех обстоятельств, в которых данный вариант неприемлем. Если действовать вышеуказанным образом, то ни одно из принятых решений не явилось бы отражением предложения Америки или России.

По завершении рабочий документ был бы передан заинтересованным правительствам и, в зависимости от договоренности с русским и американским правительствами, он также мог бы быть опубликован.

Geneva, 19th November 1962.

MEMORANDUM

FROM : Leo Szilard
TO : Chairman N.S. Khrushchev

The United States is formally committed to general and complete disarmament, but at the present time, few Americans in responsible positions are wholeheartedly in favor of it. Disarmament would not automatically guarantee peace, and at present no one is able to appraise the chance that America and Russia might be able to reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world. No decisive steps towards general and complete disarmament will be taken unless the uncertainty on this issue is first removed.

A Committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of which I happen to be chairman, proposes to explore this question by setting up a non-governmental task force, composed of five to seven Americans and five to seven Russians, who would work fulltime, for a short period, half of the time in Russia and half of the time in America.

It would not be the purpose of this study to come up with a recommendation of how the peace should be secured in a disarmed world. Rather the goal of the study would be to produce a working paper which would list several possible approaches to this problem, discuss in each case the weaknesses of that particular solution, and the circumstances in which it would be likely to break down. By proceeding in the manner projected, none of the solutions discussed would carry the stigma of representing an American or a Russian proposal.

Upon its completion, the working paper would be transmitted to the interested governments and, depending on the arrangements with the Russian and American governments, the working paper might also be published.

The End

104-5 m V-34
Geneva, Sunday 25 November 1962

N.S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Moscow

Dear Mr Khrushchev,

In response to my letter of 15 November Mr Moliakov transmitted to me your kind invitation, for which I am very grateful.

My wife and I had intended to fly to Moscow tomorrow morning. However, last night I received a telephone call from Washington which indicates that the Angels project has run into a serious difficulty there.

This does not alter my desire to visit Moscow before returning to Washington. I know, however, that this is an exceptionally busy time for you and I feel I ought to put it up to you whether you would be willing to see me, in spite of the set-back which the project has suffered.

I shall await your decision in this regard in Geneva and my wife and I shall be ready to leave for Moscow at a few days' notice if I am advised that you would be able to see me.

The telephone call which I received yesterday from Washington reported that one of the key Government officials, with whom I intended to discuss the Angels project upon my return from Moscow, was prematurely approached by one of the Angels and reacted quite negatively. It is possible, of course, that it was not made clear to him that the Angels project was not meant to replace governmental negotiations but rather to be a prelude to such negotiations and to be a means for discovering what could be negotiated with a good chance for success. Nevertheless, unless I can convince this official on my return to Washington to change his mind, employees of the

Government would not receive permission to participate in the project and consultants would be discouraged rather than encouraged.

Because I seem to have the strong support of other people in Washington I am not giving up the fight. Nor am I abandoning my intention of visiting Moscow as soon as possible, if you are able to find the time to see me.

I am listing below four purposes for which such a visit might be useful :

1. Such a visit might make it possible for me to say with assurance upon my return to Washington that the Angels project is correctly understood in Moscow to be a prelude to negotiations, rather than a replacement for negotiations, or an activity that would be conducted concurrently with negotiations.
2. I would hope that by talking to you, and perhaps subsequently to someone designated by you, I would be able to learn some of the answers to the questions which trouble the Angels.
3. Though the contrary might appear to be the case, the fact is that many people in the US Government have a real desire somehow to stop the arms race, and I would like to get something across to you in this regard. Part of the trouble is that so many people would like to have their cake and eat it too.
4. I would hope to discuss with you the possibility of setting up a joint Russian-American staff study which is not quite as urgent as the Angels project but could be quite important. It relates to the problem of how the peace might be secured in a disarmed world, and the people who know about it are all quite enthusiastic. This project does not

seem to run into any objections on the part of the US Government.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

to the President

Geneva, December 1st, 1962

Dear Mr. Krushchev,

I have had a watch for fifteen years of which I am very fond. It is protected so that I can keep it in the pocket of my trousers and it does not break when I drop it. Also, it automatically winds up when I look at it.

When I made my reservation in Geneva to fly to Moscow, I got a new model of it which I intended to bring you as a token of my esteem and affection.

I am returning to America in the next few days but it would be useless to take the watch there. I am asking Mr. Moliakov to get it to you in the hope that you will like it.

Respectfully,

(Leo Szilard)

(Geo. S. S. S. S.)

Respectfully,

Will like it.

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Dear Mr. Knapford,

The Study

Geneva, December 1st, 1883

Geneva, 15 July 1963

Chairman N.S. Khrushchev
Moscow

Dear Mr Khrushchev,

We had an exchange of letters last year which I am enclosing for your convenience. In response to a letter of 15 November of last year that I wrote you from Geneva, you were kind enough to say that I may come to Moscow and arrangements were made for my trip, but then I had to advise you that some difficulties have arisen in Washington and the trip to Moscow was cancelled. I owe you an apology for having taken so long to come back to you with a concrete, and perhaps not fully satisfactory, proposal.

Formal Government approval for the project has now been obtained in the form of an exchange of letters between Mr Hudson Hongland, President of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, and President Kennedy. A copy of this exchange of letters is enclosed. A Committee of the Academy of which I am the Chairman and Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, is the Vice-Chairman, proposes to carry out the "Angels-Project" by holding a three-week session in Washington D.C. either in August or in September of this year. The circumstances under which this meeting would be held and the identity of the American participants are fully described in the enclosed memorandum.

The general character and the purpose of the proposed meeting would be the same as originally intended, the form of the proposed meeting has been changed, however. According to my original proposal there would have participated in the meeting some of the more imaginative young officials who are employed by the US Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, who are on the side of the Angels (in the sense that they realize that the United States may have to give up some temporary advantages for the sake of obtaining major gains in security on the long-term basis), but who are not in a decision-making position. Because it proved to be impossible to obtain the permission of their Agency for their direct participation in the conference, we have proposed that the meeting be held in

Washington D.C. This would then enable the American participants to have private discussions with these junior officials of the Agency. We would ask the American participants, however, to stay away, during the conference, from any member of the Administration who is in a decision-making position, for fear that their thinking might be influenced by what may or may not be currently acceptable to the US Government.

This solution would create unequal conditions for the American and the Soviet groups of participants. No official of the American Government would directly participate, yet it would be necessary for some of the junior officials of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Relations or the Ministry of Defence to participate in the conference, and the conference could hardly be useful if Soviet participation were limited to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

I am uncertain in my own mind just how useful the proposed conference would be in the present circumstances. The other members of my Committee, including its Vice-Chairman Roger Fisher, Professor of Law at Harvard University, feel however very strongly that such a conference could be very useful if it were held in August or September of this year. This view is stressed in a letter from Professor Fisher which I enclose.

At this point it would seem best that I submit the whole matter to you for your consideration.

If you determine that we ought to go through with this project then I stand ready to go to Moscow to discuss who the Soviet participants in the conference might be. If I were to go to Moscow, then I would very much hope also to have an opportunity to get your guidance on a few of the most important aspects of the proposed conference. These aspects of the conference are spelled out in the Appendix attached to this letter.

If in your determination we ought to abandon the project, in the prevailing circumstances, or if you were to find that the conference could not be held in August or September of this year, then I would recommend to my Committee to postpone the project for an indefinite period of time. It would then be my hope that the long-range study of disarmament (projected to be carried out in cooperation with the Soviet Academy of Sciences) to which the first paragraph of the enclosed letter from the President of the American Academy refers, may get under way before the end of this year and may perhaps

fulfil some of the functions which I had in mind when I proposed the "Angels-Project" to you last October.

This letter is being transmitted through the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and, as long as I am still in Europe, your reply would best reach me through them. I propose to await your reply, if possible, in Europe. Depending on your reply I would then go to Moscow before returning to America. If I did, I would be accompanied by my wife who is also my doctor.

Perhaps you would want to transmit a copy of this letter to Ambassador Dobrynin, with whom I kept in touch in Washington until he left for Moscow in June.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard

P.S. - 16 July 1963 - I have just learned that Carl Kayson is with the Harriman Delegation in Moscow. He is fully familiar with all aspects of the "Angels-Project" and in a better position than I am to judge whether the conference we propose to hold in August or September could be expected to be useful, in the prevailing circumstances. Because I have been away from America for over three weeks I was not able recently to consult with him, and when I tried to reach him over the telephone at the White House yesterday, I was told that he had left for Moscow. If you should wish to get his appraisal I am convinced he would give you his frank opinion. I shall send him a copy of this letter to Moscow which should reach him by the time this letter reaches you.

Geneva, 15 July 1963

MEMORANDUM

from : Leo Szilard
to : Chairman N.S. Khrushchev

Acting as Chairman of a Committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of which Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School is Vice-Chairman, I take the liberty to propose that a three-weeks meeting be held in Washington D.C. as early as possible in August or September of this year, but not starting before 7 August. The American Academy expects to cover the expenses of the Soviet participants while they are in Washington. In this regard the American Academy has received commitments for funds totalling \$ 20,000, of which \$ 12,500 are conditional upon the meeting being held before October of this year.

The following Americans would participate in this meeting :

Marvin Goldberger, Princeton University
Murray Gell-Mann, California Institute of Technology
Louis Henkin, Columbia University
Roger Fisher, Harvard University
Steven Muller, Cornell University

Those listed above have all recently functioned or are currently functioning as consultants either to the US Department of Defence or to the US Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament. A description of the qualifications of each of these men is attached.

Herbert York, formerly Director of the Livermore Laboratory who was in charge of Research and Development in the US Department of Defence during the Eisenhower Administration was also asked to participate in the conference. He cabled me that he cannot participate but would be willing to help in other ways. The text of his cable is attached.

The instructions to the participants which the American Academy has proposed are attached to the enclosed letter from the President of the Academy to President Kennedy. These instructions differ in form, but not in intent from the tentative "Instructions", dated 11 January 1963, which I have submitted. A copy of the latter is also enclosed.

We do not propose that the conference prepare a document representing the consensus of the participants. Rather each participant in the conference would be expected to formulate his own conclusions. If possible each

participant should individually record his conclusions in writing at the end of the conference and both time and facilities will be provided to enable the participants currently to record their thoughts in writing during the conference.

Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, would be in charge of all technical arrangements and all questions relating to dates and other arrangements should be addressed directly to him. During the summer he could be best contacted by the Soviet Embassy in Washington at Box 66, Vineyard Haven, Massachusetts, telephone 1590 M.

Questions relating to who the Soviet participants might be and relating to the intellectual preparation of the conference should for the time being be addressed to me. While in Europe I can be contacted through the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. After my return to America I can be contacted through the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. I shall be staying in Washington at the Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington 6, D.C.

315x

Geneva, ~~20~~ July 1963

Chairman N.S. Khrushchev
Moscow

Dear Mr Khrushchev,

I take the liberty of sending you this message in order to ask if my letter of 15 July has reached your office (it should have reached it on or about 18 July) and also to ask if the proposal made in my letter is under active consideration at present. If it is, then I would want to await your decision here in Europe.

Your reply to this note may reach me through the Soviet Mission in Geneva.

Respectfully,

Leo Szilard