

RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

4 JUNE 1964

In politics as in science, Leo Szilard provided all mankind an outstanding example through his compassion, challenging humor and broad genius. His ability to perceive how men could live in peace in a nuclear world and his capacity to encourage all sides to work together to achieve a livable world brought us together under his leadership as Directors of the Council for a Livable World. His wisdom catalyzed a program that will remain a lasting tribute.

As his friends we grieve; as fellow Directors, we renew our pledge to strive to realize his dream -- a livable world.

In sorrow and in dedication, we meet today in Washington, comforted by knowing that his works will guide us and his friends will rejoice that he lived in their midst.

Ruth Adams
Lee Bamberger
H. Ashton Crosby
William Doering
Bernard T. Feld
Roger Fisher
Allan Forbes, Jr.
Maurice S. Fox

Jerome D. Frank
Lois Gardner
Robert Livingston
Matthew Meselson
James G. Patton
Charles Pratt, Jr.
John Silard
Daniel M. Singer



COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036, Phone: 265-3800, ac 202, Cable: DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICERS

BERNARD T. FELD *President*
ALLAN FORBES, JR. *Vice-President*
DANIEL M. SINGER *Secretary-Treasurer*
H. ASHTON CROSBY *Executive Director*
JOHN SILARD *Counsel*

June 18, 1964

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Co-Chairmen:
WILLIAM DOERING
New Haven, Conn.
LEO SZILARD
Chicago, Ill.

Dear Supporter:

The Council for a Livable World owes its existence to the genius of Leo Szilard. Its continuance and growth, despite the absence of his guidance, will attest even further to the profundity of his insight and ingenuity. For there is no doubt that the Council is fulfilling a genuine need in Washington; that the number of its supporters has been increasing steadily; that it has had a discernible influence in one election and will certainly have an appreciable effect on the one to come; and that it is providing a rallying ground for a growing number of members of Congress and of the Executive Branch who are deeply concerned with averting a nuclear war.

To me the success of the Council remains a major miracle. When, in 1961, Leo Szilard undertook his academic barnstorming tour, and some of his friends volunteered their support, we were motivated by a number of considerations: first, there was that devotion which, without trying or asking, Leo Szilard was able to call forth; then there was the convincing eloquence of his speech, "Are We on the Road to War?", and, more particularly, of the informal discussions which he arranged to follow his formal presentations; and finally there was the relief that, anxious as we were over the way the world was going and frustrated with the difficulty of influencing political processes, here was a concrete proposal for a concrete course of action which, if it could succeed, gave promise of having a real impact on the course of events.

I do not think that any of us, possibly not even Leo Szilard himself, felt that there was more than an outside chance that the Council would take hold. The idea of the Council seems much too simple and logical to be politically practicable. To say that a combination of sweet reason and cool cash, advanced by a lobby of scientists and scholars, might

RUTH ADAMS
Chicago, Ill.
BERNARD T. FELD
Cambridge, Mass.
ALLAN FORBES, JR.
Cambridge, Mass.
MAURICE S. FOX
Cambridge, Mass.
JEROME D. FRANK
Baltimore, Md.
MARGARET BRENNAN GIL
Stockbridge, Mass.
MATTHEW MESELSON
Cambridge, Mass.
JAMES G. PATTON
Denver, Colo.
ARTHUR PENN
New York, N.Y.
CHARLES PRATT, JR.
New York, N.Y.
DANIEL M. SINGER
Washington, D.C.

wield political influence, sounds like the kind of political naivete of which scientists are too frequently accused. And to act as though you believed it, by setting up an organization like the Council for a Livable World, requires a kind of faith in reason and logic -- some might call it arrogance -- which is supposed to be the hallmark of the scientist's inability to operate effectively in the real world.

But it is precisely in the directness of its approach and in the logical inevitability of its operation that the Council reflects the sophistication of Szilard's genius. As a construct in the realm of politics, the Council will, I believe, be counted on a par with some of his best ideas in science. It bears the same imprint of his uncanny ability to go straight to the heart of a problem, coupled with a fantastic ingenuity in devising solutions.

We, who have worked with him on the Council, have no doubt that the Council or something very much like it will continue to play a significant role on the national political scene as long as the voice of reason and restraint continues to be needed.

* * *

Finally, I cannot refrain from taking this opportunity to express a few, very personal feelings: I first met Leo Szilard in 1941 when I succumbed to his invitation to exchange the sheltered life of a graduate student for the hectic, unpredictable, but always exciting position of his assistant in the so-called Uranium Project, then just starting up at Columbia University. From then until now I have been involved, in one form or another, in most of the endeavors which he did so much to advance. I have collaborated in some of his brilliant scientific coups, and witnessed flashes of scientific insight and prophecy which set him off as one of the most original minds of the century. I have participated in Pugwash Conferences where, by the cogency of his observations and the human and humorous tone in which they were made, he has turned acrimony into harmony. I have often seen him so deeply preoccupied with a scientific problem as to be impervious to his surroundings and then, suddenly, as though responding to a sensitive antenna, become aware of the personal problem of someone in his presence and immediately to shift his interest and exhibit that compassion and understanding of which he was bountifully capable. I have suffered through his struggle with cancer and rejoiced over the miracle of the cure for which he himself so largely was responsible. I have wondered at his renewed vigor and been delighted to witness the warm personal happiness of his domestic life. And, like all his friends, I now resent the prematureness of his departure, but will bask for a long time in his afterglow.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld,
President

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June 15, 1964

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ARTHUR PENN
New York, N.Y.

CHARLES PRATT, JR.
New York, N.Y.

DANIEL M. SINGER
Washington, D.C.

Dear Supporter:

NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL

June 1, 1964

LEO SZILARD

In 1939 Dr. Leo Szilard played a key role among those who opened the Pandora's Box from which emerged the nuclear weapons that have created the present "peace of mutual terror." But in these past two decades he dedicated his great heart and brilliant mind to the task of closing that box, of seeing to it that no human community ever again suffers the fate that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His great contribution to posterity is not only the legacy of scientific discoveries he leaves behind, but the example he personally set of the responsible scientist deeply concerned that the fruits of research be used to benefit, not harm, humanity.

His genius transcended any one field and was as apparent in his political ingenuity and his fiction as in his physics, but beyond his purely intellectual gifts was his compassion for all mankind and his courage, which enabled him to continue his crusade for peace even while he struggled against cancer. The United States that gave him refuge received more than full measure of gratitude and service from him.

By now you have received Dr. Feld's letter concerning the death of Dr. Szilard. Under Dr. Szilard's guidance and direction the Council has been established solidly and effectively and will continue its programs and expand its activities for the future.

This is an interim report to bring you up to date on a number of Council activities.

The Council and some of the Directors and Members of the Scientists Committee have come under sharp attack by two syndicated columnists hostile to the political views advanced by the Council.

The derogatory articles are a nuisance not only because of their distortion of the basic aims and purposes of the Council but because they tend to distract energies which can be more usefully employed on behalf of the Council. It should be remembered, however, that an organization that is ineffective or sterile is usually left alone in its torpor. The fact that we are now enduring hostile publicity can be considered a bench mark of the Council's success and testimony that our efforts to bring balanced perspective, sound policy and good people to our government are having an impact.


The Council would be remiss if we did not bring to your attention the fact that the attack centers not only on the Council but also upon the people for whom we are recommending support. Despite these attacks, the response from our supporters has been most gratifying and it becomes even more imperative that the Council's recommended candidates be supported and sustained through contributions in order to blunt those irresponsible writings.

We are enclosing two items from the Congressional Record concerning the criticisms. A number of friends have rallied to our support and as a result of a letter written to about forty Senators explaining the Council's views, we have had only one derogatory answer and some thirty complimentary personal notes from the Senators.

Our seminars are continuing with great success, and our speakers continue to be from the very top echelon of the Government and the scientific or academic world. After our latest seminar for Senators themselves, we received a number of notes requesting more such sessions and thanking the Council for such a useful program. In addition, a number of Administrative Assistants who have left government service have personally telephoned or written to express appreciation for the Council's role. One aide stated, "The Council Seminars have been the high point of the past year." Another said, "The dinners are of great value -- I was able to resolve a difficult question by calling the guest speaker whom I had met at the dinner." A third, "The seminars are the most informative, interesting and valuable sessions I've attended since I've been an Administrative Assistant."

A second printing of some 4000 copies of the Council paper on Multi-lateral Force has been distributed as a result of many requests for this paper. Further papers are in preparation; one by Dr. Hans Bethe on the Social Responsibility of Scientists is in the process of distribution now.

Sincerely yours,


H. Ashton Crosby,
Executive Director

HAC:kg
Enclosures



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 110

WASHINGTON, SATURDAY, MAY 16, 1964

No. 98

Senate

ALICE IN WONDERLAND

Mr. McGOVERN. Madam President recently I read an account in the Omaha World Herald, written by an Alice Widener, for a publication called U.S.A. I have never heard of either Alice Widener or her publication, but after reading her article I believe it should be entitled "Alice in Wonderland."

Actually, her account as printed in the Omaha paper is entitled "How Lefties Aided McGOVERN."

The article then proceeds to attack the senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and me because we had the campaign support of the Council for a Livable World.

The Senator from Pennsylvania, who first came to national prominence as the courageous, effective, and hard-hitting reform mayor of Philadelphia, needs no defense. For myself, I am proud of the confidence which the council demonstrated in my candidacy in 1962. Their membership is composed of some of the Nation's greatest and most respected scientists, including those who developed our nuclear defense capability. They happen to be scientists with a conscience who believe that they have a political responsibility as citizens along with the rest of us.

They have pledged a percentage of their income to be used to support those candidates that they believe will make a worthwhile contribution to the cause of peace. In my case their contributions were made through a committee of Washington friends.

Although "Alice in Wonderland" somehow imagines that anyone who favors a livable world must be a "lefty" or a "pacifist," to use her words, the members of the council are neither. They do not favor unilateral disarmament, as she falsely asserts, nor are they pacifists. Indeed, their executive director, Col. Ashton Crosby, has just completed a distinguished career as an officer in the U.S. Army. If the council members were pacifists, they would hardly have backed me—a World War II pilot with a record of 35 bombing missions.

Writing in reply to another groundless attack, Colonel Crosby has stated:

The council is not a pacifist organization, neither the directors nor I as a retired regular officer with the well-being and security of our country foremost in mind, would ever advocate pacifism or unilateral disarmament.

As the council becomes more effective in its operations—

Writes the colonel—

It will come under attack increasingly from those groups or individuals who for one reason or another are opposed to all measures leading to the easing of international tensions and arms limitations. The council recognizes this as a measure of its success.

One of the most ridiculous points raised by Alice Widener is her question: "Do the people of South Dakota know they have the Council for a Livable World to thank for their first Democratic Senator in 26 years?"

The answer to that silly question is that the people of South Dakota are not so easily fooled as Miss Widener. It is a cheap insult to the intelligence of South Dakota voters to suggest that their votes are for sale to anyone. South Dakotans are much better equipped, it seems to me, to evaluate their candidates for public office than is Miss Widener, scrounging through her New York office for something to write about.

I was born in the State of South Dakota. I have lived there all my life. I believe the people of that State are fully capable of evaluating both my faults and my strengths.

I have waged four, hard, uphill campaigns in what is normally a Republican State, always with a much smaller campaign budget than any one of my opponents.

Although Miss Widener may find this hard to grasp from her vantage point in New York City, I have won three of those four campaigns.

I imagine that Miss Widener somehow feels that she is contributing to my political defeat as obliging Republican editors, such as the Omaha editor, reprint her material. But I suspect that the voters of South Dakota will again look carefully at my weaknesses as well as whatever strengths and merits I may possess. I hope that by 1968 they will find the merit list to be a little longer than the list of mistakes.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the article published in the Omaha World Herald, to which I have referred, and written by Miss Widener, a letter to me dated May 13, 1964, written by Colonel Crosby the executive director of the Council for a Livable World, as well as a letter to the editor of an Omaha paper written by Mr. H. V. Jorgensen, a contractor of Winner, S. Dak., may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article and letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOW LEFTIES AIDED McGOVERN

(By Alice Widener)

I thought I was relatively immune to political shock—but what I've just found out in a letter addressed "To Readers of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists" from a thingumajig called "Council for a Livable World" is the living end.

Hold your hats, hang on to your right senses, and let me tell you the tale of this Council for a Livable World which, according to its letter dated April 24, 1964, is a lobby for the election of "good" Senators and Representatives, and which "acts as an agent for transmitting checks from our supporters, made out directly to the candidate."

The confessed activities of this council ought to clear away any sentimental illusions about the intellectual independence of certain liberal Senators who call for thinking unthinkable thoughts and for the "reform" of Congress as an outdated hindrance to the executive and the intellectual elite.

Among the holler-than-thou critics of Congress has been Senator JOSEPH S. CLARK, of Pennsylvania, a strong supporter of the leftwing Fund for the Republic.

Here is what the lobbying Council for a Livable World says about Senator CLARK on page 4 of its January-February 1964 Washington bulletin that was mailed out to readers of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

"The hearings on the economic impact of arms reduction on the U.S. economy, which the council was instrumental in initiating, were held from November 6 through December 5 by the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower (JOSEPH CLARK, chairman) * * * John Silard (general counsel of the Council for Livable World) acted as special consultant to Senator CLARK."

The Council for a Livable World is all for banning the bomb, for a minimal nuclear deterrent, and for other pacifist programs leading to unilateral U.S. disarmament. Its board of directors includes such leftwingers as Dr. Leo Szilard, Bernard T. Feld, Jerome D. Frank, James G. Patton and others.

MAY 11, 1964.

EDITOR THE PUBLIC PULSE,
Omaha World Herald
Omaha, Nebr.

DEAR SIR: Just finished reading good old "Nightmare Alice" Widener's knife-thrusting article about GEORGE MCGOVERN. I am checking on the council, as it is the first time I ever heard of it, but I do feel that it is my duty to inform the readers of your paper that the Council for a Livable World did not elect our first Democratic Senator in 26 years, as she states.

The voters of South Dakota elected Mr. MCGOVERN, by going to the polls and casting their vote for the man of their choice. I realize that many of "Nightmare Alice's" group do not have much truck in this practice of letting the common man vote, as they do not consider the average citizen capable of self-rule, but fortunately they have not yet rewritten the Constitution of the United States of America.

Incidentally, you have a fine newspaper, and give excellent news coverage for the whole Midwest.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY V. JORGENSEN.

Mr. CLARK. Madam President, will the Senator from South Dakota yield?

Mr. MCGOVERN. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. Madam President, I congratulate the Senator from South Dakota on the statement he has just made.

It occurs to me that Alice Widener, whom my friend the Senator from South Dakota so aptly compares to Alice in Wonderland, must have been spending quite a bit of time in her New York office talking to the Mad Hatter. I can think of no other way in which she could have become so grossly misinformed.

I share the admiration expressed by the Senator from South Dakota for the Council for a Livable World, and for their brilliant executive director, World War II veteran, Col. H. Ashton Crosby, who has an outstanding record in combat—as does the Senator from South Dakota.

I do not know whether I regret it or not. I never got into combat, but I spent 4 years in the Air Force in the China-Burma-India theater and was quite glad to get back with a whole skin.

This kind of cheap demagoguery indulged in in this column, I am happy to say, has no effect whatever in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

It was tried in my election of 1962, when I was accused by right wingers and Birchites, and indeed by some who cannot be fairly categorized, as being soft on communism, soft on Red Cuba, soft on Red China, and as the unilateral disarmament candidate, the effort being made to hold me up to contempt.

I am happy to recall to my colleagues in the Senate that while our Democratic candidate for the governorship in that election was unfortunately defeated by some 450,000 votes, I was able to surmount this rightwing hate tide and still win by a majority of 103,000.

I am delighted to have had the support of so fine an organization as the Council for a Livable World, which favors general and complete disarmament under enforceable world law. I strongly join in such a program, as did President Kennedy, and President Eisenhower before him, under the leadership of Christian Herter, his Secretary of State, and

as does President Johnson. It would indeed be a far more livable world if Miss Widener were to retire to private life and the program of the Council for a Livable World became a reality.

Mr. MCGOVERN. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for his helpful comment. I also thank the Senator from Mississippi for his courtesy in yielding to me.

What shocks me is that this lobby not only initiated the hearings held by Senator JOSEPH CLARK, but also its paid counsel acted as special consultant to the Senator. What intellectual objectivity.

Can you imagine the howls of outrage among liberals if counsel for the American Medical Association were to act as special consultant to the chairman of the Senate committee studying medicare?

Here's more about the Council for a Livable World. Its April 24 letter to readers of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists states:

"In the 1962 congressional election, the council transmitted over \$20,000 to GEORGE MCGOVERN, former Director of President Kennedy's food-for-peace program, who was running for the Senate in South Dakota. He was elected with a margin of a few hundred votes, the first Democratic Senator in South Dakota in 26 years."

Do the people of South Dakota know they have the Council for a Livable World to thank for their first Democratic Senator in 26 years?

At any rate, if you read the council's letter and bulletin, you will quickly catch on to what its "peace" proposals are. Why not find out about this lobby for yourself? Its address is 301 Dupont Circle Building, 1346 Connecticut Avenue NW., Washington, D.C.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD,
Washington, D.C., May 13, 1964.

HON. GEORGE MCGOVERN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MCGOVERN: I have been asked by a number of Senators within the past few months as to what precisely the council stands for and what it is trying to do. Essentially the council is striving to further the development of interest between the scientific and political communities in the area of foreign affairs and, by recommending financial support to intelligent and thoughtful persons running for the Senate, contribute in some measure to constructive U.S. foreign and defense policies.

The council is an organization devoted to developing realistic and practical programs in the fields of arms control and the easing of international tensions, taking into consideration the national and international political climate. The council stresses the concept of responsibility and is well aware of the practicalities and limitations inherent in disarmament negotiations and the necessities of safeguarding our national security. Our programs are advanced within this context.

During the past few months the council has been under attack by columnist Holmes Alexander. His remarks have included the following statements:

That the council is an extremist group favoring unilateral disarmament.

That the council favors disarmament in the face of the enemy.

That the council backed Stuart Hughes in the 1962 Massachusetts Senate election.

The council never, at any time, recommended or solicited support for Mr. Hughes. The council has never at any time advocated unilateral disarmament or disarming in the face of the enemy.

The council is not a pacifist organization. Neither the directors nor I as a retired regular officer with the well-being and security of our country foremost in mind, would ever advocate pacifism or unilateral disarmament.

As the council becomes more effective in its operations, it will come under attack increasingly from those groups or individuals who for one reason or another are opposed to all measures leading to the easing of international tensions and arms limitations. The council recognizes this as a measure of its success.

Sincerely,

H. ASHTON CROSBY,
Executive Director.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 88th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Vol. 110

WASHINGTON, MONDAY, JUNE 8, 1964

No. 114

THE MAD HATTER AND THE LOOKING-GLASS HOUSE

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, recently I had occasion to borrow from Lewis Carroll's classic "Alice in Wonderland," in commenting on one of our present-day "Alices"—one by the name of Widener.

And now, as the walrus said, "The time has come to speak of other things"—not of "shoes and ships and sealing wax," but about the "Looking-Glass House" in which Alice and some of her associates conversed.

As Alice carefully explained to the kitten, everything seems backward when one looks at a glass. A poem entitled "Jabberwocky," which she read in the Looking-Glass House, begins:

'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!

Alice thought "Jabberwocky" pretty; but she said, "It's rather hard to understand."

In recent days, I have come to a new appreciation of the difficulties that faced Alice, for I have read several syndicated columns, by a Mr. Holmes Alexander, which, in Alice's phrase, are becoming "curiouser and curiouser." The title for the series could most appropriately be "Jabberwocky," and their author could very likely be the "Mad Hatter." Indeed, our distinguished colleague, the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], surmised 2 weeks ago that "Alice in Wonderland" Widener has been conferring with some modern-day "Mad Hatter"—perhaps Holmes Alexander.

In the Looking-Glass House, as the Queen explained to Alice:

It takes all the running you can do,
to keep in the same place. If you want to get
somewhere else, you must run at least twice
as fast as that.

Whether or not I can talk fast enough to keep ahead of both Alice and the Mad Hatter remains to be seen. But here goes.

THE MAD HATTER

Mr. Holmes Alexander sees himself in the role of a detective who has uncovered some kind of a plot that is leading Senators to prefer world peace to nuclear war. He is afraid the Council for a Livable World, which encourages its members to act like responsible citizens, has gotten too close to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—an agency established by the Congress, at the request of the late President Kennedy.

He believes that the council is a part of "a pacifist lobby" that favors "unilateral disarmament" and is anxious to secure the election of Senators who will support that goal.

What are the facts? The Council for a Livable World is a group of distinguished American scientists, teachers, and scholars who believe that they, like other good citizens, have a responsibility to participate in our political process. Many of them, including the late Leo Szilard, are nuclear scientists who helped develop our atomic defense system, and understand how devastating an atomic war would be. For that reason they are especially anxious to support the election campaigns of Senators who, they believe, will work for the prevention of war.

Mr. Alexander somehow imagines that anyone who wants a "livable world" and desires to prevent war is a "pacifist" favoring "unilateral disarmament." This is nonsense. The members of the council, their decorated war-hero Director, Col. Ashton Crosby, and the Senators they have supported—none of these is a pacifist, and none favors unilateral disarmament.

In 1962, the council's supporters contributed to the election campaigns of Senators CARROLL, CHURCH, CLARK, FULBRIGHT, JAVITS, MORSE, and myself.

Speaking for myself and, I believe, for all the Senators and the council, I state that we favor a strong military defense fully adequate to our Nation's needs, combined with positive steps to control—if not reduce—the arms race. Some of us have seen war at first hand; all of us have some idea of what a major nuclear war might mean; and we want to do everything within reason to save our families, our Nation, and our world from incineration. Mr. Alexander may have grown tired of living; but we have not, and we do not think our fellow Americans have, except for a suicidal, extremist minority.

Several hundred people contributed a total of \$22,000 to my 1962 campaign after I was endorsed by the council. These contributions were routed through a Washington, D.C., committee. Under District of Columbia law, campaign contributions are not reported. For example, my Republican opponent in the last election received over \$60,000 from a Washington, D.C., luncheon; and, following the District of Columbia law, he did not report the names of the contributors. But I am sure he is proud of this support, just as I am proud of the contributions I received. Their average size is about \$25, and they came from some of our most respected citizens. Not one of those contributions had a string attached or a special request or a narrow, self-interest angle. Not one of these contributors and no member of the council has ever tried to influence my votes, my public statements, or any aspect of my role as a Senator.

Alexander says that shortly after my election and the support of the council, I began introducing unilateral disarmament legislation. This is pure poppycock. I have never introduced any such legislation. As a matter of personal conviction, without discussing the matter with the council, I have urged the elimination of waste in our gigantic arms budget. I have suggested that we apply to military spending the same searching examination that we do to other parts of the budget, instead of rubberstamping every arms appropriation simply because it is labeled "defense." I intend to go on doing this, in spite of Holmes Alexander, who pretends to be for economy in government, and then asks Senators to vote blindly for every costly military gadget that comes down the pike—even those that the Secretary of Defense does not wish to accelerate, such as the new follow-on bomber. Most of our Federal budget is spent for the military; so we have a special obligation to look for excessive weapons spending, and then have the courage to cut it out when we see it. We also ought to have the commonsense to do what we can to halt or reverse the arms race, so that all the major powers will reduce the horribly wasteful and dangerous pileup of nuclear weapons.

But what of Holmes Alexander's connections? For whom does he speak? Why his strenuous effort to discredit the conscientious patriotic citizens who comprise the Council for a Livable World?

I think the clue is that Holmes Alexander is married to the John Birch Society and is spouting the Birch line.

Beginning in March 1958, Alexander wrote a long series of 12 articles for the magazine, American Opinion, edited by Robert Welch, head of the John Birch Society. In 1961, Welch copyrighted and published these articles as a book entitled "How To Read the Federalist," by Holmes Alexander.

Robert Welch, Mr. Alexander's publisher, who doubtless paid him handsomely for his articles and his book, is the same man who called the late Republican Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "a Communist agent." He is the same man who said President Eisenhower was a "dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy" whose whole purpose was treason.

Our distinguished colleague from North Dakota, Senator MILTON YOUNG, who has himself been shamefully attacked by the Birchers, and who has had the courage to fight them, inserted into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 12, 1961, selections from Welch's writings.

A few sentences from those writings of Mr. Alexander's publisher, Robert Welch, as inserted in the RECORD by Senator YOUNG, follow:

For many reasons and after a lot of study, I personally believe Dulles to be a Communist agent.

While I too think that Milton Eisenhower is a Communist, and has been for 30 years, this opinion is based largely on general circumstances of his conduct. But my firm belief that Dwight Eisenhower is a dedicated, conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy is based on an accumulation of detailed evidence so extensive and so palpable that it seems to me to put this conviction beyond any reasonable doubt.

The Communists can now use all the power and prestige of the Presidency of the United States to implement their plans, just as fully and even openly as they dare. They have arrived at this point by three stages. In the first stage, Roosevelt thought he was using the Communists to promote his personal ambitions and grandiose schemes. Of course, instead, the Communists were using him; but without his knowledge or understanding of his place in their game.

In the second stage, Truman was used by the Communists, with his knowledge and acquiescence, as the price he consciously paid for their making him President.

In the third stage, in my own firm opinion, the Communists have one of their own actually in the Presidency. For this third man, Eisenhower, there is only one possible word to describe his purposes and his actions. That word is "treason."

Mr. President, I consider myself to have made the honor roll when I am attacked by men who "reason" in the way Robert Welch and Holmes Alexander do. Their muddleheaded nonsense does not worry me, as far as my personal peace of mind is concerned; but I do resent their attacks on the Council for a Liveable World, because we need to encourage, rather than discourage, the political participation of good citizens who love their country and the world enough to invest in the cause of peace.

It is not necessary for me to ask that Alexander's many articles attacking the council and numerous Members of the Senate be printed in the RECORD, because Mr. E. Y. BERRY, of the other body, has already taken care of that. It is appropriate that Mr. Berry, like Robert Welch of the Birch Society, should sponsor Mr. Alexander's articles, because Mr. Berry was one of only two Members of Congress who accepted an invitation to attend a Birchite organizational meeting in Washington, some months ago.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

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Chicago, Ill.

June 3, 1964

Dear Supporter:

It is with profound sorrow that the Council for a Livable World informs you of the death of its founder, Dr. Leo Szilard. Dr. Szilard died quietly, in his sleep, on May 30, 1964, at the age of 66. At the time, Dr. Szilard was in La Jolla, California as one of the permanent fellows of the Salk Institute, working on a new theory of the biochemical basis of the memory process.

Leo Szilard will be remembered as one of the major figures in the explosive development of physics and biology in the 20th century. In Berlin in the early 30's, where he worked with Einstein and von Laue, his pioneering papers on the relationship between the statistical behaviour of complex physical systems and the organization and utilization of information in general, laid the groundwork for and anticipated many recent developments in information theory and cybernetics.

With the seizure of power by Hitler, Szilard left Germany for England. Here he undertook work in nuclear physics, first in London and then at Oxford. Of the many ingenious and important investigations carried out by him during this period, one can, in retrospect, observe as an underlying theme the search for nuclear processes which gave promise of providing means for releasing the energy stored in atom nuclei. While in England, he helped to set up an organization which arranged for the escape of a large number of distinguished scholars from Nazi Germany. Convinced by Munich that war in Europe could not be far off, he came to America in 1939, where he was welcomed as a visiting scholar at Columbia University.

Szilard was among the first to recognize the tremendous potentialities inherent in the discovery of nuclear fission; he and W. H. Zinn carried out one of the earliest experiments demonstrating that, through the emission of neutrons, the fission process had the potential for a sustained nuclear chain reaction. His role in establishing the Manhattan project, and in its success, is well known. He shared with Enrico Fermi the basic patent for the nuclear chain reaction, and he was awarded the Atoms for Peace prize in 1959.

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Perhaps the outstanding feature of Szilard's contribution to the Manhattan project was his remarkable ability to foresee well in advance those aspects of the problem which would in later stages present the greatest difficulty, and to begin well in advance the necessary researches for overcoming these difficulties. Thus it was Szilard who anticipated the need to obtain pure graphite and pure uranium metal in very large quantities; and it was on his initiative that research was started in time to make feasible the Hanford reactors.

He also saw early and with great clarity what would be the consequences of nuclear weapons and their spread, and he took the initiative in bringing these problems to the attention of President Truman before the first bombs were available, urging a demonstration before they were used against population centers.

After the war, Leo Szilard started a new career in science--in the field of microbiology and genetics. In this field his contributions have also been marked by that special ingenuity and penetrating clarity which was the hallmark of all Szilard's work, both in science and in politics.

In the last 20 years, Leo Szilard devoted the major part of his efforts to the problems of avoiding nuclear war. He organized, with Einstein and others, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, which launched a major program of public education on the implications of nuclear energy and, in particular, the necessity for effective international control over the growth and spread of nuclear weapons. Dr. Szilard was one of the original signers of the Einstein-Russell appeal which led to the Pugwash Conferences on science and world affairs. He participated in most of these conferences and could be unfailingly depended upon to introduce that necessary ingredient of good-humored novelty and consistent attention to essentials, without which the conference might many times have foundered.

In 1959, Dr. Szilard was stricken with cancer. His cure, due in no small measure to his own ingenious variation of the medical techniques available, was followed by a renewed interest in political problems. In 1961, Dr. Szilard started the Council for a Livable World and in the ensuing years he personally gave it direction and meaning. The Council will remain a monument to his idealism and practicality.

Sincerely,

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld,
President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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Mrs. Leo Szilard, Dr. James R. Arnold and Mrs. Gita Braude

cordially invite you to meet

The Honorable Albert Gore


in the Imperial Room of the Torrey Pines Inn, 11480 Torrey Pines Road, N.
La Jolla

on Wednesday, November 10, 1971 from 8-10 p.m.

Senator Gore is currently Washington Chairman of the Council for a Livable World and will speak about the role of the Council in Washington, and in the 1972 elections.

This meeting is sponsored jointly by the Council for a Livable World, the La Jolla Democratic Club and the San Diego County Chapter of the World Federalists.

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER



*For Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky -
distinguished scientist and invaluable
member of my staff - with the
best wishes and warm regard of his
devoted friend
26 November 1960. Dwight D. Eisenhower*

FAREWELL RADIO AND TELEVISION ADDRESS
TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. JANUARY 17, 1961
DELIVERED FROM THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
AT 8:30 P.M.

PREFACE BY DR. GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY

Preface

by George B. Kistiakowsky

Before stepping down as the President of the United States twenty years ago, Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a farewell radio and TV address to the nation. It was mainly concerned with the threat to our democracy from the growing political power of the American military establishment and its allies in Congress, in the weapons industry, and among the technologists of war and weapons. Eisenhower gave this alliance a name that endured—the military-industrial complex.

Being deeply concerned with this danger, he spoke of it to me in private conversations during much of 1960 while I served as his assistant for Science and Technology. After the breakdown of the Paris Summit Conference in May 1960, Eisenhower told me of his extreme distress over the collapse of his efforts to end the Cold War. He considered this effort the main thrust of his policy in the preceding months, the main hope of the closing years of his presidency.

Eisenhower's farewell address was truly prophetic. The influence of the "military-industrial complex" has spread throughout the country and it is seeking to dominate Congress in the months ahead. Several members of the Senate and the House who took Ike's warning to their hearts were defeated in the last election by the aggressive campaign tactics of the militarist neo-conservatives and their fundamentalist allies. And, as in 1960, distorted intelligence about Soviet military might again played a role in this political campaign. Efforts to advance the US-USSR detente have again been reversed through the actions of both governments. An intensified nuclear arms race is now in prospect.

A confrontation with the Soviet Union could and in all probability would carry us over the brink. Let us fervently hope this is not in store for us. The Eisenhower warning is reprinted below. Let us hope that Eisenhower's foresight will be heeded by the man of his own party who now succeeds him in the White House.

January 18, 1981

Dr. Kistiakowsky was chief Science Adviser to President Eisenhower who awarded him the Medal of Freedom. He is Professor Emeritus of Chemistry, Harvard University and Chairman of Council for a Livable World Education Fund.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People.

January 17, 1961

(Delivered from the President's Office at 8:30 p.m.)

My fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II.

We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved,

a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI.

Down the long lane of history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war—as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years—I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII.

So—in this my last good night to you as your President—I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I—my fellow citizens—need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.



Council for a Livable World Education Fund

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___ Please send me at no charge ___ copies of the full text of President Eisenhower's Farewell Address.

___ I enclose a tax deductible contribution of \$ ___ to be used for similar appeals for arms control to our citizens and political leaders.

Name _____

Address _____

Zip _____

*A
Critique
of the
Safeguard
ABM*

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

THE COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD was founded in 1962 by the world-renowned physicist and biologist, Leo Szilard. It is a non-partisan national political organization with headquarters in Washington, D. C. The Council's major objectives are to end the arms race and to bring nuclear weapons under control. Its long-range goal is general and complete disarmament of all nations under effective international systems of verification and inspection.

The Council has been involved in every important issue of foreign and defense policy which has come before the nation during the last seven years. Of all these questions, none has been of greater concern than ABM. The Council opposed the Sentinel system and is opposed to the Safeguard program now under debate.

President Nixon's intention to press for deployment of Safeguard means there will be a hard fight in Congress and in public forums throughout the country. It is difficult at best for the average citizen to understand an issue as complex as ABM; but in the heat of partisan debate, it is almost impossible. The purpose of this booklet is to clarify the arguments for and against Safeguard in order that any concerned American may be better able to judge the debate and form his own opinion.

Leo Szilard played a key role in establishing the Manhattan Project which led to the development of the atom bomb. In 1945, he was the leader of a group of scientists who opposed its use against Japanese cities. After World War II, he devoted his energies and prodigious genius to the control of nuclear weapons and to encouraging policies which would avoid war and bring peace to the world. In 1959 Leo Szilard received the Atoms for Peace prize. Three years later, convinced the world was on the road to nuclear war, he formed the Council for a Livable World.

*A
Critique
of the
Safeguard
ABM*

by Allan Forbes, Jr.

Prepared and Published by the Council for a Livable World

Drawings by Art Wood

Copies of this booklet may be obtained by writing to the Council for a Livable World
at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

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Prepared and Published by the Council for a Livable World

Prologue

ABM AND THE DELICATE BALANCE OF DETERRENCE

TWENTY-FOUR HOURS a day, every day of the year, the giant bombers of our Strategic Air Command are poised at the end of the runways of their air bases, bellies loaded with H-bombs, their crews on full alert — everything in complete readiness to take off on a moment's notice to bomb the Soviet Union. Deep in the oceans surrounding the U.S.S.R., some 30 Polaris submarines are constantly on patrol, each of them carrying 16 nuclear-tipped rockets aimed at Russian cities. In the western part of the United States, 1,000 Minuteman missiles wait in underground silos ready to be fired at the touch of a button. Day and night, long-range early warning radars scan the northern skies for the first indication of an enemy attack. In Russia, similar weapons are maintained in the same state of readiness aimed at cities in the United States.

This is the basic condition under which we all live and very few of us ever seem to give it a second thought. Very few of us appear to feel even the slightest sense of insecurity, not because we are unaware of what is happening — countless television programs, movies, novels, and articles have spelled it out in precise detail — but because we have come to acquire an unquestioning faith in this system of mutual deterrence. How does deterrence work? What prevents the Russians from launching their hundreds of nuclear rockets at us and what prevents us from firing our still more powerful forces at them?

The answer is that both Russia and America are deterred from launching a “first strike” by the certain knowledge that the other would inevitably retaliate, destroying one-third to two-thirds of the attacker's population and most of its industry. There is a certain grim effectiveness to this state of mutual deterrence in which more than 400 million Americans and Rus-

sians live out their lives, but it is a very delicate balance which could be upset all too easily. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, Russia and America experienced their first thermonuclear confrontation — an “eyeball to eyeball” confrontation, as former Secretary of State Rusk called it. Since that time the balance of deterrence has been relatively stable.

The deployment of a system of Anti-Ballistic Missiles — ABM — now threatens to disrupt the balance drastically. Let us assume the Soviet Union were about to deploy an ABM defense of its cities and its industry, and the United States believed it to be a perfect or near-perfect system. To offset such an ABM, the U.S. would almost certainly respond in one of the following ways: rush to procure and deploy an ABM system of its own; increase its present Minuteman, bomber, and Polaris forces; or deploy a new weapon such as MRV (Multiple Reentry Vehicle), a missile with more than one warhead. If sufficiently alarmed, some defense officials might recommend that our best countermove would be a preemptive (first) strike before the Soviet Union had time to complete its ABM defenses.

Deterrence is governed by the law that any disturbing action by one side calls for an immediate reaction by the other to restore the balance. Invariably, this reaction is based on the principle of the “worst possible case,” and therefore becomes an over-reaction. For example, when the Russians first began to deploy ICBM's, the U.S. intelligence community, attempting to estimate the number of rockets the Soviet Union would build, based its calculations on the maximum industrial capacity of the Russians to build ICBM's, not an assessment of their intentions or their actions. The United States then proceeded to build a missile force larger than that which it assumed the Soviet Union could deploy. The Russians, as it turned out, actually built only one-tenth as many ICBM's as our intelligence had pre-

dicted. Nevertheless, we continued with our scheduled missile build-up. There was, indeed, a "missile gap" a decade ago, but it was the Soviet Union — not the United States — which was on the short end.

It is only in the context of this "action-reaction" phenomenon inherent in the arms race that the issue of ABM can be understood, debated, and resolved.

I

HOW DID ABM DEVELOP?

WHEN THE ICBM (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile) carrying a thermonuclear warhead was developed in the late 1950's, it was at first regarded as the ultimate weapon against which no effective defense would ever be designed. The problem of intercepting an ICBM was compared to "hitting a bullet with a bullet." But in the world of military technology, nothing is considered impossible. Army technicians got the assignment of designing a counterweapon and by 1959 had managed to propose a solution to the problem with the Nike-Zeus ABM system. But during this time, the Air Force, which had responsibility for the ICBM, had set its technicians to designing countermeasures to a Russian equivalent of Nike-Zeus in a kind of internal arms race.

In 1959 the Army recommended to Congress that Nike-Zeus be deployed. Two Administrations rejected the Army's proposal on the grounds that Nike-Zeus was already obsolete because the Soviet Union could be expected to develop techniques similar to those our Air Force had already designed. It was generally conceded that the system contained a number of "fatal defects." Had it been deployed at an estimated cost of \$14 billion, as the Army urged, it would, in the words of a Deputy Secretary of Defense, "have had to be torn out and replaced almost before it became operational."¹

The Army's technicians went back to work and by 1966 had designed a new ABM — Nike-X. At the same time, the Air Force had been hard at work also and had succeeded in devising new methods to defeat a Soviet version of Nike-X.


They had not, however, devised a system to defeat the political friends of Nike-X. In September of 1967, the Johnson Administration — under enormous Congressional and military pressures — reversed its stand against

2



THE U.S. ABM SYSTEM

Nike-X and reluctantly decided to deploy a "thin" ABM defense against the People's Republic of China.





1. ICBM attack launched
2. 1st-stage Booster separates
3. 2nd-stage Booster separates
4. 3rd-stage Booster separates and accompanies RV
5. PAR detects and tracks incoming RV 2,500 miles and ten minutes from target



6. MSR launches and guides area defense SPARTANS toward incoming RV. SPARTANS detonate at 400 miles range when RV is 1½ minutes from target
7. RV reenters atmosphere. Hard-point defense SPRINTS launched at RV to detonate at 15-25 miles range when RV is 45 seconds from target

2

THE U.S. ABM SYSTEM

ABM is a defensive weapons system designed to protect the United States from an enemy ICBM attack. It intercepts incoming enemy reentry vehicles (RV's) after they have separated from their missiles. The reentry vehicles, which approach the United States *via* the Great Circle Route over the North Pole travelling at 17,000 m.p.h., carry the thermonuclear warheads to their targets and protect them from burning up in the earth's atmosphere. To "kill" the reentry vehicles is the mission of ABM.

The present ABM system is based on five interdependent components: a long-range missile, SPARTAN; a short-range missile, SPRINT; a long-range detection radar called PAR (Perimeter Acquisition Radar); a short-range radar, the MSR (Missile Site Radar); and a complex of advanced high speed computers.

SPARTAN is a three-stage rocket armed with a 2-megaton thermonuclear warhead, equivalent in destructive power to 100 Hiroshima bombs. Its mission is to intercept and kill incoming weapons at a range of 400 miles or more from target, high above the earth's atmosphere. The explosion of a SPARTAN warhead has no immediate harmful effects upon populations below. SPARTAN is intended to kill enemy weapons by an intense emission of X-rays. Its 400-mile range enables it to defend an area somewhat larger than New England.² A small number of SPARTAN batteries is supposed to provide what is called an "area defense" of the entire United States.

SPRINT is a two-stage missile with an extraordinarily high rate of acceleration. It carries a warhead comparable in destructive power to the Hiroshima bomb. SPRINT is supposed to destroy incoming RV's by neutron emission and by blast, at a range of 15 to 25 miles from the target, well within the earth's atmosphere. SPRINT's short range means that it can


protect only a small area, for example, a city or missile base. SPRINT defense of a missile base is known as a "hard-point" defense. SPRINT defense of a city has one serious flaw. Because of the missile's limited range, an enemy could detonate his warheads upwind of the city just beyond the range of SPRINT. The fallout from the ground bursts would kill the inhabitants almost as surely as if the weapon had landed on the city.

PAR, the long-range radar, detects incoming RV's at a distance of 2,500 miles, some ten minutes from target. It feeds back to the computers information which enables them to determine the RV's trajectory. MSR picks up the enemy RV at a range of several hundred miles, and passes on information as to trajectory and configuration of objects to the computers which make the necessary calculations for launch and guidance of both SPARTAN and SPRINT. MSR gives the "order" for the interceptor missiles to be fired and guides them to intercept. The computers are the "brains" of the ABM defense; MSR and PAR are the "eyes."


No operational models of the two radars have yet been built. The Pentagon plans to take PAR straight from the component test stage to operational status. An MSR prototype is currently being tested at Kwajalein in the Pacific. No test of the entire system will be possible because of the partial nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 and because the actual wartime "environment" in which it is designed to function cannot be simulated.

An ABM system reduces drastically the time for decision-making in the event of a nuclear war. A scientist who has been closely involved for many years with design of weapons systems recently warned Congress of this trend.

It is certain that deployment of these ABM's would lead to more steps in that awesome direction of placing greater reliance on automatic devices



for making that ultimate decision as to whether or not Doomsday has arrived. The power to make certain life-and-death decisions is inexorably passing from statesman and politicians to more narrowly focused technicians and from human beings to machines. Any [ABM] deployment would speed up this process.³



1. ICBM attack with decoys. SPARTANS fired at objects detected by MSR above atmosphere
2. Decoys and real RV reenter atmosphere
3. Lighter decoys slowed down by the atmosphere at a greater rate than real RV enabling MSR to distinguish between them
4. Decoys burn up in atmosphere
5. SPRINTS fired at real RV

N.B.: The area defense of the entire nation consists of 12 separate SPARTAN batteries. An attacker whose goal is to inflict limited damage rather than to destroy the whole country, may fire all his missiles at any single point, or two or three points, thus avoiding the bulk of the defense.

3


THE WEAKNESSES OF ABM

BY THE TIME Nike-Zeus was believed to have solved the problem of "hitting a bullet with a bullet," devices known as "penetration aids" had been developed by the offense to fool the ABM defense. The problem had become roughly analogous to stopping a shotgun charge with a bullet. SPARTAN kills high above the earth's atmosphere where the MSR has great difficulty distinguishing between the real warhead and decoys which have been deliberately designed to resemble warheads. A group of simple decoys can be made by exploding the booster rocket into small sections which accompany the RV on nearby trajectories. A better decoy is an aluminum-coated balloon which reflects radar waves and appears to the MSR much like a reentry vehicle. Should balloons look different from the RV's, the latter can be enclosed in balloons — thermonuclear wolves in sheep's clothing. More sophisticated still is the "kite" decoy, an arrangement of wires on a light metal framework designed to be indistinguishable to MSR from the RV; to some degree, these latter may be effective even after reentry into the atmosphere. SPARTAN missiles would have to be launched at all separate objects detected by MSR above the atmosphere and the defensive forces could be rapidly exhausted firing at harmless decoys.

Other effective penetration aids interfere with the operation of the radar itself and may render either PAR or MSR, or both, ineffective. Decoys and real warheads can be equipped with electronic devices which generate microwave noise and "jam" the MSR. Without a properly functioning MSR, the entire system is dead. Another effective countermeasure consists of fine metal wires (chaff) cut to act as radar-reflecting antennas. Millions of these wires dispersed in clouds hundreds of miles long accompanying the warhead reentry vehicle appear to MSR as a large opaque mass and successfully prevent the detection of objects concealed within it.

Explosion of an enemy warhead at a high altitude can cause a radar blackout lasting several minutes, making detection and tracking of incoming RV's impossible for MSR. The blackout is caused by the ionized cloud of the fireball itself. A megaton explosion at altitudes above 60 miles can black out thousands of square miles of sky. Another type of blackout from a nuclear explosion is caused by the ionizing effect of beta rays on the atmosphere. Since beta rays can descend as low as 40 miles, a high-altitude explosion can cause sustained ionization at this level and give rise to a beta blackout through which PAR would have great difficulty seeing.

Dr. Herbert York, a member of President Eisenhower's Science Advisory Committee, Chief Scientist of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and Director of Defense Research and Engineering under three Defense Secretaries, has expressed the "gravest doubts" as to the reliability of any ABM defense. He has discussed the possibility that when an ABM deployment is called upon to defend the country in a nuclear war, the result might be a "catastrophic failure in which at the moment of truth either nothing happens at all, or all interceptors fail."⁴



4

THE SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM


AFTER A FIVE-WEEK review of the highly controversial Sentinel ABM, President Nixon announced his decision to deploy a "modified Sentinel," now known as the Safeguard system.

Safeguard consists of twelve sites, each serving a dual function: to provide hard-point protection of bombers and missiles from a Russian first strike, and area defense against a Chinese attack. There will be twelve MSR's and seven PAR's. The number of SPARTAN and SPRINT missiles is still classified "Secret." But, since Safeguard has approximately the same number of radars as Sentinel and the costs of the two systems are almost identical, the number of missiles must be similar — probably about a thousand altogether.

The map opposite locates the sites and identifies their functions. Only one city — Washington, D. C. — is protected by SPRINT. All other American cities are defended by the SPARTAN area defense only. Each of the twelve sites has SPRINT missiles to protect the radars from being knocked out.

Safeguard has the following three missions:

1. To protect land-based deterrent forces — ICBM's and strategic bombers — from a Soviet first strike (hard-point defense with SPRINT).
2. To protect the entire United States against a possible Chinese ICBM attack (area defense with SPARTAN).
3. To protect the entire United States from the accidental launching of a small number of ICBM's by any nation (area defense with SPARTAN, principally).



Mission One

President Nixon's decision to deploy Safeguard was based primarily on the Pentagon's appraisal of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear plans. He stated that both the Soviet SS-9 missile capability and their submarine missile program have been increased by 60 percent since 1967. Protection of our

Minuteman missile sites, the President said, is "essential to avoid putting an American President — either this President or the next President — in a position where the United States would be second rather than first or at least equal to any potential enemy."⁵

President Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, told Congress that the Soviet Union "is going for a first-strike capability, and there is no question about it."⁶ There is an important difference between the strategies of a first and second strike. The attacker who launches a first strike must fire at his enemy's missiles with the intention of eliminating enough of them to prevent a devastating retaliatory blow. The country which has been attacked would aim its missiles at the enemy's cities to make him pay an unacceptably high price for striking first.

Four of Safeguard's twelve sites protect our Minuteman bases; seven protect bomber bases. The assumption is that should the Soviets have a first-strike capability by the mid-1970's, the existence of ABM hard-point defenses would reduce that capability sufficiently to dissuade them from attacking.

Mission Two

The second reason given by the President for deployment of Safeguard is that by 1973 or 1974, the Chinese "would have a significant nuclear capability which would make our diplomacy not credible in the Pacific unless we could protect our country against a Chinese attack aimed at our cities." The President added, "The ABM system will do that and the ABM Safeguard system, therefore, has been adopted for that reason."⁷

Mission Three

Safeguard's third purpose is to provide a thin shield over the entire nation to intercept missiles which might be launched accidentally at the United States. An attack of this type presumably would not consist of more than a few ICBM's.


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A CRITIQUE OF MISSION ONE

MSR IS THE key element in any ABM defense. Unfortunately, in a hard-point defense it is also the most vulnerable part. It can be "hardened" (protected) to withstand an overpressure at most one-tenth that of the Minutemen it is defending, which are buried in underground concrete silos. The defense must, therefore, allocate a large proportion of its defending SPRINT's for the protection of the MSR. An intelligent attacker would attempt to ensure the destruction of the MSR before the bulk of his ICBM force came within range of the ABM defense. Almost certainly he would know the approximate number of SPRINT's defending the radar and all he would need to do is fire a sufficient number of ICBM's to overwhelm them. With the MSR gone, none of the attacker's missiles could be intercepted.

There appears to be a basic fallacy to the concept of hard-point defense. The time required to launch a Minuteman after warning of an enemy attack has been received is about a minute. If the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were sure that a massive Soviet strike at our *unprotected* Minuteman force had been launched, it is difficult to believe that the attacked Minutemen would not be fired *before* the Russian warheads hit them. *This is the most reliable way of assuring retaliation.* If Soviet strategists and political leaders were certain that American leaders were prepared to let them have a free shot at our deterrent bases before retaliating, they might, under certain conditions, preempt. The same applies to the United States. *It is the virtual certainty that first-strike missiles will fail to destroy our retaliatory ICBM's because the latter will have been fired before they can be hit, that gives deterrence its credibility.*

Safeguard protection of Minuteman does not change the situation. Were the United States to deploy a hard-point defense around its Minute-



men, what would the President and the Joint Chiefs be likely to do if the U.S.S.R. launched a massive first strike? Would they rely completely upon the untested, unproven, vulnerable hard-point SPRINT defense to protect Minuteman? It seems inconceivable that the highest civilian and military officials entrusted with the security of the United States would permit 500 or 1,000 — or, for that matter, even 100 — Russian warheads to rain down on our Minutemen without first clearing the silos.⁸ Although Secretary Laird has said that he would like to have “flexibility” and an ABM button to push as well as a Minuteman button, he conceded to the members of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee that —

. . . I am hopeful that we would be able to react immediately to an attack . . . I do not want to frighten people about this, I want the Soviet Union, and I want any potential aggressor to understand that we are going to be in a position where we will respond immediately.⁹

The purpose of a hard-point defense, Secretary Laird explained, was only to cope with a special contingency — a surprise attack from the Soviet Union which did not provide sufficient time for the President of the United States to order a retaliatory blow before Soviet weapons hit their targets.¹⁰

There is a distinct possibility, as Senator Church repeatedly pointed out during the Disarmament Subcommittee Hearings, that deployment of a hard-point defense could reduce rather than enhance the credibility of our deterrent:

. . . but if I were the Russians and knew that an immediate counterlaunch of Minutemen would be the American response to any first strike against the United States, I would be far more reluctant to launch the attack than

if I thought the United States might rely upon a defensive system in which I, as a Russian, had contempt. In other words, it seems to me that the very defensive system you are talking about might weaken our deterrent credibility, and might even lead the Russians to conclude that they might hazard a first strike.¹¹

If our Minutemen were genuinely endangered by Soviet ICBM forces, there are a number of ways of defending them which tend to be less expensive, less provocative to the Soviet Union, and more reliable than hard-point defense. For instance, our present "hard" silos could be "super-hardened" by emplacing them in rock. The overpressures which the Minutemen could then withstand would be increased ten-fold. A former Secretary of the Air Force has referred to superhard silos as a "form of ABM defense."¹² Increasing the survivability of our deterrent by a factor of ten would make it necessary for an attacker to increase the yield of his weapons or their accuracy or their number by an equivalent amount.

Another means of ensuring our retaliatory capacity would be to increase the number of Minutemen missiles. Actually, it would be possible to construct more silos than missiles and keep a certain fraction of the total number of warheads constantly under redeployment ("nomadic" weapons). Since an attacker would never know which silos were loaded, he would have to target for *all* silos and would have to increase his forces substantially if he wished to have a first-strike capability.

6

CRITIQUE OF MISSION TWO

IF CHINA DOES BUILD an ICBM force of some 50 to 75 missiles and launches them against the United States in 1975, how effective will Safeguard be? Twelve SPARTAN "farms" provide the bulk of the China defense for the entire nation. Since there are no SPRINTS defending large cities, except for Washington, D. C., any Chinese missiles which penetrate the SPARTAN shield will get through to their targets, and these targets will undoubtedly be cities, not ICBM's, as would be the case if the Soviets launched a first strike.

The promoters of Safeguard have made the most absolute claim possible for the effectiveness of the China defense. It will provide 100 percent protection — "damage denial" the Pentagon calls it — against a Chinese ICBM attack for ten years following its deployment in 1973.¹³ Not 90 percent or 75 percent or even 50 percent, but 100 percent. No defensive system in history has ever met that performance standard. The claim is reminiscent of one made by Hermann Goering, Chief of the Nazi Luftwaffe in World War II. "If a single allied bomb," he told the German people in 1940, "should fall on this country, you can call me Max Meier." By 1945 almost every major German city had been reduced to rubble by British and American bombers.

The Pentagon takes the position that the Chinese will not possess penetration aids which can elude, defeat or exhaust SPARTAN. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard said:

I am confident we can handle the penetration aid problem and I think our technology is good on that.¹⁴

A scientist involved in designing ABM was rather more cautious.

Certainly there are possible penetration aids . . . that could be attempted to defeat the Safeguard system, but the uncertainties are not all on the side of the defense . . . a great deal of analysis [was] done to provide reasonable assurance that the system could evolve to handle future penetration aids that could be adopted by the Chinese. This . . . [means] a continued technical upgrading as necessary to include and counter advances in technology. Certainly there is no guarantee that this is possible, but there were adequate possibilities to warrant the deployment decision.¹⁵

Dr. Hans A. Bethe, a Nobel prize winner in physics and a weapons expert, testified before the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the question:

. . . You will remember that they [China] tested their first H-bomb only two years after their first A-bomb. I interpret this as meaning that they must have done a lot of theoretical work on the H-bomb before their first A-bomb was ever exploded . . . The Chinese are clearly weak industrially but they are not weak in brain power. It seems to me entirely credible that they would develop one or more systems of penetration aids in the laboratory before they have an operational ICBM capability. In this case, [Safeguard] ability to stop a Chinese missile attack will only last for a short time after the first Chinese ICBM deployment. They need to deploy only a small number of ICBM's to penetrate our defenses. Studies of this problem have been made which I believe to be essentially correct.¹⁶

Dr. J. P. Ruina, one of the most experienced weapons experts in the nation, has said of the SPARTAN anti-China defense that —

The system suffers one great disadvantage, it cannot effectively use the earth's atmosphere to help sort and classify [discriminate] incoming objects. The result is that it is relatively easy for an opponent to deceive, exhaust, or otherwise penetrate the Sentinel system . . .¹⁷

Dr. Herbert York has made this comment on the attitude of the supporters of ABM to the penetration aid problem:

Such an attack [from China] is supposed to consist of fewer and less sophisticated missiles and thus presents a simpler problem to solve [than a Soviet attack]. The problems created by decoys and other penetration aids are solved by defining them out of existence, and a cheaper area defense system becomes possible in theory.¹⁸

The Pentagon relies on the principle of the "worst possible case" to justify Safeguard's hard-point defense against a Soviet first strike. For the SPARTAN area defense against a Chinese attack, they use the "best possible case." For the Pentagon it *is* possible, apparently, to have one's cake and eat it too.

During a Pentagon briefing, Deputy Secretary Packard was asked what degree of confidence he placed in the ability of Safeguard to deal with blackout caused by nuclear explosions. His answer was:

I have looked at that carefully, and I believe that for the use of the system to protect our Minuteman bases, with the deployment we have, we will be able to deal effectively with that blackout problem.¹⁹

Blackout affects principally SPARTAN, the anti-China defense missile, not SPRINT, which defends Minuteman bases. Mr. Packard avoided the real issue — the effect of blackout on the *area defense*.

Dr. Ruina also has said that experts are generally agreed that "eventually the Chinese will have the capability of penetrating Safeguard with relative ease." In his opinion it will be three years from the time the Chinese deploy their ICBM's until they "can discount the existence of Sentinel."

Ruina asks a most significant question:

During a transitional period in Chinese missile deployment, they might be able to launch 40 missiles, perhaps with crude, untested penetration aids. Because of the existence of Safeguard, it might be possible to protect ourselves against all but five — with, of course, some probability that more or fewer might penetrate. What differences might this make for U.S. policy and security if damage denial [100 percent protection for the entire U.S.A.] cannot be counted on?²⁰

Capabilities of Safeguard against a Chinese ICBM Attack

There is a finite chance that any given ICBM force will penetrate any ABM defense. Assuming an ABM kill probability — the probability that a single SPARTAN will intercept a single incoming Chinese ICBM — of the order of 80 percent, the probabilities of a successful defense of a given defended area against five different possible Chinese attacks are shown below. The attacking missiles are assumed to be 80 percent reliable and to be without penetration aids or multiple warheads. This table is based on nothing more than the accepted mathematical laws of probability and the above-stated assumptions.

According to these figures, a Chinese attack with 35 ICBM's aimed at a target defended by 50 SPARTAN's would have a 90 percent chance of penetrating the defenses and thereby causing *unacceptable* damage. Even with a force as small as 20 missiles launched at the same defended area the Chinese would have one chance in five of destroying the target, while

Number of Chinese Missiles Attacking	Number of SPARTANS Defending	Probability of Successful Defense
20	50	81%
25	50	51%
35	50	10%
50	50	less than 0.1%


50 Chinese missiles fired against the same target would hopelessly overwhelm the defense.

However, it must be emphasized that our deterrent against a Chinese attack is, and will remain, based on the certainty of the overwhelming and unacceptable retaliatory damage which, no matter what the Chinese might do, would inevitably follow such an attack.

CRITIQUE OF MISSION THREE

IF SAFEGUARD can do nothing else, it would seem a fair assumption that at least it could provide essentially complete protection against the accidental launch of a very few missiles. Safeguard's capability in this respect is open to serious question on two grounds:

- (1) If an accidentally launched missile carried a warhead with advanced penetration aids, as Soviet weapons might be expected to do, it is far from certain that Safeguard's SPARTAN area defense could intercept it successfully. Except for Washington, D. C., there is no SPRINT city protection in Safeguard; if the missile happened to be targeted at a city, it would have an appreciable likelihood of hitting that city.
- (2) An active defense system like ABM must be maintained in a state of instant readiness for years on end. It is a "hair-trigger" system, but it also requires a "stiff-trigger" as a precaution against accidental launch or nuclear accident. The two requirements are difficult to reconcile. This means that an ABM system will probably be placed on full operational alert only during periods of international tension or crisis. An accidental launch can, of course, occur at any moment and the probability that the system would be switched off at such a time is substantial.




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ABM AND THE CREDIBILITY GAP

THE ADMINISTRATION'S CASE for deployment of Safeguard was presented to Congress by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and his Deputy Secretary, David Packard, during late March of 1969. The Soviet Union, Mr. Laird said, was "going for a first-strike capability and there is no question about it." Mr. Packard went even further: "The Soviet Union has the capability of being able to destroy substantially all of our land-based Minuteman capability in hardened silos if they chose to do so."²¹

Secretary Laird's appraisal of the Soviet Union's intention to acquire a first-strike capability was based largely on the SS-9 missile which carried, he said, a 20- to 25-megaton warhead and could "only be aimed at destroying our retaliatory force."²² The Secretary gave the impression that he was revealing the existence of the SS-9 for the first time. However, several Senators pointed out to him that they had been briefed on the SS-9 during the previous session of Congress by an Assistant Secretary of Defense who had described it to them as a "second-strike" weapon.²³

In addition to their SS-9 program, the Soviet Union was, according to Secretary Laird, preparing to deploy the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), were developing a capability to destroy our Polaris missile submarines, were proceeding rapidly with a large Polaris-type program of their own, and were replacing present single-warhead RV's with multiple-warhead RV's. In examining the Secretary's view of Soviet intentions, it is essential to bear in mind that the United States at present has 41 Polaris submarines with 656 missiles, that it has been working for years to develop effective techniques for destroying enemy missile submarines, and that it is about to deploy multiple warheads. In other words, the Soviet Union is doing what we have already done. The difference is that the United States has a total of 4,200 deliverable weapons by comparison with the Soviets'



1,200, and that it is ahead of the Russians in all areas of research, development, and deployment with the possible exception of FOBS, a weapon in which the Pentagon appears to have little interest.

If the Pentagon interprets current Soviet efforts — which can equally well be interpreted as being for the purpose of narrowing the strategic nuclear gap — as *prima facie* evidence of their intention to acquire a first-strike capability, how must Soviet leaders regard our plans to enlarge our present nuclear arsenal? Secretary Laird has expressed alarm at the possibility that the 200 SS-9's now operational may be increased to 500 by 1975. By that time, the United States plans to have some 10,000 deliverable nuclear weapons.²⁴

A Pentagon spokesman stated that Secretary Laird, in claiming that the Soviets were “going for a first-strike capability” was “probably swinging a little hard.”²⁵ Mr. Packard's remark that the Soviet Union had the capability of destroying substantially all our Minutemen was corrected by a Pentagon official who had accompanied him to the Hearings. The Deputy Secretary had meant to say, the official explained, that if the Russians continued to deploy SS-9's at the present rate, they could have such a capability by 1975.²⁶

Mr. Laird made a number of other errors. He informed Senators that the Russians were deploying a “third-generation” ABM system. Under questioning, he conceded they were only *testing* a “third-generation” ABM, something we did several years ago.²⁷ He also announced that the United States required a 6-to-1 margin of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to ensure its strategic “parity.” A Pentagon spokesman subsequently described this statement as “wild.”²⁸

For either the United States or the Soviet Union to acquire an actual

first-strike capability over the other would seem to be at this time an impossibility. Both nations have deployed three separate deterrent systems — strategic bombers, land-based ICBM's, and missile-launching submarines. Even if the Russians were able to destroy simultaneously all our Polaris submarines and our bombers in a coordinated surprise attack, their strike at our Minuteman ICBM's would be detected 20 minutes before impact. We would, therefore, have ample time to check and recheck the radar signals and to launch the Minutemen in a retaliatory strike before they were destroyed by Soviet weapons. It would make no difference how many ICBM's the Soviets fired at our Minutemen — 1,000 or 10,000 — the warheads would hit empty silos.

It is possible that in the future a new weapons system or a new form of penetration aid could give one country or the other a first-strike capability. Until that time it does not seem reasonable for either side to fear that a first strike could wipe out its retaliatory forces. It is not correct to claim, as the Secretary of Defense has, that a nation could obtain a first-strike capability merely by increasing the number of its weapons and counterweapons presently deployed or by deploying new systems now being readied for operational status. Nevertheless, the Pentagon's Director of Research and Engineering, the principal Administration spokesman for Safeguard, is barnstorming the nation to warn Americans that the Russians, by placing multiple warheads on their SS-9 missiles, could in 1975 destroy all but 100 of our 1,000 Minutemen.²⁹

If a nation wished to acquire a first-strike capability, it would have to meet all the following requirements: it would need to be able to destroy simultaneously the adversary's missile-launching submarines and bombers; it would need to deploy an effective ABM defense of its population centers

and industrial base; it would also have to "MIRV" its ICBM's; that is, equip them with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles. It would then — and only then — be in a position to launch a first strike and to intercept successfully all or almost all of the enemy's retaliatory ICBM's. ABM is generally thought of as a purely defensive weapon because it does not kill people. It is, however, an indispensable element in what is called a *credible* first-strike capability.

The likelihood of a Chinese attack does not seem to be regarded very seriously by either the present U.S. government or the previous one. Former Vice-President Humphrey in February 1969 stated publicly that the real reason for the Johnson Administration's decision to deploy a thin "Chinese-oriented" ABM was not really to protect the U.S. against a Chinese attack but to serve as a bargaining counter for arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.³⁰ At a press conference in February, President Nixon said, "I do not buy the assumption that the thin Sentinel was simply for the purpose of protecting ourselves from attack by Communist China."³¹ The new Secretary of State, William Rogers, told a Senate Committee in March of 1969 that if arms talks with the *Soviet Union* progressed favorably, he would drop Safeguard altogether.³²

9

ABM AND THE ARMS RACE

WHEN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCNAMARA announced in September 1967 the decision to deploy Sentinel, by far the greater portion of his address consisted of a sombre and impassioned plea to the American people to resist political pressures to expand the thin anti-China Sentinel ABM into a heavy anti-Soviet defense. The latter, he said,


would in effect be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. That, as I have pointed out, would make it necessary for us to respond in turn — and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side.

During his 7-year tenure as Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara sat resolutely on the lid of a Pandora's Box of new weapons systems for which the services and their Congressional supporters were clamoring. After only a few weeks in office, the new Secretary, Melvin Laird, has served notice on the American people that he intends to open that box and distribute its contents. Safeguard is but one weapon in an arsenal of new and terrible weapons systems.

The Air Force has Minuteman III, AMSA, SCAD, SRAM, MRV, MIRV and MODS — its own ABM system. The Navy has the Poseidon and its successor — ULMS, Ocean Engineering Project (missiles on the seabed), and SABMIS, its ABM program.³³ The Army has only one entry in the big missile system sweepstakes — ABM. It hopes to be able to develop a new ABM based on multiple warheads — a “glorious goal for the future” as the Army's Chief of Research and Development calls it.³⁴

Deployment of any single one of these systems could destabilize the balance of deterrence; deployment of several systems would set in motion

a multiple action-reaction process which would lead to greatly increased forces-in-being on both sides, feverish Research and Development programs for new systems and intense mutual mistrust between Russia and America — in short, all the conditions for a cataclysm.



10

THE POLITICS OF ABM

SAFEGUARD IS NOW before the Congress. There will probably be four separate votes in the Senate during the spring and summer of 1969 and possibly another round in 1970. The Senate line-up appears to be split almost 50-50; a few votes either way will make the difference. In the past, ABM was a non-partisan issue. Mr. Nixon has elected to commit the prestige and power of the Presidency to the fight for Safeguard, and there is now a real danger that the debate will turn into a partisan political struggle in which the real issues of ABM and national security will play a minor role.

President Nixon left himself little room for maneuver; he has said, "I'm going to fight as hard as I can for it, because I believe it is absolutely essential for the security of the country."³⁵ A senior White House Aide has stated it more bluntly. "All the conventional and proper, the unconventional and improper means of persuasion will be employed to win this thing."³⁶

It may require the massive intervention of the American people to ensure that the ABM issue will be decided on its merits.

Epilogue

THE BASIC ISSUE is this: Is Safeguard necessary to deter a massive Russian first strike at the United States? The answer is no. It is not necessary. Deterrence depends upon an absolutely unquestioned ability to retaliate. We have this capability today. We have deployed vast and diversified deterrent forces composed of 645 strategic bombers, 41 missile-launching submarines carrying a total of 656 weapons, and 1,054 land-based ICBM's. Each one of these three forces can *by itself* inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union or China, or, if necessary, both.

Our strategic bombers and Polaris submarines are regarded as almost invulnerable to enemy attack.³⁷ The bombers are dispersed at airbases throughout the country and can be put into the air on approximately five minutes' notice. Some 22 of the 41 Polaris submarines are constantly on station in different parts of the world within striking distance of the U.S.S.R. An enemy would have to locate the submarines, wherever they might be, and destroy them at the same time as the bombers. While this is a strategic problem which would seem impossible to solve, a President of the United States might not wish to base the security of the nation on such an assumption. However, in addition to the Polaris submarines and the bombers, we have 1,054 land-based Minuteman and Titan ICBM's deployed in hardened silos. The Minutemen can be launched upon verification of a Russian strike *before* that strike could destroy them. Therefore, *in the worst possible case*, a massive Russian first strike at our 1,000 Minutemen would hit silos from which missiles had already departed on their flight of retaliation.

Credible deterrence applies equally to China. If China were to launch a small and "primitive" ICBM force at the U.S., it would receive moments later a devastating retaliatory strike. China's leaders would have made

a suicidally irrational decision which would have brought an abrupt end to the society they had struggled to establish over the last two decades. It is not believable that the prospect of instant annihilation of the People's Republic of China would not be the most powerful deterrent to any thoughts of an attack on the United States.³⁸

Our ability to deter the Russians or the Chinese, or anyone else for that matter, in no way depends upon protection of our land-based ICBM's. Our Minutemen are the ultimate retaliatory weapon and they do not require an ABM defense.

ALLAN FORBES, JR.
Vice-President, Council for a Livable World



References

1. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament Subcommittee, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967. The words "fatal defects" are those of Dr. J. S. Foster, *ibid.*
2. An improved SPARTAN missile with considerably longer range but with a reduced warhead yield is under development. If deployed a SPARTAN footprint would cover a far larger area than is now possible.
3. *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Disarmament Subcommittee, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969 (hereafter cited as *Implications*), 80.
4. *Implications*, 78.
5. *New York Times*, 19 April, 1969.
6. *Ibid*, 22 March, 1969.
7. *Ibid*, 19 April, 1969.
8. In an exchange during the 1969 Disarmament Subcommittee Hearings, both Defense Secretary Laird and Senator Stuart Symington were in agreement that the Minuteman missile has a special mechanism which permits it to be armed or disarmed after it has been launched. If this is correct there can be no question whatsoever but that Minutemen would be launched on warning of attack. However, the Pentagon subsequently changed Secretary Laird's testimony so that he *denied* the existence of such a mechanism. Both the original version and the Pentagon's correction will be found on pages 209-10 of *Implications*.
9. *Implications*, 249.
10. *Ibid*, 249. It is difficult to credit Secretary Laird's statement that the United States would not retaliate in the event of a Russian first strike if it could not find the President in time. The President is supposed to be in constant communication with the appropriate military authorities. Surely, if he were sick or missing at the moment of a first strike against the country, plans exist to delegate the retaliatory authority to the Vice-President, the Secretary of State or other important members of the government.
11. *Ibid*, 218.
12. *ABM Statement*, Federation of American Scientists, n.p., n.d.

13. *Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the U.S. ABM Program*, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, Subcommittee on Military Applications, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 7, 8, 10, 17, 30.
14. Defense Department Transcript of 14 March, 1969 press briefing by Deputy Defense Secretary Packard.
15. Daniel J. Fink, Letter to Editor, *Scientific American*, May, 1968.
16. *Implications*, 38.
17. *Ibid*, 33.
18. *Ibid*, 77.
19. Defense Department Transcript of 14 March, 1969 press briefing by Deputy Defense Secretary Packard.
20. *Implications*, 33.
21. *New York Times*, 21 March, 1969.
22. *Ibid*, 22 March, 1969.
23. *Ibid*, 22 March, 1969.
24. *Implications*, 214.
25. *Baltimore News American*, 28 March, 1969.
26. *New York Times*, 21 March, 1969.
27. *Ibid*, 21 March, 1969.
28. *Baltimore News American*, 28 March, 1969.
29. *New York Times*, 12 May, 1969.
30. *Boston Globe*, 10 February, 1969.
31. *Time*, 14 March, 1969.
32. *New York Times*, 29 March, 1969.
33. AMSA: Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft; SCAD: Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy; SRAM: Short Range Attack Missile; MODS: Minuteman Offense-defense System; ULMS: Undersea Long-range Missile System; SABMIS: Sea-based Anti-Ballistic Missile Intercept System.

34. *Washington Post*, 31 March, 1969.
35. *New York Times*, 19 April, 1969.
36. *Ibid*, 28 April, 1969.
37. Secretary Laird fears that after 1972 the Polaris submarines will be increasingly vulnerable to Russian anti-submarine tactics. Rear Admiral Smith, director of Navy strategic systems, recently gave an interview in which he affirmed his conviction that the Soviet Union would not be able to destroy the Polaris fleet in the foreseeable future, that Polaris is, and will remain an invulnerable deterrent. (*Washington Post*, 13 May, 1969).
38. It is not impossible that the Chinese motive for building a small ICBM force is not so much for the purpose of launching a first strike at the U.S. as it is to deter a U.S. preemptive strike at China. An area defense system might be able to intercept the few Chinese ICBM's which were not destroyed by an American first strike. According to G. W. Rathjens' recent study, "The Future of the Strategic Arms Race," this is the "one option that might be significantly more acceptable if the United States had Safeguard than if it did not."

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



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15 May 1964

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Memo to: Persons Interested in the Council for a Livable World

From: Bernard T. Feld, President

On 20 March we described some of the activities the Council for a Livable World has undertaken since its formation in 1962 on the basis of Leo Szilard's proposal.

To repeat: the Council for a Livable World is dedicated to working for attainable measures to reduce the risk of war, to halt the arms race, and to progress toward disarmament. It does so by providing substantial campaign funds to outstanding congressional candidates, and by operating an effective lobby in Washington directed toward responsible policies that can reduce the risk of war.

Some of the Council's activities which were not included in that letter are described in the Washington Bulletin which was sent you on 20 March:

1. A discussion has been initiated by the Council among members of Congress and the Administration on the Multilateral Force (MLF). A seminar will be held 21 May for some 15 senators at which Dr. Frank Long, former assistant director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will give views on the formation of this force. The Council's position, is indicated in the attached study paper.

In addition, the Council has sponsored a seminar on Viet Nam of senatorial assistants addressed by Dr. Bernard Fall and Mr. Benjamin Cohen. On 12 May a further seminar on Viet Nam for some seven Senators was held by the Council with Dr. Fall amongst others participating.

On 18 May Mr. Archibald Alexander and Mr. Arthur Barber, Assistant Secretaries of ACDA and Defense, respectively, will address a combined Republican-Democratic seminar for senatorial assistants on the forthcoming Geneva negotiations.

2. The Council has distributed a number of study papers of late to top officials in the Executive and Legislative Departments. These are:

RUTH ADAMS
Chicago, Ill.
BERNARD T. FELD
Cambridge, Mass.
ALLAN FORBES, JR.
Cambridge, Mass.
MAURICE S. FOX
Cambridge, Mass.
JEROME D. FRANK
Baltimore, Md.
MARGARET BRENNAN GIBSON
Stockbridge, Mass.
MORTON GRODZINS
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MATTHEW MESELSON
Cambridge, Mass.
JAMES G. PATTON
Denver, Colo.
ARTHUR PENN
New York, N.Y.
CHARLES PRATT, JR.
New York, N.Y.
DANIEL M. SINGER
Washington, D.C.

Viet Nam - H. A. Crosby
Non-Nuclear Defense of Western Europe - H. A. Crosby
Problems of Defense Against Ballistic Missiles - Freeman Dyson
Multi-Lateral Force - John Silard
Social Responsibilities of Scientists* - Hans Bethe
A New U. S. Foreign Policy* - Barnet-Raskin

The majority of these studies were sent to Council supporters and a few copies remain, which will be sent on request as long as the supply lasts.

3. On 5 May the Council recommended support for the following Senatorial candidates on a priority basis:

Congressman Montoya	Senator Muskie	Congressman Harding
Senator McGee	Senator Moss	(for the House)

These additional candidates are also on our recommended list on a non-priority basis:

Senator Hart	Senator McCarthy
Senator Gore	Senator Burdick


4. A Scientist-Senator taped discussion (two 28-minute programs) on current issues of foreign policy was made on 24 April with Senators Church, Pell, McGovern, McGee and Nelson and scientists Feld and Meselson. This is being offered to a number of radio stations throughout the country.
5. The Council has sponsored a number of speeches by Senators throughout the country in the past two months. Senators Clark, McCarthy and Muskie to date have spoken under our auspices and Senator McGovern is scheduled later this month. A number of other Senators have agreed to speak on conclusion of the Civil Rights debate.

Activities like these, directed toward attainable goals, do have a real impact on the programs and policies in Washington that affect the course of the arms race, an impact far greater than the actual number of persons involved would suggest.

We hope you too will join the dedicated minority who are supporters of the Council for a Livable World. We ask for what is admittedly a substantial commitment--two percent of your income each year, or if this is unrealistic, one per cent or \$100 (forwarded in whatever regular payments you prefer). But we do so in the belief that your contribution, together with those of professional persons, and others who already support the program of the Council, can have important effects.

The enclosed questionnaire is provided for your convenience in replying. If you share our aims and our enthusiasm for this practical method of implementing them, we urge you to become a supporter now.

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld
President

A Note to Present Supporters of the Council: It is difficult to cross-check the list of all persons who initially requested this information against our membership records. If you are already a Supporter, just check the appropriate box on the enclosed questionnaire and we will be glad to clear our records. And if you have just joined the Council as a Supporter, please excuse this unnecessary reminder; it takes a few days to complete all office records.

* to be issued

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GEORGE W. RATHJENS
Newton, Mass.

October 13, 1970

Dear Council Supporter:

With the Congressional elections only three weeks away, Council supporters have their last chance to intervene in those critical elections which could change the complexion of the Senate. A number of races are so close, or could become so close in the coming days, that a relatively small amount of money could be decisive for the outcomes.

Two races which unquestionably need support urgently and immediately are those of Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee and Senator Frank Moss of Utah. Council supporters provided valuable assistance to both men early in their campaigns and are now asked to make the last-minute effort which may spell the difference between victory and defeat.

Senator Gore won renomination in the August 6 Democratic primary by a small margin, and has been waging a vigorous uphill fight against his Republican opponent, William Brock. Only in the past ten days has it appeared that Senator Gore is beginning to pull ahead of Brock in some key areas, and is catching up with him in others. He is still badly in need of funds for last-minute purchases of television and radio time, and for a massive, critically important, get-out-the vote drive in urban Memphis and Nashville.


In Utah, Senator Moss, an old friend of the Council whom many of you assisted in 1964, is in a close and bitter contest for re-election. His opponent, Representative Laurence Burton is the beneficiary of "a tremendous White House effort to eliminate Mr. Moss from the Senate." In fact, Vice President Agnew, two cabinet members, and at least a half-dozen Republican senators have invaded Utah to campaign against Senator Moss. Burton has attacked Senator Moss for his support of East-West trade and recognition of Communist China, and for his opposition to the deployment of ABM and the nominations of Haynsworth and Carswell to the Supreme Court. For its pejorative effect, Burton's campaign flyer includes a report from the Washington Star that Senator Moss is receiving the backing of Council supporters. (Significantly, Senator Moss has reprinted this Burton flyer to demonstrate his pride in holding the positions for which Council supporters respect him.) Senator Moss now urgently needs more television and radio coverage to meet Burton's last-minute barrage.

We need to assure the re-election of such outstanding senators, but hope for improvement in the Senate comes from a group of challengers which includes such superior candidates as Kay of Alaska, Tunney of California, Heftel of Hawaii, Stevenson of Illinois, Metzenbaum of Ohio, Morrison of Nebraska, and Rawlings of Virginia. If even two or three can unseat their conservative opponents, it will be a significant accomplishment. The Council is following these races especially intently, particularly when they are taking place in small states with small campaign budgets.


In several such states these worthy challengers, whose chances seemed finite but small some months ago before the campaigning had really started, are now moving up. In Hawaii, Cecil Heftel, a widely known liberal television executive but a newcomer to politics, won against three opponents in the primary of October 3 with a decisive, impressive majority. He now opposes incumbent Senator Hiram Fong. In Nebraska, the small, tightly organized campaign of former Governor Frank Morrison against incumbent Senator Roman Hruska is beginning to move with good effect. In Alaska, Wendell Kay's standing against incumbent Senator Ted Stevens is rapidly improving. Because these races are relatively unpublicized, we append brief descriptions of the contenders.

In the final days before the election, the Council can expect to receive urgent calls for immediate financial help. Where it appears that the chances of victory can be significantly improved, we will want to act quickly. We are, therefore, asking some of you to make your checks payable directly to the Council and others to make your contributions to Senators Gore and Moss. Please follow the suggestions on the enclosed envelope.

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld,
President.



William Doering,
Chairman.

P.S. It is our conviction that contributions at this late date will be most positively effective if made in accord with the recommended suggestions. However, for those of you who may still have a strong personal preference to contribute to another of the many outstanding candidates in other states, we would urge you to send such checks to the Council for our transmittal; in this way you will assure maximum benefit to the Council's future Washington activities.

THE SENATE ELECTIONS - 1970

These candidates have already received assistance from Council supporters or from the Council's political fund.

<u>State</u>	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Opponents</u>
Alaska	Kay (D)	STEVENS (R)
California	Tunney (D)	MURPHY (R)
Illinois	Stevenson (D)	SMITH (R)
Indiana	HARTKE (D)	Roudebush (R)
Michigan	HART (D)	Romney (R)
Nebraska	Morrison (D)	HRUSKA (R)
New Mexico	MONTOYA (D)	Carter (R)
Ohio	Metzenbaum (D)	Taft (R)
Tennessee	*GORE (D)	Brock (R)
Utah	*MOSS (D)	Burton (R)
Vermont	Hoff (D)	PROUTY (R)
Virginia	Rawlings (D)	BYRD (I), Garland (R)

*Recommended for immediate support

Capital letters indicate incumbents

CANDIDATES ENDORSED FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT

Albert Gore (D) Tennessee: Albert Gore is an independent, outspoken and fearless senator beholden to no man. As Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, he occupies a vital position of power in the Senate which he has used again and again to challenge the military hegemony. His opponent is William E. Brock, 3rd, the Chattanooga candy manufacturer who has had four illiberal terms in the House of Representatives and has been hand-picked by President Nixon to gain Tennessee in the Republican campaign to take control of the Senate.

Senator Gore's part in the hard-fought ABM struggle of last year is an issue in the campaign, Brock having accused him of "playing Russian roulette with American security" by opposing ABM deployment. The courage and talents of Albert Gore are desperately needed in the Senate. He is in the fight of his political life and thanks in part to assistance given him by Council supporters, has survived the first battle by winning a close race (53%) against Hudley Crockett in the Democratic primary. Please make your check payable to Gore for Senate and mail to the Council's Washington office.

Frank E. Moss (D) Utah: Utah's Senator Frank E. Moss is high on the target list of the reactionaries. A liberal on both domestic and foreign policy and an early opponent of the Vietnam war, he has repeatedly taken stands on controversial issues which have produced angry outbursts from an active radical right wing. He has been a constant critic of the ABM proposal; he was deeply concerned about the Army's chemical and biological warfare program.

A liberal running in an essentially conservative state, Moss faces Nixon's personal choice, conservative Congressman Laurence J. Burton. Senator Barry Goldwater is leading an active fund-raising campaign for Burton whom he describes as a "legislator who votes right". Council supporters contributed to the campaign of Senator Moss last fall and are now urged to continue assisting him in his difficult campaign for re-election to a third term. Please make your check payable to Re-elect Senator Moss Committee and mail to the Council's Washington office.

SOME SMALL STATES IN WHICH PROMISING CHALLENGERS ARE RUNNING

Alaska: Wendell P. Kay (D) v. Senator Ted Stevens (R)

Wendell Kay, an Anchorage lawyer and State Representative, is running against Senator Stevens who was appointed to fill the unexpired term of the late Senator Bartlett. On both domestic and foreign policy issues Kay and Stevens are poles apart. Kay backs immediate withdrawal of all American forces. Stevens is a Nixon follower who has voted against every measure to limit the war. Kay called the Nixon plan to expand the Safeguard ABM "an outrage"; Stevens vigorously defended it.

Stevens supported both Haynsworth and Carswell. He has backed plans to store obsolete nerve gas on Kodiak Island and favors nuclear weapons testing in the Aleutians.

Kay has an uphill fight to unseat Stevens who has the advantage of incumbency and the usual political debts owed a "service senator". But there are off-setting factors. Alaska has a serious unemployment problem and Stevens, who was appointed to the Senate, has been a weak campaigner in past elections.

Council supporters are already contributing to the Kay campaign.

Hawaii: Cecil Heftel (D) v. Senator Hiram Fong (R)

In the October 3rd Hawaii primary Cecil Heftel, a well-known television commentator, won the Democratic nomination to oppose conservative incumbent Senator Hiram Fong. In his campaign against Fong, Heftel is stressing his opposition to the Nixon war policies, to excessive military spending, and to ABM.

Senator Hiram Fong has been a consistent war hawk in his two terms in the Senate. He supported the ABM and other strategic weapons systems, and opposed the Cooper-Church and the McGovern-Hatfield amendments.

Heftel is politically untried, but his strong primary showing and his well known views on many controversial issues suggest that his chances to unseat Senator Fong may be good. His frequent editorial commentary on television has given him state wide prominence and the Council is watching developments with great interest.

Nebraska: Frank B. Morrison (D) v. Senator Roman Hruska (R)

Frank B. Morrison, a three-term governor of Nebraska, is challenging incumbent Senator Roman Hruska, who is seeking a fourth term in the Senate. Morrison was a popular governor who increased his margin of victory in three successive elections. As one of the best-known political figures in his state Governor Morrison is given a real chance of defeating one of the most reactionary members of the Senate.

Morrison is making the Vietnam war a central issue in his campaign. He has spoken out repeatedly against disordered priorities in the federal budget which cause domestic programs to be slighted or stalled by wasteful military spending.

Hruska's record of support for conservative positions is unbroken. He supported ABM, opposed the Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern amendments and achieved notoriety for his defense of G. Harrold Carswell when he declared: "Even if he [Carswell] was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there."

Council supporters are already contributing to the Morrison campaign.



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CHARLES C. PRICE
Philadelphia, Pa.
GEORGE W. RATHJENS
Newton, Mass.

August 24, 1970

Dear Council Supporter:

We are all aware of the critical nature of this year's Congressional elections. Three and a half months after the invasion of Cambodia, polls show the President's popularity growing. Senatorial opponents of the Administration's "Safeguard" ABM deployment were able to muster only 47 votes this year, as compared to 50 a year ago.

The major issues in this campaign, however, appear to be shaping up as domestic ones -- conservatives are laying great stress on "law and order" while liberal candidates are seeking to exploit economic issues; foreign policy, arms control, even Vietnam somehow appear to have been tranquilized as issues. But liberal candidates are running scared -- not so much because of any conservative trend -- as the unprecedented financial and organizational support of their conservative opponents. Spiro Agnew's fund-raising dinners have produced a bloated war chest for conservatives, while contributions for even the most outstanding liberal candidates are running pathetically behind what they were two years ago.

With about twice as many liberal as conservative seats at stake this year, there is a real danger that the November senatorial elections will be lost through default of liberal support.

Last fall, Council supporters provided vital early assistance to the campaigns of Senators Philip Hart of Michigan and Frank Moss of Utah. Two months ago in response to Council recommendations, many of your fellow supporters made contributions to former Governor Philip Hoff of Vermont, who is challenging Senator Winston Prouty, and Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, who has just won a close primary contest. At this time, we urge you to support one of two outstanding candidates -- incumbent Senator Vance Hartke (D) of Indiana, who is fighting for re-election to a third term, and former Governor Frank B. Morrison (D) of Nebraska, challenger for the seat of Senator Roman Hruska.

[Faint handwritten signatures and text at the bottom of the page]

Senator Hartke has an outstanding record; he has shown impressive industry and fearlessness on both domestic and international issues. He split with the Johnson administration over Vietnam in 1965 and has been a vigorous critic of the war ever since. Sponsor of a bill to establish a Department of Peace, he introduced the recent amendment to terminate military aid to Greece and has been in the forefront of efforts to reduce military spending.

Hartke's opponent is the arch-conservative, former National Commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Representative Richard Roudebush. A sponsor of TRAIN -- "To Restore American Independence Now" -- (described by one of its officers as "part of the John Birch Society"), Roudebush is an outspoken hawk flying under the colors of "good Americanism." He is particularly proud of his seat on the House Internal Security Subcommittee (formerly HUAC).

The vicious campaign to unseat Senator Hartke is characterized by vilification and slander on a personal level and attempts to ridicule him as a "paragon of left-wing politics." One of this year's prime targets of right-wingers, no efforts are being spared to defeat Senator Hartke. If he is to be re-elected in November, he must receive nation-wide assistance. His presence in the Senate is desperately needed.

The second candidate whose support we are urging at this time is Frank B. Morrison, three-term governor of Nebraska from 1961-1967. He is challenging incumbent Roman Hruska, who is seeking a fourth term in the Senate. Morrison, 65, was a popular governor, winning re-election by a wider margin in each of three successive elections. Although the underdog at this stage in the campaign, as one of the best known political figures in his state, Governor Morrison is conceded a fighting chance of unseating one of the most right-wing members of the Senate.


Morrison's campaign against Hruska is concentrating on the war in Vietnam and -- in a state already suffering from drought and high unemployment -- the drastic effects of the mis-allocation of resources from domestic needs to the war and wasteful defense spending.

Senator Hruska's support of extreme conservative positions is unrelenting. He has supported the ABM, opposed the Cooper-Church and McGovern-Hatfield amendments, and achieved notoriety in his defense of G. Harrold Carswell. "Even if he (Carswell) was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance. We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozas and Frankfurters and stuff like that there." The Senate can do without such champions of mediocrity.


Governor Morrison's campaign seems made-to-order for Council support -- an attractively liberal candidate opposed to a fading reactionary in a small state.

Unless you have a strong preference to the contrary, we urge that those of you whose last names begin with the letters A through J make your checks payable to Volunteers for Hartke; those whose names begin with the letters K through Z make your checks payable to Morrison for Senate Committee. A return envelope is enclosed for mailing your contribution to the Council for transmittal.

Sincerely yours,



Maurice S. Fox



Bernard T. Feld

from - Term, Tax
+ 12 D

(35 paid) 0 57:43
Reps +10 D
245:170

THE SENATE ELECTIONS - COUNCIL POSITIONS ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1970

In this year's thirty-five Senate races there are many outstanding candidates, some running for re-election, others challenging for the first time. Each race is under constant analysis in terms of the Council's criteria for recommending financial support.

A: "Endorsed: For Immediate Support": These candidates are described in greater detail in this letter and are in particular need of immediate support.

B: "Endorsed: Already Received Support": These outstanding candidates have already received assistance from Council supporters or the Council's political fund. They may be recommended for additional support as conditions warrant. If you wish to make a further contribution to one of these candidates now, please send your check to the Council for transmittal.

C: "Endorsed: With Enthusiasm": Excellent candidates are running in these important races. However, at least one of the Council criteria is not satisfied and no recommendation is being made at this time. If you have a strong preference for contributing to one of these candidates, please send your check to the Council for transmittal.

D: "No Current Recommendation": These are races in which the Council can see little likelihood of becoming involved.

State	Candidates	Primary	
A Alaska	<u>Kay</u> (D)	STEVENS (R)	
A Nebraska	<u>Morrison</u> (D)	HRUSKA (R)	
A New Mexico	<u>MONTOYA</u> (D)	Carter (R)	
B Illinois	<u>Stevenson</u> (D)	SMITH (R)	
B Indiana	<u>HARTKE</u> (D)	Roudebush (R)	
B Michigan	<u>HART</u> (D)	Romney (R)	
B Tennessee	GORE (D)	<u>Brock</u> (R)	
B Utah	<u>MOSS</u> (D)	Burton (R)	
B Vermont	<u>Hoff</u> (D)	PROUTY (R)	
B Virginia	<u>Rawlings</u> (D)	Garland (R) BYRD, JR (I)	
C California	<u>Tunney</u> (D)	MURPHY (R)	
C Connecticut	<u>Duffey</u> (D)	Weicker (R) DODD (I)	
C Hawaii	<u>Heftel</u> (D) et al	FONG (R)	Oct. 3
C Maine	<u>MUSKIE</u> (D)	Bishop (R)	
C Maryland	<u>TYDINGS</u> (D)	Beall (R) et al	Sept. 15
C Massachusetts	<u>KENNEDY</u> (D)	Spaulding (R) et al	Sept. 15
C Missouri	<u>SYMINGTON</u> (D)	Danforth (R)	
C Montana	<u>MANSFIELD</u> (D)	Wallace (R)	
C New Jersey	<u>WILLIAMS</u> (D)	Gross (R)	
C New York	<u>Ottinger</u> (D)	GOODELL (R) J. Buckley (C)	
C North Dakota	<u>BURDICK</u> (D)	Kleppe (R)	
C Ohio	<u>Metzenbaum</u> (D)	Taft (R)	
C Wisconsin	<u>PROXMIRE</u> (D)	Erikson (R)	
D Arizona	Grossman (D)	FANNIN (R)	
D Delaware	Zimmerman (D)	Roth (R)	
D Florida	Bryant (D)	Cramer (R)	
D Minnesota	<u>Humphrey</u> (D) et al	MacGregor (R)	Sept. 15
D Mississippi	<u>STENNIS</u> (D)	unopposed	
D Nevada	CANNON (D)	Raggio (R)	
D Pennsylvania	Sesler (D)	SCOTT (R)	
D Rhode Island	PASTORE (D)	McLaughlin (R)	Sept. 15
D Texas	<u>Bentsen</u> (D)	Bush (R)	
D Washington	JACKSON (D)	Maxey (D) Elicker (R)	Sept. 15
D West Virginia	BYRD (D)		
D Wyoming	McGEE (D)	Wold (R)	

(Capital letters indicate incumbents; endorsed candidates are underlined.)

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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September 10, 1970

Dear Council Supporter:

In federal elections Labor Day is the turning point. In most states the primaries are finished, voter registration drives completed, and candidates at summer's end take stock before the final intensive drive toward the November vote.

At this critical point, with only two months remaining in the 1970 campaign, we are fortunate to be able to recommend three candidates for the Senate who deserve your generous support. Each is a capable, distinguished candidate running a close race against a clearly conservative opponent. Each is campaigning in a small state where election expenditures are relatively low and where Council support could decide the outcome.

Joseph Montoya (D) New Mexico: Joseph Montoya, seeking a second term in the Senate, faces an extremely reactionary opponent, Anderson Carter. Montoya has been a strong critic of the war, an opponent of ABM and wasteful defense spending, and an advocate of arms control. He voted for the Hatfield-McGovern "Amendment to End the War", for the Cooper-Church amendment and against Administration-backed attempts to weaken it. He opposed the appointments of Haynsworth and Carswell to the Supreme Court.

Carter's type of conservatism is reflected in leadership of the draft-Goldwater movement in 1964 and his avid backing of Reagan in 1968. Carter has called the United Nations "the greatest waste of time and money foisted upon the world in the last 100 years." He calls Montoya and other supporters of the Cooper-Church amendment "a bunch of liberals bent on usurping the power of the Presidency." He is on record in favor of an expanded anti-ballistic missile system, conservative nominees for the Supreme Court and right-to-work laws, and is opposed to "socialistic programs" of liberal Democrats.

The New Mexico Senate race provides one of the most clear-cut choices in the nation this year. Montoya's loss and Carter's election would deal a sharp blow to the liberal coalition in the Senate.

Frank B. Morrison (D) Nebraska: Frank B. Morrison, a three-term governor of Nebraska, is challenging incumbent Senator Roman Hruska, who is seeking a fourth term in the Senate. Morrison was a popular governor who increased his margin of victory in three successive elections. As one of the best-known political figures in his state Governor Morrison is given a real chance of defeating one of the most reactionary members of the Senate.

Morrison is making the Vietnam war a central issue in his campaign. He has spoken out repeatedly against disordered priorities in the federal budget which cause domestic programs to be slighted or stalled by wasteful military spending.

Hruska's record of support for conservative positions is unbroken. He supported ABM, opposed the Cooper-Church and Hatfield-McGovern amendments and achieved notoriety for his defense of G. Harrold Carswell when he declared: "Even if he [Carswell] was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurters and stuff like that there."

Morrison's campaign is seriously short of funds while Hruska has access to the huge war chest amassed by Vice-President Agnew.

Wendell P. Kay (D) Alaska: Wendell Kay, an Anchorage lawyer and State Representative, is running against Senator Stevens who was appointed to fill the unexpired term of the late Senator Bartlett. On both domestic and foreign policy issues Kay and Stevens are poles apart. Kay backs immediate withdrawal of all American forces. Stevens is a Nixon follower who has voted against every measure to limit the war. Kay called the Nixon plan to expand the Safeguard ABM "an outrage"; Stevens vigorously defended it.

Stevens supported both Haynsworth and Carswell. He has backed plans to store obsolete nerve gas on Kodiak Island and favors nuclear weapons testing in the Aleutians.


Kay has an uphill fight to unseat Stevens who has the advantage of incumbency and the usual political debts owed a "service senator". But there are off-setting factors. Alaska has a serious unemployment problem and Stevens, who was appointed to the Senate, has been a weak campaigner in past elections.

With only 104,000 registered voters in the state, campaign costs are modest and a contribution will go a long way. In Alaska, Council supporters have an excellent chance to help an outstanding liberal candidate unseat a doctrinaire and uninspiring conservative.

1970 is no ordinary election year. The explicit goal of the White House to gain organizational control of the Senate this November depends on a change of only seven seats. The lines are drawn, and nowhere is the contrast between opposing candidates more sharply defined than in the three senate races in New Mexico, Nebraska and Alaska.

This is your Senate. It will act on your concerns more effectively if Montoya, Morrison and Kay win in November. Please give all you can.

Yours sincerely,



William Doering
Chairman

Towards a New American Program for Peace

Since the end of W. W. II, the United States has invested countless billions of dollars in programs of foreign military and economic aid, aimed at establishing a stable world order and maintaining world peace. Yet, today, peace is far from established and the hopes of the newly developing nations for stability and prosperity are further from reality than they were twenty years ago.

In addition, we are now faced with the most severe internal crisis since the Civil War. Our economic and social stability are threatened by the imbalance of foreign payments, and more critically by the consequences of neglect of our responsibilities towards our own disadvantaged classes, mainly in the urban ghettos and among the Negro population.

The brutal assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King has brought the crisis to the boiling point. It is no longer possible to continue expending some 30 billions of dollars per year on the Vietnam war, not to speak of other aspects of our swollen defense budget, while neglecting the elementary needs for relief of the shocking plight of the underprivileged millions of black inhabitants of our urban slums.

Unless we act immediately with massive programs to improve the plight of the American Negro, our society is in grave danger. The problem is not to know what to do -- there are plenty of practical suggestions around and, indeed, a coherent and sensible program of action has recently been recommended in the (Kerner) report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders. But what holds up the implementation of these programs is money; what is required is the immediate unfreezing of vast sums -- at least 5 to 10 billions of dollars must be spent in the next year, and this rate of expenditure for human rehabilitation must be kept up and even increased until the problem is solved.

To save our society, Americans must look inward as never before. But this does not necessarily mean a new American isolationism. Friends of America abroad should realize that our crisis is theirs as well, that the economic and social disruption of the United States is having the gravest repercussions on the economic and social well-being in all other areas of the world, not excluding those areas under Communist domination. Our problem is thus a global problem, and the measures required for its solution will have global implications.

What can America do now to restore her economic and political health and to free the funds necessary for the rapid re-establishment of internal tranquility? A number of measures can be undertaken immediately, assuming that the current initiatives for achieving peace in Vietnam will be vigorously pursued and that they will be even partially successful. Here are some examples:

1. Obviously it is to the Vietnam war that we must look for the largest saving of money and moral capital. In view of the positive North Vietnamese response to President Johnson's recent bombing reduction, as demonstrated by their lifting of the siege of Khesanh, a significant further de-escalation of the war on our part is both possible and desirable. This could take the form of:

- (a) Further reduction of the bombing of North Vietnam, leading as rapidly as possible to a complete cessation as our installations in the region of the demilitarized zone are no longer in grave danger of being overrun.

(b) As a positive move toward a cease-fire, we could withdraw American troops from areas which are substantially under the control of the National Liberation Front. This move toward the "enclave" strategy, proposed by General Gavin and others, would permit a substantial reduction of American forces in Vietnam, the beginnings of which could be effectuated almost immediately and whose tempo could increase as cease-fire agreements are negotiated.

Aside from the obvious positive effects on the U.S. internal situation, which would result from such a military de-escalation in Vietnam and from the removal of the threat to draft hundreds of thousands of reluctant American young men, the monetary saving resulting from such a military de-escalation would be more than enough to cover the costs of the massive domestic programs we need to undertake.

2. It is to be hoped that some of the above measures can be initiated immediately. But real progress towards military de-escalation in Vietnam depends on the progress of the peace talks which are only just on the verge of starting. In the meanwhile, we must undertake some immediate measures for freeing billions of dollars, through the curtailment of military programs which are of lesser importance to us at this time. It may well be that later, once the Vietnam war is effectively over and the urban crisis past, we may wish to reinstitute some of these programs, and that this might turn out to be more costly in the end than it would be to maintain them now. However, this is irrelevant. We cannot permit trivial arguments of cost-accounting to stand in the way of saving the country. Two possible prospects for large immediate savings are:

(a) Immediate reduction of our commitments to the military defense of Europe, in the amount of a few billions of dollars in the next year, in recognition of the real lessening of the "Communist threat" to European security. In a sense, the possibility of achieving these savings depends on the recognition, on the part of the Soviet Union, that large expenditures on both our parts, aimed at the defense of our European allies against external attack, are no longer called for. However, almost irrespective of the Russian response, in view of the strong economic and military condition of our European allies, reductions in our expenditures toward their defense, especially in the realm of so-called tactical nuclear weapons production and deployment, can be unilateral on our part without any significant weakening of the security of our European allies.

(b) Postponement of further U.S. deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems, including the "thin ABM". This move should be unilateral on our part, in the expectation that such postponement will before too long be matched by comparable acts of restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. The present state of our strategic forces, and the time-table for deployment of new missile systems are such that we can afford to act unilaterally at this time without fear of serious diminution of our current superiority in strategic nuclear weapons.

3. Our government is spending very large sums of money -- well in excess of five billions per year -- on programs of applied technology whose contributions to basic science are at best marginal, and whose rationale lies

mainly in their prestige value. The continuation of such programs in this time of crisis cannot be justified, either on moral or on scientific grounds, and the savings resulting from their postponement would enable us to finance a large fraction of the necessary programs of social rehabilitation demanded by the present critical situation. Furthermore, almost all of the valid scientific goals of these programs can be attained by experiments of a much more modest, if less spectacular nature, while at the same time permitting continuing expenditure for the basic research programs needed to maintain a healthy American scientific climate. Programs whose postponement would now be in the national interest include:

(a) The project for landing a man on the moon by 1970. It has been amply demonstrated that essentially all of the scientific objectives of this program can be achieved by a far less costly program of instrumental moon landings.

(b) The development of the supersonic transport airplane. Considering, especially, the many unsolved questions relating to the supersonic "boom" and its detrimental effects, this project is at best of questionable value at this time and its postponement could be justified even if these were normal times.

(c) Project plowshare, aimed at the development of peaceful applications of underground nuclear explosions, whose continuation jeopardizes the attainment of a nonproliferation treaty and for which one can not even advance the justification of international competition.

The funds released by the implementation of such measures of economy and retrenchment should be ear-marked primarily for the amelioration of our domestic crisis. However, in recognition of the responsibility of prosperous nations for the development of the underprivileged and undernourished portion of the globe, a certain fraction, say thirty percent, of these funds should be devoted to economic measures for the reconstruction of all Vietnam, as well as to programs of aid to other underdeveloped countries, without political strings attached and preferably through the UN.

The American people have been reluctant to make the sacrifices necessary to pay for an unpopular war -- hence much of the responsible opposition to the President's tax increase and to other Administration measures aimed at redressing the foreign payments imbalance. But the American people cannot, and I'm sure will not, refuse to make comparable sacrifices in the cause of internal and external peace. Furthermore, the program outlined above could well permit the expenditure of those vast funds immediately necessary to prevent the social upheavals which we are now undergoing, while at the same time obviating the need for the tax increase and foreign travel curbs which are regarded by the administration as essential for a continuation and expansion of the Vietnam war.

What is needed is a positive program of progress in America and in the underdeveloped world, a program which will turn our current disillusionment into a feeling of optimism and belief in America's future, a future in which the benefits of a healthy American economy will be shared by all of our citizens.

B. T. Feld
9 April 1968

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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Dear Council Supporter;

In these climactic days of the see-saw struggle over the deployment of ABM, the lines of a larger battle can be seen more clearly: the battle of an aroused, resurgent United States Senate against the increasingly dominant force of the military-industrial complex. This force is in reality a complicated interplay of portions of the industrial, labor, and political establishments with the military and the Department of Defense. The effectiveness of the complex depends completely on its political power. The closeness of the ABM fight offers the most heartening evidence of the vulnerability of the complex's political control. It suggests, furthermore, the real possibility of its being supplanted by a coalition of forces that can reflect the popular concern for cities, for health, for the natural environment, for education, and for a peaceful and constructive international policy.

Supporters of the Council can now see what a remarkable effect their collective sacrifices have had on the quality of the United States Senate. They can look back to the successful 1968 campaigns that elected Church, Cranston, Eagleton, Fulbright, Hughes, Mathias, McGovern and Nelson and take comfort in the thought that the opponents of these Council-backed Senators (a Max Rafferty, for example) are not the present incumbents. To be sure, the almost precise balance in the Senate painfully marks the absence of liberal stalwarts like Clark, Gruening and Morse, but the Council can take an unexpected satisfaction over the performances of such freshman Republican Senators as Cook, Saxbe and Schweiker.

A number of quotations from Senator Fulbright's remarks of July 25, 1969 on the floor of the Senate help to dramatize the change in the Senate effected in last year's elections:

"I have been in the Senate 25 years now and this is the first time in those 25 years that there has been a serious debate upon an important item in the defense budget.... I have not done my part, I know, in the last 25 years, because I always believed it was hopeless. I was sure if I made a motion to cut any of those programs, I would not get any votes, because nobody ever had.

"I think there are enough Senators who think that the Senate is sufficiently important that it should play a role in the balance of our government, that we should not be completely under the control of the military bureaucracy of our government.

"Really, that is what the ABM is a symbol of; namely, whether the Senate has got enough independence from the influence of the great manufacturers of this country, the great industrial enterprises, and the military bureaucracy.

"I have been extremely impressed by the outspoken position of the new Senators in this body, men...who are close...to the pulse of the electorate...because they were elected for the first time. It is remarkable how interested they are in being Senators and not stooges of the military."

This year and next Council supporters will bear the heaviest burden of their involvement with the Senate. Of the 57 Democratic seats in the present Senate, 25 or nearly half are at stake next year, while only 9 Republican seats will face an election contest. We are faced with the sobering prospect that with the defeat of only seven Democratic Senators the leadership of the Senate will pass from Mansfield's hands to Dirksen's, and the present number of enlightened Senators (36 Democrats and 14 Republicans voted against ABM deployment) will become smaller rather than larger. This will thus be a crucial non-presidential election year.

To give you an opportunity to see the picture in terms of specific, individual Senators, we enclose a tabulation of the vote on the ABM of August 6. The recent vote on the extension of the surtax reflects similar concern for the order of national priorities. But the vote of a Senator on the nearly successful amendments to limit the application of ABM funds to research and development and to prevent their use for deployment is the most reliable single indicator of his position on related issues of primary interest to the Council.

At this time we would like to urge supporters of the Council to begin their involvement in the 1970 elections by contributing most valuable early dollars to the reelection campaigns of two Senators.

We would also like some of you to contribute to the Council's Washington operation. Our activities in the ABM campaign have been intensive for the past two years and need not be reported in further detail. It may suffice to quote from the Baltimore Sun, 14 June 1969:

"Some ABM opponents say they think their most effective ally is the Council for a Livable World, which was formed in 1962 to attempt to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and began lobbying against the ABM as early as 1965.

"Its technique is to invite small groups of Senators -- and recently newsmen -- to informal off-the-record luncheons and dinners with scientists and other experts on disarmament."

And from another article on the politics of ABM in the Washington Post, 16 June 1969:

"The Council is capable of putting money behind its arguments. Last year it gave nearly \$400,000 to the Senate campaigns of its friends, drawing contributions from about 10,000 members, primarily in the academic and scientific communities."

The two Senators whom we believe you should support now face difficult campaigns and are among the prime targets for replacement by reactionary men. Both have been unflinching in their dedication to arms control and peace and deserve massive support at this time.

Supporters are reminded of the high value of early dollars. They allow a confident campaign office and the campaign itself to be organized before contributions from other sources have begun to come in.

Philip Hart, senior Democratic Senator of Michigan, will be running for reelection to his third term. With Kentucky Republican John Sherman Cooper, he led the fight in the Senate in 1968 against the ABM. Together they first showed the potential for a sizeable opposition to this unnecessary and wasteful program, mustering in four separate roll calls a total of some 46 votes against the deployment of the "Sentinel" ABM. This year Hart and Cooper have again been leading the now much stronger Senate opposition in its fight against the deployment of ABM. The consummate legislative skill and acuity of these two Senators is clearly revealed in the closeness of the vote on August 6.

Hart suggests that the ABM issue may become President Nixon's Vietnam. He has said, "we are near a national consensus now that we should never have gotten into Vietnam in the first place. But even many who concede this will also argue that we must remain in Vietnam in order to preserve our honor or to insure that our dead will not have died in vain... Vietnam is a perfect example of how military projects achieve a life of their own and become their own reason for being. The Anti-Ballistic Missile presents the same sort of danger....the ABM is insane."

Senator Hart has years of achievement in the Congressional wars over civil rights, where he spearheaded voting rights and fair housing legislation from his position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. He has been a vigorous spokesman for consumer interests, and as chairman of the important Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee has sought to place more effective curbs on big business. Senator Hart's vision clearly emerges in these words of three months ago: "I just hope that the nation's preoccupation with the ABM doesn't turn out to be tunnel vision. Because the focus ought to be broadened to include all military spending."

The Republican organization in Michigan looks hopefully to the defeat of Senator Hart and plans to raise a million and a half dollars this year for that purpose. Republican optimism is strengthened by their success four years ago in electing Griffin who ran against the liberal Democrat G. Mennen Williams.

Utah's Senator Frank E. Moss is also high on the target list of the reactionaries. A liberal on both domestic and foreign policy, and an early opponent of escalation of the Vietnam war, he has repeatedly taken stands on controversial issues which have provoked angry outbursts from an active radical right wing. He has been a constant critic of the ABM proposal; he has been deeply concerned about the Army's chemical and biological warfare program, which led in March 1968 to the death of 6,400 sheep at the Dugway, Utah proving ground. On domestic issues, Senator Moss is a champion of conservation measures, and, as chairman of the Commerce Committee's Consumer Subcommittee, he has taken a leading role in promoting measures for consumer protection, most recently by pressing for restrictions on cigarette advertising.

On July 18 Senator Moss said in the Senate:


"It is clear that many in this body have mastered its [the ABM's] complexities, and that ultimately what we are debating is not differences over technical capability or scientific estimates, but differences over the shape of our national destiny and the kind of nuclear security which we can have on the one hand by relentless and unending nuclear weapons races with the Soviet Union, and on the other hand by advancement of nuclear restraint and nuclear arms control on both sides."

A liberal running in an essentially conservative state, Moss is likely to face one of Utah's two ultra-conservative Republican Congressmen, Laurence Burton or Sherman Lloyd, next year in a difficult campaign for reelection to a third term.

Some Council Supporters are being asked to contribute to the Council for a Livable World to help support current Washington activities. These include continuing efforts to prevent deployment of the Safeguard ABM, to halt the testing of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), to encourage the definition of positive and valuable goals in the forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, and to gain Senate ratification, at long last, of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical and biological warfare.

In the usual manner you are asked to contribute according to the instructions on the enclosed form, unless you have a strong preference otherwise.

Yours sincerely,



William Doering
Chairman

THE ABM VOTE OF AUGUST 6, 1969

AGAINST DEPLOYMENT - 50

Democrats - 36

Bayh (Ind.)
*Burdick (N.D.)
*Cannon (Nev.)
Church (Idaho)
Cranston (Calif.)
Eagleton (Mo.)
Ellender (La.)
Fulbright (Ark.)
*Gore (Tenn.)
Gravel (Alaska)
Harris (Okla.)
*Hart (Mich.)
*Hartke (Ind.)
Hughes (Iowa)
Inouye (Hawaii)
*Kennedy (Mass.)
Magnuson (Wash.)
*Mansfield (Mont.)

*McCarthy (Minn.)
McGovern (S.D.)
McIntyre (N.H.)
Metcalf (Mont.)
Mondale (Minn.)
*Montoya (N.M.)
*Moss (Utah)
*Muskie (Me.)
Nelson (Wis.)
Pell (R.I.)
*Proxmire (Wis.)
Randolph (W. Va.)
Ribicoff (Conn.)
*Symington (Mo.)
*Tydings (Md.)
*Williams (N.J.)
*Yarborough (Tex.)
*Young (Ohio)

Republicans - 14

Aiken (Vt.)
Brooke (Mass.)
Case (N.J.)
Cook (Ky.)
Cooper (Ky.)
*Goodell (N.Y.)
Hatfield (Ore.)

Javits (N.Y.)
Mathias (Md.)
Pearson (Kan.)
Percy (Ill.)
Saxbe (Ohio)
Schweiker (Pa.)
Smith (Me.)

FOR DEPLOYMENT - 50

Democrats - 21

Allen (Ala.)
Anderson (N.M.)
Bible (Nev.)
*Byrd (Va.)
*Byrd (W. Va.)
*Dodd (Conn.)
Eastland (Miss.)
Ervin (N.C.)
*Holland (Fla.)
Hollings (S.C.)
*Jackson (Wash.)

Jordan (N.C.)
Long (La.)
McClellan (Ark.)
*McGee (Wyo.)
*Pastore (R.I.)
Russell (Ga.)
Sparkman (Ala.)
Spong (Va.)
*Stennis (Miss.)
Talmadge (Ga.)

Republicans - 29

Allott (Colo.)
Baker (Tenn.)
Bellmon (Okla.)
Bennett (Utah)
Boggs (Del.)
Cotton (N.H.)
Curtis (Neb.)
Dirksen (Ill.)
Dole (Kan.)
Dominick (Colo.)
*Fannin (Ariz.)
*Fong (Hawaii)
Goldwater (Ariz.)
Griffin (Mich.)
Gurney (Fla.)

Hansen (Wyo.)
*Hruska (Neb.)
Jordan (Idaho)
Miller (Iowa)
Mundt (S.D.)
*Murphy (Calif.)
Packwood (Ore.)
*Prouty (Vt.)
*Scott (Pa.)
*Stevens (Alaska)
Thurmond (S.C.)
Tower (Tex.)
*Williams (Del.)
Young (N.D.)

*Terms expire January, 1971

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



STUDY PAPER

April 1964

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

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SHOULD THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO PROMOTE THE MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE?

John Silard

In 1960 Secretary of State Herter first proposed creation of a NATO multilateral strategic nuclear force. When Premier de Gaulle made manifest his break with the United States and his determination to develop a French nuclear capacity, the Administration's response was a strong espousal of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. The MLF was intended as a face-saving device for the United States, which would quiet claims in England and Germany for independent nuclear capability by the offer of a nuclear "partnership" among the allies who hold out against de Gaulle's unilateralist policy.

The initial lukewarm reaction among our NATO allies and here at home, has induced the belief within the last year that the MLF is a dormant proposal. That belief is erroneous. Having won the formal approval of the Administration, plans to activate the MLF have progressed under the leadership of a contingent in the State Department for whom MLF is a major commitment. The Navy, too, has become interested because of the potential accretion to its operations with the fleet of nuclear vessels contemplated by the MLF. Meanwhile, President Johnson's proposal for a nuclear freeze to be negotiated with the Soviets has been stalled at Geneva by the Russians who point out that we cannot coincidentally activate a freeze and build a strategic nuclear fleet. Moreover, while it was anticipated that the opposition of the Labor Party in Great Britain would preclude activation of the MLF, there is growing doubt whether the Labor Party will hold to its present position if it wins the elections. In sum, MLF plans are proceeding in the face of disinterest both among our allies and at home, while opponents within our own Government cannot effectively exert their influence as long as our official policy remains wedded to the MLF.

What is the MLF? Essentially, it is a "partnership" in the operation of a fleet of vessels equipped with strategic nuclear weapons. The Polaris-armed vessels would be manned by mixed forces from various NATO participants, with a veto by anyone of the major participating nations on the firing of the weapons. Of course, the veto renders the "partnership" unequal, since the United States with its nuclear forces in Europe thereby remains the only country which can independently of its allies activate a nuclear exchange. Accordingly, some German advocates of the MLF hope that ultimately the veto will be removed, and Germany will thus obtain its own nuclear force through the MLF. We have encouraged this hope by assurances that MLF is only the beginning of a "true European" force. That was the suggestion made by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaezel in a presentation in September 1963 in Oxfordshire, England. Yet such a veto-free MLF would be quite contrary to our present proposals at Geneva for a nuclear freeze and an agreement against further proliferation, with the result that there exists a present inconsistency in our overt representation to the Soviets and our thinly veiled promises to NATO countries.

This memorandum examines the principal arguments advanced by the proponents of the MLF, reviews countervailing considerations, and suggests some alternative courses of conduct for the Administration, should it be determined that the present insistent United States advocacy of the MLF is not in the national interest:

A. THE PROPONENTS' MAJOR ARGUMENT: STOPPING NATIONAL NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT.

A principal argument advanced by proponents of the MLF is that England, Germany, and possibly other nations will follow de Gaulle's independent force example unless we can offer these nations a larger nuclear role within the NATO Alliance. Initially, it might be questioned whether the modest nuclear capability which France will attain is more troublesome in its military and political implications than the prospect of a large European strategic force with Germany a predominant participant. Exposition of the view that such a development would be less disturbing than the political and military implications of the MLF, appears in the March 1963 issue of The Reporter in an article by Henry A. Kissinger, and it will not be repeated here. We examine here in its short and its long-term implications the "anti-proliferation" argument made for the MLF:

1. MLF in the Short Run. It is clear that for the 1960s, MLF proponents vastly over-estimate European desire for a larger nuclear role. It is said that without MLF the Germans would soon follow the example of de Gaulle in developing an independent nuclear capacity. But with respect to Germany, not only would an independent nuclear force violate the existing treaties, it would cause a reaction by the Russians, as well as the United States, of a dimension which would give the Germans serious pause before entering on a provocative and expensive nuclear program.

There is, in fact, no evidence that the Germans presently desire a nuclear force of their own. What the Germans do desire in the short run is assurance that the United States is committed to employing its nuclear forces in Europe to forestall any form of aggressive action from the East, and that our weapons are targeted so as to assure that a nuclear exchange would also involve Russian territory, not just German soil. Yet for this modest German concern, the MLF goes too far. Bringing technical personnel from European nations into a second-level role in the targeting and deployment of our existing strategic missiles, would go most of the way towards meeting existing German concern about the United States nuclear umbrella. The MLF, on the other hand, will create an entirely new nuclear force at sea, which is both expensive and unnecessary in strategic military terms. Moreover, it may kindle rather than quiet nuclear aspirations among our European allies, and thus propel the very sentiment it is claimed the MLF would foreclose - the aspiration for independent nuclear capability. If we espouse the view that our allies' self-respect requires parity of nuclear participation with us, it will not be long before they espouse the same view. By contrast, without our active salesmanship, nuclear arms development may remain unpopular in Germany, England, and other nations.

2. MLF in the Long Run. While the MLF is more than is needed to meet the present concern of our allies, on the other hand it is inade to meet what are likely to be the long-term aspirations of NATO nations. As Kissinger's analysis points out, the force of de Gaulle's

position for independent nuclear capability is based upon the realization of some fundamental differences of outlook between the United States and European nations. Thus, as much as our nuclear posture in Europe serves to preserve our close relations with allies and to hold the line for our positions vis-a-vis the Soviets, we may yet be increasingly disinclined actually to use these weapons in an exchange which could precipitate an all-out war of annihilation between the United States and the Soviets.

Moreover, the glue in the NATO alliance has been the existence of the common enemy in the East, but a predictable progression of closer relationships with the Soviets, fear of a resurgent Germany, and conflicting economic interests such as those reflected in the split over the Common Market, may radically alter the present community of interest between the United States and some of its NATO allies.

To the extent that anticipations of such changes exist in Europe, there will be growing interest in independent nuclear forces or a European nuclear force not subject to a United States veto. In the case of Germany, there will be the added incentive of the role of swing-nation which the pseudo-partnership will not satisfy. In sum, as much as the MLF exceeds the presently manifested desire for NATO-nation participation in the nuclear deterrent, it will fall short of the long-term European demand for independent nuclear capability.

It may therefore be anticipated that the strongest pressures will ultimately arise for abandonment of the United States veto on the use of the MLF, and that such pressures may in time succeed with the result that the MLF will have paved the way for the very proliferation of nuclear weaponry which it is supposed to forestall. Alternatively, if NATO countries cannot attenuate or force abandonment of the United States veto, they may then proceed with the development of their independent nuclear forces, with the added stimulus and know-how which we ourselves have provided through the MLF. It seems clear, therefore, that the MLF is not a proper answer either to the existing or to the longer range nuclear aspirations of our NATO allies, and will more likely hasten than retard the spread of nuclear weapons in Europe.

B. SUBSIDIARY ARGUMENTS FOR THE MLF.

1. MLF As a Bargaining Device. Some Administration officials who are not advocates of the MLF would nevertheless continue on our present course on the theory that in future bargaining with the Soviets over arms control in Europe, the MLF would provide an additional pawn for trading. Yet as an experienced negotiator knows, one may bargain with assets, but it is difficult to bargain to an advantage with liabilities. If MLF is a free world liability, it cannot become a bargaining asset with the Soviets.

Even more importantly, the "bargaining pawn" argument disregards the fact that if the MLF actually comes into being, it may be impossible to convince our own allies to give it up for an arms control agreement. Once a strategic European force is in existence, our NATO allies may say with

some credibility that if it was worth creating for the collective security, it is worth keeping and ought not to be surrendered short of a complete and general disarmament agreement. It is therefore probable that while creation of the MLF may provide an additional pawn for trading with the Soviets in an European arms control agreement, it would represent a pawn which our own allies will refuse to trade.

2. MLF As a Mere Multilateral Substitute for Bilateral Controls. Proponents urge that the MLF multilateral control with vetoes by major participants, is not materially different from the existing bilateral control over tactical and medium range nuclear weapons in Europe. These proponents argue that with respect to the present nuclear weapons in Europe there is already a system of shared control with the situs nation, and that all the MLF will do is to add more trigger fingers whose concurrence would be necessary for the firing of the weapons.

Apart from some question whether the MLF controls will in fact not give increased leverage to other nations with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, this argument blurs the critical distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. The decision that our NATO allies should share in the deployment and control of tactical weapons located in Europe may have been right or wrong, but it was a radically different decision from that posed by the MLF. For a decision to fire the missiles in the MLF would be to launch an attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of medium range so deployed as to be able to reach Soviet targets. In such an event there would ensue a nuclear war in which countless millions of Soviet and American citizens would perish. By contrast, the decision to give our NATO allies bilateral controls over tactical weapons was only a determination that a nuclear exchange initiated within the boundaries of NATO nations properly requires their participation in the decisional process. Accordingly, the MLF cannot be passed off as a mere extension of a bilateral control system to a multilateral control system, for the weapons of strategic war deployed in the MLF have radically different significance for the United States from the Nuclear weapons over which we presently share controls with NATO allies.

3. MLF as Step Toward a Western European Strategic Force. A final argument made by some proponents, is the converse of the principal "non-proliferation" rationale for the MLF. Under this argument, it would be desirable to move toward a Western European alliance possessing its own strategic nuclear weapons free of United States control and United States responsibility. The proponents who welcome such a force, urge that the MLF is desirable not because it will end the spreading of nuclear weapons but because it will promote it.

To the extent that this view rests on the desire for a Western European unity it may, for sake of argument, be conceded that such a force would in fact promote some accretion in the unity of the NATO alliance. Yet the chief reason for such unity would be not fear of the Soviets, but fear of the Germans - the anticipation that without participation by other allies, the MLF would be a German-American nuclear alliance. Certainly, this is a fragile base for European "unity."

Moreover, the price paid in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries and the destabilization of the nuclear balance between the Soviets and the United States by this third force, is a price too high to be paid. In the last analysis, the integrity of the MLF proposal itself becomes subject to question when it is advertised simultaneously as a device which will contain and a device which will promote strategic nuclear weapons in Europe.

C UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF OUR MLF SUPPORT.

There are five major unfavorable aspects to the continuing United States insistence upon creation of the MLF:

1. Nuclear Freeze and Non-Proliferation Agreements Imperiled.

President Johnson's proposals at Geneva for nuclear freeze and non-proliferation agreements, have been imperilled by our support of the MLF. The Russians quickly seized upon the MLF, pointing out that we could not both stand still and move ahead at the same time, and would have to abandon the MLF if we are serious about the proposed agreements. The Russian claim of inconstancy is somewhat confirmed by William Foster's quoted statement in the Herald Tribune of January 24, 1964 that the United States freeze proposal would not include the MLF. And as the editorial in the Washington Post of February 12, 1964 points out, there is some inconsistency between our offering NATO the MLF as the beginning of a European force and our asserting to the Soviets that it is consistent with a nuclear freeze.

2. De-emphasis of Conventional Force Expansion in Europe. Replacement of nuclear with conventional defensive capability in Europe has been a major policy of the Administration. To the extent that the MLF will be costly to our NATO allies and emphasize their continued protection through nuclear response, it militates against the Administration's stress on the need for conventional capability among our NATO allies.

3. Production of European Rift Rather Than Unity. Our European allies are not requesting the MLF but are having it forced upon them by our insistence¹. With the exception of some element in Germany, the MLF is not welcomed among the other nations, who must join it from fear of German predominance. The MLF is thus a rift-producing issue among our allies. And it is also causing serious internal political friction in NATO countries since it requires them to cast their lot unequivocally either with the United States or de Gaulle. Such a sharp choice situation

¹USIA Research and Reference Service report, dated April 5, 1963: "The reaction of the Western European press to U.S. Ambassador Merchant's recent trip indicated an overwhelming rejection of the kind of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) envisaged by the United States. Editorial comment was heaviest and most negative in West Germany. The rejection of the multilateral nuclear force within the NATO framework was commonly based on the belief that the United States was offering a hastily improvised and confused politically motivated and exorbitantly expensive device which would afford West Europe neither increased security nor increased voice in nuclear decisions. Supporters of the United States suggestion, for the most part a minority of Italian, British, and Scandinavian voices, saw it as the lesser of two evils and a possible starting point for discussions. By the end of the Merchant trip, most papers were openly speculating that the multilateral nuclear force plan in its present form would be scrapped with the debate continuing on the central issue of nuclear interdependence within the Western Alliance. Hopes were also expressed that the United States would find a way to dispel the confusion aroused by its original multilateral force proposals."

has unfavorable consequences upon West Germany, and by drawing another divisive line among our allies, disserves the European unity and settlement aspirations entertained by many within our Administration. As the Kissinger analysis in The Reporter pointed out: "The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest - least of all West Germany's - to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not - in its own interest - be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy."

4. Political Repercussions in the Congress. It also seems clear that the MLF is not presently favored in the Congress, or likely ultimately to win its support. It probably violates or strains the McMahon Act by giving nuclear information to other countries. It gives concern to those who have worried about a re-emerging Germany as a predominant European power which controls European fortunes. It is not favored by those who value our nuclear monopoly and the direct controls which we have retained upon the strategic weapons of potential annihilation. Meanwhile, the Administration has completely by-passed the Congress. The closer we approach activation of MLF, the larger will be the cumulative weight of these Congressional concerns.

5. Nuclear Race Escalation. Following the test ban, there have been widespread hopes that a way would be found to reach a plateau in the nuclear arms race in which there would be a leveling off of nuclear forces within present limits, and no expansion of weaponry to countries which are nuclear-free today. Apart from the additional numbers of strategic weapons and nations with such weapons which the MLF would involve, it is today the single proposal for a new advance which stands in the way of a leveling off of the nuclear arms race. This is a serious new ground for a reassessment of the MLF proposal.

D. THE LARGER CONTEXT: ENDING THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY OF ARMAMENTS.

Almost all current debates about the MLF are limited to the existing political and military relationship in Europe. All are predicated upon the assumption that there remains a military threat in Europe from the East which requires degrees of nuclear capability in Western Europe. First, however, it must be noted that except for the special problem of Berlin, conventional forces are demonstrably adequate for the defense of Western Europe against conventional force attack. Moreover, the very hypothesis of an attack upon Western Europe becomes less and less credible as the years pass. Without Soviet participation, such an attack would be

meaningless in military terms and therefore unlikely of initiation; with Soviet participation it would unquestionably initiate a world war, which again provides a highest level deterrent. Nor is it clear just what Soviet hope would impel such an attack. Our present military posture in Europe is based on a threat which no one believes.

The fact is that we have continued to give a preemptive position to military policy and nuclear power in Europe, in an era when the real problems of Europe are economic and political rather than military. Our continuing diplomacy of weaponry, both against the Soviets and vis-a-vis de Gaulle, stands in the way of the traditional diplomacy, prevents desired economic and cultural exchange, and other normal adjustments between countries as well as the necessary political developments within them. The MLF perpetuates obsession with military response to rifts with the Soviets and between the Allies, in an era which calls not for an arms polemic but for the progression of relationships between sovereign states.

Those who would promote a detente and ultimately a settlement in Europe, must look beyond such merely military alignments such as the pseudo-partnership of the Multilateral Nuclear Force. For the nuclear arms race and the diplomacy of armaments in Europe will not cease as long as the United States itself is the chief promoter of new nuclear weapons systems. On the other hand, a return to the traditional international diplomacy in Europe would foster a climate in which national possession of nuclear arms would appear less vital either for national prestige or national security. As long as the United States remains ready to employ its nuclear strength against a nuclear attack in Europe, there is in fact no security necessity for national nuclear forces. And the demand for nuclear arms in NATO countries attributable to the desire for national prestige and self-esteem, reflects a desire which we ourselves are fostering when we proclaim by devices such as the MLF that our NATO allies must have a first-ranking role in the operation of a strategic weapons system. In short, the only way in which our NATO allies can be induced not to strive for a strategic nuclear system of their own is if we ourselves cease our obeisance to nuclear power as the cornerstone of European policy and European defense.

Today we welcome agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Latin America and other areas where they are not presently deployed. One may hope that tomorrow we may recognize that in Europe, too, the proper goal is not an accretion in nuclear armaments but the replacement of the nuclear confrontation by political and economic settlements and conventional forces adequate to assure that they are honored. At a time when we should seek to move away from the nuclear arms race, the multi-lateral nuclear force is a move in precisely the wrong direction.

E. ALTERNATIVES TO UNITED STATES PROMOTION OF THE MLF.

There are essentially three alternatives to the present United States position:

1. Abandoning the MLF. While this may constitute long-term wisdom for the United States, it is unlikely that we would renounce the MLF in the near future without at least a serious quid pro quo from the Soviets. It should be noted that if the United States abandons the MLF, it may continue to adhere to its opposition to the independent development of nuclear capability by Germany, and other nations, and we may expect some success in holding our allies to that position at least for the next few years.

2. Initiating a Slow-Down of MLF Activation. This seems the most desirable immediate step, but there is always difficulty in taking the first step away from an established course. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings might serve as a temporary brake. A slow-down should pave the way toward ultimate recession by the United States from the MLF proposal.

3. A Replacement for MLF. A more modest nuclear "partnership" might be proposed to meet the present concerns of NATO allies. Second level technical people could be brought into the targeting and planning phases of our existing strategic nuclear force, to give added assurance of our readiness to employ the nuclear umbrella. To the extent that we are, in fact, ready to employ that umbrella, it seems highly desirable that our allies be assured that this is so. By this means we may satisfy some present concerns among our NATO allies without creating a new strategic striking force in Europe and opening the door to an independent European nuclear "third force" with its troublesome political and military implications.



COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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September 24, 1964

Memorandum to: Persons Interested in the Council
for a Livable World

From: Bernard T. Feld, President

The 1964 election campaign has become vicious to a degree we had not anticipated. In some states the Republican candidate for President is being supported loudly and effectively. In these states congressional candidates who oppose his views are under strong and sometimes extreme attack by opponents who may have exceptionally large funds at their disposal and who, in some instances, have had political organizers brought in from outside the state. The Council is therefore recommending that support now be concentrated on the campaigns of four candidates who are confronted with just this situation:

Gale W. McGee, for reelection to the Senate from Wyoming;

Frank E. Moss, for reelection to the Senate from Utah;

Joseph M. Montoya, for election to the Senate from New Mexico;

Ralph R. Harding, for reelection to the House from Idaho.


It is for these candidates that the Council urges concern if we are to have in January a Congress which will deal with foreign affairs on a rational and considered basis. An important further effect of our support of these congressional candidates will be to strengthen voices opposed to a reckless nuclear policy and thus to bring the issues of the presidential

campaign home to many voters.

If these men are to win in November---and the Council feels it is extremely important that they win---they must receive all the support we can muster. We therefore urge that you now join the dedicated minority who are Supporters of the Council. We ask, as you know, for a substantial commitment---two percent of your annual income, or, if this is not possible, one per cent, \$100, or whatever you can afford. We suggest that you contribute half of your commitment directly to a recommended candidate, half to the general funds of the Council for political and other purposes. (We are requesting the contribution to the general funds of the Council so that we may have the flexibility to make contributions that may prove to be critical in this election.) We make this request in the belief that your contribution, together with those of the scientists, scholars, professional persons, and others who already support the activities of the Council, can have decisive effects.

We enclose a memorandum to provide you with more detailed information on the candidates, and a questionnaire for your convenience in replying. If you still share our aims and our enthusiasm for this practical method of implementing them, we urge you to become a Supporter now.

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld
President

BTF:mk

Enclosures: memorandum on candidates
return questionnaire
return envelope



COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036, Phone: 265-3800, ac 202, Cable: DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Dear Supporter:

You will remember that last spring we asked Council supporters to consider making the second half of their 1963 contribution to a Senatorial candidate who would be up for re-election in 1964, and that we suggested that these candidates would be chosen from the following list:

- Quentin N. Burdick - North Dakota
- Albert Gore - Tennessee
- Philip A. Hart - Michigan
- Frank E. Moss - Utah
- Gale W. McGee - Wyoming
- Edmund S. Muskie - Maine
- Eugene J. McCarthy - Minnesota

All of these candidates are worthy of support, but on the basis of their relative needs for support, the Council recommends that priority now be given to Senators Brudick, Moss, and McGee.

Senator Quentin N. Burdick, the Senator from North Dakota, has himself forcefully described to the Council his positions. "...I will attempt to acquaint you with my philosophy, particularly as it deals with American influence in improving the prospects for a more peaceful, rational world. I believe my position will be apparent from my record in the House of Representatives in 1959-60 and in the Senate from 1960 to the present....

"In 1960, as a member of the House, several Congressmen, including myself, introduced bills to establish a National Peace Agency. Similar legislation was enacted in 1961, establishing the Disarmament Agency, and, of course, it had my support in the Senate (September 8, 1961).

"During my tenure in the House, I also introduced H. Con. Res. 563 to extend the moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons tests. In May 1963, I co-sponsored the Dodd-Humphrey resolution, S. Res. 148, which encompassed the essentials of the test ban treaty negotiated two months later....

"While I have been a supporter of the foreign aid programs of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations, I have been skeptical of the value of continued military assistance, particularly to the Western European nations. In 1961, I voted in favor of the Ellender Amendment to reduce by \$500 million the authorization for military assistance for fiscal years 1962 and 1963

(August 16), as well as for the Church Amendment providing that no further military assistance shall be furnished on a grant basis to a Western European country, except in emergencies (August 16). In 1962, I voted for the Ellender-Church Amendment to cut appropriations for military assistance by \$150 million (October 1)....

"I have been a supporter of a strong national defense, but have had questions about the large proportion of the national budget that is earmarked for this purpose at the expense of needed domestic programs. In the defense appropriation bill for fiscal 1964, I voted for the Saltonstall Amendment (September 24, 1963) to cut by 1 per cent the \$15.8 billion military procurement item.

"The United Nations, in my opinion, offers hope for an improvement in the relations between nations--in bringing peace through world law closer to reality. I have, therefore, willingly supported appropriations for the United States share of its maintenance. In April 1962, I cast a vote in the Senate in favor of the \$100 million United Nations bond issue to help the organization through its financial crisis resulting from its peace-keeping operations in the Congo.

"In 1961, I co-sponsored Senator Clark's resolution calling for a revision of the United Nations Charter to develop effective international machinery for the supervision of disarmament and the maintenance of peace, and, currently, I am a sponsor of a similar Clark resolution that has been rewritten to take into account present-day conditions...."


Senator Frank E. Moss, the Senator from Utah, has a consistent record of liberal positions on both domestic and foreign matters. He has taken special interest in public works and--against strong opposition from within his own state--Federal aid to education. He has devoted considerable attention to the foreign aid program and (with Senator McGee, among others) has participated in study missions to Africa, South America, and Asia. An outspoken liberal Senator, he has been a target of the radical right in Utah.

Senator Gale W. McGee, the Senator from Wyoming, has urged a constructive foreign policy and has supported the Administration's proposals in this regard. He has been a firm supporter of the United Nations and has seriously questioned our foreign aid programs in their heavy emphasis on military rather than economic and social programs. Senator McGee has also spoken out against the radical right, on a nationwide basis, and has come under considerable attack because of his forthright statements.

In 1964, the Council will, of course, support additional candidates, including new Senatorial candidates. But the Council considers that campaign contributions made now to these candidates under the auspices of the Council can have a very special effect: They will enable a candidate to undertake certain early activities which can be of critical importance to his re-election but which he might not otherwise be able to carry out. Even a relatively small amount of money transmitted to a candidate now can thus be highly effective. And as a by-product, the effectiveness of the Council in its Washington activities will be commensurately enhanced.

We therefore urge you to forward the remaining portion of your 1963 contribution as soon as possible. A form and a return envelope are enclosed for your convenience.

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld
President

PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES

by Freeman J. Dyson

Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey

It is no accident that ballistic missile defense has become one of the major issues confronting the United States and the Soviet Union. We have seen how the question of BMD came to dominate the debate over the ratification of the test ban treaty. It is likely to dominate in a similar way any attempts at arms control or disarmament which may in future come close to the point of realization. It is necessary that scientists and other people who are concerned with disarmament should take BMD seriously and should avoid the oversimplified views which are at the moment prevalent. On one side, many people believe that BMD is necessary to our security; on the other side, many believe that BMD is a dangerous illusion. The truth is certainly much more complicated.

There are three whole ranges of problems connected with BMD, which we may call technical, military, and political. To understand the issues, one must examine in detail all three types of problem. I obviously cannot discuss any of these problems adequately in a few paragraphs. I shall only try to give all three types of problem equal emphasis, to show that in neglecting any one of them we may reach very wrong conclusions. Let me begin with a few technical facts.

TECHNICAL FACTORS

1. The technical progress which has been made in BMD development is extremely impressive. The people who are doing the technical work are enthusiastic about what they have done, and believe they can do even better in future. Technical problems, which were five years ago considered severe, are now either solved or close to being solved. There is no doubt that the euphoria of the successful technician has played a large role in making BMD look more promising now than it did five years ago. It is easy to understand the enthusiastic statements of Marshal Malinovsky and other Russian leaders on this basis.

2. BMD is immensely expensive. Costs are quoted from 10 billion dollars upward. A system which tries seriously to protect a big country is likely to cost 100 billion dollars by the time it is finished.

3. The state of the art is constantly changing. This means that a massive BMD system might very well be made obsolete by changes in the offensive threat during the time it is being built.

An enormous literature exists in which the technical problems of BMD are discussed in detail. Most of this is, unfortunately, classified. The best source of unclassified information is the Congressional Record; for example the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February and March 1963, and the test ban hearings of July 1963.

MILITARY PROBLEMS

Next I may mention a few of the military problems.

1. Before deciding whether or not a BMD system is useful, one must have some point of view concerning the types of situation with which it is supposed to deal. Generally speaking, American and Soviet military planners seem to be planning for totally different kinds of war. The American-style war is short; it consists of little more than a single, well-organized and massive attack, possibly followed by additional attacks, but not extending in time longer than a few days or weeks. A Russian-style war is typically a long and messy affair, with both sides carrying on a bitter and disorganized struggle, probably for many years. It is hard to say which picture of war is more realistic. In general, the American-style war favors the attack, while the Russian-style favors the defense. Thus it is to be expected that BMD will generally look better to the Russians than it will to us.

2. It is probably a permanent feature of BMD systems that their performance will be unpredictable. Even a system which can defend a city "on paper" may well fail to do so in practice because of human failures, confusion, cowardice, or breakdown of equipment. It is totally impossible, even disregarding the atmospheric test ban treaty, to give a BMD system any worthwhile practice in peacetime. Its inherent unpredictability is a serious drawback to BMD in the eyes of American strategic planners who try to make war into something calculable. For Russian planners, the unpredictability is not such a drawback since they do not believe that war is calculable anyhow.

For a good general survey of Soviet military thinking, I recommend the volume "Soviet Military Strategy", edited by Marshal Sokolovskii and now available in English translation.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Lastly, I come to the political problems connected with BMD. The main political problem is the intense pressure which exists on both sides to duplicate anything which the other side does. It is a fact of life that, as soon as the Russians begin the construction of a serious BMD system, the pressure on the American government to follow suit will be almost irresistible. The prevalent belief in the United States is that a Soviet BMD system would indicate a Soviet attempt to nullify our second-strike force and thereby present a serious threat to our security. In the test ban hearings the intensity of fear of a Soviet BMD system was very strikingly shown. I wish to argue that a Soviet BMD system would, in fact, be built with entirely different objectives in mind.

The following are three of the many political factors which in my judgement would lead Soviet leaders to build BMD:

1. The balance of power in the Russian military establishment, as in our own, rests largely on budgetary considerations. Our strategic air command has always had a larger budget than our air defense command, and a correspondingly larger share of political influence. In the Soviet Union, the big budgets and the political pull have belonged to the defensive commands, particularly to the army and air defense commands. To preserve the internal balance of power, it was almost inevitable that as the external threat changed from airplanes to missiles, the Soviet air defense command should become heavily involved in missile defense. If Khrushchev wished to call a halt to BMD in the Soviet Union, he would probably find it necessary to change the military power structure in favor of his offensive missile commanders who have hitherto been treated rather shabbily. There are many reasons why we should fear rather than welcome such a shift.

2. There is a strong tradition in the Soviet Union of using bluff as a defensive weapon. The bomber-bluff of 1955 and the ICBM-bluff of 1960 are well-known examples. The Soviet leaders are able to tolerate a position of numerical inferiority if it can be hidden by brave words and effective secrecy. Soviet BMD development falls into this same pattern. Clearly BMD is an excellent bluff weapon, since nobody will ever know, short of war, how good or bad it really is. The historic American reaction to Soviet bluff is to demolish it as rapidly and as publicly as possible; for example the ICBM-bluff was demolished in 1960 by the humiliating disclosure of the results of U2 reconnaissance. A much more intelligent American reaction would be to preserve the bluff; it is strongly to our advantage to be facing a Soviet bluff rather than a militarily real defense, even if our intelligence is not good enough to tell the difference.

3. Soviet political leaders and military experts have never accepted the distinction between deterrence and defense. Among American disarmament experts it has become almost obligatory to make this distinction. Many of our scientists are strongly opposed to BMD, because they consider that defense and deterrence are necessarily incompatible. Their argument is that deterrence against war depends on both sides being defenseless against a massive attack on populations. This American dislike of defense is, of course, connected with the idea of war as something short and calculable, which I discussed earlier. The Russians have never believed that deterrence of war depended primarily on the outcome of an initial attack. They relied on the fact that in the long run neither side can defeat the other, and that nobody is likely to begin a war which he knows he cannot finish. Soviet-style deterrence consists in having the power and the will to drag a war out indefinitely into the long and messy phase in which the traditional Russian strategy of endurance and attrition can operate successfully. They have never seen any inconsistency between this kind of deterrence and a maximum emphasis on all kinds of defensive weapons including BMD.

This is a very brief and sketchy summary of some of the important factors that must be included in any assessment of BMD. My main message is that the strategic and political purposes of BMD are quite different in the Soviet Union from what they are in the United States. It is very likely that Soviet BMD is well suited to Soviet purposes, whereas American BMD may be quite unsuited to American purposes. A Soviet BMD system may be highly reassuring to them and not at all threatening to us, while an American BMD system may look threatening to them and not at all reassuring to us. Any analysis of the problem which treats the two sides symmetrically is far too simple to be correct.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



WASHINGTON BULLETIN

March-April 1964

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

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The following article and the two enclosed are forwarded for your information as part of the Council's program of reproducing or preparing papers of significance in the field of arms control.

The Council has been working on the Multilateral Force (MLF) and Viet Nam problems. A Council study on the MLF will be issued shortly, a draft version of which has been circulated within the Senate, State and Defense Departments.

The next newsletter will contain Council recommendations on candidates for election and/or re-election to the Senate and House.

The Council and Dr. Szilard have been under attack from a correspondent named Holmes Alexander who writes for the McNaught Syndicate. An article appearing in various newspapers 10 March was hostile in tone and content. It was initially feared that such an attack might cause our candidates some embarrassment but from all indications the response has been minimal. Mr. Alexander has written a series of 12 essays on the Federalist papers which were carried by American Opinion in 1958-59. American Opinion is published by Robert Welch, Inc., Belmont, Massachusetts.

THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

An analysis prepared for the National Research Council on Peace Strategy

January 1964

When, on September 26th, 1961, the late President Kennedy signed Public Law 87-297 creating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the event was greeted with high enthusiasm in the university community, cautious skepticism in Congress, and outright hostility among some conservatives. In the three years of the Agency's history the skepticism and hostility have all but disappeared by reason of the proven worth of the Agency, although too little is at present known by the public about its work to engender the support merited by its accomplishments.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AGENCY

Some of the problems of organization which were confronted in the beginning period of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are still with us. They resulted from the fact that, prior to 1960, little had been done to establish a permanent corps of disarmament experts within the American Government. In

the fifteen years between 1945 and 1960, with the exception of the three-year period of Governor Stassen's service as disarmament officer, there was no organized group of trained men to work continuously on one of the most complicated and difficult of all political questions.

After Governor Stassen's appointment in 1955, a centralized organization came into being for the first time, although by 1957 its entire staff of professionals and clerical workers was only 54 in size. A great deal was accomplished with this staff, and there was a quality of thinking and planning behind the negotiating team which rendered Governor Stassen's work effective in the disarmament negotiations themselves.

Following Governor Stassen's resignation in 1958, the machinery for disarmament negotiation was transferred from the White House, where there was direct access to the President, to the State Department, where it became lost in the State Department apparatus. By Fiscal Year 1960 there were only twenty persons on the disarmament staff of the Department.

In December 1959, the Democratic Advisory Council through its Advisory Committee on Science and Technology published a document "A National Peace Agency, December 1959" which suggested many of the ideas which were incorporated into the ACDA legislation. Among those active in the preliminary stages of the idea were Harold Urey, Polykarp Kusch, Harrison Brown, Charles Lauritsen, the late Trevor Gardner, Ralph Lapp, and the chairman of the Science and Technology Committee, Ernest Pollard.

Senator Humphrey cooperated with the staff of the Advisory Committee, as did the then Senator Kennedy; both men introduced bills in 1960, Senator Humphrey for a National Peace Agency, and Senator Kennedy for an Arms Control Institute. In response to these and other pressures and suggestions the Eisenhower Administration in September 1960 organized the U.S. Disarmament Administration within the State Department.

When the Kennedy Administration took office, efforts to create a new agency for disarmament were intensified and new bills were introduced in the Senate and the House. Many of the supporters of these early efforts wished to have an agency for war and peace similar to the National Institutes of Health, with a heavy emphasis on research. However, it became apparent that such an agency would be out of the main stream of decision-making. John McCloy, after a considerable amount of study of the matter, took the same position. The bill that was finally written and passed provided both for research and for the day-to-day work of backing up negotiations.

In 1960, as plans developed, the Administration and the Secretary of State favored an independent Agency; the career men in the State Department were opposed. The argument was that ACDA would be too visionary in its approach to foreign policy problems, and that since disarmament was part of international affairs, it was the proper province of the Secretary of State. On September 8th, 1961, the Senate passed a bill by a vote of 73-14 placing the Agency within the State Department. Three weeks later the House, by a vote of 290-54 voted for an independent Agency which would work with the Secretary

of State. A compromise was reached whereby the Director of ACDA serves as the "principal adviser to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters." The Act states further that "the director shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters." Section 31 of the Act states that the Director shall conduct research "under the direction of the President" without mentioning the Secretary of State.

The character of the debates on the question of where to put the Agency in the Governmental structure showed that many Senators and several Congressmen feared that the Agency might become a force for liberal policies. This reluctance to create a strong agency was reflected again in the controversy over whether the Agency should have the authority to construct its own laboratory facilities.

The Administration bill concurred with the earlier bills and gave the Director the authority to construct laboratory facilities if he thought it necessary. The Atomic Energy Commission protested on the grounds that the Agency would thus duplicate work already being done elsewhere; although the issue was in reality a question of how powerful the Agency would become. Both the House and the Senate committees eliminated the authority for laboratories from the bill.

Another amendment to the original proposal was the elimination in the House of the Agency's Office of Public Affairs. Fear was expressed during debate that the Agency would set up a propaganda office, and the measure was whittled down to the appointment of a Public Affairs Advisor. This has not only hampered the Agency's efforts to disseminate information about arms control and disarmament affairs, but has made it impossible for ACDA to gain the visibility which its importance demands.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY

Under Section 2 of P. L. 87-297 (The Arms Control and Disarmament Act) the Agency has four primary functions:

- (a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formation;
- (b) The preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;
- (c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and
- (d) The preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of United States participation in such control systems as may become part of United States arms control and disarmament activities.

Four separate bureaus have been established:

1. Bureau of International Relations: The bureau, headed by Jacob Beam is divided into two offices: a) The Office of Political Affairs which is responsible for the day to day conduct of international negotiations on disarmament and testing; b) The Office of Political Research and Analysis which assesses the international implications of arms control and disarmament proposals and examines long range international trends and developments.
2. Economics Bureau: The bureau, headed by Archibald S. Alexander, investigates not only the economics of disarmament but also its social consequences. With the appointment of Alexander the bureau has assumed responsibility for the major portion of the social science research of the Agency as a whole.
3. Science and Technology Bureau: The bureau, headed by Dr. Herbert Scoville, is responsible for research on the scientific and technical aspects of disarmament and arms control.
4. Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau: Advises on military weapons systems as they relate to arms control and disarmament. Dr. George E. Pugh is acting head of this bureau.

In addition to the bureaus, ACDA is composed of the Disarmament Advisory Staff which recommends policy, the General Advisory Committee of 15 private citizens appointed by the President, a Reference Research Staff which performs library functions, and an Executive Staff and Secretariat which performs administrative functions.

ACTIVITIES

The Agency, as the primary agency of government responsible for disarmament and arms control negotiations, in cooperation with other agencies, was responsible for three negotiations instruments of great significance: An Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World; A Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in all Environments; and A Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater. The Agency has also been responsible for the formation of the agreement concerning direct communications between the United States and Russia - and the limited test-ban treaty.

In addition to drafting these documents, ACDA was deeply involved in the disarmament and test-ban negotiations at Geneva in 1962-63 and was the primary advocate of our test-ban position on behalf of the Administration, during the Congressional debates of last year.

From the Beginning ACDA has been heavily oriented towards research.

For the first year of the Agency's operation Congress appropriated \$1,831,000 of which \$725,000, or one-third, was budgeted by the Agency for research. In Fiscal Year 1963 the Agency allocated \$4,000,000, almost two-thirds of its total budget of \$6,500,000, for research. The Agency plans once again to increase the percentage of its total budget for research. For Fiscal Year 1964, the Agency's appropriation is \$7.5 million, approximately two-thirds of which again the Agency plans to allocate to research. Since the inception of ACDA in September 1961, it has let twenty-eight contracts and awarded nine grants in addition to the Agency's own staff studies. The total amount spent or committed to research to date is thus over \$4,725,000.

The Agency's research program is divided into two categories: "Concept studies" which deal with the implications of arms control and disarmament studies and "supporting studies", which are concerned with specific technical aspects of arms control and disarmament. As ACDA became better acquainted with the subject matter it began to shift its research emphasis from support to concept studies. In Fiscal Year 1962, for example, two-thirds of the research contracts entered into by the Agency concerned inspection and verification. In Fiscal Year 1962, for example, only 2/5 of the research contracts let out by the Agency concerned inspection and verification.

The grant program began to function in June of 1962; of the nine grants awarded by the Agency only one is for a study of inspection and verification. The Agency staff has also performed research on the broader implications of arms control and disarmament. It should be noted, however, that the total amount of money spent in support studies is greater than on concept studies; according to an ACDA spokesman, technical studies are by their nature more expensive than the others.

For Fiscal Year 1964, ACDA plans to give more emphasis to social and behavioral science research. As part of the increasing awareness of the importance of such research, the Agency is forming a Social Science Advisory Board which will consist of experts in the various disciplines who will advise ACDA on research and other matters in the field of social sciences.

In addition to conducting such research, ACDA has published a total of 19 documents and has sent representatives to various conferences, forums, study groups, etc., at the rate of approximately one a day.

FUNCTION

Section 32 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act States:

"The Director is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of such other Government agencies as the President may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control and disarmament policy...."

It is therefore clear that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has, under the general direction of the President and the Secretary of State, primary government responsibility for the formulation of arms control and disarmament proposals and his Agency is the governmental fountainhead for all such proposals.

This is the way the Agency works:

When the staff prepares a proposal which the Director feels should be seriously considered, he circulates it to the members of the Committee of Principals. This Committee, established in 1960 to advise the President on disarmament, is composed of the Secretary of State as chairman, the Director of ACDA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directors of CIA, AEC, USIA, NASA, the President's Advisor on National Security Affairs, and the President's Scientific Advisor. After the Agency's draft proposals are circulated, written comments are sent to it. ACDA then reviews the comments and circulates a revised draft to the Committee of Deputies. This committee consists of the deputies to the members of the Committee of Principals. After the issues are further clarified by the Committee of Deputies a formal meeting is held by the Committee of Principals, each member of which is by this time thoroughly briefed on the proposals. There is no voting in the meeting of the Principals, but each member makes his views known so that the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency can make his recommendation to the President with a clear indication as to where consensus exists and where it does not. The recommendation initiated by ACDA is then taken to the President by the Director of the Agency. The United States draft of a test-ban treaty, for example, was formulated in this way.

POTENTIAL

The Agency, even with its structural and political limitations, has the potential for steadily increasing its capacity for negotiations and as a primary governmental source for disarmament studies and proposals. At present there are a total of about 220 persons employed by the ACDA. Excluding secretarial and clerical personnel there are 113 persons, 13 of whom are in military service, 36 are foreign service officers and 64 have previous governmental experience or have been recruited from private life. It is expected that ACDA will continue to broaden the scope of its research. Such areas as the psychological barriers to disarmament will be explored and there will be, for example, an increase in its efforts in regard to the economics of disarmament. These two areas, among others, have not been sufficiently explored.

As the Agency becomes more established there is no doubt that its effectiveness and activities will increase.

POSSIBLE ACTION IN THE FUTURE

1. During World War II the State Department set up committees in various universities to work on post war problems. These campus-based groups of

scholars were all given the same assignment at the same time. Each group sent its report to a coordination center at Harvard University which sent a report based on these studies to the State Department. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency could explore the possibility of establishing a similar arrangement in order to receive diverse and valuable opinions on problems of disarmament which would not otherwise be available to it.

2. Authority is given to the Agency in Section 42(f) of P.L. 87-297 to "establish advisory boards to advise with and make recommendations to the Director on United States arms control and disarmament policy and activities." Under this section ACDA could establish such advisory boards throughout the country consisting of representatives of all segments of the community, including labor and industry.

3. The Agency could also play an increasingly important role in the "dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament." The dissemination of information on this issue is one of the most important functions that it could perform. ACDA is attempting to meet this obligation, but much more could be accomplished in this area. For example, the Agency could issue a monthly bulletin or newsletter indicating the latest developments in the disarmament field and could increase the number and scope of its publications. In addition, ACDA could hold periodic briefings and seminars with representatives of the mass media, labor, business, and others; it could hold regional meetings on defense and disarmament such as the one held last year in New York City sponsored by Congressman William Fitts Ryan. Other meetings could be encouraged within the academic community, where there are many scholars interested in the work of the Agency but insufficiently informed as to its activities and needs. Such meetings both in the universities and the community at large would be particularly important in areas of the country in which lack of knowledge on disarmament matters is greatest.

Finally, citizens' organizations, should be given the opportunity to learn more about the work of the Agency and to include the issues on disarmament and arms control among their central items for discussion and community action. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the focal point in the Administration for creating and advocating proposals designed to prevent war and to encourage the development of a peaceful world order. In carrying out its work, it needs and deserves the highest degree of public understanding. The present report has been prepared in the hope that the information contained in it may help to increase that understanding.

The above article, a condensed version of which appears here, was prepared by the National Research Council on Peace Strategy and has been reproduced in abbreviated form with their kind consent.

The Council adds the following Council comments to the last paragraph:

a) To improve the functioning of the Agency in terms of personnel stability and policy consistency and development, career state and military personnel should not be placed in charge of bureaus. The Council would recommend retired persons, university and/or business persons as a better choice in this respect.

b) The Agency should be permitted more flexibility in contracting - i.e., individual consultants should be allowed to be paid out of non-obligated contractual funds when required.

c) The Agency should have a formalized liaison relationship with its United Kingdom counterpart as does the President's Scientific Advisory Committee. This liaison should be carried out, on a quarterly basis, at the Bureau Chief plus two or three deputy levels, and should be extended to other Allied groups as well.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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Dear Council Supporter,

March 3, 1970

The enclosed ABM Memorandum was sent to members of the Senate on February 26, forty-eight hours after Secretary of Defense Laird presented the Administration's rationale for an expansion of the Safeguard System. A few days before the Defense Secretary's announcement, the Council had given Senators a memorandum setting forth a list of 15 questions against which the Administration's case might be judged. Also on February 26, we held the first of a new series of Senatorial seminars, aimed at exposing the contradictions and weaknesses of the new Safeguard ABM proposals.

The new campaign to defeat ABM is well under way, and Washington observers give it a good chance of success. It is encouraging that Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, always one of the most ardent ABM advocates in Congress, has expressed serious misgivings about the new proposals. It is expected that the crucial vote on the ABM authorizations will come soon -- probably within the next six weeks. Our campaign this year is likely to be short and, if we are to win over wavering Senators, it will have to be extremely intense.

The key role played by the Council in last year's efforts to defeat ABM has been widely noted and discussed. The December Atlantic, in an extensive analysis of the ABM fight, recognized the Council's contribution in these words:

"No one worked harder to fan those doubts [about the rationale for ABM], or had more effect, than a collection of scientists all too familiar with the properties of nuclear power. The Council for a Livable World, a Washington organization of nuclear physicists and other scientists, helped to stir up the 'no missile in the backyard' sentiment. Then, through a series of lunches and dinners, they proceeded to educate senators and their staff members about the workings and dangers of anti-ballistic missilery. This novelty of legislators sitting down to learn for themselves and make up their own minds about a difficult and arcane matter, and finding that after all they, too, could grasp it, was what set the ABM issue apart from previous defense questions and led to the unprecedented challenge to the Pentagon's authority.

Nor would the challenge have come as near to its mark had it not been for the continuing work, the daily contacting and trading of information on the part of Cooper's and Hart's . . . , and Edward Kennedy's and Mike Mansfield's assistants, . . . , all working closely with Tom Halsted of the Council for a Livable World."

We are now faced with the necessity of mounting a new all-out campaign against ABM, not one which will come within a single vote of victory, but one which will defeat the entire Safeguard ABM program. Our financial needs are urgent and immediate. Elaborate plans have been prepared and we are ready to move, but we do need your help. Although you will shortly be receiving the first of our 1970 appeals for help to Senatorial candidates, this is probably our last chance to defeat ABM, and it would be tragic to fail because of inadequate financial support. We are asking all of you to send a check to us by return mail.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard T. Feld
President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

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February 26th, 1970

MEMORANDUM ON SECRETARY LAIRD'S ABM PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 24th, 1970

On February 24 Secretary Laird announced the Administration's decision to expand its Safeguard ABM system by increasing Minuteman defense and laying the groundwork for a nationwide system of population defense. He offered two principal reasons for doing so: a projected deployment rate of the Soviet SS-9 missile which might leave our land-based Minuteman vulnerable to a first strike attack by the mid 1970's, and a projected rate of ICBM development which might permit China to launch an attack of ten to twenty-five nuclear tipped missiles on the United States by the mid 1970's.

There should be no doubt in the mind of proponents or opponents of the Safeguard ABM that, if these projections of the Defense Secretary were to come true, our Minuteman missiles would be vulnerable to a Soviet attack and our cities to a Chinese attack. A large Soviet SS-9 force with highly accurate MIRV warheads could destroy virtually all of our land-based missiles, if we were to refrain from firing our own before the Soviet blow struck. Ten to twenty-five Chinese missiles could take a horrendous toll in American lives, as indeed ten to twenty-five Soviet missiles have been capable of doing for almost a decade.

If present trends continue the United States will be able to destroy the Soviet land-based missile force in a first strike. Even today, an American attack whether delivered by land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, or bombers can destroy a virtually defenseless China.

What Secretary Laird and other spokesmen of the Administration have failed to establish is how these projected Soviet and Chinese developments will actually affect the future security of the United States.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age our security has rested on our universally recognized ability to destroy any would-be attacker even after the first blow had been dealt against us. The effectiveness of our deterrent is no less credible today than it was in 1945.

In the first years after World War II the deterrent consisted of the atomic bomb and the intercontinental bomber which assured its delivery.

With the advent of ICBM's and the thermonuclear warheads in the 1950's the role of the intercontinental bomber as the primary component of our deterrent was taken over by the new missiles. Indeed, the obsolescence of the intercontinental bomber as the preferred delivery system was so rapid that the Soviet Union very nearly by-passed this system in building their own strategic nuclear forces, preferring to focus almost all of their efforts on ICBM's.

We too went ahead with ICBM's, first deploying Atlas and Titan missiles above ground. Later, recognizing the vulnerability of these missiles we phased them out as soon as we had an adequate number of submarine-launched missiles and Minutemen in hardened underground silos.

By the end of the 60's there was gathering evidence that, with increasing missile accuracy, even the hardened ICBM's would soon be vulnerable. It may well be time to recognize that the fixed ICBM has served its purpose, and that in the future we should rely primarily on the mobile sea-based systems for deterrence. This we can safely do.

No government can mount a nuclear attack on the United States with any hope of surviving the retaliatory blow which our Polaris fleet can inflict.

This point was underscored in a prepared statement by the Secretary of Defense presented to a joint session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on February 20th 1970:

"Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea can be considered virtually invulnerable to-day. With a highly concentrated effort the Soviet Navy to-day might be able to localize and destroy at sea one or two Polaris submarines. But the massive and expensive undertaking that would be required to extend such a capability using any currently known ASW techniques would take time and would certainly be evident."

Viewed in this perspective, the Administration's current proposals for expansion of the Safeguard ABM system are anything but moderate.

For a variety of technical reasons which are discussed further below, expansion of Minuteman defense would be an untimely effort to shore up a delivery system which will continue to suffer, despite Administration efforts, a declining role in our deterrent force.

Last year we were told that we needed two ABM sites to test the operational capacity of the system and to eliminate the inevitable bugs. Although no substantial construction and consequently no testing has begun at either site, it would seem that this year we must begin to build in earnest.

More startling is the proposal to lay the groundwork at this time for a nationwide, anti-Chinese system of population defense. The cost for the spadework in FY 71 will be minimal, but the commitment, if accepted by the Congress, will be almost unlimited.

Senator Mansfield has estimated the ultimate cost of such a system at \$50 billion or more. It is now clear, as opponents of ABM feared last year, that the Administration's "minimum" proposal for ABM was the nose of the camel beneath the tent.

As Chinese missile strength grows beyond the projected level of ten to twenty-five missiles, ABM will require constant upgrading and constant expansion. It will require a nationwide shelter program for which no price has been set, either in terms of dollars or of regimentation of our society.

An anti-missile system on this scale will force Soviet leaders to reevaluate fundamentally their own strategic planning. The adverse effect of these new ABM proposals on SALT which will shortly resume in Vienna, can not be underrated.

How have we moved so far away from a reasoned assessment of our national security requirements?

There is evidence that the President has come to rely almost exclusively on a small group of officials within his own Administration for advice on national security and defense problems. Senators of both parties who might have been expected to take a contrary position on the ABM question have apparently had little opportunity to present their views directly to the President.

As a disturbing example, consider the President's statement of January 30th, 1970, that an anti-Chinese defense would be "virtually infallible". This assertion suggests that the President has not only failed to avail himself of the advice of knowledgeable senators but has also neglected to draw on informed scientific opinion outside the government. No responsible scientist or engineer with experience in military technology would support the concept of an "infallible" population defense.

No system as complicated as Safeguard can be counted on to work perfectly, particularly if it cannot be tested adequately. The failure in combat of far less complicated systems - recall the F-111 - even after extensive testing, bears witness to that.

But there are other reasons as well. According to the Secretary of Defense full Safeguard deployment would not be realized until the late 1970's; yet the Chinese may have ICBM's several years earlier. By the late 1970's the Chinese would have been able to introduce penetration aids into their ICBM force, and once that happened the entire concept of Safeguard would be obsolete. Local defenses for each American city and a nationwide fallout shelter program would then be required if the system were to retain significant credibility.

What is so worrisome about the President's judgement of the "virtual infallibility" of the defense is the possibility that he, or a successor, in the false confidence that there would be no risk, might some day take actions that would trigger a Chinese nuclear attack. There is a high probability that millions of Americans would be killed if this were to happen.

Putting aside for the moment the Administration's apparent unwillingness to face the strategic realities of the seventies - when improved missile accuracy will have doomed land-based ICBM's to obsolescence, when all efforts to build an airtight defense against

China will have failed no matter how many billions are spent, and when our best hope, while maintaining a strong deterrent, will clearly lie in negotiation with both the Soviet Union and China - let us ask whether the ABM program for defense of Minuteman makes sense even within the Administration's own frame of reference.

A year ago opponents of Safeguard pointed out that the system would be totally unnecessary for the defense of Minuteman if Soviet capabilities did not grow, and that it would be almost totally ineffective if they did. The Administration has now conceded as much.

Again on February 20th 1970 Secretary Laird stated:

"There is no need for a defense of the Minuteman force...if...the Soviets do not increase the deployment of the SS-9 and the SS-11, do not develop a MIRV for the SS-9, and do not improve ICBM accuracy..."

and immediately thereafter he stated:

"We would... be faced in the mid 70's with a threat which is much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system... if... the Soviets deploy a MIRV on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy, and do not stop building ICBM's at this time but continue building them at their present rate."

Thus we are confronted with the ridiculous situation of being asked to spend billions on a system that will be useful, even within the Administration's frame of reference, only if the Soviet Union should co-operate in tailoring their threat to suit the peculiar limitations of our Safeguard.

What it comes down to, and what the Administration continues to refuse to acknowledge, is this; in the nuclear age defense is and will remain an illusion. More Missiles and more Anti-Ballistic Missiles do not and will not bring increased security. The future depends not on preparations to "win" a nuclear war, but on the ability to deter a nuclear attack through invulnerable retaliatory forces. We shall be living with deterrence for a long time; we must come to terms with reality.

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld
President

William Doering

William Doering
Chairman

(This memorandum is being sent to Senators and Congressmen, Governors and Mayors, and members of the Press.)

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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January 1, 1972

Dear Council Supporter:

Last July we asked you to support two Senate incumbents for re-election: Clifford P. Case, R-New Jersey and Walter F. Mondale, D-Minnesota. Your response to these two outstanding Senators was generous and gratifying. Their re-election campaigns are underway and, as we noted in our preliminary report on the 1972 Senate Races in the November Washington Bulletin, their chances appear good.

Now we are asking your support for two more incumbents who are faced with difficult races for re-election: Lee Metcalf, D-Montana, and Claiborne Pell, D-Rhode Island.

Lee Metcalf, D-Montana: Senator Lee Metcalf was first elected to the Senate in 1960 and was re-elected in 1966 by 53.6% of the vote. He is a strong, independently minded legislator who has taken on national issues which have sometimes been unpopular in his home state. He vigorously opposed the Safeguard ABM system even though construction of ABM sites would have poured millions of dollars into local payrolls. He has been the Senate's most vocal opponent of the monopolistic electric power industry; a stand which has made him the number one target of the well heeled power industry in Montana and in the nation. The utilities have funneled more than \$100,000 in campaign contributions to his Republican opponents in the past. They will no doubt spend just as freely for Metcalf's opponent in 1972.

Metcalf was elected to the House of Representatives in 1952 and served four terms before he won his Senate seat. As a freshman representative he joined with Eugene J. McCarthy of Minnesota to form the Democratic Study Group; Metcalf was elected its first Chairman. From its modest beginnings, DSG has grown to 158 House members and is today the focal point for liberal action in the House of Representatives.

Senator Metcalf has been a critic of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations' policies in South-east Asia. In an article in The Nation (May 10, 1971), Metcalf was characteristically outspoken. "I feel just as strongly against ... the war and this goddamned bureaucracy as George McGovern does If I were going to the White House every Tuesday [Nixon's weekly meeting with selected legislators] I'd tell Nixon every Tuesday that we've got to get the hell out of Vietnam. I'd say it every day to the President if I could get to the White House every day." Senator Metcalf's voting record squares with his talk.

Council supporters gave him major campaign assistance in 1966. We are happy to recommend Senator Metcalf for re-election in 1972. Please make your check payable to Metcalf for Senator.

Claiborne Pell, D-Rhode Island: Senator Claiborne Pell was first elected to the Senate in 1960. Throughout his two terms, he has worked tirelessly to defuse the nuclear arms race through arms control and disarmament measures. A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he has opposed the Vietnam war since 1965 and has supported the Cooper-Church, Hatfield-McGovern and Mansfield amendments. He actively opposed the Safeguard ABM system.

As Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, Senator Pell has been both a practical legislator and a visionary. His was a lonely voice in the Senate when he authored the Ocean Space Treaty Resolution in 1968 to outlaw nuclear weapons on the seabed. Now the Seabed Arms Treaty Resolution has been signed by the United States and eighty-one other nations. He conducted hearings this year on international conventions concerning oil pollution on the seas and was the floor manager for these conventions, which passed the Senate unanimously. In a thoughtful book, Challenge of the Seven Seas, published in 1966, he advocated a comprehensive body of laws for international waters and an international sea patrol to enforce these laws.

Senator Pell faces a tough race in 1972. His Republican opponent is expected to be John Chafee, the former Governor, who is presently Secretary of the Navy in the Nixon Administration. This year Chafee has traveled throughout Rhode Island in what is clearly an undeclared campaign. A hawk on Vietnam, Chafee was an enthusiastic backer of the invasion of Cambodia in 1970. A stubborn opponent of any cuts in the Pentagon Budget, Chafee stands for programs which can only lead our country dangerously further into the arms race spiral.


The lines are being drawn distinctly in the Rhode Island Senate race. Although this is normally a strong Democratic state, it is also a state heavily dependent upon Navy payrolls. Against Mr. Nixon's Secretary of the Navy, Senator Pell will have a hard race.

We urge you to support his campaign generously. Please make your check payable to Re-elect Senator Pell Committee.


In addition to contributions for the re-election campaigns of Senator Metcalf and Pell, we are also asking some of you to contribute directly to the Council. Our effectiveness depends not only upon the election of good candidates to the Senate but also on the maintaining and strengthening of the Washington lobby on the issues of war and peace. In the usual way, we are asking you to contribute to one of the candidates or to the Council according to the instructions on the enclosed envelope.

The Directors would like to express their deep appreciation of your support through this past year and to extend their best wishes for 1972.

Yours sincerely,



Bernard T. Feld
President



Albert Gore
Washington Chairman

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

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JOHN SILARD *Counsel*

March 20, 1964

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Chicago, Ill.

Memo to: Persons Interested in the Council for a Livable World

From: Bernard T. Feld, President
H. Ashton Crosby, Executive Director

On February 21 we described some of the activities the Council for a Livable World has undertaken since its formation in 1962 on the basis of Leo Szilard's proposal, as you had requested.

Some of the Council's activities which were not included in that letter are described in the "Washington Bulletin" (and the other material) which is enclosed today:

1. A discussion has been initiated by the Council among members of Congress and the Administration on the proposal of Leo Szilard for a "minimal deterrent" of nuclear missiles to replace the condition of "saturation parity" which may exist between the U.S. and the USSR within a few years. The "Washington Bulletin" includes Dr. Szilard's summary of his paper; enclosed separately is the entire paper, as well as a letter to the editor of the New York Times on the "minimal deterrent" by Bernard Feld.
2. The hearings on the economic impact of arms reduction on the U.S. economy, which the Council was instrumental in initiating, aroused considerable interest in the subject, and confirmed the desirability of planning now for projected cut-backs in the defense budget. (A full report "Legislative Report-January, 1964" on the Council's role in the hearings, together with a summary of the hearings, and excerpts from the testimony presented was provided to all Council supporters. A few copies remain, which will be sent on request as long as the supply lasts.)
3. The Council will recommend support of candidates in the 1964 Senatorial campaign in addition to the three incumbents--Senators Burdick, Moss, and McGee--already recommended. Very considerable funds have been transmitted to these Senators, and providing significant support to additional candidates will be a major goal of the Council this year.

RUTH ADAMS
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JEROME D. FRANK
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
4. Assistance to Senators in preparing speech materials is being provided at their request. The Council is in a unique position to provide the advice of scientists, scholars, and other knowledgeable people whose ideas might not otherwise be brought to bear on a particular problem in Washington.
5. Major addresses by Senators are being sponsored by the Council, to enable Senators to present their views on defense and foreign policy, and to bring the Council's programs to wider public attention.

Activities like these, directed toward attainable goals, do have real impact on the programs and policies in Washington that affect the course of the arms race, an impact far greater than the actual number of persons involved would suggest.


We know that you are interested in the Council for a Livable World, and we hope that you will now join the dedicated minority who are Supporters of the Council. We ask, as you know, for what is admittedly a substantial commitment--two per cent of your income each year, or, if this is unrealistic, one per cent or \$100 (forwarded in whatever regular payments you prefer). But we do so in the belief that your contribution, together with those of the scientists, scholars, professional persons, and others who already support the program of the Council, will have important effects.

The enclosed questionnaire is provided for your convenience in replying. If you still share our aims and our enthusiasm for this practical method of implementing them, we urge you to become a supporter now.

Sincerely yours,



Bernard T. Feld,
President



H. Ashton Crosby,
Executive Director

A Note on Remaining on the Mailing List of the Council: Since you first requested that your name be placed on the mailing list of the Council, the number of reports we make available to our Supporters, as well as the number of other people who would like to receive our reports, have increased so greatly that we are no longer able to provide everything without charge. We therefore ask that if you do not wish to become a Supporter of the Council at this time, but do wish to receive reports (which would have included last month, for example, a Washington Bulletin, an advance copy of Leo Szilard's paper, and the ten-page Legislative Report on the hearings on the economics of arms reduction), you contribute \$10 toward a "subscription" to all Council materials. (The enclosed questionnaire provides an appropriate box to check.) And if you have just joined the Council as a Supporter, please excuse this unnecessary reminder; it takes a few days to complete all office records.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



WASHINGTON BULLETIN

January-February 1964

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: *Co-Chairmen*, WILLIAM DOERING, LEO SZILARD; *Officers*: BERNARD T. FELD, *President*; ALLAN FORBES, JR., *Vice-President*; DANIEL M. SINGER, *Secretary-Treasurer*; *DIRECTORS*: RUTH ADAMS, MAURICE S. FOX, JEROME FRANK, MARGARET BRENNAN GIBSON, MORTON GRODZINS, MATTHEW MESELSON, JAMES G. PATTON, ARTHUR PENN, CHARLES PRATT, JR.

Toward a Meaningful Agreement on Arms Control: The "Minimal" Deterrent

A "Minimal" missile deterrent to replace the condition of "saturation parity" between the United States and the Soviet Union which is expected to exist in a few years is proposed in a new paper by Leo Szilard. The paper is being circulated among a number of key officials in the Administration (including the State Department, the Department of Defense, the White House) and a few selected Senators for comments and recommendations; the Council hopes to further press the issue by a variety of means. Advance copies are being provided to Supporters of the Council for their information, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists will publish the paper as an article in their March issue.

Dr. Szilard summarizes his paper as follows:

"Unless a decisive step is taken towards arms control, Russia might deploy before long anti-missile missiles around her rocket-launching sites and around her cities. This could lead to a new arms race in which the Administration might find itself forced to double, or triple, the number of Minutemen scheduled to be built, to deploy anti-missile missiles around our cities, and to embark on a fall-out shelter program for the protection of the inhabitants of our cities, at a cost of about \$50 billion.

"Economic considerations may slow Russia's build up of her anti-missile defenses sufficiently to make it possible for us as yet to avoid such a new arms race, by reaching an agreement with Russia on a cut-off in the production of bombs and rockets.

"Russia might perhaps agree to a production cut-off, as a first step, if America and Russia were to reach a meeting of the minds on reducing their strategic striking forces, step by step, to a 'minimal' level, just sufficient to inflict 'unacceptable damage' in a counterblow, if an atomic attack were extended to their territory.

"We have now reached the point when we can no longer use our strategic striking forces any longer as a deterrent, except as a deterrent against 'nuclear blackmail.' Moreover, we would be more secure if both Russia and we reduced these striking forces to a minimal level, provided that the measures of inspection adopted would be sufficient to give us assurance that Russia would not secretly retain a strategic striking force large enough to be capable of destroying a significant portion of the minimal striking forces we retain.

"In the course of the last year the Soviet Union has accepted our notion that America, as well as Russia, may retain a 'minimal' strategic striking force, for a period of years to be agreed upon, and that inspection shall not be limited to equipment which is to be destroyed, but be extended also to equipment which is being retained.

"We would have to explore whether the Russians mean the same thing as we do when they appear to accept the principle of the minimal deterrent. But before we can do this we must clarify our own minds on what we ourselves mean when we speak of this principle....

"An agreement based on the concept of the 'minimal deterrent' would provide for a step-by-step reduction of Russia's as well as America's strategic striking forces to a 'minimal level.' At this minimal level the Russians would be left in the legitimate possession of perhaps twelve rockets and bombs, up to three megatons each, which could reach their target. This would make it possible for them to demolish, in a counter-blow, twelve of our largest cities, totaling 25 million inhabitants. We would need to retain about forty bombs and rockets which could reach their target, in order to be capable of demolishing Russian cities totaling the same number of inhabitants.

"The Agreement ought to limit the size of the tactical bombs retained by America and Russia, to one kiloton and their number to about three hundred, on each side.

"The current superiority of our strategic striking forces is a rapidly vanishing asset. In a year or two Russia could absorb an all-out American attack, directed against her strategic air bases and missile bases of known location, and still retain a 'residual striking capacity' sufficient to demolish all of our cities of over 100,000. In other words, within a few years, the strategic striking forces of Russia may reach 'saturation parity' with those of America.

"Many people within the Administration know that we would be far more secure if both America and Russia agreed to reduce their strategic striking forces to the minimal level. Russia might agree if she could be assured that Germany will not have atomic bombs and that China would not build a substantial strategic striking force. Conceivably, China might be willing to cooperate if we were willing to create a de-nuclearized zone in the Far East and Southeast Asia.

* * *

"We cannot have general disarmament without having a far-reaching political settlement, but the conclusion of an agreement based on the concept of the minimal deterrent need not await a political settlement in Europe, or elsewhere. Moreover, in view of the current estimates of Russia's conventional armies, such an agreement could be negotiated between America and Russia without including limitations on conventional arms which would involve other nations in a major way.

"Russia might agree to a production cut-off in bombs and rockets, in time to avert a nuclear arms race, if we reach a meeting of the minds with them on the concept of the minimal deterrent at an early date. If the conversations were carried far enough to convince them that an agreement could be negotiated without running into any major hitches, then the Russians might accept a production cut-off, even before an agreement based on the minimal deterrent is spelled out, with the i's dotted and the t's crossed.

* * *

"What the Russians would accept and also what the Congress would accept depends on whether the Administration can make them understand the need to avoid a new arms race, the perils which we face in the current situation and the advantages that an agreement based upon the concept of the minimal deterrent would hold for all concerned.

"Unless it becomes possible somehow to arrange for greatly improved communications between the Administration and the Soviet Government, on the one hand, and between the Administration and the Congress, on the other hand, no decisive progress towards a meaningful agreement on arms control is going to be made. Instead, we may be taking a number of little steps, like the test ban, for instance. These little steps improve the international climate, but if nothing decisive is done before long, the climate may keep on improving and improving until there is a new crisis and, then we shall be back where we started from. To make progress is not enough, for if the progress is not fast enough, something is going to overtake us."

The 1964 Senatorial Elections

The response from Supporters to the Council's recommendations for the 1963 pre-elections support of incumbent candidates was exceptionally generous. The Council has transmitted (as of January 15) approximately \$13,000 to Senator Burdick, \$6,800 to Senator McGee, and \$6,700 to Senator Moss. In addition, approximately \$1,000 was received and transmitted for the other Senators suggested, and substantial contributions were made to the general funds of the Council. It is considered unusual for such sizable contributions to be made to candidates so far in advance of the election, and, needless to say, the recipients are highly gratified. (The Senators are writing personal letters to all donees.)

The Council will recommend additional candidates to support with 1964 contributions, but these recommendations cannot be made until late spring, when candidates declare themselves and election situations crystallize.

Assistance to Senators

The program of seminars for Senators and their aides continues. The Council has also volunteered to provide assistance to some Senators in preparing speech materials, and several requests for such help have been received.

Assistance to the President

The Council wrote to President Johnson shortly after he took office, offering its help and calling attention to its program and objectives. The Council has since also volunteered its services to President Johnson to prepare material for speeches during the 1964 presidential campaign, and that offer has been accepted.

Enlarging the Council's Support: Major Public Addresses

The Council hopes to sponsor major addresses, some by Senators, during the spring of 1964. Such addresses can bring the views of thoughtful persons as well as the activities of the Council to wider public attention. Several Senators have agreed to speak under the auspices of the Council, and speeches in certain major cities are now being planned.

The Hearings on Disarmament and the Economy

The hearings on the economic impact of arms reduction on the U.S. economy, which the Council was instrumental in initiating, were held from November 6 through December 5 by the Senate Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower (Joseph Clark, Chairman). Some interest within the government has thus been generated on the economics of reconversion of defense industries to civilian production and the problem of automation, and further government action--namely, empowering a federal council to consider the subject--is expected. John Silard (General Counsel of the Council for a Livable World) acted as special consultant to Senator Clark; his report to the Board of Directors of the Council on the hearings, together with an analysis of the hearings and some excerpts from the testimony, will be provided to Supporters.

No Tax Deduction

There have recently been a number of inquiries to the Council on the status of contributions for federal income tax purposes. The Council for a Livable World is a non-profit organization, but it is a political rather than an educational organization, and, therefore, contributions to its fund, just as those to political candidates, are not deductible from the federal income tax.

Council for a Livable World
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"MINIMAL" DETERRENT VERSUS SATURATION PARITY

by

Leo Szilard

We are close to the point where America and Russia could destroy each other to any desired degree and therefore one would perhaps think that the arms race is about to come to an end. In fact a new arms race might be just around the corner.

Russia might before long deploy anti-missile missiles in defense of her rocket-launching sites. For such a defense to be effective it is only necessary to prevent a ground burst of the incoming rockets and this is, quite possibly, an attainable goal. Thus, the Administration might find itself under Congressional pressure to double, or triple, the number of Minutemen scheduled to be built in order to overcome Russia's defense of her bases.

Russia might go further and might deploy anti-missile missiles also for the defense of some of her larger cities. If she does, we would be forced to do likewise. There is this difference, however: Russia could deploy anti-missile missiles around a few of her largest cities and stop there, but if we deployed anti-missile missiles around any of our cities, the Administration would be under pressure to deploy such missiles around every one of our cities.

Fall-out could kill most people in a city if Russia were to explode suitably-constructed bombs at some distance from the city and it would make little sense for us to deploy anti-missile missiles around our cities without also embarking on a program of building fall-out shelters for the protection of the population of these cities. The cost of an adequate fall-out shelter program may be estimated at about \$50 billion.

Economic considerations might slow Russia's buildup of her anti-missile defenses sufficiently to make it possible for us as yet to avoid such a new arms race, by reaching an agreement with Russia on a cut-off in the production of bombs and rockets.

Russia would perhaps agree to such a cut-off — as a first step — if America and Russia were to reach a meeting of the minds on reducing their strategic striking forces, step by step, to a level just sufficient to inflict "unacceptable" damage in a counterblow, in case of a strategic strike directed against their territory.

An agreement providing for a reduction of America's and Russia's strategic striking forces to such a "minimal" level would also have to provide for adequate measures of inspection. It would take very stringent measures of inspection indeed to make sure that no bombs and rockets whatever remain hidden in Russia, but as long as we retain a striking force large enough to inflict unacceptable damage on Russia in a counterblow we could be satisfied with rather limited measures of inspection. In this case we would need to have just enough inspection to make sure that Russia would not secretly retain a strategic striking force large enough to be capable of destroying a significant portion of the "minimal" striking forces which we retain. The same considerations also hold true, of course, in the reverse for Russia.

Many of those who joined the Kennedy Administration in 1961 have come to believe that we would be much more secure in the years to come if we concluded with Russia an agreement based on the concept of the minimal deterrent. In the course of the last year Russia has accepted the notion that America as well as Russia may retain a small strategic striking force, until the "end of the third stage" of the "disarmament agreement" and that inspection shall not be limited to equipment which is to be destroyed, but be extended also to equipment which is being retained.

We shall have to explore whether the Russians mean the same thing as we do when they appear to accept the principle of the "minimal deterrent." We shall be able to discover this however only if we first find out what we mean ourselves when we speak of this principle.

* * *

We may as well start out by asking ourselves how large the strategic forces retained would need to be in order to fulfill their function.

If Russia retained twelve rockets and bombs, of one to three megatons each, which could reach their target, then Russia's counterblow could demolish twelve of our largest cities totaling over 25 million inhabitants. Clearly, this would be unacceptable damage, since in none of the

conflicts which may be expected to arise in the foreseeable future would we be willing to pay such a price for the sake of attaining the political objectives involved.

Because Russia has fewer large cities, we might have to retain about 40 bombs, if our retaliatory counterblow is to demolish Russian cities housing over 25 million people.

Both America and Russia could maximize their immunity to undetected violations of the agreement, by maintaining a certain balance between land-based long-range rockets and submarine-based rockets, within the limitations set by the agreement.

The warheads carried by anti-missile missiles may have to be limited to perhaps twenty kilotons each and to a total of say three megatons, for Russia and for America alike. The deployment of anti-missile missiles around cities may have to be prohibited.

* * *

It is my contention that we need to reduce the strategic striking forces down to the level of the "minimal deterrent", as soon as possible, because of the perils we face today and the even greater perils that we shall face when we reach the end of the current transitional period.

Had a conflict between Russia and America led to an armed clash a few years ago, and had at some point along the line of escalation, Russia made a sudden attack against America's strategic air bases and rocket bases, then America's "residual striking capacity" would have been sufficient to demolish, in a counterblow, all of Russia's sizeable cities. But, if conversely, America had made such an attack against Russia's air bases and rocket bases of known location, Russia's residual counterblow could not have caused any comparable destruction.

To-day, America's strategic atomic striking forces are presumably still superior to those of Russia, by a factor of perhaps between three and ten, in the number of hydrogen bombs that they could deliver and, presumably, America could maintain this kind of numerical superiority in the years to come. She could not however, by doing so, keep Russia from steadily increasing her "residual striking capacity." In recent years, Russia has steadily proceeded with the hardening of her rocket-launching sites and the building of additional submarines, capable of launching long-range rockets. To-day, she has reached the point where her "residual counterblow" would be sufficient to demolish most of America's major cities on the Eastern Seaboard and some of her cities in the West. This is a higher price than America would be willing to pay for reaching her political objectives, in any of the conflicts that might be expected to occur in the predictable future. In other words, to-day Russia's "residual striking capacity" would be sufficient to inflict "unacceptable damage" on America. Conversely, America's residual striking capacity would be sufficient to-day to demolish all of Russia's cities of over 100,000.

It might be true that to-day America would still be able to recover from an all-out atomic war, whereas Russia would lose all of her cities of over 100,000 and thus suffer a destruction of her society from which she would not recover.

In the situation in which we find ourselves at present we no longer try to "deter" Russia with threatening a massive strategic strike against her cities. We realize that to-day such a threat would come very close to being a threat of murder and suicide and clearly a threat of this sort would not be believable in any conflict in which major American interests might be at stake, but not America's existence as a nation. Instead, we are currently maintaining a military posture which threatens to lead step by step to an escalation of the war and ultimately to our accepting "unacceptable" damage, in return for the virtually complete destruction of Russia's society. We maintain this military posture in order to discourage Russia from embarking on any military conquest.

Right after the Second World War the security of Western Europe was threatened by the combination of communist pressure from the inside and the possibility of a Russian military intervention from the outside. To-day the Russians would be exceedingly unlikely to embark on a conquest of Western Europe whether or not we maintained our current military posture, but —because of the military posture we maintain— if a war broke out, as the result of a border incident or an uprising in Eastern Germany, it would be likely to escalate and to end up with an exchange of strategic atomic strikes between America and Russia.

Presumably only conventional weapons would be used at the outset of such a war. At some point during the see-saw of fighting Russia might be tempted however to send her troops in hot

pursuit across the pre-war boundary and they might penetrate deep into Western territory. In case of a deep penetration of Western Europe by Russian troops our plans call for the use of tactical weapons not only in combat against troops which have penetrated the pre-war boundary but also against the lines of communications of the Russians in Eastern Germany, Poland and Russia, herself. If, conversely, certain NATO units were to penetrate into Eastern Germany the Russians would presumably bomb communication lines in Western Europe including the ports where American troops disembark. Because the size of tactical bombs ranges all the way from one kiloton to several hundred kilotons, there is no substantial gap between where tactical bombings end and where strategic bombings begin. Thus, a war that neither America nor Russia wanted could easily end up in an all-out atomic war between them.

The risk that such a war in Europe might end up in an all-out atomic war is the price that we are paying for maintaining our present military posture. To my mind this is far too high a price to pay for deterring Russia from something that she wouldn't be likely to do anyway.

* * *

A meaningful agreement on arms control based on the concept of the minimal deterrent would limit not only the number of the strategic bombs retained, but also the number, as well as the size, of the tactical bombs retained. The size of these bombs might be limited to one kiloton and America, as well as Russia, might each be limited to perhaps 300 such bombs.

The total tonnage of the tactical bombs retained by either side would thus amount to only a few per cent of the total tonnage of the strategic bombs retained by them, still it would amount to about ten per cent of the tonnage of high explosives dropped during the last world war.

By establishing a wide gap between the size of the tactical bombs retained, one kiloton, and the size of the strategic bombs retained, presumably about one megaton or larger, one may establish a clear distinction between bombs which might be used against troops in combat and bombs which have been retained only to be used in a counterblow, in retaliation for a strategic strike.

America ought to resolve and to proclaim that she will not resort to the use of tactical bombs if there is a war in Europe, except in case of a 100 mile deep penetration of Western Europe by Russian troops and would then use them only within the Western side of the pre-war boundary —as long as Russia imposes similar limitations upon herself. Then, if a war were to start in Europe which neither America nor Russia wanted it would be less likely to end up with an exchange of strategic strikes between America and Russia.

Even the limited numbers of tactical bombs retained could have an important effect on the course of the war, if such a war were to break out in Europe, and their effect could be to slow down the war and stabilize a front across Europe provided that America and Russia imposed upon themselves the restraints spelled out above. For if Russian troops were to cross in hot pursuit the pre-war boundary and were to penetrate one hundred miles deep into Western Europe, with America in possession of tactical bombs, the Russians could not very well mass troops and conventional armor at any point in front of the American defense line in sufficient strength to break through that line. Conversely, Russia would gain the same advantage from her possession of tactical bombs if certain NATO units were to cross the pre-war boundary and were to penetrate one hundred miles into Eastern Europe. The fear that atomic bombs might be dropped on troops, massed for a breakthrough, would thus tend to stabilize a front across Europe, giving time for tempers to cool and for ending the war by a settlement.

No agreement providing for arms control, would be likely to withstand the strain of a protracted war in Europe, however.

Saturation Parity

In the last few years, Russia has steadily proceeded with the building of submarines capable of launching rockets and with the hardening of her long-range rocket bases, located on Russian territory. It is clear that, in time, Russia must reach the point where her "residual striking capacity" would be large enough to demolish all of America's sizeable cities. AT THAT POINT RUSSIA WILL HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY OF SATURATION. Russia may reach saturation parity, at a modest economic sacrifice, within a very few years.

General Le May said, in a major speech, reported in the WASHINGTON POST of December 18, 1963, that those, who argue that the United States has an extensive over-kill, favor cutting

American strategic striking forces so they would only be capable of hitting cities. He said that such a reduced force, would leave the United States too weak "to destroy the enemy's nuclear forces before they destroy us," and that America's maintenance of "superior counterforce strength" gives American policy makers the widest range of credible options for controlled responses to aggression at any level. According to General Le May, this paid off during the Berlin and Cuban crises in which the United States forced Russia to back down and won her political objectives, because the Russians knew that the United States had a clear margin of strategic nuclear strength.

I do not propose to take issue with General Le May at this point, except to say that the "deterrent effect" of America's margin of strategic nuclear strength obviously comes to an end when the striking forces of the Soviet Union reach saturation parity with those of the United States. If our "margin" was in fact responsible for Russia's yielding in the Berlin and Cuban crises, then if another similar crisis were to occur, after Russia reaches saturation parity, we would no longer have any reason to expect that Russia would yield always.

Had Russia not yielded in the Cuban crisis of October 1962, and had her ships continued on their course to Cuba, in defiance of America's proclamation of a partial naval blockade of that island, American warships would have sunk Russian ships. No one can say how far escalation would have gone and whether Russia, being unable to resist America in the Caribbean, would have retaliated elsewhere, perhaps in Europe.

General Le May believes that if it had come to an armed clash in the Cuban crisis, because of the superiority of our strategic striking forces the Russians would have put an end to escalation, at some point along the line. But even if one were to accept this view one could still not predict which of the two countries would take the first step to halt escalation, if a similar clash were to occur a few years hence, in the symmetrical situation of saturation parity. And, if it is no longer possible to say who would put an end to escalation, then also one cannot predict just how far escalation might go. In saturation parity, escalation might go to the point where all of America's and all of Russia's cities of over 100,000 get demolished.

Manifestly, saturation parity presents a threat to the survival of our society.

* * *

Let us consider now how saturation parity may be expected to affect our allies, in general, and Western Germany, in particular:

Let us ask ourselves, for example, what would have happened if there had occurred a few years ago a major uprising in Eastern Germany against the established government and if substantial units of armed West German volunteers had moved into East Germany to assist the insurgents. Presumably at first one would not have known with certainty whether these volunteers were acting with the tacit approval, and active participation, of the West German Government, or whether they were acting against its wishes, and in disregard of its orders. Had such a contingency occurred a few years ago, the odds are that America would have extended protection to West Germany against the strategic striking forces of Russia, on the ground that America must prevent the destruction of West German military power. America would have been likely to extend such protection to West Germany whether Germany was, or was not, the aggressor, and if there had been any doubt of this score, Germany would have been given the benefit of the doubt.

If a contingency of this sort were to occur in the years to come, and if the Russians were to fear that the clash might escalate into an all-out atomic war, they might decide to knock West Germany out of the war by dropping, all at once, between five and ten hydrogen bombs, on West German cities. Having done this, Russia would then be in the position to speak to America as follows:

"German aggression forced us to do what we did, lest the clash of arms escalate into an all-out atomic war, which neither Russia nor America want. We realize that America could now respond by demolishing one Russian city after another, but for every Russian city that America may demolish Russia would demolish one American city. Let's be rational about this. What has happened, has happened; let's see now where we go from here. Russia does not intend to occupy any West German territory and she is willing to put up a few percent of her industrial output to help rebuild the cities of West Germany, provided her contribution is matched, dollar-for-dollar, by America."

The Russians would hardly assume that the Americans would respond in a rational fashion if they were to drop bombs on American cities but, in the contingency described above, they might, rightly or wrongly, expect a rational response, if they demolished German cities only and refrained from extending their attack to America's own territory.

The nations of Europe are becoming gradually aware of the situation they will face in saturation parity and they are beginning to ask themselves whether they may not have to maintain each a strategic striking force under its own control in order to safeguard their own security.

Few people contemplate with equanimity the possibility that Germany may acquire a substantial atomic striking force. There are those in America who believe that we might keep Germany from wanting to have such a striking force under her own control, by setting up a strategic striking force under the joint control of America and Germany, with perhaps a few other nations joining in. The multilateral strategic striking force under discussion would be equipped with two hundred Polaris missiles, enough to demolish two hundred cities, if all of them were to reach their target, yet it would not give the Germans what they need in saturation parity, as long as America can veto the use of this force. There is reason to believe that the Germans propose to participate in it only because they assume that it may be possible for them to get rid of the veto.

The creation of such a strategic striking force would make it possible to endow West Germany, by the mere stroke of a pen, with a striking force of her own, a force corresponding in size perhaps to the financial stake that Germany would have in the joint force. Those Americans who advocate the setting up of such a joint force, in order to keep the Germans from having a force under their own control, follow the principle of the lesser evil. Following this same principle could lead to transferring to Germany control of a part of the joint force later on, if Germany should proclaim that they would otherwise build a substantial striking force of their own.

It is doubtful whether control over atomic bombs can be kept from the Germans by a gadget like the multilateral nuclear striking force, or for that matter by any gadget, AND IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF ATOMIC BOMBS IF SATURATION PARITY WERE TO PREVAIL.

* * *

Under an agreement based on the concept of the "minimal deterrent" which would leave Russia in possession of say, twelve bombs and rockets, Russia would put herself at a disadvantage if, in the contingency discussed above, she were to use up five to ten of her twelve bombs and rockets in a "first strike" against German cities. If she were to do this, she would have only two to seven bombs and rockets left, in comparison to the forty bombs and rockets retained by America and she would therefore put herself to a disadvantage in the crisis that would follow her attack. In this sense an agreement limiting Russia to twelve bombs and rockets would provide protection to the cities of our allies in Western Europe, but this would be true only if we could be certain that Russia would not secretly retain say another twelve strategic bombs and rockets which are operational, or could be made operational on short notice. The measures of inspection instituted at the outset of the agreement would not be likely to give us any certainty in this regard because initially we might have to be satisfied with measures of inspection which give us assurance that Russia cannot secretly retain a striking force large enough to be capable of destroying a significant fraction of our minimal striking forces.

It is therefore necessary to explore what additional measures of inspection would provide our allies with the protection they need and whether such measures would be acceptable to Russia.

In an extended conversation which I had with Chairman Khrushchev in October of 1960, I said that even if Russia were willing to admit international inspectors in unlimited numbers it would not be possible for us to be sure that there would not remain a few bombs and rockets hidden somewhere in Russia which are operational, or could be made operational very quickly. I told Khrushchev that I believed that the Soviet Government could reassure the world in this regard only if they were to create conditions in which we could rely on a Soviet citizen reporting secret violations of the agreement to an international authority. He got the point, got it fully and his answer was gratifying.

I would not attach as much significance to this as I do, if I had not accidentally discovered in December of the same year when I attended the Pugwash meeting in Moscow that some of our colleagues of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, scheduled to attend this meeting, had been given a detailed report of my conversation with Chairman Khrushchev. In this report, Khrushchev was

quoted to have said to me that, for the sake of making general disarmament acceptable to the United States, the Soviet Government would give serious consideration to creating conditions which would make it possible for the world to rely on a Soviet citizen reporting violations of the disarmament agreement to an international authority.

After the Pugwash meeting, I stayed on in Moscow for about a month and had numerous private conversations with our Russian colleagues. I wanted to discover most of all whether the Soviet Government could, if it wanted to, create conditions in which the world could rely on Russian citizens reporting violations of the disarmament agreement. I finally concluded that this would not be easy but that it would be done, provided the arms control agreement offered Russia a substantial increase in her security and permitted the Soviet Government to divert substantial funds from armament to other uses.

I believe that it would be much easier to get the Soviet Government to accept very far-reaching measures of inspection for the sake of obtaining an objective that makes sense to them, than to get them to accept quite limited measures of inspection for the sake of any "first steps" which would not offer any major direct benefits to Russia.

* * *

Speaking before the Economic Club of New York on November 18, 1963, Secretary McNamara stated that we have now more than 500 operational long-range ballistic missiles and are planning to increase their number to over 1700 by 1966. In addition, we have to-day over 500 bombers on quick-reaction ground alert. In his speech, McNamara refers to the "damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces", which I take to mean our capability of making massive attacks against Russia's strategic air bases and rocket bases of known location.

It is my contention that we will not be able to negotiate a meaningful agreement on arms control until we are willing to give up what General Le May calls our "capability to destroy the enemy's forces before they destroy us" and that by giving it up we would gain more than what we would lose.

If I were given an opportunity to cross-examine General Le May, I would ask him what contingencies he has in mind when he speaks of "destroying the enemy's nuclear forces before they destroy us." It would then turn out that while we could invoke the "damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces" by making a massive attack against Russia's strategic air fields and rocket launching sites of known location in certain conceivable contingencies, these contingencies are very contrived and are most unlikely to occur.

The "damage-limiting capability of our numerically superior forces" might have a certain marginal value in the least probable contingencies, but in the most probable contingency if a war were to break out which neither Russia nor America want our capability of making a sudden massive attack against Russia's rocket-launching sites of known location would render an escalation of the war more likely rather than less likely. For if the superiority of our strategic striking forces is anywhere as great as General Le May claims then, if war broke out, the Russians might fear at some point that our next move in the pursuit of war would be the waging of a massive strike against their rocket bases of known location and at that point they might be impelled to launch rockets against our cities and the cities of our allies from all of their bases which are vulnerable to an attack.

There is no need to belabor this point, however, because of "superiority of our strategic striking forces" of which General Le May speaks is at best a vanishing asset, which will not exist tomorrow. Within a few years now we shall have saturation parity and in that situation Russia will no longer have to fear a massive strike against her rocket bases of known location.

In saturation parity—as far as the strategic striking forces are concerned—America and Russia will find themselves in a fully symmetrical situation, and at this time the only meaningful choice before us is between the symmetrical situation of saturation parity, in which both America and Russia maintain strategic striking forces at a high level, and another symmetrical situation in which they both maintain strategic striking forces at a "minimal level."

More and more people within the Administration realize that it would be futile and increasingly dangerous to continue to use our strategic striking forces as a deterrent, the way we used them in the past, and that these forces must be used only for the purpose of threatening a counterblow in case of an atomic attack directed against our territory. Those who take this position inevitably arrive in time at realizing that both America and Russia would gain, rather than lose,

in security by reducing their strategic striking forces from the level of saturation parity to the level of the minimal deterrent.

* * *

We must ask ourselves at this point under what conditions would Russia want to have an agreement based on this concept, and want it strongly enough to be prepared to pay the price in terms of the measures of inspection needed.

I think that Russia would have no desire to enter into such an agreement unless she could be sure that it would not be necessary for her later on to abrogate the agreement and to rebuild her atomic striking forces so to speak from scratch. Thus, Russia would have to be convinced that Germany is not going to have under her own control an atomic striking force, and also that China would not build a substantial atomic striking force of her own.

I do not know what it would take to induce China to forego having atomic bombs, but it is conceivable that China might be willing to go along with an agreement on arms control that would leave America and Russia in possession of minimal strategic striking forces, provided that in return America would agree not to resort to the use of either strategic, or tactical, atomic bombs in the Far East and Southeast Asia, and the setting up an atom-free zone that would include these areas.

There are those who say that America could not agree to forego the use of atomic bombs in the Pacific because it might be necessary to use atomic bombs in the defense of Formosa.

Quite similar views were voiced at the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations which was held in Geneva in the 1930's. At issue at this conference was the elimination of the bomber plane from the national arsenals and the outlawing of bombing from the air. At one point during the negotiations, Anthony Eden, who was at that time a civil servant, told the Conference that His Majesty's Government could not be a party to the outlawing of bombing from the air. He said that, from time to time, the Royal Air Force engage in the bombing of the mud huts of the unruly tribes on the Northern frontier of India and that this was the only effective way to keep these tribes from making periodic incursions into Indian territory. Some people have no sense of proportions.

* * *

It is probably true that we cannot have general disarmament without also having a far-reaching political settlement. The conclusion of an agreement providing for arms control based on the concept of the minimal deterrent need not await however a political settlement in Europe, or elsewhere. Moreover, in view of our current estimates of Russia's military manpower and resources we need no longer insist that the reduction of the number of bombs and rockets to a minimal level must be accompanied by the reduction of the conventionally-armed forces. Rather, we may rely on economic considerations to limit the armies maintained by the nations of Europe, including Russia.

The reduction of the strategic striking forces to the "minimal" level spelled out above need not take place at the very outset of the agreement, all at once, but there would have to be substantial step-by-step reductions to intermediate levels soon after the agreement goes into force. What matters is not so much in what steps, and just how fast, a reduction of the strategic striking force takes place, but rather whether America and Russia are in full agreement on the level of the "minimal" striking forces which would be retained under the agreement.

In these circumstances, Russia and America could enter into conversations aimed at reaching a meeting of the minds on the reduction of the number of atomic bombs and rockets to a minimal level and could thereafter seek the concurrence of the other nations, including Germany and China.

If these conversations were carried far enough to convince the Russians that an agreement could be negotiated without running into any major hitches, then the Russians might accept a production cut-off in bombs and rockets, even before an agreement based on the minimal deterrent is fully spelled out, with the i's dotted and the t's crossed and for the purposes of a production cut-off the United States would be presumably satisfied with inspection limited to production facilities of known location.

* * *

Postscript

I do not know anyone in the Department of Defense who would not on the whole agree with the analysis, given above, of the perils of saturation parity and the security to be gained from the "minimal deterrent." Some people in the Defense Department might say that I am overstating my case, that it would not be sufficient for us to retain forty large bombs and rockets because only a certain fraction of the Polaris and Minutemen launched would reach their target, the rest being duds. They might say therefore that instead of forty bombs and rockets we ought to retain perhaps 100 or 150 of them. These are not essential differences, because as the reliability rating of our rockets increases their numbers could be more or less automatically reduced.

Others in the Defense Department might say, not publicly but privately, that I am understating my case when I say that Russia may achieve saturation parity within a few years and that Russia has achieved saturation parity already. This is not an essential difference either.

I should perhaps add that I am not personally acquainted with any of those in the Defense Department who are part of the "military-industrial complex" of which President Eisenhower spoke in his Presidential Farewell Address, and who have a vested interest, emotional or otherwise, in maintaining large strategic striking forces. Even though these people do not occupy top positions in the Administration they must be reckoned with because they have considerable influence in the Congress.

While the "military-industrial complex" might well attempt to block any significant reduction of our strategic striking forces, when such a reduction becomes a "clear and present danger", our current failure to make any decisive progress on arms control must not be attributed to them. Rather, this failure is mainly due to our method of negotiating with the Russians.

We have not made so far, and are not likely to make in the predictable future, a formal proposal on arms control which the Russians could accept, as it stands, for fear that the proposal would become the starting point of a "horse trading" and that we would end up with an agreement that might endanger our security.

Each time we introduce a new feature into our proposals, which we hope could create a basis for negotiations, it takes the Russians about six months to respond. This sluggishness of the Russian response is not surprising because there are few people concerned with the problem of arms control working within the Russian Government who are capable of coping with the unprecedented problems involved. These few men have their hands full, taking care of the day-to-day problems and cannot devote much time to long-term planning. This may well be the reason why the Russians take so long to respond, even if we propose something that clearly would be in their interest to accept.

The number of those working within our Administration who can cope with these problems is larger, but it is not large. These men are plagued by being uncertain as to what the Russians would be likely to accept and also what the Congress would be likely to accept.

Not knowing what the Russians might accept forces them to consider a large number of alternatives. "Selling" any of these alternatives to the rest of the Administration is arduous work and none of the alternatives can be broached to the Russians without first putting it through the mill in Washington. The handful of people who do this work are highly motivated but still they are only human, and the job that needs to be done is not going to be done unless they can be given a better idea of what the Russians would be likely to accept and what the Congress would be likely to accept.

What the Russians would accept and what the Congress would accept depends on whether the Administration can make them understand the need to avoid a new arms race, the perils which we face in the current situation and the advantages that an agreement based on the concept of the minimal deterrent would hold for all concerned. Unless it becomes somehow possible to arrange for greatly improved communications between the Administration and the Soviet Government, on the one hand, and between the Administration and the Congress, on the other hand, no decisive progress towards a meaningful agreement on arms control is going to be made. Instead, we might be taking a number of little steps, like the test ban, for instance. These little steps improve the international climate, but if nothing decisive is done before long, the climate may keep on improving and improving until there is a new crisis and, then we shall be back where we started from. To make progress is not enough, for if the progress is not fast enough, something is going to overtake us.

THE END

Letters to The Times

Talking Peace With Russia

Support for President's 'Peace Offensive' Urged by Physicist

The writer of the following letter, professor at M.I.T. and a participant in Pugwash conferences, has written extensively on arms control.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

Only slightly over three months ago most Washington observers, commenting on the struggle for Senate ratification of the limited test-ban treaty, were predicting that it would be a long time before it would again become politically feasible for an American President to strive for arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Yet the new year finds President Johnson announcing a "peace offensive" and a rash of official and unofficial statements calling for further agreements to reduce international tensions and reverse the arms race.

But relief and gratification over this welcome turn of events should not cause us to overlook a simple truth—that agreement is a two-way street on which we on our part must be prepared to recognize and accommodate Russian security requirements at the same time that we strive to enhance our own.

For example, we rightfully insist that any political settlement in Central Europe must take into account the legitimate aspirations of the German people for the eventual peaceful reunification of their country, as well as including guarantees in the interim for the continued freedom of West Berlin.

Guaranteeing Borders

But are we also willing to join in a guarantee of the integrity of the present eastern borders of Germany? Or to accommodate the deeply felt conviction of most Europeans that a united, militarily powerful Germany, possessing nuclear weapons, would present a grave threat to their security?

If we and our German allies were willing to accept binding limitations on German military power it might well be possible to arrive at agreements which would permit and encourage the Germans to work out among themselves the problems of their unification.

In the present situation of effective nuclear stalemate—in which both we and the Soviets possess sufficient long-range nuclear weapons to guarantee that neither could destroy by any offensive action the ability of the other to inflict unacceptably destructive retaliation—it should surely be possible for us both to pause in the further accumulation and improvement of such weapons.

Arms Reduction

But such a halt in the nuclear race could hardly last unless it were soon followed by agreement to reduce the present awesome arsenals to much smaller levels commensurate with the needs of what we call the "minimum deterrent" and what the Russians call the "nuclear umbrella." Such an agreement will require inspection—though neither as much nor as intrusive in character as is generally believed.

The price of acceptance by the Russians of such inspection will certainly include our willingness to cut back substantially from present numbers (i.e., to take seriously the "minimum" aspect of the deterrent) and to move from our present numerical superiority toward a situation approaching nuclear parity.

Realistically, the current "peace-probe" will probably proceed for some time by small unilateral initiatives on our part or the Russians', designed to call forth further tension-reducing responses by the other side—what Premier Khrushchev recently called the "policy of mutual example." But such steps will only be significant insofar as they are a prelude to serious negotiation aimed at settling outstanding differences and reducing the burdens and dangers of excessive arms.

Without the willingness on the part of the American people and the Senate to support our President, recognizing that negotiation must involve "give" as well as "take," these negotiations will be doomed to failure. And this failure could signal a new phase of the arms race, out of which we would be unlikely to emerge intact. BERNARD T. FELD.

Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 12, 1964.

Council for a Livable World
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

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Dear Council Supporter:

At this time of its regular semi-annual request for financial contributions, the Council is engaged in the most strenuous lobbying and educational effort of its existence. The United States Senate, for the first time in years, is moving toward a fundamental reassessment of the vast military spending programs that until now have received almost automatic approval. The focus of the new mood is the multi-billion dollar Sentinel anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program initiated by the last Administration but now tentatively suspended in the face of unprecedented Congressional and public criticism.

The enclosed Washington Bulletin relates the remarkable series of events that led Defense Secretary Laird early in February to halt Sentinel construction and to announce a Pentagon review of the "available options." The Administration is now expected to ask Congress for funds for an ABM system reduced or modified to make it politically more palatable than Sentinel--but still sizeable enough to satisfy intense military pressure for a major new weapons system which could be expanded almost indefinitely at a later and more propitious time. Only the Senate can block such a request--and the Senate is presently almost evenly divided over ABM.

Through seminars, background papers and private discussions, the Council is making an all-out effort to provide Senators and their staffs with the best available independent evaluation of ABM and its implications. Our most recent ABM seminar, held last week, was attended by 26 Senators and provided many of those present with their first opportunity to hear knowledgeable analysis of ABM different from that supplied by the Pentagon.

We are convinced that the Council's efforts have contributed substantially to the rising mood of independent review of national priorities and military spending. In the days ahead we intend to step up our opposition to ABM and to press for international agreement for mutual arms limitations and reductions. But we must have your help. We ask you to do two things:

First, contribute as generously as you are able to the Council at this time. Heavy demands on the Council's funds during the closing days of the 1968 elections have left our operating balance exceptionally low. A contribution return envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Second, we urge that you wire or write to your Senators and your Representative, voicing your opposition to the deployment of ABM. Enclosed is a survey of the positions taken by Senators based on ABM votes in 1968. In addition, you may wish to join with a local citizens group opposing ABM, or to help form a group where none now exists. The Council's Washington office will be glad to supply you with information and materials if you so indicate on the enclosed form.

Sincerely yours,

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld
President

Matthew Meselson

Matthew Meselson
Treasurer

SENATORS' POSITIONS ON SENTINEL IN 1968*

Opposed Deployment in 1968 (40)

Aiken (R-Vt) McGovern (D-S.D.)
 Boggs (R-Del) Metcalf (D-Mont)
 Brooke (R-Mass) Mondale (D-Minn)
 Burdick (D-N.D.) Moss (D-Utah)
 Case (R-N.J.) Muskie (D-Me)
 Church (D-Ida) Nelson (D-Wisc)
 Cooper (R-Ky) Pell (D-R.I.)
 Ellender (D-La) Percy (R-Ill)
 Fulbright (D-Ark) Prouty (R-Vt)
 Gore (D-Tenn) Proxmire (D-Wisc)
 Goodell (R-N.Y.) Randolph (D-W.Va.)
 Hart (D-Mich) Ribicoff (D-Conn)
 Hartke (D-Ind) Scott (R-Pa)
 Hatfield (R-Ore) Smith (R-Me)
 Inouye (D-Hawaii) Symington (D-Mo)
 Javits (R-N.Y.) Tydings (D-Md)
 Jordan (R-Ida) Williams (D-N.J.)
 Kennedy (D-Mass) Williams (R-Del)
 Mansfield (D-Mont) Yarborough (D-Tex)
 McCarthy (D-Minn) Young (D-Ohio)

Favored Deployment in 1968 (45)

Allott (R-Colo) Hruska (R-Neb)
 Anderson (D-N.M.) Jackson (D-Wash)
 Baker (R-Tenn) Jordan (D-N.C.)
 Bayh (D-Ind) Long (D-La)
 Bennett (R-Utah) Magnuson (D-Wash)
 Bible (D-Nev) McClellan (D-Ark)
 Byrd (D-Va) McGee (D-Wyo)
 Byrd (D-W.Va.) McIntyre (D-N.H.)
 Cannon (D-Nev) Miller (R-Iowa)
 Cotton (R-N.H.) Montoya (D-N.M.)
 Curtis (R-Neb.) Mundt (R-S.D.)
 Dirksen (R-Ill) Murphy (R-Calif)
 Dodd (D-Conn) Pastore (D-R.I.)
 Dominick (R-Colo) Pearson (R-Kans)
 Eastland (D-Miss) Russell (D-Ga)
 Ervin (D-N.C.) Sparkman (D-Ala)
 Fannin (R-Ariz) Spong (D-Va)
 Fong (R-Hawaii) Stennis (D-Miss)
 Griffin (R-Mich) Talmadge (D-Ga)
 Hansen (R-Wyo) Thurmond (R-S.C.)
 Harris (D-Okla) Tower (R-Tex)
 Holland (D-Fla) Young (R-N.D.)
 Hollings (D-S.C.)

Not in the Senate in 1968 (15)

Allen (D-Ala)
 Bellmon (R-Okla)
 Cook (R-Ky)
 Cranston (D-Calif)
 Dole (R-Kans)
 Eagleton (D-Mo)
 Gravel (D-Alaska)
 Goldwater (R-Ariz)
 Gurney (R-Fla)
 Hughes (D-Iowa)
 Mathias (R-Md)
 Packwood (R-Ore)
 Saxbe (R-Ohio)
 Schweiker (R-Pa)
 Stevens (R-Alaska)

*Based on votes on amendments to deny Sentinel deployment funds on April 18 (28-31)

June 24 (34-52)

August 1 (27-46)

October 2 (25-45)

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



WASHINGTON BULLETIN

March 1969

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

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No arms control and disarmament issue has been of greater concern to the Council than the Anti-Ballistic Missile program. Since 1962 we have conducted an intensive long-range information campaign on ABM through seminars, individual briefings and private discussions with Senators from both sides of the aisle and with their staffs. You probably remember receiving from us last year the booklet "ABM - Point of No Return?", which has been reprinted twice and is shortly to be reissued in a revised edition.

We were dismayed, and so were many others, when the Johnson Administration announced in September 1967 that on "marginal grounds" a "thin" ABM system was to be deployed against China. The name Sentinel was given to the proposed China defense. The appropriation in fiscal 1969 amounted to \$927.6 million. During the summer and fall of 1968 a running floor fight was waged by Senators opposed to Sentinel. They introduced amendments which would have struck out the authorizations and appropriations for deployment while retaining funds for research and development. The Council was closely involved in these efforts to defeat Sentinel. Since 1965, 11 seminars for Senators, Senate staff and the press have been devoted to the ABM issue. Speakers for these seminars have included former Presidential science advisors Drs. George B. Kistiakowsky and Jerome B. Wiesner; Nobel Laureate Dr. Hans A. Bethe; Dr. Ralph Lapp; Dr. Franklin A. Long; and Dr. George W. Rathjens. Over 40 Senators have attended these ABM seminars.

During 1968 the Council provided extensive aid to Senators opposing Sentinel deployment, assisting in the preparation of position papers and speech materials. The Council was also active in coordinating the activities of other interested Washington organizations, and providing background briefings to members of the Washington press corps.

There were four critical roll-call votes on Sentinel in 1968, and its critics picked up new allies with each successive vote. In the opinion of at least one Senator, had the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia not preceded the last of these four roll-calls, on an amendment to the Defense Appropriation Bill voted on October 2, there is a strong possibility that Sentinel might have been defeated. Nevertheless, a total of forty-six Senators voted to delete ABM deployment funds from one or another of the four major bills.

What is particularly significant is that Senate opposition to Sentinel developed in the absence of strong constituent pressure. Most of the external impetus consisted of the efforts of the Council and a few other organizations to help Senators obtain expert information, and some anti-Sentinel editorials in the press.

Toward the end of 1968, however, public protest began to grow near Sentinel sites located at Boston, Seattle, Detroit and Chicago. In Seattle the uproar forced the Army to abandon its site in the heart of the city in favor of another a few miles away. At Chicago, where the Army had selected a site near Libertyville, Illinois, public interest and opposition grew as Congressman

Sidney Yates held well-publicized hearings and the Northern Illinois Citizens Against ABM filed a lawsuit to enjoin the Army from proceeding with construction of Sentinel. Similar hearings and protest meetings were held in Detroit.

But these efforts were not sufficient to persuade the Sentinel proponents to take a second look. The outgoing Johnson Administration on January 15 requested \$1,788 million in new Sentinel funds, spokesmen for the incoming Nixon Administration expressed approval of the program, and as the 91st Congress convened the changes for a successful Senate fight looked very slim.

But the level of public interest continued to rise. The national news media had begun to take greater notice of the issue, with live television coverage of public meetings, special documentary programs, and feature articles in major periodicals. By the middle of January the cumulative effect of the first stirrings of citizen protest may have started to generate uneasiness among Sentinel supporters, both in Congress and the new Administration.

It was in the wake of these efforts that the momentum generated by a highly successful public meeting in the Boston area led directly to a dramatic reversal of what had seemed a hopeless situation.

Of the many Sentinel sites across the country, construction work was underway at only the two near Boston, the Army not having yet taken title to any others. Faced with the prospect that the last real hope to stop Sentinel was about to vanish, representatives of the Council met in mid-January with a number of people in the Boston area for an emergency meeting to discuss the possibility of launching a local public protest movement. Within a week an informal group was set up and as word of its formation spread through the area hundreds of Massachusetts citizens went to work setting up local meetings and committees, writing Congressmen and Senators, telephoning to radio "talk programs", circulating petitions, and informing their friends and neighbors.

As in other cities designated for Sentinel deployment, the Army had scheduled a meeting in Reading, Massachusetts, one of the two Boston-area installations, for January 29. The purpose was to acquaint the local citizens with minor engineering and construction details. A few hours before the meeting the new Boston group held a press conference to announce they were forming a New England ABM opposition movement and to issue a statement criticizing Sentinel.

The Army was represented at Reading by a team of engineers led by General R. S. Young, Corps of Engineers. They had come--a bland, affable panel of brass--to hear local complaints and to discuss "housekeeping" details: The level of local swamps might rise by one inch; there would be no appreciable effect on highway traffic; the increase in school enrollment would be one additional pupil per class; they would build a new National Guard rifle range to replace the one they were taking; trees would be planted to preserve the "aesthetic" nature of the site. For them Sentinel was a fait accompli, all the necessary decisions having long since been taken by the appropriate authorities--the Joint Chiefs, the Congressional Committees and the Administration.

In the 1,100-seat Reading High School auditorium the General and his three colonels found themselves confronted by an angry and deeply troubled overflow audience of 1,500 which had come to find answers to a rather different set of questions. What was the rationale for Sentinel? Would it protect them or simply increase the dangers they faced? What was the probability of a thermonuclear accident at the site? Who had authority to order the missiles launched? The President? The local commander? Or a computer, perhaps?

The people asking these questions had not participated in the decision to deploy Sentinel. They had simply discovered one day that large amounts of nearby real estate had been transferred to the Army, that thermonuclear warheads were being emplaced virtually in their backyards and that billions of dollars were to be diverted from the most pressing domestic needs to buy another new weapons system, untested, probably unreliable and ineffective, which almost all non-governmental experts had severely criticized.

For the Army and for Sentinel the evening was a disaster. On Thursday morning Boston newspapers carried headlines reading "Angry Reading Crowd Greet ABM Delegates" and "Crowd is Strongly Anti-anti-Missile." Within the next few days a succession of developments took place, as the chronology below indicates, with phenomenal rapidity and with results beyond the wildest dreams of most ABM opponents.

- Jan. 29: Press conference and town meeting at Reading, Mass.
- Jan. 30: Secretary of Defense Laird, at his first news conference, announces he wishes to retain the Sentinel system as a bargaining counter in any future arms negotiations with the Soviet Union.
- Jan. 31: Senator Brooke (R-Mass) calls for a re-examination of the Sentinel system.
- Feb. 1: Senator Kennedy (D-Mass), in a letter to Secretary Laird, urges the freezing of Sentinel construction funds pending a review.
- Feb. 2: Former Vice President Humphrey, in a Washington Post interview, explains he had "always been skeptical in my own mind about the security value of deploying an ABM defense."
- Feb. 4: Nine Senators, led by John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky), join in a colloquy against ABM.

Mendel Rivers (D-S. C.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, writes Secretary Laird to ask that he hold up the project and to inform him that the House committee would not approve any further Sentinel sites until the new Administration clarified its intentions regarding the program.

Massachusetts State Senate calls for a halt to Sentinel construction.

- Feb. 6: Defense Secretary Laird announces all work on the Sentinel system is to be halted until a complete national defense review has been completed.

The magnitude of the victory may have been far greater than the decision to reconsider construction of Sentinel would indicate. During the February 4 anti-ABM colloquy, the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Stennis (D-Miss), took the floor to say "I have told the staff (of the Armed Services Committee) that I am not going to pass on this matter, on my own part, solely on the testimony of government witnesses." This apparently innocuous statement constitutes an astonishing victory for the critics of the military-industrial-congressional complex. In the past it has been the practice of Armed Services Committee chairmen to invite to their hearings witnesses whose views were, for the most part, in conformity with their own. Stennis' concession means that in the future a substantially more democratic procedure may be observed when holding hearings.

For many years it has been unthinkable on Capitol Hill to question the military budget. The reluctance of members of the Congress, ordinarily so parsimonious, to scrutinize the vast defense expenditures has given the military a free ride. On Saturday, February 8, the honeymoon between the military and Congress may have come to a long-overdue end. Senator Mansfield (D-Mont), the majority leader, said that in the future Congress would "put a microscope" on defense budgets and he attributed the new attitude in part to the protests of the preceding days over Sentinel. Senator Javits (R-N. Y.) informed the press that never again would defense expenditures be treated as a "sacred cow."

The suspension of Sentinel deployment, the adoption of more democratic procedures in Congress, and closer scrutiny of the defense budget do not mean the Utopia has been reached. But certainly the so-called military-industrial complex has suffered its initial setbacks and we may have reached the first stage in restoring control over the military to the appropriate political and public authorities.

By his February 6 press conference statement that he did not accept the anti-China rationale for Sentinel, President Nixon made it all but impossible for the Army to push Sentinel again, at least as it was conceived in 1968. But ABM has by no means been defeated. There is little reason to doubt that the Nixon Administration will continue pushing vigorously for some form of ABM deployment following a review of the Sentinel program. Among the possibilities are:


- a "very thin" defense, consisting of about 100 missiles, capable of protecting the United States against the very few Chinese ICBM's which might survive a U. S. pre-emptive first strike;
- a "hard point" deployment of ABM's around ICBM launch sites only, with no provision for defense of population centers;
- a modified Sentinel deployment in which radars and launch facilities are moved farther away from populated areas, thereby reducing popular opposition but leaving the system essentially intact.

The Administration would view any of these alternatives as more palatable to the public in general, and therefore less likely to result in continued opposition. Furthermore, any of the three could serve as a stepping stone toward an expanded deployment later.

The opponents of ABM have won only the first round. The next may well be a much more difficult struggle against an Administration defending its own program, not one inherited from its predecessor.

The lesson learned in this first round of the Sentinel fight represents the key to final victory. Sentinel was stopped because civilians in a few cities across the country raised an outcry. Letters and telegrams to their Senators and Representatives, petitions for local hearings, and the wide-spread press, radio and television coverage did the trick. It was a magnificent illustration of the effectiveness of genuine grass-roots sentiment.

The Council and many other organizations will be making an all-out effort to fight ABM in Washington. But what is done in the Capital will have little meaning unless there is a general outcry against ABM. The difference between victory and defeat will be the active commitment of persons like yourself.



Allan Forbes, Jr.
Vice President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

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May 7, 1970

Dear Council Supporter:


In mid-March we sent you a copy of a special Council Memorandum, dated February 26, 1970, on the Administration's proposal for expanding the Safeguard ABM. The Memorandum was mailed to every member of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as to the editors of several hundred leading newspapers across the country. At this moment we are mounting a major campaign against ABM. We intend not only to block this proposed expansion but to put an end to the entire ABM program. We also have underway an all-out effort to forestall deployment of the MIRV'ed Minutemen III missile which the Pentagon has decided to rush through for a June start.

With our February 26 Memorandum you also received a letter asking for a contribution to help our fight against ABM and MIRV. We have had to double our Washington staff in order to cope with the added demands upon us. It is going to be a very hard fight. As you know, the President has committed himself personally and directly to a victory in the ABM struggle. The column by Messrs. Evans and Novak printed on the reverse side of this letter indicates the extent of the President's determination.

And now -- on top of ABM and MIRV -- the President has plunged the nation into a catastrophic extension of the war in Southeast Asia. Vietnamization has been replaced by re-Americanization and the Vietnamese war may well turn into a major conflagration. The Council has already taken a significant step to block this new escalation through legislative steps in the Senate and is preparing a number of other vital and critical approaches to stop the war. It is giving maximum assistance to the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Bill (H.R. 17123). This amendment would prevent the use of funds for the war after December 31, 1970.

Never before has the Council been so deeply and intensively involved in so many critical issues. The demands upon our resources have never been greater and never have we needed your support more than today. We must win all these battles. We must defeat ABM and MIRV and we must stop the war. It is unnecessary to stress the seriousness of the plight of our country in this desperate hour. The Council deeply appreciates your loyal support in the past and asks you to send a check by return mail. Your contribution is urgently needed.

Sincerely yours,



William Doering
Chairman

ROWLAND EVANS and ROBERT NOVAK

Nixon personally runs new battle for ABM

WASHINGTON—Proof that President Nixon has now taken personal charge of his biggest single battle with the Democratic Congress this year—Phase Two of the antiballistic missile (ABM) program—came in a private White House briefing session last Thursday, when he unleashed a frightening catalogue of warnings about Soviet weapons progress to his legislative leaders.

The somber report also contained an implied threat that senators who vote no on the ABM this Summer will risk political retribution for furthering Soviet ambitions. Mr. Nixon said:

"Those who would ask us to declare a unilateral moratorium on MIRV (multiple nuclear warheads) and ABM would concede to the Soviets the position of supremacy in military power on the globe." Deployment of MIRV starts soon, but the future of the ABM rests with Congress.

Speaking slowly from rough notes, Mr. Nixon flatly warned that "if present trends continue, the United States a very few years hence will find itself clearly in second position—with the Soviet Union undisputably the greatest military power on earth."

Hence, said Mr. Nixon, the U.S. cannot risk any unilateral concessions at the SALT arms-control talks with the Russians. More important, Congress must approve Phase Two of the ABM program as "the only major bargaining counter we have" in Vienna.

So overwhelming was Mr. Nixon's argument for Phase Two of the ABM program that Rep. Rogers Morton of Maryland, the Republican national chairman, asked whether his words could be used by the congressional leaders in making the case among their colleagues.

Not only did Mr. Nixon assent, he ordered a "talking copy" of his words typed up from his notes. This talking copy will be distributed this week to the legislative leaders for use in speeches and floor debate.

It makes chilling reading.

With deployment of 122 additional ICBM's last year, while the U.S. deployed none, the Soviets now "not only possess more long-range missiles than the United States, their nuclear delivery ca-

pability is 150 percent greater," Mr. Nixon said. They have also "initiated work" on another 125 ICBM's (presumably the giant SS-9).

Moreover, he sketched a frightening picture of Soviet missile-firing submarines, claiming that at current rates of deployment "by 1974 or 1975 at the latest the Soviet . . . force will be superior to that of the United States."

Mr. Nixon contended that 40 new ABM's were installed around Moscow last year (making a total of 64), while the U.S. plans "not a single ABM on the ground operating until 1974 or 1975."

The President's "talking paper" did not accuse Moscow of trying for a first-strike capability. But it warned of a more subtle danger—the effect on the rest of the world if Moscow should achieve a credible superiority over the U.S.

"The minute the word goes out . . . that the Soviet Union is the first power in the world, the eyes of Europe and Asia will no longer look to the United States but to Moscow," he said. "The American position in Europe and the Far East will crumble overnight."

As the administration's ABM campaign begins, passage of Phase Two is assured in the House, but chances in the Senate are only 50-50. On two key votes last year, Phase One—ABM deployment at two Minutemen sites in the Northwest—escaped defeat on a tie vote and by a margin of one vote (with 14 and then 13 Republicans opposing the President).

Phase Two adds a third site (Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri) and preparation of five additional sites.

In a switch from last year, the President has put the Pentagon, instead of his own White House staff, in charge of the lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill.

Moreover, a tentative decision has already been taken for Mr. Nixon to go to the country if the Senate remains precarious, as it almost surely will. Even so, Mr. Nixon's gamble is fraught with danger.

If he fails, by his own estimate the U.S. position at Vienna will be drastically weakened, but no more than his own position at home. Having built the stakes high, he is using every ounce of his political power to win.

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Newton, Mass.

May 10, 1971

Dear Council Supporter:

It is the Council's custom to make a major appeal on behalf of its Washington operations in the months following a Congressional election when reserve funds are always at their lowest. Response to our March 1st letter asking for contributions has been gratifying but according to our records we have not yet heard from you.

Over the past decade the Council has made a significant impact on United States foreign and defense policy through seminars, conferences, briefings, special meetings, the preparation of research papers and development of political strategies. Our effectiveness has been hailed by such divergent political figures as Vice-President Agnew and Senator Fulbright.

The primary focus of this year's Washington Program is the end of United States military involvement in mainland Southeast Asia. We are also working to ensure membership of China in the United Nations, to achieve a productive outcome of strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, to re-establish an effective, trustworthy international peacekeeping force, and to restore adequate civilian control over the military establishment.

With regard to the 1972 campaigns, we are undertaking a new political research activity. In the past we have worked hard to provide you with the best possible advice on the choice of candidates to support. The cumulative achievement of the Council has been impressive: twenty-one members of the present Senate were given major support and many more received lesser assistance. Many of them won by small margins which we consider an excellent measure of our success.


In some campaigns in which you participated our candidates were defeated. Predicting the chances of victory and the probable effect of incremental support can never be as accurate as one would like. Near misses have to be accepted with understanding. The Council could improve its record by recommending only candidates assured of winning. This not entirely uncommon practice would let us count more victories but only at the expense of detracting from the effectiveness of your campaign contributions.

We believe you want us to continue to adhere to the Council's traditional criteria: close races between candidates of clearly disparate qualities, preferably in small states where the effect of your contributions will be greatest. In order to sharpen the predictive value of our advice we have undertaken a substantial expansion in our gathering of political information. We are fortunate in having found an able and experienced man who can devote his full energy to these researches into the 1972 senatorial campaigns and who has the freedom for the extensive travel required.

This may be an added burden on our finances but we are confident it will enhance enormously the value of your support of worthy senatorial candidates.

The Washington Program and the political research effort to ensure a more effective expenditure of your money in the 1972 campaigns need your generous support now. Please mail your contribution to the Council's Cambridge office in the enclosed envelope.

Yours sincerely,



Allan Forbes, Jr.
Vice-President

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10 June 1970

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GEORGE W. RATHJENS
Newton, Mass.

Dear Council Supporter:

Since Cambodia fell victim to the widening war, the overriding issue has become how to end U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Americans in unprecedented numbers are writing and telegraphing their senators and congressmen. Many are traveling to Washington to present their views in person. This time there must be no let-up until the Congress acts to end the war by withholding the money which sustains and continues it.

Three motions presently before the Senate may help bring about this end: the Cooper-Church amendment limiting further U. S. military action in Cambodia after June 30, 1970; the Mansfield-Mathias initiative rescinding the Gulf of Tonkin resolution; and, by far the most important, the Hatfield-McGovern amendment which removes funds for the purpose of war in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Had this amendment not been introduced in the Senate on April 30, the day before Nixon's Cambodian announcement, there would have been no legislative proposal around which opponents of the war could rally.

The Council raised almost half the money required to fund the nation-wide TV broadcast on Tuesday, May 12, in which Senators Church, Goodell, Hatfield and McGovern launched the public campaign to gain support for their "Amendment to End the War". Through this program, the Senators raised an additional \$300,000 for further television coverage.

In this crucial election year, what are loosely called "conservatives" and "liberals" are almost evenly balanced in the Senate. The Administration has to date raised millions of dollars to lock in the seats of conservative incumbents and to gain control of the Senate by knocking out selected members of the end-the-war vanguard. The \$500 to \$1000-a-plate dinners of Spiro Agnew have been ominously successful in amassing a war chest to launch this attack. You and thousands like you must act to counter this move.

Council supporters have already contributed generously to the campaigns of Senator Hart of Michigan and Senator Moss of Utah. Now we ask you to help two more outstanding candidates: Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, who is in a difficult fight for re-election; and former Governor Philip Hoff of Vermont, who is seeking to defeat Senator Winston Prouty.

ALBERT GORE, the independent and fearless chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee occupies a position of vital power in the Senate which he has used repeatedly to challenge the military hegemony. Hearings conducted by his subcommittee played a key role in generating Senate opposition to the Safeguard ABM. Though faced with a bitter struggle for re-election in a border state, Senator Gore, in a display of courage rare in Washington, voted against the Supreme Court nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell.

His opposition in November will be either a country-and-western singer, Tex Ritter, or William Brock, a candy manufacturer who has had four illiberal terms in the House of Representatives. Senator Gore's part in the hard-fought ABM struggle of last year is already an issue in the campaign, Brock having accused him of "playing Russian roulette with American security". Tennessee has been marked as one of the two key states in the Nixon Administration's Southern Strategy: Texas and Senator Ralph Yarborough was the other. If this threat to Senator Gore is to be turned back in November, he will need nation-wide assistance.

PHILIP HOFF was not only the first popularly-elected Democratic governor of Vermont, but in a state where Democrats have been almost non-existent, he was elected to three successive terms. According to a state-wide survey he is the best-known political figure in Vermont, not excepting Senator Aiken.


He was the first Democratic governor in the nation to break publicly with President Lyndon Johnson over the Vietnam war, some time before Johnson announced his withdrawal from the presidency. At Chicago in 1968 he was one of the principal architects of the minority peace plank, and now has strongly endorsed the Church-Cooper and Hatfield-McGovern amendments. As an active and innovative governor, he established an outstanding record in pollution control and environmental programs before they became issues of major national concern. Having met and talked with Philip Hoff, we are convinced that he is one of the most promising and best-informed challengers we have ever supported.

Hoff's opponent, Winston Prouty, has been an inconspicuous and ineffective member of the Senate, reluctant to take a stand on controversial issues, reluctant to be a leader on any matter of policy or legislation, evasive on Vietnam, evasive on the military. He voted twice against bills to extend the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He voted against a measure to establish a special watchdog committee over the C. I. A. Last year he withheld his decision on the ABM vote until the last moment and then voted for ABM deployment.


Senator Gore and former Governor Hoff are two exceptionally able men in tight races who are desperately needed in the Senate, who meet all the Council criteria for support, and who must be given substantial early assistance. We ask you to make a special effort on their behalf.

Please make your contribution according to the instructions on the enclosed envelope.

Yours sincerely,



William Doering



Allan Forbes, Jr.

P. S. Raising large amounts for specific candidates increases their chances of election in November; but if it is raised now, at this time in the election year, the assistance not only comes early enough to make possible much stronger campaigns, but it will also have an immediately salutary effect on the way undecided Senators will vote on the crucial war-controlling measures presently before the Senate. It is essential to demonstrate to them at this time that the anti-war feeling in the country can be translated into concrete campaign assistance.

NEW WORLD

Scientists and Senators against Arms Race

by our Washington Correspondent

THE scientific community may not have fielded any candidates in next week's elections but it will have at least a small voice in determining the composition of the next Senate and the way it votes on certain pertinent issues. The organs of that voice are two lobbying groups, the Council for a Livable World and the Federation of American Scientists*, both of them governed and largely supported by scientists. Up to now the two groups have been concerned almost exclusively with the arms race but the Federation is preparing to broaden its scope to include matters of more special concern to scientists such as employment and federal funding of science.

The Federation, founded after the last war by physicists concerned to see the control of atomic weapons in civilian hands, lapsed into a long quiescence once this task was done and has only come to life again since the appointment of a full time director in July this year. The Council for a Livable World has a more recent and sturdy history. Formed in 1962 by the physicist Leo Szilard with the purpose of halting the arms race, the Council focuses its efforts on the Senate, holding seminars on controversial military issues and contributing to the campaign chests of Senators or candidates who share its views. A tangible measure of the Council's strength is that this year it has 12,000 supporters and hopes to have contributed some \$400,000 by election day to twelve Senate candidates.

The full time director of the Council is Thomas A. Halsted who from an office on Capitol Hill arranges the seminars, advises the Council on how it should act on particular issues, and coordinates activities with other arms control groups. Halsted is not a scientist by training but worked for two years in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency before becoming director of the Council in 1967. Policy decisions are taken by the Council's board of directors of which the chairman is William von E. Doering, professor of chemistry at Harvard. The twelve member board shares three of its members in common with the council of the Federation of American Scientists—Bernard T. Feld, professor of physics at MIT, who is also the president of the Council for a Livable World, Matthew S. Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard University, and George W. Rathjens, professor of political science at MIT.

The Council's campaign funds are small in relation to need and have to be spent judiciously for effect. The Council's money would be a drop in the bucket in states like New York or California but in places like Montana small sums can go far. Races where both candidates are either favourable or unfavourable to the Council's ideas are not worth investing in. A

candidate's party is not a consideration but in fact the Council has supported only five Republicans and thirty-five Democrats in the four elections in which it has been involved. Thirty of the Council's forty candidates have won their races, of which perhaps the most gratifying was that of Senator McGovern who in 1962 received a contribution of \$20,000 and came home by a margin of 597 votes. This year the Council is supporting candidates such as Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee and an important opponent of the anti-ballistic missile system (ABM), who is facing what is expected to be a close fight. Another ABM critic, Senator Frank Moss, is being supported for re-election in Utah, and a new candidate, Howard M. Metzbaum, already victorious over astronaut John Glenn in a primary, has the Council's backing in the Ohio race against representative Robert Taft.

The Federation of American Scientists has also been active in the elections. This week it entered into public battle with the American Security Council, a political group targeted against liberal candidates and claiming that the United States has allowed the development of a "megatonnage gap" with the Soviet Union. But the Federation's existence as a political force lies in the future. At the moment it has only 1,500 members whose dues scarcely suffice to support the present level of activities. After many moribund years the Federation was aroused, among other things, by the noise of the ABM debate in the Senate, which showed that scientists' voices could be heard even if they did not prevail. Jeremy J. Stone, who became the Federation's full time director in July, is a mathematician with a long standing interest in the arms race and experience at the Hudson Institute and the Harvard Center of International Affairs.

In anticipation of a broader membership, the Federation has extended its interests from just arms control to matters of more particular concern to scientists. The present brochure describes the FAS as standing for six policies: arms limitation and disarmament, the reconversion of defence industry to peaceful purposes, improvements in the quality of life by the enlightened application of science, informing Congress on matters of concern to the FAS, rights of scientists in respect of travel and security regulations, and a "vigorous scientific community". Under the last heading the Federation expresses its concern with the administration and funding of science and imbalances in the supply and demand in scientific specialties.

The basic policies of the Federation are decided by the 24 member council but considerable latitude is allowed to members; individual chapters, for example, may make public pronouncements as long as they are not in conflict with general policy, and in practice the

* Council for a Livable World, 201 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington DC 20002. Federation of American Scientists, 203 C Street, NE, Washington DC 20002.

director, Dr Stone, has wide discretion on day-to-day issues.

The success of the membership campaign is crucial to the Federation's future, which its recent few months of activity have at least established as promising. The Federation's lobbying efforts during the ABM debate did not take the opponents of the system to victory, or even as close to it as last year's tied vote, but at least were effective enough to draw criticism from several pro-ABM senators. The Federation was defended by Senator Cranston who praised its "invaluable" expertise.

By the nature of their business lobbying groups such as the Federation and the Council for a Livable World cannot claim any given proportion of the anti-ABM vote as being due to their efforts. But seen in retrospect there has been a significant shift in the Administration's position on ABM, to which the intensive lobbying efforts of the scientific community has certainly contributed in some measure. Halsted has recently described the "pivotal role" played by scientists in the lobbying effort: "They gave senators and congressmen confidence in their ability to counter Administration arguments; they contributed invaluable information and advice to grass-roots citizens and organizations, which they often started. . . . And the controversy in turn has had an important effect on the scientific community itself, providing the stimulus to the formation of lasting activist political organizations and alliances through which concerned scientists could become more effectively involved in discussion of public policy". The Council has been the channel through which much of the scientific evidence in the ABM debate was delivered and to that extent can take credit for what the evidence has achieved. It has at any rate received the enviable though maybe ironic accolade from Senator Charles Mathias that on issues such as arms control and ABM, "the Council for a Livable World is one of the most effective organizations in Washington . . . with the possible exception of the Pentagon".

In the coming months Halsted sees the Council's activities being directed towards getting productive results from the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, of which the third round starts on November 2 in Helsinki. Another issue will be the Geneva protocol on chemical and biological weapons which President Nixon has asked Congress to ratify though with certain reservations. The Council at least has the advantage of having an unchanging goal in sight, the limitation of the arms race. It remains to be seen how far the Federation of American Scientists can preserve unanimity in extending its activities to the more controversial private affairs of the scientific community. What with the downturn in Federal funding of academic science and in military spending, the unemployment that this has brought in its train, and a vaguely felt but widespread disenchantment with science and technology, scientists as a group are probably more ready to be politicized than ever before. For different reasons neither the National Academy of Sciences nor professional bodies such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science can openly step down into the political arena. The Federation of American Scientists, if it plays its card right, could find itself representing a solid constituency. With admirable braggadocio it is already billing itself as the "largest lobbying arm of science".

DRUGS

Cyclamates Farce not appreciated

by our Washington Correspondent

A BRUTAL inquiry into the management of the cyclamates farce has left the Food and Drug Administration with little that could be called a reputation. Reporting on the hearings it held in June, the House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Operations has accused the FDA of failing to protect the public against possible health hazards associated with cyclamates despite a clear legal obligation to do so, of aggravating the consequences of its lethargy by allowing the use of cyclamates in food to reach massive proportions, of contravening its own regulations by allowing foods containing cyclamates to be marketed as drugs, and of sundry other offences and misdemeanours. Many of these charges have been denied by Dr Charles Edwards, the present Commissioner of the FDA.

The salient tergiversations of the cyclamates melodrama have been as follows. On Saturday, October 18 last year, acting on the basis of evidence received by the FDA five days previously, Mr Robert Finch, the then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), announced that cyclamates were to be removed from the list of substances generally recognized as safe (the GRAS list). The announcement sparked off a train of equally precipitate bans in other countries, notably Britain, where hitherto respectable scientific advisory committees hastened to follow Mr Finch's footsteps without troubling to see where he was going. They, like many others, failed to appreciate the significance of what Mr Finch also said at the time, "I expect that in the future these products will be labelled as drugs, to be consumed on the advice of a physician".

A month later, on November 18, it transpired that Mr Finch had indeed correctly predicted the conclusions to be arrived at by a group of scientists known as the Medical Advisory Group. The group, appointed by HEW after Mr Finch's announcement, duly reported that cyclamated products should continue to be made available for the benefit of diabetics on a non-prescription, drug-labelled basis. Following this finding, the FDA drew up the appropriate regulations which allowed cyclamated products to be sold as before, except that they now carried a label saying they were for use only by diabetics or obese people under medical supervision.

Cyclamates enjoyed their new lease of life as drugs only until August 4 this year, when the HEW Medical Advisory Group on Cyclamates met once more and rescinded its previous decision, declaring that cyclamates should now not even be allowed as drugs. The reason given for this volte-face was that new evidence on the carcinogenic effects of cyclamates in rats brought the permissible safe level for human consumption so low that very few calories would be saved thereby, hence cyclamates were ineffective as drugs. The "new evidence" became available in the form of a FDA memorandum dated November 26, 1969, one week after the group's original decision to allow the use of cyclamates as drugs.

The FDA's conduct in the cyclamates case clearly warranted some investigation and the enquiry became the subject of hearings in June before the House Sub-

Council for a Livable World

R E P O R T S



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THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

Brought to the attention of Congress and the public almost by mistake, the neutron bomb triggered fierce debate in Washington and then with even grimmer overtones in West Germany. The President's decision on the bomb will test the honesty of statements that he made in his election campaign.

Shortly before the July 4th recess this summer Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) noted during senate debate that he had first learned of neutron weapons through press reports. When he sought further information from colleagues and senate staff, he discovered that "none of them were aware of this weapon."

In fact, Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus spied the item providing funds for an "enhanced radiation" warhead for the Lance missile, while reading the public-works appropriation bill for a story on President Carter's efforts, strenuously opposed in Congress, to delete funding for a large number of major government water projects. The enhanced radiation warhead appeared as a single, brief item in the ERDA portion of the massive \$10.2 billion public works bill.

"This whole thing has stumbled into our lives," Hatfield told his colleagues. "It should not be passed in a cursory fashion."

The White House held an opposite view. Press Secretary Jody Powell announced that President Carter wanted the neutron funds approved in order "to keep his options open." The President's decision on production of the weapons, which neither he nor his Secretary of Defense had known were included in the budget, would come after action by Congress.

In the late 1960's a rising chorus of critics in the Congress pointed to constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities that had been allowed to pass over the years, either by dereliction or usurpation, from Congress to the Oval Office. Articles on the imperial presidency were very much in vogue.

With the neutron bomb all that was forgotten. What had been a matter of ringing constitutional principle as recently as the Nixon and Ford Administrations suddenly became unimportant with a Democrat in the White House. On the question of the neutron bomb President Carter asked Congress to surrender the power of the purse, and the Senate promptly acquiesced.

When Senator Hatfield's amendment to delete funding for the neutron bomb was voted on shortly before the July 4th recess, it was narrowly defeated by a vote of 43-42. On July 12th the President himself asked Congress to approve the funds. The next day the Senate struck down the Hatfield amendment on a second vote of 58-38.

Here the story might have ended, but Congressional debate and press coverage in this country sparked an outcry in West Germany, where the bomb is to be deployed. It has been a common assumption by average citizens in West Germany that NATO's tactical nuclear weapons were for use on the territories of their East European Communist neighbors, but as U.S. debate made clear, a basic argument favoring neutron weapons was that they were far more suitable for use on allied—and in this case, of course, West German—territory than conventional tactical nuclear weapons because, it was claimed, of the sharply reduced "collateral damage" that would be inflicted upon civilians near the battlefield. The General Secretary of the ruling West German Social Democratic Party denounced the neutron bomb as "a symbol for perversion of human thinking."

While the West German public has been largely unaware, their leaders have for long been familiar with the catastrophic potential of NATO and Soviet tactical nuclear weaponry. In 1962 the present West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wrote of the "dangers of war which, though regarded as 'limited war' by the superpowers, would be no less than a war of annihilation for the countries of the battlefield."

Within a short time President Carter must decide whether this country will proceed to production of neutron weapons. As the accompanying article by Alton Frye concludes, the debate over the neutron bomb might have a beneficial effect if U.S. and West European leaders were to reexamine the

basic notion that tactical weapons of any design are suitable for use on the densely populated battlefields of Europe. Introduced to offset Soviet advantages in conventional forces, tactical nuclear weapons could be gradually withdrawn if NATO were committed to raising the level of its own conventional forces.

With this thought we were reminded of the campaign statement of candidate Jimmy Carter on November 23, 1975 in Louisville, Kentucky: "This nation's avowed policy... should be... a reduction of nuclear weapons in all nations to zero... Everything that we do... ought to be designed to get rid of our growing dependence on atomic weapons."

NEUTRONS AS WEAPONS

By George Kistiakowsky

The neutron bomb produces less blast and heat than present nuclear warheads. Advocates, however, ignore that in response to a neutron bomb the Soviets would probably use large fission warheads.

On the technical side one might note that the illustrations which have accompanied several articles in the press indicate that the total nuclear energy release in the proposed Lance missile warhead and probably in the planned heavy artillery shells will be greatly reduced in contrast to present warheads. Even without other design changes this would enhance the effects of prompt radiation (neutrons and gamma rays) over those of blast and heat.

Additionally, in the proposed Lance warhead use has been probably made of the $D + T$ and $T + T$ fusion reactions (the same reactions that will perhaps one day power the controlled fusion power reactors and are related to reactions occurring in hydrogen bombs). About 80% of the high energy release in these reactions appears as the kinetic energy of the neutrons which, unless slowed down by the outer layers of the warhead, pass through hundreds of meters of air without suffering collisions and therefore contribute very little to the heating and blast formation near the locus of the explosion.

Neutrons are most effectively slowed down by hydrogen atoms, and since human bodies are mostly water, they would suffer intense damage producing radiation sickness. The extent of exposure varies, of course, greatly with the distance. If people were uniformly distributed over the entire area of bomb effects, there would result from an explosion fewer prompt deaths than what Alton Frye in the accompanying article calls "walking corpses," people certain to die after protracted agony lasting days or weeks or even months but for a while capable of performing their assigned battlefield tasks, if they happen to be in the military.

The neutron bomb, thus, is not a humane weapon, but insofar as its range of action is smaller than that of larger warheads, it affects fewer individuals. If greater numbers of these warheads are to be used to compensate for the limited range, the casualties and suffering would become indistinguishable from those that would result from present warheads. To be sure, more buildings and

other works of man would remain undamaged and to some commentators on the neutron bomb this appears to be a great, almost a moral plus.

The idea of enhanced radiation warheads is old. In 1959 the Livermore Weapons Laboratory management actively promoted in Washington the "pure radiation" tactical weapons under the cute code names of Dove and Starling, promising spectacular battlefield advantages and giving a distorted description of their effects. Other such projects went to development stage later, but the objective of pure radiation has so far eluded bomb designers. They have succeeded presently in minimizing the fission (plutonium) trigger to probably less than one kiloton yield, thus restricting severe blast damage to a radius of only a couple of hundred meters.

Since the warheads are to be exploded above ground (a 100 meters altitude has been mentioned) and have a small fission yield, the amount of delayed radioactive fallout carried by the winds should be minimal, perhaps negligible. On the other hand, a substantial fraction of the neutrons from the fusion reaction will reach the ground and there induce radioactivity. Without more information than has been released, the damaging effects cannot be estimated.

The advocates of the neutron bomb argue that the reduced casualties and property damage among civilians in Western Europe will make the initiation of its use by the United States more credible to the Soviet Union than that of larger warheads and hence will strengthen deterrence. They ignore that in their nuclear response the Soviets would probably use large fission warheads and that the question of whose warhead is the killer would appear rather academic to West Germans being killed. Not surprisingly, the public (as contrasted to official) reaction in the Federal Republic of Germany is quite negative to the proposed erosion of the existing threshold between conventional and nuclear weapons.

In his own article Alton Frye has pointed out a fallacy or at least a simplicity in the arguments about enhanced deterrence of nuclear war that would be generated by the neutron bombs. It is that Soviet doctrine about war in Europe is that such war is almost certain to become nuclear and that the Soviet Union must be able and ready for a massive nuclear response to any initial use of nuclear weapons by NATO forces.

On balance—and this is only a value judgment—I come to believe that deployment of the neutron bomb in Europe will not decrease the likelihood of a hypothetical attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe, but it may lead to a speedier change from a conventional to a nuclear war if that attack occurs, leaving less room for other responses. The neutron bomb will not advance the stability of nuclear peace.

THE HIGH RISKS OF NEUTRON WEAPONS

By Alton Frye

This article is reprinted by permission of the Washington Post. Alton Frye is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a former Senate aide and the author of "A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security."

Although they have come to public attention only lately, arguments over the military utility and deterrent value of "enhanced radiation weapons"—the neutron bomb—have occupied the national security community for two decades. They have always been inconclusive.

Army commanders have been reluctant to procure such weapons largely because the radiation effects on which they rely would rarely kill enemy personnel instantaneously, leaving many irradiated troops capable of fighting for some period after an attack. This problem is bound to persist with the systems currently proposed. If, as some sources indicate, personnel within 200 to 300 yards would be incapacitated in a few minutes, others might receive lethal doses out to more than half a mile, although they could survive for days or weeks. The battlefield scene would deserve Herman Kahn's famous caption: "Will the living envy the dead?"

One of the greatest uncertainties concerns the likely behavior of these "walking corpses." Knowing that they face prolonged agony and certain death, would these troops lay down their arms or would they exact vengeance? The matter is especially pressing if the affected forces control nuclear weapons of their own.

Given such battlefield uncertainties, what accounts for the Army's recent shift to favor neutron weapons? Political, bureaucratic and technical factors appear to have combined. Worried about the aging nuclear components of its European arsenal, the Army was rebuffed three years ago when it sought congressional approval to modernize its tactical warheads. Influential members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, prompted by experts from the Los Alamos and Livermore nuclear laboratories, withheld support, complaining that the tactical nuclear innovations were too "conventional." Politically, it was clear that the Army would have to suggest more dramatic changes.

Bureaucratically, some figures in the Army had come to fear the steady erosion of their nuclear mission. The drastic decline in nuclear capable air defense forces had been followed by the negotiated abandonment of the Army's anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the service's best hope for a long-term nuclear role. There was talk in NATO and in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction discussions of cutting the number of theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Thus, there were powerful institutional reasons for the Army to devise novel and exciting weapons to protect its claim to a nuclear mission.

Technologically, work on warheads for the ABM system had made significant progress toward enhancing various types of radiation. Weapon engineers had explored different kinds of "kill mechanisms" for use against missiles and had tinkered with ways to "fine-tune the output spectrum" from nuclear detonations. There was much interest in finding an alternative application for this costly and hard-won knowledge.

Furthermore, the legacy of James Schlesinger's tenure as Secretary of Defense was a heightened interest in the Pentagon and among our NATO allies in forging nuclear systems capable of discrete attacks and less wholesale destruction. Faced with these inducements and the very impressive threat of Soviet armored forces, the Army hierarchy overcame its persistent skepticism of enhanced radiation devices.

Yet this history only underscores the fact that policy makers have not addressed the vital issues. Would such weapons increase or decrease the likelihood that nuclear weapons would actually be used, raising or lowering the so-called nuclear threshold? Would they strengthen or weaken deterrence of Soviet attack? Would they facilitate or impede negotiated restraint on the use of force in Europe and, more generally, on the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union? In sum, would they contribute to American security? These questions defy final answers but they demand scrupulous judgment.

WHY THE SECRECY

The disreputable procedure through which the weapons nearly evaded legislative and public scrutiny may prejudice one's initial view of the case. If the purpose of enhanced radiation warheads is to bolster deterrence, why were they cloaked in such secrecy? Deterrence exists in the mind of a potential adversary, not in the hidden recesses of the public works budget.

Though unaware of the original proposals, President Carter has become a party to a badly tainted procedure by urging Congress to pass the appropriations before he has completed his own review of the program's merits. He can redeem this violation of democratic process only by the most thoroughgoing and critical evaluation of the program. Carter's evident concern for the horrors of nuclear war gives hope that he will attend the problem with special care—but that same concern may make him vulnerable to the tempting prospect of "more humane" weapons.

One can be sure that no presidential study will resolve the fundamental dilemmas posed by all tactical nuclear weapons. It may be that the deployment of neutron weapons could reinforce deterrence by persuading Moscow that NATO would use them, if necessary, to repel a conventional attack. That increment of deterrence, however, is likely to be minor compared to the overwhelming influence of 7,000 U.S. nuclear weapons already deployed on the continent, weapons which the Russians have every reason to fear would be employed, not only against invaders but behind their lines.

Moreover, we must reckon with a perverse consequence of deploying enhanced radiation systems. To the very degree that the Soviets expect such weapons to be used against conventional armor, we increase Moscow's incentives to launch preemptive nuclear strikes against our tactical forces. Russian doctrine already emphasized the likelihood that any war would go nuclear. Preemptive nuclear attacks are common topics in Soviet military discourse. Thus, the price of a putative increase in deterrence by deployment of neutron bombs is further pressure on the Soviets to go first with weapons that would render meaningless any hypothetical limits on damage promised by new U.S. weapons. The net

result is likely to be a reduction in the slender chances that a conflict could remain conventional long enough for diplomacy to exercise its own powers of damage-limitations.

The proposed investment in neutron warheads to fit three tactical weapons systems in Europe—the Lance missile and both 8-inch and 155-millimeter artillery—would also divert funds from the pressing need to improve survivability for nuclear forces deployed in Europe.

If we are serious about a tactical nuclear option for NATO, the urgent requirement is to reduce the vulnerability of such weapons to the kinds of preemptive strikes the Soviets might mount. Only by concerted action on this front can we diminish the danger that nuclear weapons will be used at the very onset of a European war. Money spent on enhanced radiation weapons, which could ultimately approach \$3 billion, will do nothing to meet this central weakness in the force.

Equally important is the fact that a comparable expenditure could well buy a more effective and usable conventional capability to deal with the threat of Soviet tanks. With the advent of precision-guided munitions (PGM), Soviet tanks are becoming far more vulnerable to destruction by high explosives. The neutron bomb budget could add more than 100,000 precision anti-tank weapons to the NATO arsenal. Such “smart” weapons avoid the severe operational difficulties of nuclear explosives. They do not require the same degree of centralized command and control, since they are presumably authorized to attack any Soviet tank on Western territory. And, needless to say, hundreds of PGMs can be fired without yielding the devastation of a handful of nuclear weapons.

Army studies acknowledge the trade-off between enhanced radiation weapons and PGMs, but they contend that the nuclear devices could deliver a faster shock to an attacking enemy. This might turn the tide of a conventional battle. Undoubtedly, there would be a dramatic and traumatic effect from the use of neutron warheads, but the claimed advantage highlights some other troublesome features of Army employment doctrine.

In order to achieve the desired shock treatment, the Army contemplates not discrete and singular use of neutron weapons, but barrages of dozens of such rounds. Indeed, some employment packages are said to involve well over 100 nuclear warheads. This reckless employment doctrine is scarcely a plan for selective and discriminating use.

In a setting like Germany, where average population densities exceed 650 people per square mile, the Army's ideas for using enhanced radiation weapons offer no meaningful protection to civilians in the combat zone. One hundred nuclear rounds could easily be another Hiroshima. Furthermore, knowing the approximate lethal radius of nuclear weapons, the Soviets can vary their own tactics, separating their tanks enough to prevent multiple kills even by neutron weapons. This may force NATO to target each tank individually; if so, conventional PGMs will clearly be more cost-effective than nuclear devices.

All of these contingencies reveal the difficulty of calculating the consequences of a neutron weapons

deployment. Some years ago, when pressed in the Senate Armed Services Committee to estimate collateral damages and casualties from using a portion of its tactical nuclear force, Army witnesses confessed their inability to do so. The same confession is in order today. The variables are simply too numerous—and too variable. The recommended force rests more on guesswork than calculation. If one doubts that assertion, let him consider the conclusion of the Army's attempt last year to treat the matter systematically. With the shift to enhanced radiation weapons and substantial adjustments in employment doctrine, the authors found that the ideal number of weapons to deploy in Europe was the number currently deployed there. *Sic semper status quo.*

STOKING THE ARMS RACE

As the President deliberates on this subject, his commitment to arms control will be very much at stake. While it is possible that the Soviets have been pursuing enhanced radiation techniques, it is certain that they will do so if the United States goes forward with testing and production of neutron weapons. Every experience to date indicates that Moscow's military authorities will insist on retaining the option to match the United States technologically.

The real choice confronting the President, then, may be whether he prefers a neutron bomb or a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, with all that it portends for the effort to curb proliferation and to curtail the Soviet-American strategic competition. Coinciding with U.S. movement toward the cruise missiles to strike Soviet missile silos and the general malaise of detente, the neutron bomb controversy inevitably creates the impression that the technological arms race is continuing unabated. That is not the objective to which the Carter administration proclaims its dedication.

To be sure, the Soviet Union shares responsibility for provoking these new developments in the technological competition. Moscow's introduction of mobile SS-20 missiles to cover targets in Western Europe has triggered much alarm there and allies are anxiously asking what the United States proposes to do to meet the rising Soviet threat. The steady growth in Russian armor forces has created an imbalance that demands correction or countermeasures. It may even be that some members of the administration hope to play the neutron bomb option as a bargaining chip to elicit cutbacks in the number of Soviet armored divisions.

Out of this commotion some good may emerge. Close study of the Army's proposals may persuade the President more vividly than anything else that plans to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are a snare and a delusion. He may well discover that the most refined nuclear weapons cannot relieve the defects of the schemes to employ them. The President could well conclude, as others have, that NATO cannot reasonably expect to counter a Soviet conventional threat except by adequate conventional forces of its own. And he may well perceive the truth too long ignored by all of us, namely, that the only proper function of tactical nuclear weapons is to deter the use of similar weapons by the other side. If the neutron bomb debate leads Jimmy Carter to these essential insights, it will have made its contribution to national security.



Council for a Livable World

September 2, 1977

Dear Council Supporter,

The end of summer finds the Carter Administration at a critical point in its pursuit of arms control and disarmament. Pledged in his inaugural address to eliminating all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals, President Carter has in fact set a record that is mixed.

His selection of Paul Warnke as chief SALT negotiator and director of ACDA and of Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense made clear that the nuclear issue was high on the new administration's agenda. The decision to drop production of the B-1 bomber, while avoiding the expenditure of vast sums of taxpayers money, did little to curtail the tempo of the arms race. In fact, the concomitant decision to substitute the air-launched cruise missile as the primary alternative to the costly B-1 has created one of the thorniest issues, if not in fact an insoluble issue of verification, confronting the American and Soviet negotiating teams in the current round of SALT.

Administration efforts to halt the projected construction of the Clinch River breeder reactor at a time when France, West Germany, Japan, Great Britain and the Soviet Union are committed to development of a plutonium breeder technology were coolly received by Congress. Press reports that Clinch River has been shelved are still very much premature.

Now the President faces a decision whether to proceed with production of the controversial neutron, or enhanced radiation, bomb. In the enclosed issue of REPORTS neutron weapons and their implications for arms control are discussed at length. President Carter was originally scheduled to make his decision on the bomb shortly after August 15. His decision has now been postponed until September.

At this juncture we believe that Council Supporters have a double opportunity to influence events in Washington, and we urge you not to miss either.

Firstly, we hope that you will write or wire the President regarding your own strong feelings about the neutron bomb. In late July we asked the more than 600 Supporters who have already enlisted as legislative

(over)

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contacts to undertake such a writing campaign. Many sent copies of their correspondence to our Washington office, and we have been deeply impressed by the forceful and imaginative letters that were sent to the White House.

Now we ask all Supporters to join this effort. Letters and telegrams should be addressed to:

President Jimmy Carter
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

It is also possible that the President will have announced his decision by the time you receive this letter. If that is the case and his decision is to produce the neutron bomb, your letters should be sent to Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) who has lead the opposition in the Senate and who is the appropriate member to initiate further action, if the Congress is at all inclined to challenge the President's decision. In this instance your letters should be sent to:


Senator Mark Hatfield
Room 463
Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Your second opportunity to influence events is by contributing to the Council. We recognize that contributions in the election year are not only more exciting but also more rewarding inasmuch as the impact of the contribution is known - win or lose - within a very few months. Yet in the off-election year the less visible work of the Council continues. In September the Council will sponsor with Senator Kennedy as host a seminar for members of the Senate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Problems of Verification and Policy Considerations.

This is one example of the work which continues year in and year out, to be sure with far less fanfare than electoral politics, but with results, if ultimately successful, that will eclipse in significance the election or defeat of individual Senate candidates.

We urge you to take a moment now to write to the President or to Senator Hatfield, as the situation requires. We urge you also to send your contribution to the Council at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely



Steve Thomas
National Director

George B. Nicholas	James D. Frank	James D. Frank	James D. Frank
George W. Ball	James D. Frank	James D. Frank	James D. Frank
George W. Ball	James D. Frank	James D. Frank	James D. Frank
George W. Ball	James D. Frank	James D. Frank	James D. Frank

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD



June 1971

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GETTING CONGRESS TO END THE WAR

In 1970 the Council played a key role in initiating and gaining support for the Amendment to End the War. Supporters will remember helping to fund the nationwide telecast featuring Senators Church, Goodell, Hatfield, Hughes and McGovern. This year, again, the Council is trying to convert public opinion into congressional action to end all United States military involvement in Indo-China.

Strategy: The first elements in this year's strategy is to get as many members as possible of the House and Senate committed, in writing, to vote this year for legislative action to end all United States military involvement in Indo-China. Following a suggestion from Council board member Roger Fisher, Senator Charles McC. Mathias (R. Md.) and Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D. Hi.) have circulated such a commitment on a bipartisan basis for signature by their Senate colleagues.

Parallel action has been taken in the House, with similar commitment statements, one circulated among House Republicans by Congressmen Mosher, Gude, Morse, Coughlin and Esch; and one among House Democrats by Congressmen O'Neill, Carey, Rostenkowski and Corman.

Thanks in large measure to Common Cause, which put its support behind this effort, 140 congressmen have, as of June 5th, committed themselves to vote this year for legislative action to end all United States involvement in the war. These commitment statements provide each congressman with a decision that he can be asked to make now; they also provide us with an ever growing list of those committed to action, a list which does not disintegrate after one unsuccessful vote.

A second element in the strategy is, of course, lobbying on legislation itself. Operating originally out of the Council's Washington office, the National Council for an Indo-China Deadline has been aiding the efforts of many organizations and individuals. Meanwhile a Congressional Barnstorming Tour - run by the Committee for Peace and New Priorities, which Council chairman William Doering helped to form - has begun a campaign to unplug the ears of the Nixon Administration, deaf so long to the outpouring of public sentiment against the war.

These two ad hoc organizations recently joined forces to coordinate a "Lobby of Americans" planned for early June. This will focus on the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment and will involve lawyers, doctors, ministers, union leaders, teachers, businessmen and other middle Americans not traditionally considered part of the peace movement. The Council will be organizing workshops and briefings for citizens participating in the lobby.

The third element in the strategy is the Voter's Pledge. Concentrating on swing congressional districts an intensive effort will be made to get voters to sign the following pledge:

I am a registered voter.

I will vote in the November 1972 election.

The only incumbent members of Congress for whom I vote will be those who vote this year to end all U.S. military involvement in the Indo-China War.

LIMITING MISSILES

The Council continues its long-standing efforts to improve world security through limiting the deployment of nuclear missiles, both offensive and defensive.

ABM: The United States Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program has gone forward in the face of an overwhelming case against it. We have repeatedly urged an end to deployment of ABMs, both through international agreement and through national self-restraint. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the United States government had insisted that no ABM agreement could be reached without concurrent limitation on offensive weapons. The Council believes that a stringent limitation - preferably a prohibition - on the deployment of ABMs should have highest priority at this time.

On May 20th identical statements were issued in Washington and Moscow announcing that the two governments had agreed to concentrate on reaching agreement this year on limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and to work "on certain measures" to limit offensive missiles as well. This is a welcome change of position on the part of the United States. We hope that the forthcoming Helsinki talks will produce an agreement barring ABM deployment, but we remain convinced that the United States should meanwhile, and on its own, refrain from deploying any ABM system.

Offensive nuclear missiles: The United States has been insisting that the more than seven thousand nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and the Mediterranean are not properly strategic weapons and are not subject to discussion at SALT. The United States has also, reportedly, refused to consider any prohibition on multiple warhead (MIRV) deployment or testing without on-site inspection, a provision unacceptable to the Russians. The Soviet Union, for its part, has continued to upgrade its missile systems, both in quantity and quality. In these circumstances, the imprecision of the May 20th joint statement with respect to strategic offensive weapons is unsettling. There may be an incentive on each side to agree on a cosmetic numerical upper limit on offensive missile systems, but to impose no limitation on qualitative improvements, such as MIRV and high accuracy. Such an outcome might leave the world in a worse fix than it would be in without an agreement. Both sides could feel compelled to build as many missiles as they were allowed - not merely to stay below that level - and thereafter to incorporate in them every possible technological improvement that could be devised. The situation would be analagous to that which has followed the 1963 partial Nuclear Test Ban, which, far from inhibiting the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of nuclear warheads, led them to devise ever more ingenious ways of conducting explosions underground, and probably to conduct many more tests than necessary.

ACTION: McGOVERN-HATFIELD AMENDMENT

As of June 5, 1971 twenty-nine senators had agreed to co-sponsor the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which would cut off funds for all United States forces in Indo-China after December 31, 1971; but a majority of the Senate must be persuaded to vote for this important legislation to end the war. The Council believes the remaining twenty-two votes will have to come from the following list of senators:

Aiken (R. Vt.)	Cook (R. Ky.)	Hollings (D. SC.)	* Metcalf (D. Mt.)	* Schweiker (R. Pa.)
Anderson (D. NM.)	Cooper (R. Ky.)	Jordan (D. NC.)	* Montoya (D. NM.)	Scott (R. Pa.)
Beall (R. Md.)	Ellender (D. La.)	Long (D. La.)	Packwood (R. Or.)	Spong (D. Va.)
Bentsen (D. Tx.)	Ervin (D. NC.)	* Magnuson (D. Wa.)	Pearson (R. Ks.)	Stevens (R. Ak.)
Bible (D. Nv.)	Fong (R. Hi.)	* Mansfield (D. Mt.)	Percy (R. Il.)	* Symington (D. Mo.)
Cannon (D. Nv.)	* Fulbright (D. Ar.)	* Mathias (R. Md.)	Randolph (D. WV.)	Weicker (R. Ct.)
Chiles (D. Fl.)	Gambrel (D. Ga.)	* McIntyre (D. NH.)	Saxbe (R. Oh.)	

* voted in 1970 for the Amendment to End the War and can be considered relatively "safe" votes.

Council supporters assume a special responsibility for the Senate and we ask you first to write to these selected senators urging them to vote for the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment. This could come to a vote as early as June 16th. so those letters must go out immediately to be effective. Mail first class to: Senate Office Building, Washington D.C. 20510.

ACTION: HOUSE COMMITMENT STATEMENTS

If your congressman appears on the list of non-signers below, please write urging him to sign the appropriate (i.e. Republican or Democratic) statement pledging to vote this year to end all American military involvement in the Indo-China War.

Republican Non-Signers

Anderson (Il.)	Cleveland (NH.)	Grover (NY.)	McClure (Id.)	Quillen (Tn.)	Steele (Ct.)
Andrews (ND)	Collier (Il.)	Gubser (Ca.)	McCollister (Nb.)	Rallsback (Il.)	Steiger (Az.)
Archer (Tx.)	Collins (Tx.)	Hall (Mo.)	McCulloch (Oh.)	Reid (Il.)	Steiger (Wi.)
Arends (Il.)	Conable (NY.)	Hammerschmidt (Ar.)	McDade (Pa.)	Rhodes (Az.)	Talcott (Ca.)
Ashbrook (Oh.)	Crane (Il.)	Hansen (Id.)	McEwan (NY.)	Robinson (Va.)	Teague (Ca.)
Baker (Tn.)	Davis (WV.)	Harsha (Oh.)	McKevitt (Co.)	Robison (NY.)	Terry (NY.)
Belcher (Ok.)	Dellenback (Or.)	Hastings (NY.)	McKinney (Ct.)	Rousselot (Ca.)	Thompson (Ga.)
Bell (Ca.)	Dennis (In.)	Hillis (In.)	Mailliard (Ca.)	Ruppe (MI.)	Thomson (WI.)
Betts (Oh.)	Derwinski (Il.)	Hogan (Md.)	Martin (Nb.)	Ruth (NC.)	Thone (Nb.)
Blester (Pa.)	Devine (Oh.)	Horton (NY.)	Mathias (Ca.)	Sandman (NJ.)	Vander Jagt (Mi.)
Blackburn (Ga.)	Dickinson (Al.)	Hosmer (Ca.)	Mayne (Ia.)	Saylor (Pa.)	Veysey (Ca.)
Bow (Oh.)	Duncan (Tn.)	Hunt (NJ.)	Michel (Ia.)	Scherle (Ia.)	Wampler (Va.)
Bray (In.)	du Pont (De.)	Hutchinson (MI.)	Miller (Oh.)	Schmitz (Ca.)	Ware (Pa.)
Brotzman (Co.)	Edwards (Al.)	Johnson (Pa.)	Minshall (Oh.)	Schneebeli (Pa.)	Whalley (Pa.)
Brown (MI.)	Erlenborn (Il.)	Jonas (NC.)	Mizell (NC.)	Scott (Va.)	Whitehurst (Va.)
Brown (Oh.)	Eshleman (Pa.)	Keating (Oh.)	Myers (In.)	Sebelius (Ks.)	Wiggins (Ca.)
Broyhill (NC.)	Findley (Il.)	Keith (Ma.)	Nelsen (Mn.)	Shoup (Mt.)	Williams (Pa.)
Broyhill (Va.)	Fish (NY.)	Kemp (NY.)	O'Konski (Wl.)	Shriver (Ks.)	Wilson (Ca.)
Buchanan (Al.)	Ford (MI.)	Kuykendall (Tn.)	Pelly (Wa.)	Skubitz (Ks.)	Winn (Ks.)
Burke (Fl.)	Frelinghuysen (NJ.)	Kyl (Ia.)	Pettis (Ca.)	Smith (Ca.)	Wyatt (Or.)
Byrnes (Wl.)	Frenzel (Mn.)	Landgrebe (In.)	Peyser (NY.)	Smith (NY.)	Wydler (NY.)
Camp (Ok.)	Frey (Fl.)	Latta (Oh.)	Pirnie (NY.)	Snyder (Ky.)	Wyllie (Oh.)
Carter (Ky.)	Fulton (Pa.)	Lent (NY.)	Poff (Va.)	Spence (SC.)	Wyman (NH.)
Cederberg (MI.)	Goldwater (Ca.)	Lloyd (Ut.)	Powell (Oh.)	Springer (Il.)	Young (Fl.)
Chamberlain (MI.)	Goodling (Pa.)	Lujan (NM.)	Price (Tx.)	Stafford (Vt.)	Zion (In.)
Clancy (Oh.)	Gross (Ia.)	McClory (Il.)	Quie (Mn.)	Stanton (Oh.)	Zwach (Mn.)
Clawson (Ca.)					

Democratic Non-Signers:

Abbutt (Va.)	Chappell (Fl.)	Foley (Wa.)	Jarman (Ok.)	Mollohan (WV.)	Satterfield (Va.)
Abernethy (Ms.)	Clark (Pa.)	Fountain (NC.)	Johnson (Ca.)	Montgomery (Ms.)	Sikes (Fl.)
Albert (Ok.)	Colmer (Ms.)	Fuqua (Fl.)	Jones (Al.)	Morgan (Pa.)	Sisk (Ca.)
Alexander (Ar.)	Daniel (Va.)	Gallagher (NJ.)	Jones (NC.)	Murphy (NY.)	Smith (Ia.)
Andrews (Al.)	Danielson (Ca.)	Garmatz (Md.)	Jones (Tn.)	Natcher (Ky.)	Slack (WV.)
Annunzio (Il.)	Davis (Ga.)	Gettys (SC.)	Kazen (Tx.)	Nichols (Al.)	Staggers (WV.)
Ashley (Oh.)	Davis SC.)	Gonzalez (Tx.)	Kee (WV.)	Passman (La.)	Steed (Ok.)
Aspinall (Co.)	de la Garza (Tx.)	Green (Or.)	Kluczynski (Il.)	Patman (Tx.)	Stephens (Ga.)
Baring (Nv.)	Delaney (NY.)	Griffin (Ms.)	Landrum (Ga.)	Patten (NJ.)	Stratton (NY.)
Bennett (Fl.)	Dent (Pa.)	Hagan (Ga.)	Lennon (NC.)	Perkins (Ky.)	Stubblefield (Ky.)
Bevill (Al.)	Dingell (MI.)	Haley (Fl.)	Long (La.)	Pickle (Tx.)	Stuckey (Ga.)
Biaggi (NY.)	Donahue (Ma.)	Hanley (NY.)	McCormack (Wa.)	Pike (NY.)	Sullivan (Mo.)
Blanton (Tn.)	Dorn (SC.)	Hanna (Ca.)	McFall (Ca.)	Poage (Tx.)	Taylor (NC.)
Boggs (La.)	Dowdy (Tx.)	Hansen (Wa.)	McKay (Ut.)	Price (Il.)	Teague (Tx.)
Brinkley (Ga.)	Dulski (NY.)	Hays (Oh.)	McMillan (SC.)	Pucinski (Il.)	Vigorito (Pa.)
Brooks (Tx.)	Edmonson (Ok.)	Hebert (La.)	Mahon (Tx.)	Purcell (Tx.)	Waggoner (La.)
Burleson (Tx.)	Edwards (La.)	Henderson (NC.)	Mann (SC.)	Randall (Mo.)	Watts (Ky.)
Burlison (Mo.)	Evans (Co.)	Hicks (Ma.)	Mathis (Ga.)	Rarick (La.)	White (Tx.)
Byrne (Md.)	Evins (Tn.)	Hicks (Wa.)	Mazzoli (Ky.)	Roberts (Tx.)	Whitten (Ms.)
Byron (Md.)	Fisher (Tx.)	Holfield (Ca.)	Meeds (Wa.)	Roe (NJ.)	Wright (Tx.)
Cabell (Tx.)	Flood (Pa.)	Hull (Mo.)	Miller (Ca.)	Rogers (Fl.)	Young (Tx.)
Caffery (La.)	Flowers (Al.)	Hungate (Mo.)	Mills (Ar.)	Rooney (NY.)	Zablacki (Wi.)
Casey (Tx.)	Flynt (Ga.)	Ichord (Mo.)	Monagan (Ct.)	Runnels (NM.)	

ACTION: VOTER'S PLEDGE

If you live in what may be a swing district and would be willing to do organization work on behalf of the voter's pledge please let us know.

The Council is convinced that current efforts to limit missile deployment by treaty should be coupled with a total and immediate freeze on the deployment of all strategic missiles - offensive and defensive. The Council will be working actively in support of congressional efforts to achieve such a freeze and will back amendments to the 1972 defense authorization which would reduce or eliminate unnecessary weapons. We anticipate floor fights over deployment funds for Safeguard ABM, the Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV programs and the B1 bomber.

REDUCING THE 1972 DEFENSE BUDGET

The Council has arranged several legislative strategy sessions where senators met with leading defense strategists and economists to shape a program for reducing the 1972 Defense budget. We shall be working to gain congressional support for the Proxmire-Mathias amendment placing a ceiling on all defense outlays for fiscal year 1972 in addition to our efforts to halt specific weapons programs.

STOPPING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Since its formation in 1962, the Council has been concerned with the potential threat of chemical and biological weapons. Although they are currently overshadowed by nuclear weapons and although no nation appears at present to place any serious reliance on them, the long-term danger of applying our substantial and rapidly growing knowledge of living processes to military purpose makes CBW one of the most important areas for arms control and disarmament measures. Over the years the Council has played a leading role in bringing thoughtful, expert advice on this subject both to the Senate and to the Administration. During the past two years the CBW policy of the United States has changed significantly from one of ambiguous intent and very substantial weapons production programs to a more restrained and rational stance, especially as concerns germ weapons which President Nixon last year unilaterally renounced. Still, serious obstacles remain to the implementation of a consistent and enlightened United States policy for these militarily unnecessary but potentially very dangerous weapons.

Council board member Matthew S. Meselson, Professor of Biology at Harvard University, has been one of the leaders among the group of scientists and other advisors who helped achieve the current United States ban on germ warfare preparations.

Professor Meselson recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was holding hearings on ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting gas and germ warfare. Although the White House has asked for ratification of the Protocol, it interprets the Protocol as permitting the use in combat of riot gas and of herbicides, used to remove vegetation and to destroy food crops. In 1969 the General Assembly of the United Nations rejected this interpretation in a resolution on which eighty nations voted against our position and only two voted with us.

In Vietnam, herbicide operations are being phased out and will reportedly end this summer. Similarly, the use of riot gas in Indo-China (which had become by far the largest combat use of gas since World War I) has fallen to a small fraction of what it once was. In the light of these facts, it is hoped that the United States will ratify the Geneva Protocol without any exemptions for riot gas or herbicides. Council efforts are being directed toward that end.

COUNCIL SEMINARS

The Council's regular seminar program, bringing together senators and experts to discuss foreign policy and arms control matters has ranged over a broad selection of issues in the past five months. Attendance at these, private, informal discussions has been excellent and has included all but two of the new senators elected in 1970. Discussions have covered:

European Security: On March 24th a group of senators met for breakfast with Frederick S. Wyle, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to review the problem of United States defense commitments in Europe, to evaluate the implications of extensive troop cuts (as advocated by Senator Mansfield in his amendment to halve United States forces in Europe, defeated May 19th), and to assess the prospects for reducing the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons there.

Peacekeeping: On April 21st Major General Indarjit Rikhye (Indian Army Retired), who commanded the United Nations forces in the Sinai, Congo and Cyprus before retiring to head the International Peace Academy Committee, discussed with a group of senators the problems of using international peacekeeping forces to control and prevent conflict in crisis situations.

United States Interests in Asia: On April 29th, just following the opening of "ping-pong diplomacy" with the People's Republic of China, former United States Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer met with twenty three senators in a most successful seminar to discuss the implications of recent developments and to consider the longer-range United States interests in the region.

United States-China Relations/One China Policy: In a second seminar on the issue of United States Far Eastern policy, Dr. Allen S. Whiting, former Deputy Consul General in Hong Kong, addressed two seminars on May 13th; one a luncheon meeting for senators, the other an evening meeting of legislative assistants, in a review of United States relations with Communist China over the past two decades, and a presentation of the case for establishing full diplomatic relations with mainland China as early as possible.


East Pakistan: On May 20th Dr. Rehman Sobhan, former economic advisor to the East Pakistan Awami League (which attempted to form an independent government in East Pakistan before being crushed by the West Pakistani army last March) described the background of the crisis, and offered his recommendations for a constructive United States policy there.

Seminars now being planned for the near future will examine the prospects for extending the present limited Test Ban Treaty to include all underground tests, and the case for halting AEC plans to conduct the "Cannikin" test, a 5-megaton underground explosion planned for this October on Amchitka Island, Alaska. That test would be the largest ever conducted by the United States. Available information indicates that the test will be for an obsolete ABM warhead and that, though remote, there is some chance of devastating effects on the environment.

POLITICAL RESEARCH EFFORT

In an effort to improve the predictive value of our advice in recommending candidates for your support we have undertaken a substantial expansion in our gathering of political information.

We are fortunate in having found an extremely able and experienced man who is devoting his full energy to researches into the 1972 senatorial campaigns. Thus far several of the western and midwestern states which have senate races next year have been visited and we shall be in touch with you shortly about campaigns which are in need of early funding.



Thomas A. Halsted
National Director

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R E P O R T S



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The Warnke Nomination

On March 9 the Senate confirmed Paul Warnke as chief negotiator for arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union by a vote of 58-40, and as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by a vote of 70-29. Not since the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 banning atmospheric testing has the Senate faced a more crucial vote on arms control.

Despite the apparent victory, the narrow margin of Mr. Warnke's nomination as SALT negotiator was a sharp setback for the Carter Administration, for the Council and for advocates of arms control across the country.

In early February, before President Carter formally nominated Paul Warnke for the two positions, voices both in and outside the Senate started to attack the nomination. As confirmation hearings began, Former Under Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze challenged Mr. Warnke's honesty. Senate offices began to receive inordinately heavy anti-Warnke mail orchestrated by right-wing direct mail expert, Richard Viguerie. One Senate office received over 8,000 pieces of mail in a single day. Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash) charged that Warnke had deliberately falsified the record, and the United States Senate found itself debating whether the omission of a single comma from the written transcript of an oral testimony presented four years ago represented willful distortion or an accurate account of Mr. Warnke's remarks.

What exactly did the opponents of arms control achieve. Adherents to the new conservatism regard the Warnke nomination and continuing struggle over arms control as a means of shattering the Democratic Party, severing from it those elements in the AFL-CIO sympathetic to the foreign policy views of George Meany, former supporters of Alabama Governor George Wallace, and Democratic Senators such as Henry Jackson and Daniel Moynihan. Richard Viguerie commented, "This is just the beginning. Our allies are going to include a lot of centrist Democrats. We're going to be going with the tide."

Quite apart from the new conservatives, the military industrial establishment must see in the forty votes against Mr. Warnke the potential to block any future arms control treaty negotiated by the Carter Administration. Since treaties must be passed by a two-thirds majority, thirty-four firm nay votes are enough to block passage. Forty votes show an ominous strength and should be taken very seriously.

The sudden emergence of a well-organized opposition and its orchestration of a massive post-card campaign against the Warnke nomination deprived the Carter Administration of the critical two-thirds majority vote. The Administration and advocates of arms control should not be caught poorly prepared again.

The Warnke votes provide a rare insight into Senate attitudes towards arms control.

As the chart below indicates thirty-two Council Senators voted yea on both votes; one, Birch Bayh (D-In), was absent but paired in favor on the crucial vote for chief negotiator at SALT II, and one, Richard Schweiker (R-Pa), defected.

Nineteen other Democratic Senators voted yea on both votes. They were joined by Senator John McClellan (D-Ak) on the vote for SALT negotiator. The willingness of Senator McClellan and other conservatives, Senator Eastland (D-Ms), Johnston (D-La) Bentsen (D-Tx), Hollings (D-S.C.), Long (D-N.C.), to support the President on a fundamental question of national security suggests that Senator Henry Jackson's accusations have been counterproductive and lacked credibility among normally sympathetic colleagues.

Six non-Council Republican Senators supported Warnke on both votes. We were especially pleased to find Senators Robert Stafford (R-Vt) whom the Council opposed in 1976, and John Chafee (R-R.I.) favoring Warnke on both votes.

For future votes, the important names are the twenty-eight Senators who voted nay on both nominations and the twelve Senators who opposed Paul Warnke as chief negotiator. From among them must be found the eight or nine votes needed to assure a two-thirds majority of the Senators present and voting when the Senate acts on ratification of the next SALT treaty.

March 31, 1977

The Votes on Warnke as Director of ACDA and SALT II Negotiator

Yea on Both Votes

CLW Supported Senators

Abourezk (D-S.D.)
Biden (D-De)
Brooke (R-Ma)
Case (R-N.J.)
Church (D-Id)
Clark (D-Ia)
Cranston (D-Ca)
Culver (D-Ia)
DeConcini (D-Az)
Eagleton (D-Mo)
Gravel (D-Ak)

Hart (D-Co)
Haskell (R-Co)
Hatfield (D-Or)
Hathaway (D-Mn)
Humphrey (D-Mn)
Kennedy (D-Ma)
Leahy (D-Vt)
Mathias (D-Md)
McGovern (D-S.D.)
Melcher (D-Mt)
Metcalf (D-Mt)

Metzenbaum (D-Oh)
Muskie (D-Me)
Nelson (D-Wi)
Pell (D-R.I.)
Ribicoff (D-Ct)
Riegle (D-Mi)
Sarbanes (D-Md)
Sasser (D-Tn)
Stevenson (D-Ill)
Williams (D-N.J.)

Other Democrats

Anderson (D-Mn)
Bentsen (D-Tx)
Bumpers (D-Ar)
Burdick (D-N.D.)
Byrd (D-W.V.)
Durham (D-N.H.)
Eastland (D-Ms)
Ford (D-Ky)
Glenn (D-Oh)
Hollings (D-S.C.)

Inouye (D-Hi)
Johnston (D-La)
Long (D-La)
Matsunaga (D-Hi)
McIntyre (D-N.H.)
Morgan (D-N.C.)
Proxmire (D-Wi)
Randolph (D-W.V.)
Sparkman (D-Al)

Other Republicans

Chafee (R-R.I.)
Javits (R-N.Y.)
Pearson (R-Ks)
Percy (R-Ill)
Stafford (R-Vt)
Young (R-N.D.)

(Bayh (D-In) was absent but paired with Magnuson (D-Wa) on the crucial SALT II vote. Schweiker (R-Pa) voted nay on both nominations.)

Nay on Both Votes

Allen (D-Al)
Baker (R-Tn)
Bartlett (R-Ok)
Bellmon (R-Ok)
Byrd, H.F. (D-Va)
Curtis (R-Ne)
Danforth (R-Mo)
Dole (R-Ks)
Domenici (R-N.M.)
Garn (R-Ut)

Goldwater (R-Az)
Griffin (R-Mi)
Hanson (R-Wy)
Hatch (R-Ut)
Hayakawa (R-Ca)
Helms (R-N.C.)
Laxalt (R-Nv)
Lugar (R-In)
McClure (R-Id)

Schmitt (R-N.M.)
Schweiker (R-Pa)
Scott (R-Va)
Stennis (D-Ms)
Thurmond (R-S.C.)
Tower (R-Tx)
Wallop (R-Wy)
Weicker (R-Ct)
Zorinsky (D-Ne)

Voting Yea on ACDA but Nay on SALT II

Cannon (D-Nv)
Chiles (D-Fl)
Heinz (R-Pa)
Huddleston (D-Ky)
Jackson (D-Wa)
Moynihan (D-N.Y.)

Nunn (D-Ga)
Packwood (R-Or)
(R-De)
Stevens (R-Ak)
Stone (D-Fl)
Talmadge (D-Ga)

(McClellan (D-Ak) voted Nay on ACDA and Yea on SALT II)

The one clear defection among Council supported Senators was Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Pa). After the vote CLW's National Director, Steve Thomas, met with Senator Schweiker to discuss the Warnke nomination and the Senator's views on the future of arms control.

Senator Schweiker gave two reasons for his opposition to Warnke.

First, based on private sources, he believed that, in addition to director of ACDA and chief SALT negotiator, Warnke would also be appointed chairman of an inter-agency committee, which would be separate from the National Security Council and charged with the evaluation of strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. Such a triple appointment would have created, in Schweiker's words, "a disarmament czar with unprecedented one-man rule."

This concern led to a curious sequence of events. On February 16, three weeks before the vote, Schweiker's office prepared a press release announcing his opposition to the Warnke nomination and sent an advance copy to the White House. On the following morning the Washington Post ran a brief story reporting Schweiker's opposition. Later that afternoon Vice-President Mondale and Paul Warnke called Senator Schweiker to say that Warnke would not chair the inter-agency committee. What is puzzling in this account is that so far in advance of the vote Senator Schweiker was unwilling to wait twenty-four hours for a White House reply before announcing to the press his opposition to Warnke.

Senator Schweiker's second concern was that "Warnke's past opposition to nearly every major strategic weapons system would make Warnke himself the issue in Senate ratification proceedings." The Senator added, Warnke will be "a serious handicap to arms control, and "in my view it's too bad to put that kind of burden on the treaty."

In 1974 the Council endorsed and supported Richard Schweiker for reelection on the strength of a superlative voting record on arms control issues. To the question whether his views on arms control had now changed, and what, if anything, the change in his

thinking might mean for the future, Senator Schweiker replied: "I always hesitate to predict the future. It all depends upon the particulars. I always like to keep my options open. What I will say is that I will call them case by case on a step by step basis."

If Senator Schweiker runs for reelection in 1980, the Council, too, can be expected to keep its options open.

From the time President Carter announced the Warnke nomination the Council devoted all its efforts to achieving a strong vote of affirmation in the Senate. The Council had hoped to focus its resources on non-Council supported Senators who were still unsure of their voting positions. However, because of the strength of the conservative lobby, Carl Marcy and Steve Thomas had to direct substantial attention to several Council Senators, who themselves became primary targets of the anti-Warnke forces. Despite intense pressures and little compensating support from the media in their home states, Senators Church (D-Id), Sasser (D-Tn), Melcher (D-Mt), Metcalf (D-Mt), and DeConcini (D-Az) did hold firm and supported Warnke for both positions. The political courage behind their votes should be fully appreciated.

The Warnke nomination was the first battle in a struggle that will last for years. We cannot be certain when the next battle will be fought. Perhaps it will be over the new treaty with Panama if that is submitted to the Senate by the late spring. Perhaps it will be over the SALT II treaty itself later on in the year.

Americans have been notified that the military industrial establishment, which has dominated our military and foreign policy since the Second World War, will oppose any reduction in U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. The Council will be on the other side giving its full support to the first priority of a strong and comprehensive arms control treaty.

Dr. Kosta Tsipis, New Member of CLW Board

Dr. Kosta Tsipis, a naturalized citizen, was born in Greece 43 years ago. He is a nuclear physicist, an arms limitation specialist and a Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

March 31, 1977

Dear Council Supporter,

Not since the days of President Kennedy has the issue of arms control reached such crisis proportions. Never has there been such an opportunity as there is now to slow and possibly stop the proliferation of atomic weapons and the escalating arms race.

During the years of the Johnson, Nixon and Ford Administrations, you and other like-minded persons were on the outside looking into a White House which, in foreign policy at least, was dominated by the arms industries and the military. At the most difficult of times, you and your fellow Council Supporters helped to chip away at the accelerating arms race through the legislative process. You built a strong contingency of protagonists for arms control in the Senate.

Now President Carter has thrown the full force of the White House into the battle for arms control, and the Council is providing key, indispensable support in the Senate.

The need for Council lobbying in the Senate is dramatically revealed in the analysis of the Warnke nomination in the accompanying REPORTS.

Driven by the election of President Carter to organize openly and outside the White House, the military industrial establishment has not been able to conceal from the people its intention to block arms control. By gaining more than 34 votes against Paul Warnke as SALT negotiator, the establishment demonstrated their potential strength to defeat any future arms control treaty.

The message is clear. Are you heeding it?

Two out of every five Council supporters made a contribution in response to the January and February mailings. According to our records, you were not among them.

(over)

Please don't abandon the fight now after all these years of preparation.

Send the Council the largest contribution you can afford to make. If this is a difficult time for you, send us a pledge and we will bill you later as you instruct us on the enclosed card.

But please act now. By having made their contributions already, your fellow Council Supporters have demonstrated their understanding of the primary importance of arms control and the Council's ability to help bring it about. They, as much as we, are depending on you.

Yours sincerely,

William Doering
President

Enc.
WD/jf

The author of many articles, Dr. Tsipis' most recent is the "Cruise Missile" in the February issue of *Scientific American*. The article presents an analysis of the complexities of the cruise and the implications of its deployment for the future of SALT II and arms control.

Dr. Tsipis is tall, thin, dark haired and craggy. His lean frame projects enthusiasm when engaged in conversation. A sense of humor and curiosity complement an exacting and demanding scientific mind.

Q. I've wondered whether your interest in and dedication to arms control issues has come from early life experiences not common to the childhood memories of most American citizens.

You were born in Greece. When did you come to the U.S.?

A. I came to the U.S. in 1954 as a Fulbright Scholar, to go to college. I studied at Rutgers and Princeton and then continued at Columbia, where I received a Ph.D. in high energy physics in 1966.

Q. Why did you go into nuclear physics?

A. Well, for two reasons.

The first is because of the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima. I distinctly remember the day. We were on vacation. It was August, and my father came in with the paper. The entire paper was a description of the new weapon. That was 1945, I was 10. I was fascinated with this new physical principle and wanted to know all about it. Since then I have studied the atom, trying to understand how it works and the forces that hold it together. Hiroshima was the specific impetus.

The more general impetus is quite unrelated. In Greece we had a house with a garden. In the summer I would sleep outside in the garden and every night I would look up in the sky and see the millions of stars and wonder about the physical universe. I always wanted to study physics, to understand this complex universe. However, my family is a family of engineers. My father, grandfather, great grandfather and his father — they were all engineers. So I was sent to the United States to study engineering, and I did; but as soon as I received my engineering degree I interfered with the family tradition by studying nuclear physics. This became my life's work.

Q. Where did your interest in arms control come from?

A. At a fundamental level, both psychological and emotional, my commitment to arms control comes from the abhorrence for the wars that I have experienced.

Q. Which wars were these?

A. My first memories are of the Second World War. The occupation of Greece by the Germans left profound impressions in me — the dead in the streets of Athens, the suffering and hunger, the persecution, the terror and destruction. I developed a profound dislike for violence of any sort and a conviction that war rarely solves anything. It just creates more suffering. Later I saw more suffering during the Greek Civil War against Communist guerrillas from 1946 to 1950. At this time I was old enough to visit villages and see what the war had done.

Q. Would Americans have more concern for arms control if they had experienced war with a foreign power on their own territory?

A. What many Americans do not understand, and

what Russians understand extremely well, is the horror of war. In gauging Russian intentions, motives and military and political activities, the error that many American political and military experts make is not giving more emphasis to the Russian experience of war.

There are several historical facts that I think should always be born in mind. Recent Russian history is a

saga of suffering, destruction, and severe trauma. Russia has survived several invasions of her country. Two of these, the First and Second World Wars, have been within the past sixty years. Tens of millions of people were lost in



each case. Before that there was Napoleon, the Swedes, the Turks and the Mongols. So Russian history is a history of being invaded from the West and the East and of trying to defend the country. Russian policy has been mainly a policy of defense, their response and thinking is instinctively defensive.

On the other hand, we must remember that since Peter the Great the Russians have always striven to become equal or superior to the West. They have tried for 200 years, and I don't see why they would stop now or succeed now. The desire for superiority or at least for equality is definitely there. Go to Leningrad. Look at the churches and palaces. See how hard Peter or Catherine tried to imitate Paris, Vienna, Berlin. Look at their efforts now, and see how hard they are trying to imitate the West.

Unfortunately, the one measure of national achievement in which they can imitate the West most closely is weapons development. They can't come near us in industry, technology, agriculture, economics, in the quality of our political and cultural institutions. We are falling into the trap of allowing superpower status to be determined by weapons alone, where both the U.S. and Russia are roughly comparable. We are so vastly superior in everything else. Why don't we emphasize status and power based on superior technology, economy and polity.

Not only do we keep pushing a weapons criterion, but we keep telling the world how good Russian weapons are and how bad our weapons are. We are the Russians best salesman.

Q. Dr. Tsipis, you are Guest Editor for a new series of articles in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on military Research and Development (R&D). Science and technology are important to the combat readiness of the U.S. armed forces, but military research and development have acquired a momentum and dynamic of their own. They are playing an increasingly important and independent role in determining overall U.S. force structure.

Could you briefly describe what you hope to obtain by examining the bureaucratic structure, the practices, and the end products of military R&D?

A. I have two objectives. First I would like to show the actual processes involved in developing a weapon

system. Many people think that the government, the Administration, or at least the higher echelons of the Pentagon decide to develop a new weapon system and they ask the technicians to do it. This is not the case. What frequently happens, as you may know, is that several technologies mature at the same time and you put them together and develop a new weapon that wouldn't have been thought of otherwise; or that a combination of operational needs and new technological achievements are combined to create a new weapon concept. These new weapons are then proposed first to the military and then to the political leadership of the country.

An example of the first process is the Polaris submarine which is the confluence of the mobile nuclear reactor and the inertial guidance principle. The two technologies were developed completely separately, but put together they made the missile-carrying nuclear submarine possible.

The cruise missile is another example. A technology of small engines was designed quite independently of cruise missiles. As a matter of fact, the man who produced the cruise missile engine started out constructing a turbine engine for cars for Chrysler Corporation. Later he engineered a turbine engine for a flying platform that could carry a man. This engine combined with microelectronics made the cruise missile possible.

My second objective in the R&D series is to describe the actors, the bureaucracies involved in the development of a weapon system, what role they play and how they interrelate. I want to know if there is planned cooperation or an *ad hoc* kind of constructive interference within these bureaucracies.

Thirdly and most importantly, I want to find out where we can inject consideration of arms control in the development of a new weapon system. I don't think that the lesson of the Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) should go unheeded. MIRV was developed for a barrage of often unrelated reasons, but no one seriously considered its implications for arms control until the system was deployed and the genie was out of the bottle. We faced great difficulties in SALT II because MIRV's presented enormous problems for monitoring and verification. Had we injected arms control considerations into the development of MIRV early on, perhaps we could have come out differently — perhaps we could have avoided MIRV entirely.

Q. Do you also deal with the problems of how arms control considerations might be used in our overall defense planning?

A. Yes. Contrary to the wide-spread assumption that the more arms we have, the greater our national security, in fact, the opposite is usually true. So arms limitation could make major contributions to the on-going effort to maintain and improve our national defense.

By examining the structure, operations and procedures of military R&D we should be able to propose specific steps via which arms control considerations could be introduced into the R&D process early enough to assure that future weapon systems will strengthen national security by not contravening arms limitation efforts.

Q. Dr. Tsipis, it can be frustrating trying to convert technical knowledge and insight into specific political action. Is that what attracted you to the Council?

A. The Council has been by far the most successful lobbying effort for arms control and the end of nuclear weapons that I have seen in this country or elsewhere. One outstanding activity of the CLW Washington office is the Senate seminar program. These seminars can establish an atmosphere and develop knowledge and expertise on proliferation problems and arms control issues among the Senators. Although you can not gauge precisely how effective or ineffective they have been in the past, they have clearly had an influence in the Senate. Precisely because it is at the nexus of the scientific and political communities the Council should be a catalyst for the kind of long term examination of alternate means of national security.

Q. Now that the battle over arms control has been joined, how should the Council be channeling its efforts?

A. If the council is to be effective, it must have a two-pronged effort. On the one hand, it must deal with the immediate and the obligatory, the next weapon system or the next Pentagon claim, the Warnke nomination and things like that. And on the other hand, it must also set a tone. At this moment there is no counterpart to the Committee on the Present Danger, an effort by the 'other side' to set the tone of the national debate concerning foreign and defense policy . . . our entire world view.

I don't think that we should lose sight of the long-range needs of this country in terms of defining policies and direction. A very difficult thing perhaps, but much more useful, more precious in many ways than merely arguing the strategic effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a specific weapon system.

Q. With President Carter's articulation of arms control policies and a moral approach for foreign affairs we have for the first time in decades, a new tone for U.S. global policy.

A. I agree, Mr. Carter has made arms control relevant. My colleagues used to say, "Don't argue against this new weapon system on the basis of arms control criteria, because the military industrial complex will stress cost effectiveness and economic arguments in support of it."

Arms control is no longer some kind of exotic argument. It has become a real, pragmatic factor that we must consider every step of the way whether we are debating a specific weapon system, our overall defense policy, or the direction our country is going to go in the next 10, 20 or more years.

I think we, the Council, ought to start thinking in more general, broader, global terms, as well as acting to address the immediate problems of the annual defense budget and the pros and cons of weapon systems.

Legislative Contacts

We have appreciated 'legislative contact' responses to council requests for assistance on the Warnke nomination votes and for mailgrams sent to President Carter and the Congress. Thank you for your continued support.