

Lieber Herr Nehru!

Alle einflussreichen besonnenen Leute hier sind sehr besorgt über die Verschärfung des amerikanischen - chinesischen ^{gegenüber} Streitmarktes. Sie denken darüber nach, wie die unmittelbare Kriegsgefahr besänftigt werden könnte, die mit dem Schicksal der Inseln Japan und all. in Zusammenhang gebracht worden ist. Die Kontroverse der neuen Besitztümer hier sehen sie einer Besetzung der Inseln durch China einen ersten Schritt zu in einem Feldzug gegen Formosa und verlangen in der Öffentlichkeit nicht nur Verteidigung der Inseln selbst sondern sogar drastische präventive Schritte gegen chinesische Vorbestimmungen (Angriff ^{auf} gegen nicht-chinesische wichtige Inseln und chinesische Festlande). Andererseits müssen die Chinesen sich unmittelbar bedroht fühlen, solange Inseln in solcher Nähe vom chinesischen Festlande in feindlicher Hand sind.

Wir denken nun, dass die akute Kriegsgefahr ohne Verkünderung des „Prestiges“ der beiden Parteien durch Evakuierung der Inseln besänftigt werden könnte. Es wäre gewiss ein im Interesse der Vermeidung eines Krieges markantvoller Schritt von Seiten Chinas, wenn es sich dazu verpflichten würde, im Falle einer Besetzung der Inseln ^{von Seiten} ^{der Inseln} ^{ein} ^{Bestimmtes} ^{zu} ^{verpflichten}. Eine solche ^{freiwillige} ^{Übernahme} einer solchen (zeitlich befristeten) Verpflichtung würde der gegenwärtigen Situation ihre gefährliche Schärfe nehmen und vor allem den hiesigen Scharfmachern den Wind aus den Segeln nehmen. Eine solche Initiative von Seiten Chinas würde nicht nur keinen Prestige - Verlust Chinas bedeuten, sondern ^{bei aller} ^{gegenseitigen} ^{besonnenen} Menschen in allen Ländern anerkannter ^{Stärke}.

Wenn Sie diesen Standpunkt für vernünftig halten, so würde ich Ihnen sehr verbunden, wenn Sie diese Anregung der Chinesischen Regierung ^{über} ^{den} ^{von} ^{Ihnen} ^{ausgesprochenen} ^{bedeutenden} ^{persönlichen} ^{Beitrag} ^{zur} ^{Handlung} ^{wollten}.

Mit herzlichem Glauben und mit freundlicher Anerkennung
Ihres so regen persönlichen Wirkens auf dem internationalen Felde.

Ihre . . .

Freunde von mir, die ebenso besorgt sind wie ich selbst
haben mit ~~dem~~ beständige Schreiben gesandt. Dasselbe
^{enthält} einen Antrag, der mich die Zustimmung Gedanken,
die mir unangenehm erscheint.

Aus diesen Grunde möchte ich Sie bitten, die
unzulängliche Kopie dieses Briefes der chinesischen Regierung
zu übermitteln, damit ich deren Wert beurteilen kann.

April 6th, 1955

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

Dear Mr. Nehru:

All reasonable people here are very much concerned about the worsening of the American-Chinese conflict. They try to think how the acute danger of war might be eliminated, which centers on the issue of Quemoy and Matsu. Dr. Leo Szilard of the University of Chicago, who is as concerned about this danger as I am, wrote me a letter which you will find attached. It contains a thought which I believe ought to be considered if it has not been considered heretofore.

For this reason, I would greatly appreciate your reading the attached copy of Dr. Szilard's letter. Also I would greatly appreciate your transmitting at an opportunity of your own choosing, the enclosed copy of this communication to China so that they may be in the position to judge the validity of these considerations on their merit.

On this occasion I wish to express my sincere appreciation of your untiring constructive efforts in the field of international relations.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Albert Einstein

The University of Chicago
Chicago, 37, Illinois
April 6, 1955

COPY

Professor Albert Einstein
112 Mercer Street
Princeton, New Jersey

I am distressed, as are so many others, about the acute danger of war that has arisen in the Formosa Straits and I am writing to you to draw your attention to one particular aspect of this situation.

American public opinion appears to be a major factor in this crisis. The public is split. There are those who press for United States intervention over Quemoy and Matsu, and their most important argument is that these islands may be taken by the Chinese mainly as a stepping stone in the conquest of Formosa. There are others who oppose such intervention and no one can foresee at this time which of these two groups will prevail.

The situation that confronts us at present is unsatisfactory in two respects. If fighting breaks out over Quemoy or Matsu and if America intervenes we may have a major war. If on the other hand America backs down now, the loss of the off-shore islands will lead to a public outcry that America has retreated once more in the Far East. As a result there is bound to be a hardening of America's position on the problem of Formosa. Even though the Formosa problem may not be negotiable today, it is imperative that the door be kept open for a later regulation of the status of Formosa.

How can the world escape from this dilemma? It seems that there are no direct negotiations in progress at present between China and America; hence we must ask ourselves is there any unilateral action which either China or America could take that would decisively improve the situation.

One thought occurred to me in this respect which I wish to present to you for what it is worth: Suppose the Indian government (together

perhaps with some of the other Asian governments who recognize the legal and moral right of China to the off-shore islands) were able to declare that they have received from China the assurance that if the off-shore islands were evacuated by the Nationalists, China would leave them unoccupied for a specified period of time. There would be the presumption that the civilian population would be evacuated from these islands. What the "specified period of time" ought to be I cannot say, but it is clear that the longer this period, the stronger would be the impact of the declaration.

It seems certain that the American public would strongly respond to such a clear indication that China places a high value on the preservation of peace. The argument that China covets these islands merely as a stepping stone in the conquest of Formosa would become invalid. Of course there will be those who will say that China would violate its pledge. But no one in his right senses will believe that China would make such a pledge to its closest friends in Asia and then break faith with them by violating the pledge. I believe the American public would be profoundly affected by such a declaration and would respond in a sane and healthy manner.

I cannot state with equal assurance whether the American government would ask the Nationalists to evacuate the off-shore islands or whether the Nationalists would accede to such a request if it were made. But it stands to reason that in these circumstances if the islands are not evacuated and if fighting breaks out over them, it would be much less likely that America would intervene or that the people would regard the loss of these islands as another American retreat. A hardening of the American position on the Formosa problem would thus be avoided.

I wonder what you might think of the thought here presented.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Szilard

April 6th, 1955

Mr. Krishna Menon
Permanent Mission of India
to the United Nations
3 East 64th Street
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Krishna Menon,

you will find enclosed a communication
which I have sent to Prime Minister Nehru. I felt
I ought to inform you of this step which I have taken.
I believe you will understand our serious concern.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Albert Einstein.

x

The University of Chicago
Chicago, 37, Illinois
April 7, 1955

Dr. Homi J. Bhabha
Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy
Government of India
Apollo Pier Road
Bombay 1, India

Dear Bhabha:

For a while it looked during the past two weeks, that we were quite close to the outbreak of an atomic war in the Formosa Straits. The pressure of public opinion that descended on Washington when the people discovered what was happening is probably responsible for the situation looking better today.

Enclosed is James Reston's column taken from today's New York Times which I think is a pretty fair description of what has happened. Enclosed is also a report on Admiral Carney's statements taken from today's New York Herald Tribune. I have marked ^{the} passage with red pencil which you may want to take note of.

Even though the situation looks a little better today, the danger will remain with us unless some way is found that will permit both America and China to save face. Enclosed you will find a copy of a communication from Mr. Einstein to Mr. Nehru that has a bearing on this problem. If you think the considerations contained in it are valid, perhaps you might discuss them with Mr. Nehru when you have an opportunity to do so.

I am sincerely sorry that I didn't get to see you when you visited New York.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

LEO SZILARD

TELEPHONE : 35058-59
TELEGRAMS : ATOMERG



APOLLO PIER ROAD
BOMBAY 1

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY

SECRETARY

Ref: DAE/Per-LS/3801

April 18, 1955

Dear Szilard,

Thank you for your letter of April 7, 1955, with its enclosures. It reached me only yesterday, after the Prime Minister had already left for Indonesia.

2. I have just ascertained from the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister that Einstein's letter to Pandit Nehru was received and seen by him before he left for Indonesia. You may, therefore, rest assured that the suggestion you made has been seen.

3. My last visit to New York was a very full and rushed one, and I therefore could not include Chicago in my programme; otherwise I should have been glad to have a talk with you. I shall be in England between the 8th and the 22nd of May and in Paris from the 22nd of May till about the 7th of June. If you are in Europe during this period please contact me care of the Indian High Commissioner in London or the Indian Embassy in Paris.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. J. Bhabha', is written below the typed name. The signature is fluid and cursive.

Leo Szilard, Esq.,
The University of Chicago,
Chicago 37, Illinois,
U. S. A.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 2, 1955

Dear Hugh:

Upon my return to the office following a little vacation, I received your letter of April fourth. It certainly was good to hear from you.

Frankly, the matter about which you wrote does not come within my immediate cognizance, but I have made considerable inquiry around here to see if anything along the line which you suggest in your letter would serve sufficient purpose to make it worthwhile for all concerned.

I find that the Secretary of State and his top advisers, as well as the President, are spending a great deal of time trying to work out a solution in this particular field and that the proposals made by your friends have been and are being given continuous and thorough study. Certainly we all appreciate the very great desirability of finding means of relieving the tension in the Formosa area and you can rest assured that everything possible will be done to accomplish this purpose.

We of course are most appreciative of the interest being shown by the people throughout the country in this all-important matter and I particularly appreciate your writing to me as you did. Please express our thanks to your friends for their interest and offer to be of assistance.

I hope that everything is going well for you, and with kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



Wilton B. Persons
The Deputy Assistant to the President

Brig. General Hugh B. Hester, Retired
The Penn Sherwood Hotel
3900 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania

THE PENN SHERWOOD HOTEL
(FORMERLY THE PENN SHERATON)

3900 CHESTNUT ST.
PHILADELPHIA 1, PA.

May 8 '55-

May Lo -

Herewith rate from General
Persons which I wish you (would) read
and pass along to Marshall McDeffie
with my regards.

How have you been and what
are your plans?

Really joins me in warm regards.

Sincerely,

Walter B. Weston

Leo Szilard

The University of Chicago
May 19, 1955

Mr. Sidney O. Raphael, Esq.
501 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Mr. Raphael:


I understand from Mr. Arthur S. Lall, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations that on May 22nd you may make public the text of a letter which Einstein wrote to Mr. Nehru, but that the text of the document which accompanied it will not be released.

Since Einstein's letter contains a reference to me, ^{by name} I thought it would be in order for me to make the following remarks:

When the Quemoy-Matsu crisis was at its worst, I had several conversations with Einstein. He felt that the policy of "no speak", which somehow became established in American-Chinese relations, was creating a difficult and potentially dangerous situation. Yet he thought that, even in the absence of negotiations, the danger of war could perhaps be lessened through some unilateral steps that either America or China might take. Are there any such unilateral steps that could greatly reduce the danger of war?

Einstein, who knew Mr. Nehru personally and held him in high regard, wanted to send to Mr. Nehru a document analyzing some steps that even in the absence of negotiations, China might take and in doing so perhaps greatly reduce the danger of war in the Formosa Straits. I prepared such a document after several discussions that we had on the subject. Einstein sent it on to Mr. Nehru in the hope that the Bandung Conference would afford an opportunity to Mr. Nehru for discussing it with the Chinese.

Very sincerely yours,


Leo Szilard



PERMANENT MISSION OF INDIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
3 EAST 64TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

May 19, 1955.

Dear Mr Raphael,

In accordance with our telephonic conversation today I am enclosing a copy of the letter which the late Professor Einstein addressed to Prime Minister Nehru on April 6, 1955. With reference to your cable to him about this matter Prime Minister Nehru has informed that he has no objection to your using Professor Einstein's letter to him at the meeting to be held on May 22.

I have also consulted with Professor Szilard regarding this matter. He is aware of Prime Minister Nehru's decision regarding Professor Einstein's letter. However Professor Szilard said he would very much appreciate it if you would kindly inform him by telegram at King's Crown Hotel, New York, as to whether you are going to use Professor Einstein's letter to Prime Minister Nehru.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Arthur S. Lall)

Permanent Representative
of India to the United Nations

Mr Sidney Raphael,
President, Interfaith Movement,
New York.

✓ c.c. to Professor Leo Szilard, King's Crown Hotel,
420 West 116th St., New York City.

A. Einstein,
112 Merger Street,
Princeton,
New Jersey, USA.

April 6th, 1955.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India.

Dear Mr Nehru,

All reasonable people here are very much concerned about the worsening of the American-Chinese conflict. They try to think how the acute danger of war might be eliminated, which centers on the issue of Quemoy and Matsu. Dr Leo Szilard of the University of Chicago, who is as concerned about this danger as I am, wrote me a letter which you will find attached. It contains a thought which I believe ought to be considered if it has not been considered heretofore.

For this reason, I would greatly appreciate your reading the attached copy of Dr Szilard's letter. Also I would greatly appreciate your transmitting at an opportunity of your own choosing, the enclosed copy of this communication to China so that they may be in the position to judge the validity of these considerations on their merit.

On this occasion I wish to express my sincere appreciation of your untiring constructive efforts in the field of international relations.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Sd/- A. EINSTEIN.

112 Mercer Str. Princeton N.J.

Mr. Krishna Menon
Permanent Mission of India
to the United Nations
3 East 64th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Pandit Jawaharal Nehru
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi, India

*and the danger of war
which it involves*

Dear Mr. Nehru:

I take the unusual step of writing to you concerning ^a the practical political problem because I am deeply disturbed about the crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. ^P It would appear, that taking into account the reality of the political pressures that are brought to bear on the President of the United States there is no course of action open to him today that could open the door to a ~~workable settlement~~ ~~act as a~~ ~~workable~~ satisfactory settlement of the ~~Formosa~~ problem. The situation appears to

DRAFT

Mr Krishna Menon

Permanent Mission of India
to the United Nations
3 East 64th Street
New York 21 NY

Dear Mr.Menon:

Attached you will find a letter which I have sent to
Prime Minister Nehru. I would appreciate your discussing with
him the issue raised when an opportunity arises.

DRAFT

Dr. Homi J. Bhabha
Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy
Government of India
Apollo Pier Road
Bombay 1, India

Reverend Bork

Dear Bhabha,

Attached you will find a copy of a letter which Professor Einstein wrote to Mr. Nehru. The letter is self-explanatory. I have spent a few days in Washington lately because this is always what I do in a time of real crisis, and I came away with a strong feeling of alarm. I ^{feel} feel that unless the force

DRAFT

Mr. Arthur S. Lall
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations
3 East 64th Street
New York 21 NY

Dear Mr. Lall,

Enclosed you will find a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, and
a letter to Mr. Krishna Menon, from Mr. Albert Einstein, and a letter
addressed to Dr. Homi K. Bhabha from me.

I would greatly appreciate your transmitting these letters to
India.

A copy of Professor Einstein's letter to Prime Minister
Nehru is attached for your information.

Be Cd

Up 16

501054491

x