Council for a Livable World

To combat the menace of nuclear war

11 Beacon Street
Boston, Mass. 02108
Phone: (617)742-9395
GEORGE KISTIAKOWSKY
Chairman
JEROME GROSSMAN
President

100 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Phone: (202) 543-4100
JOHN ISAACS
Legislative Director

THE MX MOBILE MISSILE

The missile experimental program (MX) would consist of 200 missiles, each with 10 independently targetable nuclear warheads.

The new missile is a "hard-target" killer designed to destroy Soviet silos; future modifications will result in greater accuracy and higher yield than the present force of Minuteman ICBMs. The 2,000 warheads could be accurately targeted at the entire Soviet ICBM force. The MX, as proposed, would be concealed among 4,600 shelters, 23 roughly a mile apart for each missile. The missile will weigh 190,000 pounds and will have a range of about 6,000 miles.

Every one would be placed in a shelter located on a spur road extending from a linear, or roughly straight, gravel road which would follow the contours of the valley in which it is located. (Diagram A) The Pentagon estimates that 30 to 35 valleys would be needed to deploy the 200 missiles, poised on an erector-launcher.



Every few months, the missiles would be driven in a shielded transporter vehicle into other shelters and dropped off at one of them using means to defy detection. Location for some missiles could be changed quickly even after a Soviet counterforce attack. Not knowing where each missile is hiding, the enemy would be forced to target each of the 4,600 shelters.



The New York Times / Dec. 23, 1980

The preferred deployment area is a series of valleys spread across 25,000 square miles of Nevada and Utah. (Diagram B) Second choice is the southern High Plains of Texas and New Mexico. Only a small portion of the missile field would be fenced off from the public.

In June 1979 President Carter approved a full-scale development program of the MX; a decision on the controversal deployment plan was delayed until September 1979, and since has been modified. Two months later, the Senate withheld approval of any specific deployment system while not objecting to the missile itself. Ronald Reagan and other conservatives expressed reservations about earmarking Nevada and Utah as the sites for deployment.

The MX is now at a stage called "full scale engineering development." This means the concept and design are being tested. The missile should be ready for test flights in 1983; shelter construction will start in 1984. Initial operating capability for the first 10 missiles is projected for July 1986. No significant decrease in ICBM vulnerability is anticipated until deployment nears completion in 1989.

The Department of Defense predicts the MX will cost $33 billion. Other estimates run as high as $100 billion. Budget requests to date are:

FY 1979: $ 308.2 million
FY 1980: $ 732.4 million
FY 1981: $1,508.1 million
FY 1982: $2,930.0 million

JUSTIFICATION

The MX is designed to eliminate the potential vulnerability in the mid-1980's of the land-based ICBMs to a Soviet surprise attack. The projected increase in their number of accurate nuclear weapons will make it theoretically possible for the Soviets to destroy a large proportion of our Minuteman missiles in their silos. In contrast, the many MX shelters (also called multiple protective structures or MPS) would outnumber the Soviet warheads. Therefore, an attack would leave some missiles intact.

POTENTIAL SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. LAND-BASED MISSILES QUESTIONABLE

Proponents of the MX argue that the Soviets might be tempted to launch a surprise attack on our land-based missiles with the expectation that the United States could not or would not retaliate. Such a theory is highly hypothetical for at least two reasons.

1. Despite qualitative and quantative advances in their nuclear arsenal the Soviets still cannot achieve a high degree of confidence in their ability to destroy a majority, let alone all, of the land-based missiles in the United States. After all, such an attack has never before been tried and cannot be fully rehearsed.
2. Even if such an attack were successful, the U.S. would have ample ability to devastate the Soviet Union in turn with the surviving land-based missiles, long-range bombers and strategic submarines.

The Russians would have to accept the risk of virtual total destruction if they choose to use the threat of limited nuclear attacks against our land-based missiles as a diplomatic lever.

WITHOUT SALT II MX MAKES LITTLE SENSE

The failure to ratify the SALT II Treaty has raised questions regarding the utility of the MX. The Treaty placed a cap of 10 on the number of warheads per missile and limited the number of MIRVed ICBMs; without SALT, the Soviet Union could deploy so many warheads that any land-based system, including the MX, could be jeopardized. By greatly expanding the number of their warheads, they could overwhelm even the 4,600 shelters. While the proposed number of shelters could be increased, the U.S. and the Soviets might then engage in a race between the construction of our new missile shelters and their new warheads -- with an uncertain conclusion. As Senator Gary Hart pointed out: "If we were to get into an unrestricted competition with the Soviet Union -- their ability to produce RVs [re-entry vehicles] and our ability to dig holes and trenches -- the chances are that we would run out of land sooner than they would run out of RVs."

MX COULD UNDERMINE NUCLEAR STABILITY

The MX missile will greatly expand the number of warheads able to destroy Soviet ICBM silos. Thus the MX would threaten the Soviet ICBMs, which comprise 75% of their strategic force, and give the U.S. an offensive potential to destroy the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Soviets have to view the MX as a U.S. plan to acquire first-strike capacity, since counterforce is of no value in a second-strike aimed at empty silos.

MX deployment will undoubtedly lead to Soviet counteraction. This might be a pre-emptive strike plan, a "launch-on-warning" posture of putting their missiles on "hair-trigger" alert, or a program to make their own ICBMs mobile, in a basing system which may or may not be verifiable. With unverified basing systems on either side, agreements limiting arms are impossible.

Each Soviet option reduces U.S. security, increases the risk of nuclear conflict, and promotes an expensive and uncontrolled arms race.

COST

The likely cost of the MX system is already rising rapidly. While the Pentagon in 1980 predicted $33 billion, the GAO figured at least $56 billion after inflation adjustments -- but not including warhead development and acquisition. Other studies place MX costs over the full 30 year life span of the system, as more than $100 billion.

ABM TREATY COULD BE THREATENED

Another drawback to the MX is that it may lead to an anti-ballistic missile defense and hence to the demise of the 1972 ABM Treaty as suggested by the deputy chief of staff for the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke. Burke told the Air Force Association in Chicago on March 1, 1980: "If the Soviets elected to deploy vastly larger threats -- tens of thousands of warheads -- we might well wish to exercise another option, the use of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to defend MX."

Since the treaty now bans extensive ABM deployments, the U.S. would have

to abrogate the agreement. Once the treaty is abrogated the Soviets could then build defenses around their missile fields and their cities, thereby reducing the U.S. confidence in our ability to retaliate with both our sea-based and land-based forces. Thus a hard won limitation on the arms race could be lost at a cost of many billions of dollars and a reduction in security.

And if an ABM system is needed, why build an MX in the first place?

ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT IN NEVADA AND UTAH

Local leaders oppose the choice of their area for MX development primarily because:

1. A large-scale population influx into two sparsely settled states will overwhelm the available housing, public services, materials, and the labor force.
2. Large quantities of water are necessary for building and operating the MX but water is a scarce commodity in these desert states.
3. Grazing land and wild-life habitat will be lost.
4. The area would become a target for enemy attack.
5. There will be a drastic change in the lifestyle of the people in the area.

The draft Environmental Impact Statement released by the Air Force in December 1980 confirms many of these objections.

ALTERNATIVES TO THE MX

1. A shallow underwater mobile missile (SUM) may be a less costly, less cumbersome, and less vulnerable alternative to the MX. The SUM can be deployed in off-shore waters and thus avoids environmental objections. Verifiable without being targetable, SUM could be designed to avoid presenting a new threat to the Soviet deterrent force or destabilizing the strategic balance. [for further information on SUM, see the Council's "Shallow Underwater Missile (SUM) as an Alternative to the MX Racetrack"]
2. Suggested by some as a "quick fix" to the theoretical vulnerability of our land-based missiles is using modified versions of exisitng Minuteman missiles in a mobile deployment.
3. Additional Trident submarines.
4. Best of all would be renewed arms control talks. Agreement to reduce each side's arsenal of missiles and warheads would lessen the threat to their deterrent force.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
11 Beacon Street
Boston, MA 02138
100 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Please send me at no charge ____ copies of "THE MX MOBILE MISSILE" publication.

Enclosed is my contribution to the COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD for ___$15, ___$25, ___$50, ___other.

Name_____

Address_____

GEORGE RATHJENS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Building E-38 Room 632
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Dear Fellow FAS Members:

As most of you are aware, FAS was founded as the Federation of ATOMIC Scientists because of concern about reducing the risks of nuclear war. The name was changed as it became involved with a broader range of issues.

Nuclear war is still, however, the most immediate threat to survival and in the light of the events of the last year - particularly Afghanistan, the unsettled situation in Poland, and the cessation of serious Soviet-American arms control negotiations - the danger may be greater now than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. If you share my concern, I believe you may want to support the activities of the Council for a Livable World.

Like the FAS, the Council was a response of the scientific community to "the bomb." Specifically, it was founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard who believed that one of the most effective ways of constructively influencing foreign policy is through the U.S. Senate.

This the Council has done in two ways: by providing senators and senatorial candidates with solidly based analyses and advice on weapons acquisition and other nuclear war-related issues, and, through financial support and occasional political guidance, by helping to elect those candidates who share a concern about the arms race. To do this, the Council has searched for promising challengers, even in primary campaigns, as well as evaluated the records of incumbents who are facing close races. When assured that a candidate is firm on issues and that money can make a real difference, Council supporters are asked to contribute to the candidate through the Council. In addition, particularly when there has been an immediate need for a discrete sum, the Council contributed from its own resources. Thus twenty-one members of the 1981 Senate were backed by the Council. Access to these decision makers is crucial when arms control issues arise.

Seminars for the senators and their staff are held by the Council during each legislative session. Most recently there was one on the MX, given by Sidney Drell of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and another on binary chemical weapons given by Matthew Meselson of Harvard. You will appreciate that the Council's two approaches - electing leaders and keeping them informed - are complementary. As a sponsor and former FAS chairman, I believe we complement the Council's work as well.

I know of no more effective way of combating the menace of nuclear war than by supporting the Council and Council-endorsed candidates. There has never been a more important time for such support. Will you join us in trying to ensure that the world will continue to be livable?

Sincerely,

George W. Rathjens

George Rathjens

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD EDUCATION FUND

11 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Phone: (617) 742-9395

Council for a Livable World Education Fund (CLWEF) is a non-profit corporation with headquarters in Boston, Massachusetts. Contributions to CLWEF are tax-deductible under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Chairman of CLWEF is George Kistiakowsky, Professor Emeritus of Chemistry at Harvard University and science adviser to presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Internationally known scientists and educators serve on the board of directors, and participate in its activities.

While CLWEF was incorporated in January 1980, most of the scientists, through the Council for a Livable World, have been providing United States senators for two decades with sophisticated technical and scientific information that helps them make decisions about nuclear arms control and strategic weapons. The Council for a Livable World, founded in 1962 by the late nuclear physicist Leo Szilard, was instrumental in passing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, halting ABM, banning biological weapons, advancing the SALT process under four presidents, and slowing nuclear proliferation.

CLWEF was formed to educate the public about nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race as well as the antidote of serious arms control.

CLWEF has joined Physicians for Social Responsibility in organizing a series of nationwide symposia on "The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War." Symposia have already been held in Boston, Washington, New Haven, New York and San Francisco. Others are planned for Chicago, Seattle and Atlanta. CLWEF furnishes speakers and arranges intensive coverage in the print, radio and television media.

A book on the MX has been commissioned by CLWEF for publication by the M.I.T. Press in 1981. CLWEF will subsidize an inexpensive edition for mass distribution.

CLWEF has established a Speakers Bureau composed of some of the leading physicists, chemists, nuclear experts, doctors, researchers, diplomats and experts in conflict resolution. These speakers are educating the general public on the technology of nuclear war and peace as well as a variety of measures to avoid war.

CLWEF plans to conduct regional competitions among college students awarding prizes for essays on the nuclear impasse to heighten consciousness on this the key issue of our time.

How to make Moscow's failure hurt

The Boston Globe Tuesday, January 15, 1980

By ROGER FISHER



In Afghanistan, as in Iran, the United States is faced by a situation which it cannot undo by physical means. Here again, as in most international conflicts, success for us depends upon what others think. Since our objective is to affect thinking, we should know whose minds we are trying to affect, and just what we want them to think. In this kind of a conflict, issue control is as important as arms control.

Our ultimate target is the thinking of Soviet leadership. On future occasions, we would like them to conclude that the costs of militarily conquering a neighboring country — as in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and now in Afghanistan — are extremely high. To deter future conduct we would like the costs in the case of Afghanistan to be substantially higher than they had expected.

The major costs to the USSR are likely to be political, not military. The Soviet Union will suffer because of the way others think. The prime audience is Third World, Moslem, and potentially pro-Soviet constituencies in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe. We should so conduct ourselves that the Soviet action in Afghanistan is seen by that audience in its starkest and most costly light. To this end, we should avoid some actions and take others.

1. We should not call a Soviet failure a success. The Soviet action is a tragedy for Afghanistan, but it also represents a drastic failure for the Soviet Union. Even with some 5000 Soviet military advisers, Moslem resistance in Afghanistan was threatening to overthrow a Marxist government. We should not let American hawks — or the US government — advertise this disastrous failure of Soviet policy as a "success" for the Soviet Union.

(Last year the United States caught the Russians hiding more combat troops in non-aligned Cuba than either they or Castro wanted to admit. Our unwise reaction turned that potential Soviet embarrassment into what looked like a Soviet success. Let's not repeat that mistake here.)

2. We should not treat Soviet action against the Islamic world as primarily a United States problem. The United States has a tendency to put itself at the center of every stage. We treat ourselves as the target of every action: "Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is an attack on the United States."

this action seen in its true light, as a conflict between the Soviet Union and a non-aligned Moslem country.

Non-aligned countries and the Islamic world should see themselves not as spectators at a super-power confrontation but rather as the primary target of the Soviet Union. We will all do better if the United States is lending support to the Third World, rather than if the Third World is asked to take sides in a super-power confrontation. We should do nothing to blur the clear picture of the giant, Communist Soviet Union ruthlessly trying to dominate little Moslem Afghanistan.

3. We should maximize the political costs to the Soviet Union in those countries it seeks to influence. The Soviet Union will be less affected by US criticism than by loss of support among those it hopes to influence. Those in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe, who might be tempted by Marxist ideas, should have the harsh facts of the present Soviet conduct presented in ways that cannot be avoided or forgotten. Here is a highly moral opportunity for the CIA to demonstrate its intelligence-gathering capability.

McHenry to the UN Security Council should be backed up with photographs and corroborative detail. All the hard data we can collect about Soviet military preparations in advance of the coup, the Soviet role in the coup, and the current dominant role in Afghanistan being played by Russian troops should be pulled together, presented clearly, honestly, and persuasively, and made available to journalists, political parties, magazines, radio stations and other means of dissemination world-wide.

Those who might be tempted to sign a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union should be unable to forget that in Afghanistan the Soviet Union used such a treaty as a standing invitation to intervene. Those thinking of being friendly with the Soviet Union should remember what happened to President Amin when he was not friendly enough.

We would like all these costs to fall on the Soviet Union at minimum cost to ourselves. Further, despite Afghanistan, we continue to share with the Soviet Union common interests, in limiting the strategic arms race, in trade, and elsewhere. The more narrowly and directly the costs

Afghanistan, the more effective they will be in discouraging future such conduct, and the less disruptive of other interests. The costs should be seen as the direct consequence of what the Soviet Union did, not of what we do.

Any military aid to Afghan rebels should be an Islamic effort. The United States is being tempted to take the lead in responding militarily to the Soviet action. Yet we are better off if the Soviet attack is seen in its simplest terms as an attack on Islamic Afghanistan. Islamic countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have plenty of cash and plenty of reasons to be concerned about Soviet aggression. And one benefit of the unfortunate world arms market is that there are plenty of arms available for purchase.

The lesson is clear. The United States should encourage Islamic and non-aligned countries to take the lead; we should not try to play the dominant role ourselves. That way the Soviet Union will pay the full cost.

Roger Fisher, Williston Professor of Law at Harvard University, is the author of "International Conflict for Beginners" and "Inter-

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Dr. Maurice Fox	CLW	* 195 Tappen St. Brookline, MA 02146 (H) 617-738-0860	Dept. of Biology MIT 56-731 77 Massachusetts Ave. Cambridge, MA 02139 (O) 617-253-4728
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		HOME ADDRESS & PHONE	BUSINESS ADDRESS & PHONE
Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith	CLW	away till march. 30 Francis Ave. Cambridge, MA 02138 (H) 617-491-7242 Switzerland at 1:00 PM 03042919	* Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 (O) 617-495-2140
Jerome Grossman (President)	CLW CLWEF	65 Grove Street Apt. 347 Wellesley, MA 02181 (H) 617-235-4678	CLW 11 Beacon Street Boston MA 02108 (O) 617-742-9395
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Dr. Charles Price	CLW	* 120 Hilldale Avenue Lansdowne, PA 19050 (H) 215-623-8261	Dept. of Chemistry University of PA Philadelphia, PA 19104 (O) 215-243-8234

NAME		HOME ADDRESS & PHONE	BUSINESS ADDRESS & PHONE
Prof. George Rathjens	CLW	* 39 Sewall Street W. Newton, MA 02165 (H) 617-332-0767	MIT 9-435 Cambridge, MA 02139 (O) 617-253-7282
Eli Sagan	CLW CLWEF	* 153 Dwight Place Englewood, NJ 07631 (H) 201-567-3744	
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AME		HOME ADDRESS & PHONE	BUSINESS ADDRESS & PHONE
Paul C. Warnke	CLW CLWEF	* 5037 Garfield St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20016 (H) 202-966-7938	815 Connecticut Ave. Washington, D.C. 20006 (O) 202-828-4200

Dr. Gertrud W. Sniland
8038 El Paseo Grande
La Jolla CA 92037

Director - Harriet Mark Avery	11 Beacon St. Boston, MA 02108	(O) 617-742-9395
Legislative Director - John Isaacs	100 Maryland Ave. N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002	(O) 202-543-4100
DO NOT SEND TO: CLW Lawyers - Terry Lenzner Marc Lackritz	Wald, Harkrader & Ross 1300 19th St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036	(O) 202-828-1200

Send Board mailings & minutes to:

John Isaacs
100 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington D.C. 20002

and

Victor Harris
109 Brookside Road
Needham MA 02192

and

Marilyn Grossman
333A Laverne Ave.
Mill Valley CA 94941

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

Washington Office: 100 Maryland Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20002, Phone: 202-543-4100

Cambridge Office: 12 Howard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, Phone: 617-492-4060

Mrs. Leo Szilard, Dr. James R. Arnold and Mrs. Gita Braude

cordially invite you to meet

The Honorable Albert Gore

in the Imperial Room of the Torrey Pines Inn, 11480 Torrey Pines Road, N. La Jolla

on Wednesday, November 10, 1971 from 8-10 p.m.

Senator Gore is currently Washington Chairman of the Council for a Livable World and will speak about the role of the Council in Washington, and in the 1972 elections.

This meeting is sponsored jointly by the Council for a Livable World, the La Jolla Democratic Club and the San Diego County Chapter of the World Federalists.

Washington Office: 201 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, Phone: 202-543-4100 *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D.C.

Cambridge Office: 12 Howard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, Phone: 617-492-4060

February 26th, 1970

MEMORANDUM ON SECRETARY LAIRD'S ABM PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 24th, 1970

On February 24 Secretary Laird announced the Administration's decision to expand its Safeguard ABM system by increasing Minuteman defense and laying the groundwork for a nationwide system of population defense. He offered two principal reasons for doing so: a projected deployment rate of the Soviet SS-9 missile which might leave our land-based Minuteman vulnerable to a first strike attack by the mid 1970's, and a projected rate of ICBM development which might permit China to launch an attack of ten to twenty-five nuclear tipped missiles on the United States by the mid 1970's.

There should be no doubt in the mind of proponents or opponents of the Safeguard ABM that, if these projections of the Defense Secretary were to come true, our Minuteman missiles would be vulnerable to a Soviet attack and our cities to a Chinese attack. A large Soviet SS-9 force with highly accurate MIRV warheads could destroy virtually all of our land-based missiles, if we were to refrain from firing our own before the Soviet blow struck. Ten to twenty-five Chinese missiles could take a horrendous toll in American lives, as indeed ten to twenty-five Soviet missiles have been capable of doing for almost a decade.

If present trends continue the United States will be able to destroy the Soviet land-based missile force in a first strike. Even today, an American attack whether delivered by land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, or bombers can destroy a virtually defenseless China.

What Secretary Laird and other spokesmen of the Administration have failed to establish is how these projected Soviet and Chinese developments will actually affect the future security of the United States.

Since the beginning of the nuclear age our security has rested on our universally recognized ability to destroy any would-be attacker even after the first blow had been dealt against us. The effectiveness of our deterrent is no less credible today than it was in 1945.

In the first years after World War II the deterrent consisted of the atomic bomb and the intercontinental bomber which assured its delivery.

With the advent of ICBM's and the thermonuclear warheads in the 1950's the role of the intercontinental bomber as the primary component of our deterrent was taken over by the new missiles. Indeed, the obsolescence of the intercontinental bomber as the preferred delivery system was so rapid that the Soviet Union very nearly by-passed this system in building their own strategic nuclear forces, preferring to focus almost all of their efforts on ICBM's.

We too went ahead with ICBM's, first deploying Atlas and Titan missiles above ground. Later, recognizing the vulnerability of these missiles we phased them out as soon as we had an adequate number of submarine-launched missiles and Minutemen in hardened underground silos.

By the end of the 60's there was gathering evidence that, with increasing missile accuracy, even the hardened ICBM's would soon be vulnerable. It may well be time to recognize that the fixed ICBM has served its purpose, and that in the future we should rely primarily on the mobile sea-based systems for deterrence. This we can safely do.

No government can mount a nuclear attack on the United States with any hope of surviving the retaliatory blow which our Polaris fleet can inflict.

This point was underscored in a prepared statement by the Secretary of Defense presented to a joint session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on February 20th 1970:

> "Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea can be considered virtually invulnerable to-day. With a highly concentrated effort the Soviet Navy to-day might be able to localize and destroy at sea one or two Polaris submarines. But the massive and expensive undertaking that would be required to extend such a capability using any currently known ASW techniques would take time and would certainly be evident."

Viewed in this perspective, the Administration's current proposals for expansion of the Safeguard ABM system are anything but moderate.

For a variety of technical reasons which are discussed further below, expansion of Minuteman defense would be an untimely effort to shore up a delivery system which will continue to suffer, despite Administration efforts, a declining role in our deterrent force.

Last year we were told that we needed two ABM sites to test the operational capacity of the system and to eliminate the inevitable bugs. Although no substantial construction and consequently no testing has begun at either site, it would seem that this year we must begin to build in earnest.

More startling is the proposal to lay the groundwork at this time for a nationwide, anti-Chinese system of population defense. The cost for the spadework in FY 71 will be minimal, but the commitment, if accepted by the Congress, will be almost unlimited.

Senator Mansfield has estimated the ultimate cost of such a system at $50 billion or more. It is now clear, as opponents of ABM feared last year, that the Administration's "minimum" proposal for ABM was the nose of the camel beneath the tent.

As Chinese missile strength grows beyond the projected level of ten to twenty-five missiles, ABM will require constant upgrading and constant expansion. It will require a nationwide shelter program for which no price has been set, either in terms of dollars or of regimentation of our society.

An anti-missile system on this scale will force Soviet leaders to reevaluate fundamentally their own strategic planning. The adverse effect of these new ABM proposals on SALT which will shortly resume in Vienna, can not be underrated.

How have we moved so far away from a reasoned assessment of our national security requirements?

There is evidence that the President has come to rely almost exclusively on a small group of officials within his own Administration for advice on national security and defense problems. Senators of both parties who might have been expected to take a contrary position on the ABM question have apparently had little opportunity to present their views directly to the President.

As a disturbing example, consider the President's statement of January 30th, 1970, that an anti-Chinese defense would be "virtually infallible". This assertion suggests that the President has not only failed to avail himself of the advice of knowledgeable senators but has also neglected to draw on informed scientific opinion outside the government. No responsible scientist or engineer with experience in military technology would support the concept of an "infallible" population defense.

No system as complicated as Safeguard can be counted on to work perfectly, particularly if it cannot be tested adequately. The failure in combat of far less complicated systems - recall the F-111 - even after extensive testing, bears witness to that.

But there are other reasons as well. According to the Secretary of Defense full Safeguard deployment would not be realized until the late 1970's; yet the Chinese may have ICBM's several years earlier. By the late 1970's the Chinese would have been able to introduce penetration aids into their ICBM force, and once that happened the entire concept of Safeguard would be obsolete. Local defenses for each American city and a nationwide fallout shelter program would then be required if the system were to retain significant credibility.

What is so worriesome about the President's judgement of the "virtual infallibility" of the defense is the possibility that he, or a successor, in the false confidence that there would be no risk, might some day take actions that would trigger a Chinese nuclear attack. There is a high probability that millions of Americans would be killed if this were to happen.

Putting aside for the moment the Administration's apparent unwillingness to face the strategic realities of the seventies - when improved missile accuracy will have doomed land-based ICBM's to obsolescence, when all efforts to build an airtight defense against

China will have failed no matter how many billions are spent, and when our best hope, while maintaining a strong deterrent, will clearly lie in negotiation with both the Soviet Union and China - let us ask whether the ABM program for defense of Minuteman makes sense even within the Administration's own frame of reference.

A year ago opponents of Safeguard pointed out that the system would be totally unnecessary for the defense of Minuteman if Soviet capabilities did not grow, and that it would be almost totally ineffective if they did. The Administration has now conceded as much.

Again on February 20th 1970 Secretary Laird stated:

"There is no need for a defense of the Minuteman force...if...the Soviets do not increase the deployment of the SS-9 and the SS-11, do not develop a MIRV for the SS-9, and do not improve ICBM accuracy..."

and immediately thereafter he stated:

"We would.... be faced in the mid 70's with a threat which is much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system... if... the Soviets deploy a MIRV on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy, and do not stop building ICBM's at this time but continue building them at their present rate."

Thus we are confronted with the ridiculous situation of being asked to spend billions on a system that will be useful, even within the Administration's frame of reference, only if the Soviet Union should co-operate in tailoring their threat to suit the peculiar limitations of our Safeguard.

What it comes down to, and what the Administration continues to refuse to acknowledge, is this; in the nuclear age defense is and will remain an illusion. More Missiles and more Anti-Ballistic Missiles do not and will not bring increased security. The future depends not on preparations to "win" a nuclear war, but on the ability to deter a nuclear attack through invulnerable retaliatory forces. We shall be living with deterrence for a long time; we must come to terms with reality.

Bernard T. Feld
President

William Doering
Chairman

(This memorandum is being sent to Senators and Congressmen, Governors and Mayors, and members of thePress.)

November 1964

The Election Victories: Four out of Five in Priority Campaigns, Fourteen out of Eighteen in Total

In the 1964 elections the Council for a Livable World supported a total of 18 candidates. The Council urged Supporters to transmit contributions on a priority basis to five of these candidates: Senatorial candidates McGee, Moss, Montoya, Muskie, and Congressional candidate Harding. Each of these candidates faced strong right-wing opposition: McGee, Moss, Montoya, and Muskie won; Harding was defeated. In addition, the Council recommended three Senatorial candidates who did not need financial support on a priority basis: Gore, Hart, and McCarthy. Each of these candidates won reelection.

From the unallocated political funds provided by Supporters, the Council provided late campaign contributions to three Senatorial candidates and seven Congressional candidates. The Senatorial candidates were Hart (who had previously been recommended but for whom contributions had not been asked), Yarborough (defending his Texas Senate seat), and Tydings (challenging the incumbent Beall in Maryland). Each of these candidates won.

The Congressional candidates included five Republican candidates who courageously stood up against the extreme conservative elements within their own party: incumbents Lindsay (N.Y.), Halpern (N.Y.), Sibal (Conn.), Tupper (Maine), and challenger Pettis (Calif.). Lindsay, Halpern, and Tupper won; Sibal and Pettis lost. Two further congressional candidates supported were newcomers who evinced strong concerns with issues of foreign policy. Vivian (Michigan) and Officer (New Hampshire). Vivian won ; Officer appears to have lost by about 200 votes, but a recount has been requested. In the primaries for the 1964 election, the Council had supported Miss Blatt running against Musmano, an arch conservative, for the Democratic nomination for Senate from Pennsylvania. Miss Blatt narrowly won the nomination. (In the Senate race itself, the Council supported neither Miss Blatt nor her opponent, the incumbent Scott; Scott won reelection.)

In total, fourteen of the eighteen candidates whom the Council supported were victorious. Of these, four of the five candidates for whom the Council urged support on a priority basis were victorious. Some additional information on the candidates, the contests, and the extent of the Council's support follows.

THE 1964 ELECTION RESULTS FOR CANDIDATES RECOMMENDED BY THE COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
(All figures based on unofficial published reports)

candidate +incumbent	state	total vote cast in contest in question	%vote for candidate in his race	%vote for President Johnson in state (% for each Congressional District not yet available)
In the Senate races				
Gale W. McGee (Dem.)+	Wyoming	133,801	53.7	56.4
Frank E. Moss (Dem.)+	Utah	397,702	57.4	54.7
Joseph M. Montoya (Dem.)	New Mexico	323,842	54.7	59.1
Edmund S. Muskie (Dem.)+	Maine	411,868	56.8	68.8
Albert Gore (Dem.)+	Tennessee	1,064,888	53.6	55.5
Eugene J. McCarthy (Dem.)+	Minnesota	1,529,899	60.2	64.0
Philip A. Hart (Dem.)+	Michigan	3,063,554	64.4	67.7
Joseph D. Tydings (Dem.)	Maryland	1,093,212	63.3	66.4
Ralph W. Yarborough (Dem.)+	Texas	2,541,585	56.5	62.9
In the House races				
Ralph R. Harding (Dem.)+	Idaho, 2nd C.D.	164,137	48	50.9
John V. Lindsay (Rep.)+	New York, 17th C.D.	189,821	71	68.2
Seymour Halpern (Rep.)+	New York, 6th C.D.	157,308	56	68.2
Charles B. Officer (Dem.)	New Hampshire, 2nd C.D.	125,137	49.9	63.9
Jerry L. Pettis (Rep.)	California, 33rd C.D.	167,621	48	59.8
Abner W. Sibal (Rep.)+	Connecticut, 4th C.D.	225,292	48	67.8
Stanley R. Tupper (Rep.)+	Maine, 1st C.D.	189,622	50.2	68.8
Weston E. Vivian (Dem.)	Michigan, 2nd C.D.	152,362	50.5	67.7
In the primaries				
Genevieve Blatt(Dem.)	Pennsylvania	(won primary by 513 votes)		

In 1963-64, Supporters of the Council contributed a total of $88,000 directly to candidates, with priority to McGee, Moss, Montoya, Muskie, Harding, and McCarthy, in that order. In addition, from the unallocated political funds provided by Supporters, the Council contributed a total of $12,500 in amounts ranging from $500 to $4,500 to the following candidates. In the Senate races: Hart, Tydings, Yarborough; In the House races: Halpern, Lindsay, Officer, Pettis, Sibal, Tupper, Vivian; In the primary only: Blatt.

The Campaigns: "Peace Is Not A Dirty Word"

In all but one of the contests in which the Council had publicly supported a candidate, the issues of peace and war that were central to the national campaign were joined on the fact of the Council's support. In these contests, ultra-conservative candidates did not hesitate to equate disarmament proposals with "soft on communism" charges reminiscent of the McCarthy era. Distorted allegations about the Council were widely publicized, and the Council became a controversial major campaign issue.

The early promulgator of mistruths about the Council was a writer, Holmes Alexander, who attacked the Council in print as early as March, and at whose instigation attacks on the Council were made on the floor of the Senate. The more serious attacks were those prepared by the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee and circulated in the last stages of the election. Working with the columns that had appeared earlier, Council publications, information from the public record, and a large dose of imagination, the so-called "Factual Information on the Council for a Livable World" was prepared. Senator Milward Simpson (R, Wyoming) read the "report" into the Congressional Record the day before the Senate session adjourned, thus effectively precluding strong counter-statements from being made within the same session (Congressional Record, October 2, 1964, pp. 23039-23041). The "report" stated, among countless mistruths, that the Council stood for "unilateral disarmament" and a "totally defenseless" United States, that other organizations contributed to Council funds, that Council money emanated from outside the United States, that the Council itself was a secret organization, that the Council was infiltrating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency! The report was sent to all Republican opponents of Democratic candidates who had been publicly supported by the Council. In Wyoming, Idaho, Utah, and New Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Maine, Minnesota, and Tennessee, repeated use was made of this "report" in attempts to discredit the candidates who had welcomed the Council's support. That these attempts failed is a tribute to the candidates' energetic efforts to bring foreign policy issues to focus on their merits and to the voters' good sense. As was strongly stated by Senator-elect Montoya: "Peace is not a dirty word."

And an Editorial Evaluation from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: "Putting Money Where Reason Is"

In an editorial on the Council for a Livable World of November 7, the St. Louis Post Dispatch termed the attacks on the Council "as unfounded as they are hysterical" and complimented the Council on "a good season's work." The entire editorial is reprinted here with permission of The Pulitzer Publishing Co.

"Putting Money Where Reason Is"

"The Council for a Livable World has earned the right to sit back, momentarily at least, and review the bidding after a good season's work. This was the second national election in which this group of scientists and laymen made direct financial contributions to some candidates who cast thoughtful votes on such crucial peace issues as the test-ban treaty, the purchase of United Nations bonds and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

"Three out of four Council-assisted candidates defeated right-wing Republican opponents after close races. They are incumbent Senators McGee of Wyoming and Moss of Utah. Representative Montoya of New Mexico won a Senate seat in something of an upset. Representative Harding of Idaho also received a Council endorsement.

"In 1962, the Council contributed to the campaigns of Senators Carroll, Church, Clark, Fulbright, Javits, McGovern and Morse. Some have been targets of wealthy extremists.

"The Council follows the late Dr. Leo Szilard's proposal that individual citizens might improve the chances for peace by backing candidates with cash as well as votes. Charges that it is comprised of and supports "pacifists" favoring "unilateral disarmament" are as unfounded as they are hysterical. Council members do advocate a sincere and intelligent search for ways to strengthen peace, not just avoid war. And the world is more livable for their efforts."

Council for a Livable World
535 Dupont Circle Building
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

RETURN REQUESTED

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MRS LEO SZILARD
2380 TORREY PINES RD
LA JOLLA CALIF 92038

F74

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

Washington Office: 100 Maryland Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20002, Phone: 202-543-4100

Cambridge Office: 12 Howard Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, Phone: 617-492-4060

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 30, 1969

(Secret hearing held on April 30, 1969; sanitized and printed on June 23, 1969)

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

WASHINGTON BULLETIN

September 1969

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

CBW AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL: THE CHOICES JUST AHEAD

After the recent series of incredible accidents, blunders and evasions by the Pentagon's Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) services, the Senate has taken unprecedented action to place the nation's CBW programs under long-overdue Congressional scrutiny. By a 91-0 vote last August 11, the Senate passed a series of amendments to the 1970 Military Procurement Authorization Act that would block additional procurement of lethal chemical and biological weapons, require prior notice to Congress before shipment or open-air testing of biological and lethal chemical munitions, and necessitate semi-annual reports to Congress on CBW spending. The unanimity of the Senate vote resulted from the last minute support of Defense Secretary Laird, who must have seen the political wisdom of not appearing to oppose the general demand for increased Congressional control over the nation's hitherto obscure but potentially disastrous gas and germ warfare programs.

The main significance of the Senate action is that our CBW programs will for the first time be subjected to Congressional review. Nevertheless, the new amendments represent only a first step. Existing arsenals of offensive CB weapons will remain intact. And our fundamental policy for these weapons remains to be clarified. Among the questions that should now be confronted are the following: What important military requirement, if any, does the United States have for offensive chemical or biological weapons? Should we not join the sixty-five other nations that have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol pledging not to initiate CB warfare? What policies should the United States adopt in order to discourage the proliferation of these potentially cheap and destabilizing weapons of mass destruction?

Last April, President Nixon ordered a broad review of CBW policy within the Executive Branch. It was a welcome development. However, nearly all the experts on these weapons within the government are military men who cannot be expected to present the President with the fullest range of policy choices. Only if the subject is opened up to broad Congressional and public discussion can there be any assurance that long-range wisdom will prevail over short-sighted compromise. As a contribution to better public understanding of the issues involved, the Council encloses the recently released transcript of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on chemical and biological warfare. The witness was Matthew Meselson, Harvard Biologist and Treasurer of the Council.

The most immediate recommendation made by Professor Meselson and strongly supported by the Council is that the United States at long last ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 with the understanding that it applies without exception to all gas and germ weapons. Ninety-eight members of the House and twenty members of the Senate have sponsored resolutions urging President Nixon to submit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has indicated his desire to hold extensive hearings on the Protocol as soon as it can be submitted by the Administration. The likelihood of this happening can be greatly increased by a broad expression of public support for the Protocol. If you find yourself in agreement with this objective, your letters to the President and to your Senators can have an important effect at this early stage in the current national policy review.

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld
President

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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1969

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S–116, the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Dodd, McGee, Aiken, and Case.

Also present: Representative McCarthy of New York.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting today in executive session to be educated by Dr. Matthew S. Meselson on the subject of chemical and biological warfare.

REASONS FOR COMMITTEE'S INTEREST

The committee's interest stems from several recent developments: The submission by the United Kingdom of a working paper on microbiological warfare weapons to the 18-nation Disarmament Committee, and the formation earlier this year of a United Nations Special Committee, on which the United States is represented, to examine and report on the characteristics and security implications of chemical and biological weapons.

In recent statements, both President Nixon and Premier Kosygin have expressed their interest in discussing the control of chemical and biological weapons at Geneva. As chemical and biological weapons may soon be the subject of serious international negotiations, the matter is thus clearly within this committee's responsibility. There are, of course, wider aspects of this problem that follow from the question of whether or not to adhere to a treaty and what part to play in the United Nations Special Committee.

Just as in the case of nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons have the capability literally of destroying the human race. Yet we know so little about these weapons, and about what we are doing and what other nations are doing in developing and stockpiling them even though they could destroy us. As Dr. Meselson himself pointed out recently in Science magazine, these matters have received almost no careful public or congressional scrutiny.

Our witness today has long had a special interest in the disarmament aspects of chemical and biological weapons. Currently a professor of biology at Harvard, he has served as a consultant to the Arms

NOTE.—Sections of this hearing have been deleted in the interests of national security. Deleted material is indicated by the notation "[Deleted]."

Control and Disarmament Agency. I wish to insert at this point in the record a more complete biography of Dr. Meselson.

(A biographical sketch follows:)

MATTHEW S. MESELSON, PROFESSOR OF BIOLOGY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Born: May 24, 1930. Denver, Colorado.

Address: Biological Laboratories, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Academic background: Ph.B., Liberal Arts, University of Chicago, 1951; Ph.D., Physical Chemistry, California Institute of Technology, 1957; Research Fellow, California Institute of Technology, 1957–58; Assistant Professor of Physical Chemistry, California Institute of Technology, 1958–59; Senior Research Fellow in Chemical Biology, California Institute of Technology, 1959–60; Associate Professor of Biology, Harvard University, 1960–1964. Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Member, U.S. National Academy of Science.

Government affiliation: Consultant, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency since 1963.

Recipient: National Academy of Science Prize for Molecular Biology, 1963; Eli Lilly Award in Microbiology and Immunology, 1964.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Meselson, we appreciate very much your taking the time and trouble to come here to consult with us and to give us the benefit of your knowledge in this field.

I want to confess at the outset that I know so little about the subject, that my questions may seem very naive indeed. We have with us today Congressman McCarthy who has given a good deal more study to this than I have, and we welcome his interest. You may proceed.

It does interest me that you are a biologist primarily; is that right?

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW S. MESELSON, PROFESSOR OF BIOLOGY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, sir; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't Dr. Wald a biologist also?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, George Wald is.

The CHAIRMAN. He seems to be very conscious, from what he says, of what the adult generation is doing to the world we are in. Recently I saw a very interesting article, relating to a hearing in the House, which quoted a Mr. Kominer on what we are doing technologically to our environment. I imagine this is also something you are interested in.

Will you proceed, Dr. Meselson?

Dr. MESELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Would you prefer that I read all or part of my prepared statement?

The CHAIRMAN. I have not had a chance to read it. I think we will let you be the judge. If it is too long to read, we could put it all in the record and you could emphasize what you believe should be called to our attention. You are the best judge of that.

Dr. MESELSON. I would like to read page 1.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Dr. MESELSON. Page 1 is the table of contents of this statement I have prepared for you this morning. It has an introductory portion which I would like to read.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, read anything you like. We have no other witness this morning, and at least I am going to stay with you. I want to learn something about the subject.

Dr. MESELSON. That part is relatively short. Then it is followed by a definition and description of actual chemical and biological warfare agents, and I hope you will stop me if in reading that, I seem to be going on to no good purpose.

Following that, there are some remarks about chemical weapons policy, and then there are four appendixes which are documents as indicated on page 1 of my statement.

If I might, then, I would like to read——

The CHAIRMAN. You go ahead and read all of it, if you think that is the best way. I, for one, would be interested in it.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Dr. MESELSON. My name is Matthew Meselson and I am a professor of biology at Harvard University. I was trained in the field of chemistry at Harvard University, and my present teaching and research activities are in the area of genetics and biochemistry. My concern with the problems posed by chemical and biological weapons stems from the summer of 1963 during most of which I served full time as a consultant to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington.

My assignment was to study arms control possibilities for chemical and biological weapons. In doing that I read both classified and unclassified material. I visited Fort Detrick which, as you know, is one of our chemical and biological warfare research installations.

EXPECTED PUBLICATION OF RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Doctor allow me to interrupt? I should have said for the record, I did say prior to the opening of the hearing, that while this is an executive meeting it is anticipated that, subject to sanitizing by Dr. Meselson, this record may be made public. I would like everybody to be conscious of that possibility, because I think it is the kind of record that the public needs to be informed about. The record is being kept secret today, not for any security reasons that I know of, but simply to help us learn about the subject. So in our questions and answers, let us keep that in mind. Afterward, I would imagine, this record will be made public subject to your changes. If you put something in that is based on classified material, and later you think it should come out, we will take it out, but you should be free now to go ahead and say it.

Dr. MESELSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want the ground rules to be understood. So proceed.

Dr. MESELSON. Since that summer of 1963 I have continued to serve as a consultant to the Disarmament Agency. However, I would like to emphasize that I appear here today purely as a private citizen, in no way representing any part of the U.S. Government.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NEED ANALYSIS

Because of its leading military and political role in the world today, the United States can exert an important and possibly decisive effect on the factors that act to restrain or encourage CB warfare.

This fact argues strongly against basing our policy on a weapon-by-weapon or situation-by-situation analysis and calls instead for the formulation of an overall policy on which decisions regarding particular weapons or particular situations can be based. Stated another way, decisions involving toxic, that is, chemical or biological weapons, are likely to have important effects on the military environment we face years after those decisions are made.

I am concerned that U.S. policy for chemical and biological weapons has not received the farsighted analysis it deserves. In part, I feel this is because our chemical and biological warfare programs and policies have been largely shielded from public and especially congressional scrutiny. In what follows, I would like to present a brief description of certain CB weapons and a general discussion of their implications for national policy.

DEFINITION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Chemical and biological warfare has been defined by the U.S. Army as follows: Chemical warfare (CW)—Tactics and technique of warfare by use of toxic chemical agents.

Biological warfare (BW)—Employment of living organisms, toxic biological products, and chemical plant growth regulators to produce death or casualties in man, animals, or plants; or defense against such action.

STANDARD ANTIPERSONNEL CHEMICAL AGENTS

The United States at present has seven so-called standardized chemical warfare agents. I would like, with your permission, to describe those seven agents, Senator, and I am relying in part on the unclassified Army Field Manual 3–10, dated March 1966. This is the most recent edition of the manual entitled "Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents." I repeat, this manual is unclassified.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman. The chairman pointed out, I think wisely, that we could hear even the classified information. I think it would be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. If you wish to rely on classified information, state so for the record and we will take it out later.

Dr. MESELSON. I will, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine.

NERVE AGENT—GB

Dr. MESELSON. The first agent that I would like to describe is the lethal agent called GB. This was developed in Germany during World War II. The German name for it is Sarin. It is a nerve gas.

GB is one of the highly lethal nerve gases developed but not used by Germany during World War II. It is a quick-acting lethal agent intended to enter the body by inhalation. Protection can be afforded by a gas mask. GB can be made available in a wide variety of munitions and delivery systems including landmines, mortars, artillery shells, rockets, and bombs. It can also be dispensed from aircraft by means of special spray tanks. The performance of poison gas weapons, such as those containing GB, is highly dependent upon

meteorological conditions. However, for rough descriptive purposes, it may be said that the explosion of an artillery shell containing 6 pounds of GB will kill most unmasked personnel within an area approximately the size of two football fields around the site of the burst.

At the other end of the magnitude scale, an attack on an urban area by a bomber dispensing GB might be able to kill most unmasked persons within an area of at least 5 square miles, this being the size of the zone of high mortality caused by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. By high mortality, I mean 5 percent or higher. I have used the words "might kill" in the previous sentence in order to indicate that the statement is based on rather simple calculations and not on results of actual field tests on a simulated urban target. The properties and means for production of GB are relatively well documented in the open literature. [Deleted.]

CAPACITY OF NERVE GASES

The CHAIRMAN. Has it any other name?

Dr. MESELSON. It has, of course, a chemical name.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say "lethal" you mean it kills—not just immobilizes.

Dr. MESELSON. No, it doesn't just immobilize.

The Chairman. It kills people?

Dr. MESELSON. Somehow the misunderstanding that nerve gases merely incapacitate is rather widespread. I don't know where it comes from, and it is totally false. Nerve gases kill.

Senator DODD. Have you had tests with animals or anything like that?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes; there have been intensive tests with animals.

The CHAIRMAN. And it kills animals?

Dr. MESELSON. It killed 6,000 sheep in Utah.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this what killed them?

Dr. MESELSON. No; it is the next agent.

The CHAIRMAN. But it is similar?

Dr. MESELSON. It is similar. It is one of the family of phosphorous-based nerve gases. GB, as I say, is one of the older ones, developed in Germany.

NERVE AGENT—VX

The next one, VX, which was developed by Great Britain in the late fifties, is somewhat different.

The CHAIRMAN. When you use the word "lethal" you mean killing?

Dr. MESELSON. I mean killing.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to understand.

Senator GORE. Is the death instantaneous?

Dr. MESELSON. No; it is not absolutely instantaneous. With GB it is, however, very rapid, within a matter of seconds. It is an important——

Senator DODD. That is pretty rapid.

Dr. MESELSON. It is an important attribute of GB that it kills almost instantaneously because in tactical situations one wants instantaneously to stop the military activities of the enemy.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS IN CB WARFARE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if there are some questions being asked, I would just like to ask one question. If the Soviets are developing this type and character of chemical and biological warfare, which I have followed myself, are you recommending we do not develop any?

Dr. MESELSON. I will not recommend any——

The CHAIRMAN. He is not recommending anything. He is giving us a very basic briefing on what we are dealing with. I really called the hearing to inform an ignorant person. He has just started to describe what we are dealing with.

Dr. MESELSON. I might interject that later on I will express the view we should continue certain kinds of research in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't need to anticipate all the——

Senator GORE. It might be well to note here in the record that Mr. Helms has been requested to advise the committee at the appropriate time of Soviet developments in this field.

Senator Dodd. I just want to be sure I am right. As I understand, Dr. Meselson, what you are telling us, is that we can do something to get agreements that will help to curb the use of it; isn't that so?

Dr. MESELSON. I would hope so.

The CHAIRMAN. We draw the conclusions, Tom. He is here to tell us what we are dealing with. The main purpose of the meeting is to find out about it, not what to do about it.

Dr. MESELSON. My statement is divided into two parts. The first is an attempt to describe very briefly the standard agents and the second part on——

The CHAIRMAN. I suggest we go along and learn what we are talking about. Go ahead.

STANDARD CHEMICAL AGENT VX

Dr. MESELSON. The second standard chemical agent in the U.S. arsenal is called VX. I will read about VX. This is a lethal agent that enters the body primarily by absorption of liquid droplets through the skin. A gas mask, as well as complete covering of the body, that is a protective suit, is required for protection against VX. The same general types of munitions and delivery systems as listed above for GB may be used for VX [Deleted.] A tiny droplet of VX on the skin will cause death. It appears that VX or an agent closely related to it was responsible for the accidental killing of approximately 6,000 sheep near the Dugway proving ground in Utah last March. The affected sheep were grazing within an area of approximately 200 square miles located at an average distance of approximately 30 miles from a test area where an aircraft had conducted an operation test of a nerve gas spray system. Detailed information concerning VX is classified.

BLISTER AGENT HD

The third agent I wish to talk about is the blister agent HD or more familiarly mustard gas, the gas so widely used in World War I. It primarily causes incapacitation rather than death. Casualties are

produced by blistering action on the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract. As in the case of nerve agent VX, protection against HD is afforded by a special suit and a gas mask. Weight-for-weight, HD is much less effective than VX in producing casualties. [Deleted.]

INCAPACITATING AGENT BZ

The fourth agent I wish to describe is the incapacitating agent BZ. This agent is classed as a temporary incapacitant. It interferes with normal mental and bodily processes. It can cause violent and irrational behavior and its effects may persist for several days. Most information regarding agent BZ is classified. Aircraft delivery systems are available for its dissemination.

RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS

The next agent is riot control agent CS. This agent, sometimes called "super tear gas" has been used in large quantities by U.S. forces in South Vietnam. It attacks the eyes, nose, and throat even in extremely low concentrations and also causes nausea. Its effects continue for approximately 10 minutes after exposure to fresh air. It is not generally lethal to healthy personnel even at quite high concentrations. However, a few deaths from CS in Vietnam have been claimed.

I might say here, the claims to which I refer are not official claims but claims by unofficial observers. [Deleted.]

RIOT CONTROL AGENT CN

The sixth agent standardized by U.S. forces is the riot control agent CN. This is ordinary tear gas commonly used by police in this country and other countries. It was also used in considerable quantity in World War I and manufactured in large quantity but not actually employed in World War II.

The CHAIRMAN. What does it do? In just one word, what does it do? The same as CS?

Dr. MESELSON. Basically, yes, Senator. It requires more of CN to temporarily incapacitate a man than CS. CS is more powerful in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN. The effect is about the same?

Dr. MESELSON. The effect is about the same. And many of us have probably had a whiff of CN. It is the ordinary tear gas.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Go ahead.

RIOT CONTROL AGENT DM

Dr. MESELSON. The seventh agent is riot control agent DM. This agent causes violent sneezing, nausea, and vomiting. It may also be lethal under certain conditions, and, therefore, is not approved under current U.S. policy for operations where deaths are not acceptable. It was first produced for military purposes during World War I.

It may have been used in Vietnam in 1965.

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, I know what you said and I agree with you, but I notice that he says, I think, with respect to two of these, the information is classified. I think we ought to know what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. You said the specifics are classified, didn't you?

Dr. MESELSON. Oh, yes. There is no classified information in my prepared testimony. If I do describe any classified details I will say that before I make any classified statements.

Senator DODD. I just wanted to know if it was classified.

Dr. MESELSON. I have been careful to avoid putting any classified information in the prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. So this statement itself does not contain classified material?

Dr. MESELSON. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. So it can be used publicly?

Dr. MESELSON. Completely freely. I prepared it in my home in Cambridge, Mass., which is not authorized for classified documents.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, so that my observation was not misunderstood, I am very grateful to get this statement. I congratulate you for bringing it up, and I think it is a tremendously important subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Doctor.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS

Dr. MESELSON. Now, I would like to discuss biological warfare agents.

Specific information on biological agents and weapons systems is classified. Nevertheless, certain general principles regarding the use of biological agents are widely known. Various germs, that is bacteria, rickettsia, fungi, and viruses, have been examined for utility as weapons against humans, animals, and crops.

Now, I have a set of rather short paragraphs describing some general properties of biological agents.

Because of the very small weight of biological agents needed to cover a given area, biological weapons have been considered for use mainly against large areas. I might also interject at this point that unlike chemical agents, biological agents take some time before their effect is manifested, the so-called incubation period before the disease appears. So there is a time of between one and a few days between the time of a biological attack and the time that one would expect symptoms to appear. For that reason, because of that delay, they are not generally considered for tactical use on the battlefield, but rather for strategic use.

AEROSOL CLOUD

The most generally considered mode of attack by a biological weapon would be the release of an aerosol cloud, by planes or drones——

Senator CASE. Is that a word or is that a description of something that you buy in a can?

Dr. MESELSON. Aerosol is a word meaning a fine mist.

Senator CASE. I see.

Dr. MESELSON. Released by planes, drones, missiles, offshore submarines, or offshore ships.

For infection of target personnel to occur, particles from the aerosol mist must generally lodge in the deep recesses of the lungs. A well fitting gas mask, or possibly certain simpler protective devices, can

afford a large measure of protection, given adequate advance warning of attack.

For military purposes, it is desirable that epidemic spread of the disease to those outside the immediate target area be avoided. Therefore, only those diseases which can infect the target population but which are believed to be incapable of man-to-man transmission are considered for military use.

Let me explain that. There are some diseases for which we think, although we are not absolutely sure, that infection [deleted] will not spread from one person to another. Such a disease would not start an epidemic but would infect all of the persons directly exposed to the aerosol cloud at the time of attack. That is the distinction I intend here.

Aerosol attack would cause the pulmonary form of a given disease. Generally this is not the most commonly occurring form under natural conditions. The pulmonary form of a disease, that is, the form which strikes first in the lungs, is generally more severe, more rapid in its development and more difficult to treat than other forms. Other forms would be the cutaneous form of the disease where the portal of entry is the skin or the intestinal form where the entry is through the gut. The pulmonary form is relatively rare for most diseases and we know much less about the pulmonary form of diseases than we do about other forms.

EFFECTIVENESS OF A BIOLOGICAL AEROSOL ATTACK

The effectiveness of a biological aerosol attack on human populations is extremely difficult to predict. Poorly understood and highly variable factors that determine man's resistance to infection are involved. Additional serious uncertainties can be introduced by meteorological and atmospheric conditions and by complicated factors that influence the survival of infectious organisms in the air.

If biological weapons can be brought close to anything like their potential efficiency, very small amounts would suffice for the attack of large areas. Under such conditions, a single aircraft would be capable of attacking an area of many thousands of square miles.

Field Manual 3–10 presents an illustrative discussion of biological agent employment in terms of three hypothetical antipersonnel biological agents designated as "Lugo fatigue," "September fever," and "Toledo infection." These are hypothetical diseases. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. When you say "hypothetical" do you really mean hypothetical, or do you mean this is a fictitious title?

[Deleted.]

Dr. MESELSON. I would like to say if our country felt that it did need to reserve the right to use biological agents, then it would make some sense to keep the names of those agents secret because otherwise the enemy could prepare a better defense than if it were ignorant.

Senator DODD. I think our secrets are helpful to the other side and harmful to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so, too. Secrecy keeps information from our own people.

[Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Fort Detrick?

Dr. MESELSON. It is in Maryland.

[Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Where in Maryland?

Dr. MESELSON. It is near Frederick. The other Chemical Corps facility in Maryland is Edgewood Arsenal.

To go on with my description of biological agents, I was saying that because it is unclassified, Field Manual 3–10 does not refer to actual biological agents. Nevertheless the information given for the three hypothetical agents may be taken as illustrative of the properties to be expected for actual biological agents. Table 5, from that manual, "Hypothetical Anti-Personnel Biological Agents and Delivery Systems," taken from Field Manual 3–10, is presented as appendix I to my statement. (See page 25.)

I might add that in an earlier edition of Field Manual 3–10—namely, in the edition of February 1962—detailed information is given for the carrying out of a biological attack. A series of graphs or monograms is presented there which tell how many biological agent bomblets must be dropped by an aircraft to cover a given area under given conditions of daytime or nighttime, type of terrain, et cetera. [Deleted.]

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS REQUIRE SOPHISTICATED EFFORT

Senator SYMINGTON. Doctor, if this is true, after we spend millions, if some country got angry, all they would have to do is take a room and walk out and the next thing you know everybody starts dying; correct?

Dr. MESELSON. Not really.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why not?

Dr. MESELSON. That is a widely held impression. But making a biological weapon which would have a predictable effect requires a sophisticated effort. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. You mean Switzerland or Israel wouldn't know how to do it?

Dr. MESELSON. They would not know how to prepare a biological weapon that would have any reliability, in my opinion.

Senator SYMINGTON. Neither Switzerland or Israel?

Dr. MESELSON. I doubt it. Not unless they committed themselves to a large research and testing effort.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the first optimism heard this week.

EXPLOSION OF A BIOLOGICAL WEAPON

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you one question in connection with that: Supposing instead of a megaton nuclear bomb in the warhead of a Minuteman, we explode the equivalent weight of anthrax or whatever is most effective, 1 or 2 or 10 miles above a country, let's say Russia, what would be the effect of that?

Dr. MESELSON. The answer, Senator, is that nobody knows today. It might be highly lethal over thousands of square miles. It might kill nobody. We just don't know. I might point out though that even if it were highly lethal, such a weapon would have no effect whatso-

ever in reducing the ability of the enemy to shoot missiles back at us because, unlike a hydrogen bomb, anthrax doesn't damage military installations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but you don't know. You can shoot it high, so you wouldn't know of a burst.

Dr. MESELSON. It might kill a lot of people but [deleted], there is no counterforce capability in a biological weapon. You cannot reduce nuclear damage to your own country.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I follow the Chairman, that would be no real defense whatsoever. In the first place the Spartan was not designed as a defense for a Minuteman base. In the second place a high-altitude explosion would be far higher than the Sprint could go.

The CHAIRMAN. You know about the debate going on about the ABM? It occurred to me that if the Russians are really trying to do what the Secretary of Defense says, which is develop a first strike capability, which means the physical destruction of our country, if that is their purpose, then wouldn't it be just as simple, or maybe simpler, for them to send over enough anthrax, particularly over our populated areas, and explode it? What are the probabilities, if you exploded one over New York City or the eastern seaboard? Would it have an effect, or not?

Dr. MESELSON. To do that would be even more foolhardy than to attack the United States with nuclear weapons for the reason that any biological agent takes a while before casualties begin to appear. Like any disease, you have to catch it, it has to incubate, before the disease comes out. It means whole days would elapse between the time a country knows that something is wrong, and the time that people start dying.

Senator SYMINGTON. So?

Dr. MESELSON. In those days we could fire all the missiles we have at the Soviet Union. In other words, they would not in any way degrade our ability to retaliate against them by using a biological weapon. Biological weapons do not damage missiles. Moreover, even after a BW attack had inflicted its casualties, the survivors could launch a nuclear retaliation.

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you know they had done it?

Dr. MESELSON. Done what, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you know who had fired it as more and more nations get the bomb?

Dr. MESELSON. How would anyone know where any missile came from? I don't know the answer to that question.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, that is a good answer. Nobody would know if you fired one from a submarine 500 miles south of Hawaii. There was a lot of discussion in World War II about destroying crops. In that case it would be an airplane. I would think a missile would be a very simple way. You don't have the gigantic noise, et cetera, plus all the reaction of a nuclear explosion. But you spread the germs around in an explosion.

Dr. MESELSON. Let me put it this way: I certainly agree that you might kill an enormous fraction of the population with a biological weapon.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

I also believe, however, that as strategic weapons go, these are ridiculous weapons, ridiculous because they in no way would reduce the ability of the country attacked to retaliate with nuclear missiles, and they also might not work.

You point out if the United States were attacked, we might not know who attacked us, but the problem of the enemy is a little different. Their problem is that the United States might know who attacked them or might assume who is was. In that case, they would be facing the United States with all of its gigantic nuclear might fully intact. It seems to me it would be absolutely lunatic to launch a biological warfare attack on a nuclear power.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it any more lunatic than launching a nuclear war? They are both lunatic.

Dr. MESELSON. I just meant to point out that a biological weapon does not have any counterforce capability and that it is highly unreliable. It does not damage the other side's retaliatory capability. You do not damage Soviet missiles with biological weapons nor they our missiles with their biological weapons.

Senator SYMINGTON. Interesting. You get to the question of graduation, if you are not in a nuclear war and have no agreement on other things. Some might attempt it on a reliatively modest scale, take a tap at Berlin or something. They might attack crops; then there might be an argument as to who did or didn't do it, and you would have to prove it. You wouldn't hear any explosion at all at high altitude.

Dr. MESELSON. As you go down the scale, the opportunities for smaller scale offensive actions with BW becomes realistic, but if you are talking about major strategic threats among nuclear powers, I think biological weapons are useless and foolish.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF A CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPON

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the same about a chemical weapon?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Even with instant death?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, for the reason that chemical attack would leave nuclear weapons intact. Also, it takes, weight for weight, a lot more for a chemical than a nuclear weapon.

The CHAIRMAN. It does?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

Again, the chemical weapon does not destroy the enemy's missiles, presuming they are in air-conditioned shelters. They are not good strategic weapons unless you don't have any nuclear weapons. For powers lacking nuclear weapons, it is a different story. These weapons, in my opinion, hold certain advantages for poor countries, small countries, who might not have nuclear weapons—but not for nuclear powers.

The CHAIRMAN. Lets assume there is a nuclear exchange. And let's assume, for purposes of argument, that the Russians would like to take over the United States, which some people believe. Not destroy its factories, its real estate, or its physical properties, but just get rid of the people. If that is their objective, this would be the way to do it.

Dr. MESELSON. Does anyone seriously believe that our strategic forces would remain unused in a case like that?

The CHAIRMAN. I was assuming they could find a way of delivering a chemical bomb without precipitating a nuclear war. I don't know whether they can or not. We haven't gotten to methods of delivery. You will have to enlighten us.

Go ahead, this is very interesting. I didn't have any idea what this was all about. Go ahead.

Senator CASE. Would you just keep in mind, Mr. Chairman, the possibility of this being considered as a retaliatory weapon rather than as a first strike weapon?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

Senator CASE. Might there not be some considerable importance to that? If a country had no nuclear retaliatory capacity, this might still provide a retaliation which would be a check against a first strike by the other side?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that true?

Dr. MESELSON. I think for a country that has no nuclear weapons biological weapons——

EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ANTHRAX BOMB

The CHAIRMAN. The point, if I understand it, that he is making is this: we have been saying we are not going for a first strike, we have a defensive nuclear deterrent. We could say, then, "If you attack us we will really raise hell with you, and among other things we will use chemical weapons along with nuclear." You said that it takes more weight for chemical. What about biological? How would the equivalent weight, let's say, of anthrax delivered in Moscow, compare with the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons as far as the population is concerned?

Dr. MESELSON. Nobody can say today whether an anthrax bomb would work or not work.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming it will work.

Dr. MESELSON. If it did work, then the amount required could be much less than the amount of nuclear material required to attack the same area. However, you still have the weight of the delivery vehicle to contend with, and when the vehicle weighs much more than the warhead, then fractional savings in the warhead size don't matter.

Thermonuclear weapons are already so compact and so lightweight that further reduction in warhead size that might be offered by biological weapons, especially keeping in mind that nobody can tell whether they would work or not, is not too meaningful.

The CHAIRMAN. They will be able to make them work as well as others, won't they?

Dr. MESELSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Dr. MESELSON. Because the response of the human body to a microorganism is far more uncertain than the reaction of the human body to heat, blast and radiation. We can't be sure of the result of placing bacteria in a human lung. It can vary enormously. That bacterium is a living creature. It can be ill or well, you might say. It might be infectious or it might be harmless, depending on many things.

The CHAIRMAN. Change in hours might change its habits.

Dr. MESELSON. The atmosphere.

The CHAIRMAN. As it does us.

Dr. MESELSON. I wish to emphasize that biological weapons——

Senator CASE. There is a difference between biological and chemical agents.

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, chemicals are a different matter. The effects of chemical weapons are not as difficult to predict.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

POTENTIAL ANTICROP BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Dr. MESELSON. Not considered in FM3–10 are the potential anticrop biological weapons. Chief among these are rice blast and wheat rust. These are fungal diseases of rice and wheat that cause considerable damage to crops in the world today. Their effectiveness in any given application would be difficult to predict, due to variable resistance of different plant strains and other technical factors. Potentially, however, relatively small quantities of anticrop biological agents may be capable of devastating very large areas of cropland.

The CHAIRMAN. Because once it gets started it spreads.

Dr. MESELSON. It spreads, and very little might be needed on each plant, so little that if it really worked you wouldn't need much to cover a big area.

Senator CASE. Sparrows and starlings or things like that, or the gypsy moth.

Dr. MESELSON. Fungi, of course, are very much smaller objects, tiny particles adrift in the air, spores.

If I were to continue with this prepared testimony, Senator, it would [deleted] be a rather general discussion of the policy implications of chemical or biological weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, it is new to me.

GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925

Dr. MESELSON. Half a century has passed since the world's only major outbreak of poison gas warfare. Large-scale germ warfare has never been attempted. Gas and germ warfare are explicitly prohibited by international law in the Geneva protocol of 1925.

The CHAIRMAN. Did we sign that?

Dr. MESELSON. We signed it but did not ratify it. I would like to describe the history of that protocol.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would. We are only signatories; we did not ratify.

Dr. MESELSON. We did not ratify.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did?

Dr. MESELSON. Over 60 now. All members of the NATO alliance except ourselves, all members of the Warsaw Pact, Communist China, all of the industrial powers except us and Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Including Russia?

Dr. MESELSON. Including Russia.

Senator CASE. Is it regarded as being in force among those nations that did sign it?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes it is, and some U.S. officials have expressed the opinion that it now constitutes conventional international law binding even on those countries which have not ratified it. I am not sure if that is the unanimous opinion of experts in this field.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you come back to that later?

Dr. MESELSON. I will come back to show——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON FORMATION OF CB WEAPONS POLICY

Dr. MESELSON. Considering the enormous scale of gas warfare in World War I, it is remarkable how well the protocol has been respected. There have been only two instances of verified poison gas warfare since 1925—in Ethiopia, that was the use of mustard gas by Mussolini against the Ethiopians in the 1930's and in the Yemen. In Vietnam, the United States has been employing a powerful but generally nonlethal antiriot agent, maintaining that the protocol does not forbid it.

When compared with the recent history of other forms of warfare, the record shows that the governments and peoples of the world have come to practice and expect a degree of restraint against the use of chemical and biological weapons not found for any other class of weapons, except nuclear ones. The chief factor justifying that restraint is the same for both nuclear and CB warefare—apprehension that, once begun, it would open up an unfamiliar and highly unpredictable dimension of warfare that might lead to the extermination of very large numbers of troops and civilians, especially one's own.

DESTRUCTIVENESS OF CBW

Destructiveness of CBW. There is no doubt that existing nuclear weapons would destroy entire populations. Although the performance of chemical and biological weapons in any particular attack would be less predictable than that of nuclear weapons, they too have very great potential for mass killing. The most effective method of strategic CBW attack would presumably entail the production, by bombers or missiles, of a cloud of toxic or infectious material over or upwind from a target to be inhaled or absorbed through the skin by persons in the attacked population. Although masks, protective suits and special shelters can provide effective protection against known chemical and biological agents, the cloud would readily penetrate dwellings and other ordinary structures.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you say that about a bomb shelter, too?

Dr. MESELSON. If the bomb shelter were air conditioned it would be secure. If it were not air conditioned, if the air is not filtered, it would not be secure.

The CHAIRMAN. Would an ordinary air conditioner filter it out or would it have to be a special filter?

Dr. MESELSON. A special filter would be required.

The CHAIRMAN. Which do not now exist in ordinary places?

Dr. MESELSON. No, they do not.

An attack by a single bomber dispensing one of the more deadly nerve gases could kill most unprotected persons within an area of at

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference between it and a germ, why do you call it a toxin?

Dr. MESELSON. It is a chemical made by a germ. It is not living, it is a product.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not living?

Dr. MESELSON. It is not living. It is a product made by a germ, a poisonous product made by a germ.

Senator CASE. How does it operate on the human body?

Dr. MESELSON. It is a nerve poison.

Senator CASE. Nerve poison?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you distinguish it from a nerve gas, just because of its origin?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Just like bugs make honeydew. It is a good sounding name but it is still bug juice.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't know what that word meant. I thought it meant just a poisonous substance.

Dr. MESELSON. No, a toxin refers to a poisonous substance made by a living organism. A poisonous substance made by a rattlesnake is called a toxin and poisonous chemicals made by fish are called toxins.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

MEANING OF TERM "NERVE GAS"

Senator CASE. Just to refresh my memory, what does nerve gas mean?

Dr. MESELSON. The term "nerve gas" is used to describe the class of phosphorous-containing poisons first developed by Germany in World War II. These act to poison the nerves of the human body and they cause death. They can be synthesized in factories. They are not produced by living organisms. They are rather like some commonly used insecticides but much more powerful.

Senator CASE. Do they kill these nerves that we have?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Almost instantaneously.

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, the nerve gases kill almost instantaneously.

Senator CASE. How is it done? By causing an explosion of the cells or how?

Dr. MESELSON. It works this way. When a nerve impulse travels to a muscle to tell the muscle to contract, something has to turn the impulse off, to tell the muscle to stop contracting. Nerve gas poisons the mechanism by which the impulse is turned off. Death due to nerve gas results from the simultaneous contraction of all muscles in the body.

The CHAIRMAN. You are just tied up in a knot?

Dr. MESELSON. That is right.

Senator CASE. I have to have this explained once every 2 months, I keep forgetting.

So it actually makes the victim appear to be in paroxysms?

Dr. MESELSON. Spasms, yes, although I had not planned to go into that.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? It is interesting. I had never heard this explanation before. I didn't know what a nerve gas did.

least 5 square miles, this being the size of the zone of high mortality caused by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs.

Senator CASE. How long did that attack take?

Dr. MESELSON. How long before the deaths resulted?

Senator CASE. No, how long would the attack take? Would it have to drop only one thing or would it have to go back and forth over the target?

Dr. MESELSON. If one had bombs designed to release many little bomblets, as they are called, then it might not require going back and forth. If a spray tank were used it would require spraying a long line which the wind would then carry over the target.

Going back and forth, if you can produce a line of spray, wouldn't be necessary.

Senator MCGEE. What would be the time, Doctor, then, to follow up the interpretation of his question originally, before its impact would be registered?

Dr. MESELSON. I would say something like an hour before the full casualty level was reached, but many deaths would occur sooner.

EFFECT OF WEATHER CONDITIONS

It also depends on the wind. If there is no wind, the gas cloud is stationary. For persons within the cloud, each breath brings in an additional dose so that even a relatively low concentration of gas can kill, over time. If there is a high wind so that the cloud passes by quickly, then either one gets a lethal dose in those few minutes or the cloud is gone and one does not have a lethal dose. The effects of biological and chemical weapons depend very much on winds and weather.

Senator MCGEE. May I say, as I am sure the Chairman has already observed, this gives you an eerie, creepy feeling that just, rational men would be talking here in these terms. It makes it sound like the science fiction that we used to make fun of not very many years ago.

Dr. MESELSON. True. But I believe, Senator, that it is very important for civilians, and especially for the Congress, to review our chemical and biological weapons programs and policies.

Senator MCGEE. I understand that. That is why it is wise we are having this dialog here. I merely say it gives you a creepy feeling.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, sir.

TOXINS

Dr. MESELSON. Although nerve gases are among the most poisonous substances known to be suitable for military use, it may well be possible to devise weapons containing far more poisonous materials, perhaps toxins or related substances. Toxins are poisons made by living creatures, such as bacteria. An example is Botulinus toxin.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Dr. MESELSON. Botulism is a disease caused by a protein, a toxin, made by a bacterium which you can grow in spoiling food. There was an outbreak of botulism caused by spoiled tuna fish in Tennessee a few years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it deadly?

Dr. MESELSON. It is highly deadly.

Senator CASE. I remember you talked to us about this before, but it goes out of my head.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he talk to you about it?

Senator CASE. He had lunch one time with a group of younger members of the Senate, Bill. We were going to get into it and we did start, I believe, at that luncheon.

HOW BOTULISM OPERATES

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, it is very educational. I didn't know that was the way nerve gas operates. How does a botulism operate, what does a toxin do?

Dr. MESELSON. How botulism works is less well understood. People go into a sort of trance as a result of botulism poisoning and ultimately die but it is a much slower process unless the dose is very high.

The CHAIRMAN. But you don't know any cure for it once you are exposed or get it?

Dr. MESELSON. There is a possibility of the administration of antiserum against it once you have got it. How effective this is, I don't know. Botulism isn't too common.

I believe that when some persons ate poisoned tuna fish in Tennessee not long ago, they were given antiserum. I don't think anybody was saved.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they die?

Dr. MESELSON. I am not certain, but I believe they died except for one elderly lady who survived, who may have eaten less of it. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. This is an area that is rather hard to carry on by laboratory experiments. One doesn't find subjects willing to try it.

Senator CASE. I was going to ask you about that. Do the armed services go into this with animals?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, extensive animal experiments are conducted and it is also possible to do experiments on human volunteers if therapy is ready at hand to treat them.

The CHAIRMAN. There are a number of rhesus monkeys they are working on at Detrick now. They have to use very special monkeys, that cost $75 apiece, which come from India. I suppose this is because they are most similar to humans, is that right?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes. Conscientious objectors often volunteer for experimental purposes, and there is even a society of those who have done so. They have a newsletter.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they call them?

Dr. MESELSON. Many of them are Seventh Day Adventists. I have forgotten the name of their group.

The CHAIRMAN. And they serve as guinea pigs for this purpose?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do they do that? Do they wish to promote the understanding of these diseases? Do they feel it will serve the cause of peace?

Dr. MESELSON. I don't know.

Senator CASE. It isn't limited only to this, it is all kinds of medical research.

The CHAIRMAN. Not just germ warfare?

Senator AIKEN. Radiation can kill virus.
Dr. MESELSON. Yes.
Senator AIKEN. But not botulism.
Dr. MESELSON. A fantastic dose of radiation could.

VIRUSES

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't come to viruses yet. Are they toxins?
Dr. MESELSON. No. Viruses are germs.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you come to those later?
Dr. MESELSON. They are included among the agents I mentioned earlier. For example, Venezuelan equine encephalitis is caused by a virus.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Dr. MESELSON. And that is a——
Senator MCGEE. Is it incapacitating in other ways [deleted] or just discomforting?
Dr. MESELSON. It is highly incapacitating. In nature, it [deleted] is transmitted to man by mosquitos.
Senator MCGEE. I see.
Dr. MESELSON. It is thought to be nonlethal, but, Senator, nobody can say with confidence what would happen if humans were exposed to Venezuelan equine encephalitis in the form of an aerosol. [Deleted.]
The point is that when administered through the lungs, it could be lethal. [Deleted.)]
The CHAIRMAN. Congressman McCarthy, this is a very informal meeting, a kind we don't usually have. If you wish to ask questions, you are free to do so. You are a pioneer in this area so far as the Congress is concerned. Do you have any questions you want to ask? You know all of this, I imagine.
Mr. MCCARTHY. Not really, I am learning a great deal more.
The CHAIRMAN. So am I, but if you have a question that bothers you, please ask it.

EFFECTS OF TEAR GAS

Senator CASE. Bill, would it be helpful to describe just briefly the characteristics of the other main thing, that is the tear gas and its effects, its operation as distinguished from the other?
The CHAIRMAN. He described that.
Senator CASE. Did you?
The CHAIRMAN. He said two of the standard agents are tear gases.
Senator CASE. How they operated in the body as opposed to the way nerve gas does?
The CHAIRMAN. All right. What does it do?
Dr. MESELSON. Well, ordinary tear gas is called a lacrimator because it causes intense tearing and irritation to the mucuous membranes. This is the way it acts—by causing intense irritation to the skin and membranes. The same is true for the riot agent CS, the one that is used in Vietnam. The so-called riot agent DM, which is also called Adamsite, is a different matter. It is a poison, and it can cause violent vomiting and nausea. It is not approved for riot control use under conditions where details are not acceptable.
Senator CASE. What is mace?

Dr. MESELSON. Mace contains ordinary tear gas, CN. That is its active ingredient.

Senator CASE. Just a heavier dose?

Dr. MESELSON. It is a heavy dose because it is contained in a liquid solvent that can form a jet that impacts directly on the face. Before normal instincts tell you not to inhale, you may have already got a lungful of it.

Senator CASE. Except for some unusually susceptible people, or people who are suffering from something, it is not ordinarily lethal?

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, let's see. This is very interesting and this takes time.

Senator AIKEN. This is not classified.

The CHAIRMAN. This particular questioning is, but not his statement. Go ahead, Doctor.

EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Dr. MESELSON. Yes. Although nerve gases are among the most poisonous substances known to be suitable for military use, it may well be possible to devise weapons containing far more poisonous materials, perhaps toxins or related substances. Weapons based on such superpoisons might become as destructive to unprotected populations as thermonuclear weapons of equal size.

Poisonous as nerve gases are, virulent micro-organisms and viruses can be a million or more times more so, in terms of the amount that can cause incapacitation or death. Although many infectious agents are rapidly inactivated or lose their virulence when dispersed in the atmosphere, this obstacle to the development of biological weapons can probably be circumvented or overcome with sufficient research effort. If so, biological weapons could surpass thermonuclear bombs, in terms of the area coverage possible for a weapon of specified size. However, even after very extensive research, the performance of biological weapons is likely to remain subject to great uncertainty. Their effects would depend in large measure on poorly understood and highly variable factors that determine man's resistance to infection. A biological attack intended to be highly lethal might actually kill very few persons, and, conversely, an attack expected only to cause temporary incapacitation could cause high mortality.

Although biological warfare agents might be chosen from among those that are not highly contagious under natural circumstances, this would not preclude the unexpected initiation of a widespread epidemic under the very unnatural conditions inherent in military use. Indeed, it is possible that bacteria or viruses disseminated in an aerosol cloud could subsequently emerge from the exposed population of humans, insects, birds, rodents, or other animals with increased persistence, contagiousness, and virulence to man. Large-scale operations in regions populated by many persons or animals would be more risky than small operations in desolate places, and viruses might be more hazardous than bacteria. However, we cannot evaluate the risks with any confidence in any of these situations. Therefore, the field testing of live biological weapons, and especially the outbreak of actual biological warfare, would constitute a menace to the entire human species.

[Deleted.]

REVIEW OF CBW POLICIES NEEDED

Mr. McCarthy. Senator, I wonder if I could, on this earlier point that Dr. Meselson made—in a meeting I had with Dr. Meselson, I asked someone from the executive branch if there had been a high level review of the total picture of our chemical and biological warfare policies in recent years, and he said to his knowledge there had not been except for the use of tear gas. I might say there, too, just to supplement what you said, that we have a letter from Deputy Secretary Vance to Congressman Kastenmeier in 1965 that states that three agents were shipped to Vietnam and that they were used on X, Y, and Z dates; and the places were mentioned also, and they included the more basic Adamsite which is called——

Dr. Meselson. DM.

Mr. McCarthy. DM.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Dr. Meselson. I would like to express the feeling that in a way the Defense Department is given a really impossible job, to guarantee the security of the United States of America. In today's world nobody can guarantee the security of a country. Even if they try their best there are going to be unanswerable or almost unanswerable questions.

The Chairman. When were they given this job of guaranteeing our security, and especially an exclusive guarantee, because I detect from the Secretary of Defense's attitude that he believes he has some very special responsibility quite different from the Members of the Senate in regard to security. I didn't know the Defense Department had to guarantee it absolutely. I agree with you it is impossible, but the task goes far beyond just military means.

Dr. Meselson. I should think that in performing their tasks they could only be helped by the kind of independent review which is available from concerned citizens and from the Congress, and, in that spirit, I believe that the United States could do itself far more harm than good by continuing some of its programs, some of its policies, in this area of chemical and biological weapons.

The Chairman. I agree.

Dr. Meselson. That is the spirit of my comments.

The Chairman. I agree with that completely.

Senator Aiken. Can I ask a question? Do you know of any virus that attacks both plant and animal life alike, a single virus?

Dr. Meselson. I cannot think of any virus that attacks both man and plants.

Senator Aiken. I know that if you take plants of different varieties of the same species, one will be very susceptible to a virus and another variety of the same species will be immune to the same virus.

Dr. Meselson. Absolutely.

Senator Aiken. And I think you might learn something from studying those plants.

Dr. Meselson. Yes.

There are some viruses that attack insects and plants, and insects are animals. So, yes, there may conceivably be some viruses that attack both higher animals and plants. But I do not believe that any are known today.

UNCONTROLLABILITY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

I would like to make some remarks about the uncontrollability of chemical and biological warfare.

A major uncertainty in predicting or controlling the course of CBW, once it is begun, would arise from the great variety of possible weapons and targets, from the incapacitating to the highly lethal and from the local battlefield to entire continents. Once begun at any level in earnest, it would be very difficult to predict how far CBW might go. Distinctions and stopping places would be very difficult to define and to keep. The preparations and training required for one form of CBW would facilitate and therefore tempt escalation to larger scale and more deadly CBW operations. The breakdown of barriers to weapons once regarded as illegal and peculiarly uncivilized can inspire and encourage methods of warfare even more savage than those underway at the time.

The vulnerability of troops or civilians to CBW attack depends very much on the availability and effectiveness of protective facilities, the rigor of defensive training and discipline, and the performance of early-warning systems. All of this may act to place an unusually high premium on surprise or clandestine attack and on the use of novel or unexpected agents or means of dissemination. Once the effect of surprise has worn off, however, and defensive precautions have been instituted, CB warfare might continue on a large scale but with relatively inconclusive effects until new weapons are introduced or until conventions against the attack of previously inviolate targets are transgressed.

The difficulty of allowing the limited employment of gas without running the risk of bringing the whole chemical and biological arsenal into use has been concisely stated by T. C. Shelling in his book Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966), and to quote Mr. Shelling:

> Some gas raises complicated questions of how much, where, under what circumstances; "no gas" is simple and unambiguous. Gas only on military personnel; gas used only by defending forces; gas only when carried by projectile; no gas without warning—a variety of limits is conceivable . . . But there is a simplicity to "no gas" that makes it almost uniquely a focus for agreement when each side can only conjecture at what alternative rules the other side would propose and when failure at coordination on the first try may spoil the chances for acquiescence in any limits at all.

GENEVA PROTOCOL PRINCIPLES GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD

These principles appear to have been understood by the leaders of both sides in World War II, during which neither lethal nor nonlethal gases were employed. At the outbreak of the war, both sides exchanged assurances that they would observe the Geneva Protocol of 1925, that is, Germany, France, and Britain, exchanged such assurances.

Later when the United States became involved in the war, President Roosevelt declared in 1943:

> Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.

Although many rules of war were violated in that conflict, it is fortunate for all sides that the rule against gas was observed. Germany

had secretly developed and produced a large quantity of nerve gas. Although the Allies had no weapon of comparable deadliness, they could have produced vast quantities rather soon after becoming aware of its existence. Since the previous restraints against anticity warfare had already broken down, the introduction of nerve gas in the midst of World War II would almost certainly have caused a death toll vastly greater than it was.

I feel, Senator, that I perhaps should now depart from this prepared testimony, because I would like to talk about U.S. policy from the time of World War II until the present regarding chemical and biological weapons and I fear that since time is passing I should move to that subject now.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The remainder of your statement will be included in the record at this point.

(The balance of Dr. Meselson's statement follows:)

Chemical and biological weapons by their very nature are suited to the attack of large areas; their natural targets are people rather than military equipment; important military personnel can be equipped and trained to use protective devices far more easily than can civilians. For all of these reasons, civilians are the most natural and most vulnerable targets for CBW attack. If the barriers against CBW are broken down, civilians are likely to become its main victims.

THE MYTH OF HUMANE CBW

It is well known that some chemicals such as tear gas are able to incapacitate a man for a short time with little risk of killing. Some people have concluded from this that the introduction of non-lethal chemicals and even of biological weapons thought to be non-lethal might actually make war more humane. The argument has shown considerable appeal both for thoughtless zealots who wish to advance the practice of CBW in any form and also for persons who genuinely hope to make war less savage. Although it is true that some chemical warfare agents are relatively non-lethal in themselves, it seems to me almost certain that their use would definitely not make wars on the whole less savage and would in fact risk making them much more so, should it trigger the use of lethal CB weapons.

It is naive to expect that in a real war non-lethal agents would be used by themselves. Once introduced into a combat area, the pressure would be very great to utilize them in any manner that increased the overall effectiveness of general military operations. Non-lethal chemical weapons would be used to increase the effectiveness of lethal ones. Tear gas can reduce the accuracy of enemy rifle fire, allowing one's own forces to approach more closely, increasing the accuracy and intensity of their counterfire. It can be used to force men out of protective cover and into the line of fire or the path of bomb and shell fragments. Under the desperate pressures of a war fought with artillery, bombs, napalm, and other lethal weapons, it is only reasonable to expect that "non-lethal" weapons once introduced will come to be used in order to kill. This has happened in Vietnam where U.S. forces have spread riot gas over large areas to force persons from protective cover to face attack by fragmentation bombs. It happened in World War I when both sides used tear gas and other non-lethal chemicals in grenades and artillery shells to facilitate conventional infantry and artillery operations.

In any case, if tear gas or similar agents should prove at all effective when first used both sides would introduce protective devices and tactics, making subsequent use of such agents much less effective. Thus, except perhaps when they are first introduced, non-lethal chemical weapons are unlikely to have much effect except to set the stage for more deadly CBW operations.

The conduct of non-lethal CBW can greatly facilitate preparations and training for the use of lethal chemical and biological agents. When combatants learn to protect themselves against the effects of mild or 'conventional' agents the temptation will be strong and the means will be at hand to experiment with more deadly ones. During the first year of World War I both sides used tear gas and other harassing agents until the German introduced lethal chlorine gas. Following that, both sides tested a large number of poison gases seeking to find

ones that would be decisive in battle. The first attack with poison gas had a devastating effect. The Allied front was broken, and 5,000 of the 15,000 gas casualties died. However, even though more effective gases were introduced in great quantity by both sides, advances in defensive preparations prevented gas from being a decisive weapon in World War I. Advocates of "humane" gas warfare often point out that, at least toward the end of World War I, gas produced casualties with proportionately less mortality than did high-explosive weapons. However, this was not because commanders on both sides wished to fight without killing, but rather because the most effective gases then known caused more wounds than deaths. Modern nerve gases are vastly more lethal than the old World War I gases. Can anyone have much confidence that skin-penetrating nerve gas would not have been used in World War I had it become available in 1917?

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND MINOR POWERS

The development and initial production of a new weapon usually requires much greater sophistication and effort than is needed to reproduce a weapon already possessed by another. The accessibility of chemical and biological weapons to smaller powers will depend very much on the CBW programmes of great powers and, for a limited time, on measures to keep the results of those programmes secret. With chemical and biological weapons as with other weapons, great powers will probably lead the way unless they deliberately refrain from doing so.

The chemical compositions of several nerve gases are published in the open literature, and detailed manufacturing procedures could be specified by competent chemists and chemical engineers. Although no thorough cost-analysis has been published, it would appear that a considerable number of smaller nations could produce and integrate nerve gas weapons into their artillery and air forces without great economic strain. Commercial transport aircraft could be modified without great difficulty to drop or spray the gas. No small power is definitely known to produce nerve gas or to have been supplied with it by another, although there have been newspaper reports that Egypt has used a nerve gas on a small scale in the Yemen conflict.

The acquisition of nerve-gas weapons would greatly increase the destructive potential of a small nation's military forces, but it might also greatly reduce its overall security by provoking its neighbours to arm themselves similarly. This they might do by producing the gas themselves or by demanding it from their great power allies. If nerve gas warfare should ever break out between two small states, the population of one or both could be largely annihilated within a short space of time, and the intense feelings provoked around the world might well ignite a much larger conflict.

The attempt to develop biological weapons of reasonably assured characteristics would require a costly and technically sophisticated effort and an elaborate testing programme. Indeed, only use in war itself would provide the kind of information that responsible military men would require before placing much reliance on a radically new type of weapon. It seems unlikely that a small power would attempt the development of biological weapons except perhaps as a deterrent threat. However, this would be an extremely risky posture for a small power unless large powers had already legitimized the possession and threatening display or use of biological weapons.

WHY SINGLE OUT CBW FOR SPECIAL PROHIBITIONS?

As long as wars continue to be fought with high explosive weapons and napalm, what sense does it make to maintain special constraints on CBW? The question is understandable, but it seems to me that some substantial answers are contained in the remarks above. We realize that special rules are required for nuclear weapons. The distinction between conventional weapons and nuclear ones of any size is a real one, and the importance of maintaining it is generally understood. Chemical and biological weapons share with nuclear ones the attribute of potentially overwhelming destructiveness. Biological weapons could pose a threat to the entire human species. Both chemical and biological weapons place a high premium on clandestine and surprise attack, thus lessening stability. Once developed, chemical and biological weapons can be exceedingly cheap, relatively easy to produce, and quick to proliferate. They would threaten civilians especially. Their use would violate the oldest major arms control treaty now in force.

PREVENTING THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

It is important for nations to understand that it is in their long-term interest to prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons. A relatively clear and unique standard to guide both the practice and the expectations of nations is provided by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Protocol has been ratified by all major powers except Japan and, ironically, the nation which proposed it at Geneva—the United States. Many of the states organized since World War II, including the People's Republic of China and both Republics of Germany, have ratified the Protocol or have agreed to be bound by the ratification of their predecessors. Less than two years ago, in December, 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed without opposition a resolution calling for strict observance of the Geneva Protocol and appealing for universal accession to it. The United States and Japan voted in support of the General Assembly resolution along with 89 other states. It is important to secure the actual ratification of Japan, the United States, and other nations that have not yet ratified the Protocol. Means should be found to make clear that viruses as well as bacteria and non-lethal as well as lethal chemical and biological weapons are meant to be included under its prohibition. But great care must be exercised to make sure that attempts to further clarify the scope of the Protocol do not result in weakening its universal authority.

The Geneva Protocol is a no-first-use agreement. It does not prohibit CB weapons production, nor does it prohibit reprisal in kind. Last July, the United Kingdom submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva a proposal concerning biological weapons that goes well beyond the Geneva Protocol. Under the terms of the British proposal, states would undertake not to engage in germ warfare of any kind under any circumstances. In addition, the production of germ weapons would be prohibited under terms yet to be worked out in detail. A copy of the U.K. proposal is appended, as well as a copy of The 1925 Geneva Protocol.

TABLE V. HYPOTHETICAL ANTIPERSONNEL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS

A. HYPOTHETICAL ANTIPERSONNEL BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Agent	Symbol	Time required to produce casualties (days)	Percentage of deaths	Length of incapacitation (days)	Time of effectiveness: Day (hours)	Time of effectiveness: Night (hours)	Physiological effects
Lugo fatigue	AA	2–3	0–10	(1)	2	3	Incapacitating disease of long duration; sores in the nose and throat.
September fever	BB	1–3	2–3	6–10	1	3	High fever, muscular aches, vomiting, diarrhea, and extreme prostration.
Toledo infection	CC	1–3	90–100	NA	10	10	High fever, glandular swelling, coughing, pneumonia, and sores on the skin.

[1] 3 months.

B. HYPOTHETICAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS

System	Max range (Kilometers)	HOB	Area coverage: Square Kilometers	Area coverage: Dimensions (Kilometers)	Percentage of casualties: Lugo fatigue	Percentage of casualties: September fever	Percentage of casualties: Toledo infection
Guided missile (medium)	75	High	100	[1] 5.7	70	25	60
Guided missile (heavy)	150	Low	50	[1] 3.5	90	50	80
		High	200	[1] 8	70	25	60
Fighter aircraft (spray)	(2)	Low	100	[1] 5.7	90	50	80
		NA	1,000	50×20	60	25	50

[1] Radius.
[2] Variable.

Note. To be used for instructional purposes only.

PROTOCOL FOR THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE IN WAR OF ASPHYXIATING, POISONOUS OR OTHER GASES, AND OF BACTERIOLOGICAL METHODS OF WARFARE, SIGNED AT GENEVA ON 17 JUNE 1925

The text of the substantive part of the protocol reads as follows:

"Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world; and,

"Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and,

"To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations;

"Declares:

"That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms of this declaration.

The United States delegation at Geneva proposed the ban on gas, and the Polish delegation suggested that this be extended to include bacteriological weapons. The protocol is in force with respect to most countries, including the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Peoples Republic of China, and the U.S.S.R. The United States and Japan signed but did not ratify the protocol. Although the protocol was favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, the United States Senate in 1926 referred the report back to committee without giving its advice and consent to ratification.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The General Assembly,

Guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law,

Considering that weapons of mass destruction constitute a danger to all mankind and are incompatible with the accepted norms of civilization,

Affirming that the strict observance of the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare is in the interest of maintaining these standards of civilization.

Recalling that the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 17 June 1925 has been signed and adopted and is recognized by many States,

Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference,

1. *Calls* for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives;

2. *Invites* all states to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

1483th plenary meeting,
5 December 1966.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

6 August 1968.

UNITED KINGDOM

WORKING PANEL ON MICROBIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The United Kingdom Delegation consider that the 1925 Geneva Protocol is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for dealing with the question of chemical and microbiological warfare. The following points may be noted:

(i) Many states are not parties to the Protocol and of those that are parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies.

(ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents customary international law or whether it is of a purely contractual nature.

(iii) Even if all states were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as states have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators and the allies.

(iv) There is no consensus on the meaning of the term "gases" in the phrase "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices". The French version of the Protocol renders "or other" as "out similaries" and the discrepancy between "other" and "similaries" has led to disagreement on whether non-lethal gases are covered by the Protocol.

(v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of microbiological agents that might be used in hostilities.

(vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense.

2. It is not to be expected that all these difficulties can be easily or speedily resolved. The United Kingdom Delegation suggest, however, that the problem might be made less intractable by considering chemical and microbiological methods of warfare separately. The Geneva Protocol puts them on an identical basis, but—

(i) As indicated in paragraph 1(iv) above, there is disagreement on whether the ban covers all agents or only lethal ones. It would be extremely difficult to secure agreement on a new instrument banning the use of all agents of chemical warfare, particularly as some of those agents have legitimate peaceful uses for such purposes as riot control.

(ii) Chemical weapons have been used on a large scale in war in the past and are regarded by some states as a weapon they must be prepared to use if necessary in any future war, particularly as they fear they may be used against them. In any event, at the moment, they would be reluctant to give up the manufacture of chemical agents and the right to conduct research etc., in this field.

3. The United Kingdom Delegation recognizes that verification, in the sense in which the terms is normally used in disarmament negotiations, is not possible in either the chemical or the microbiological field. The difficulty, as far as the microbiological field is concerned, is that the organisms which would be used are required for medical and veterinary uses and could be produced quickly, cheaply and without special facilities either in established laboratories or in makeshift facilities. As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely that states will be prepared to forego the right to produce and stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition etc. resolved. However, the use of microbiological methods of warfare has never been established, and these are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical methods. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore considers that in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all—in which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify indefinitely.

4. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore proposes the early conclusion of a new Convention for the Prohibition of Microbiological Methods of Warfare, which would supplement but not supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Convention would proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other animals, or crops. Under it states would:—

(i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity;

(ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare themselves in any circumstances.

5. The Convention should also include a ban on the production of microbiological agents which was so worded as to take account of the fact that most of the microbiological agents that could be used in hostilities are also needed for peaceful purposes. Thus the ban might be on the production of microbiological agents on a scale which had no independent peaceful justification. Alternatively, the Convention might ban the production of microbiological agents for hostile purposes, or it might ban their production in quantities that would be incompatible with the obligation never to engage in microbiological methods of warfare in any circumstances.

6. Whatever the formulation might be, the ban would also need to cover ancillary equipment specifically designed to facilitate the use of microbiological agents in hostilities. In addition, the Convention would of course need to include an undertaking to destroy, within a short period after the Convention comes into force, any stocks of such microbiological agents or ancillary equipment which are already in the possession of the parties.

7. The Convention would also need to deal with research work. It should impose a ban on research work aimed at production of the kind prohibited above, as regards both microbiological agents and ancillary equipment. It should also provide for the appropriate civil medical or health authorities to have access to all research work which might give rise to allegations that the obligations imposed by the Convention were not being fulfilled. Such research work should be open to international investigation if so required and should also be open to public scrutiny to the maximum extent compatible with national security and the protection of industrial and commercial processes.

8. In the knowledge that strict processes of verification are not possible, it is suggested that consideration might be given *inter alia* to the possibility that a competent body of experts, established under the auspices of the United Nations, might investigate allegations made by a party to the Convention which appeared to establish a *prima facie* case that another party had acted in breach of the obligations established in the Convention. The Convention would contain a provision by which parties would undertake to co-operate fully in any investigation and any failure to comply with this or any of the other obligations imposed by the Convention would be reported to the Security Council.

9. As regards entry into force of the Convention, the appropriate international body might be invited to draw up a list of states (say 10–12) that it considers most advanced in microbiological research work. The Convention might come into force when ratified by all those states and a suitably large number of other states.

10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of including in the Convention an article under which the parties would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in connexion with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

HAGUE CONVENTION OF 1899

Dr. MESELSON. At the outbreak of World War I, there was a treaty dealing with gas, the Hague Declaration of 1899, specifically prohibiting the use of asphyxiating or deleterious gas in projectiles.

In World War I, as you know, massive amounts of poison gas were used. It began with the use of tear gas by the French and other nonlethal gases by the French and Germans. It was Germany, however, which first introduced poison gas, namely chlorine gas, in the famous battle at Ypres. They did not use projectiles which had been prohibited by the Hague Convention.

The CHAIRMAN. It was only the use of projectiles, not the use of gas was that was prohibited?

Dr. MESELSON. The Germans responded that they had not violated the Hague Convention because the gas used was contained in cylinders and not projectiles. They also maintained that tear gas had been used previously by the French.

A great deal of gas both lethal and nonlethal was used in World War I.

1922 CONFERENCE ON LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

In 1922, at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments a treaty was concluded on submarines and noxious gases. The article on gases was introduced by the United States, represented by Senator Elihu Root. This treaty on submarines and noxious gases prohibited the use in war of poisonous, asphyxiating or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials, and devices. It was a no-first-use treaty prohibiting the use of poisonous, asphyxiating and other gases.

It received Senate ratification with no dissenting vote.

However, that treaty never came into force because France objected to a clause concerning submarines unrelated to the question of gas warfare.

GENEVA PROTOCOL OF 1925

In Geneva in 1925, at a conference that was initially to consider the commercial sale of arms, the United States again brought up the question of gas warfare. The question was put on the agenda, and what is now known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 came about. The United States signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925 and it then came to the Senate for its advise and consent to ratification.

Part of the Senate debate was in closed session, and I know of no record of that. The open discussion of the protocol began with the reading of a letter from General Pershing. I read from the Congressional Record of December 10, 1926. General Pershing states in a letter to Senator Borah of the Foreign Relations Committee:

> I cannot think it possible that our country should fail to ratify the Protocol which includes this or a similar provision. Scientific research may discover gas so deadly that it will produce instant death. To sanction the use of gas in any form would be to open the way for the use of the most deadly gases and the possible poisoning of whole populations of non-combatant men, women and children. The contemplation of such a result is shocking to the senses. It is unthinkable that civilization should deliberately decide upon such a course.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> JOHN J. PERSHING.

After the reading of the letter by General Pershing, however, the opponents of the Geneva Protocol presented arguments that gas as shown by the experience of World War I was a relatively humane weapon. It was claimed that only 2 percent of gas casualties died whereas a higher percentage of casualties due to shrapnel and high explosives died in World War I.

SENATE ACTION ON GENEVA PROTOCOL

As the debate developed, it appeared that the protocol did not have the necessary votes, and Senator Borah did not bring it to a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not brought to a vote?

Dr. MESELSON. No. It was referred back to the committee. It was finally withdrawn from consideration by the Senate by President Truman many years later along with certain other pending matters.

I would comment on the considerations of 1926 by saying that the record shows that gas in World War I did cause a higher ratio of casualties to death than other weapons. There are some——

The CHAIRMAN. A higher ratio.

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, that is, there was less death per casualty caused by shrapnel, for example.

Senator AIKEN. Percentagewise?

Dr. MESELSON. The opponents of the protocol claimed that about 2 percent of gas casualties died and 10 percent of other casualties.

Senator CASE. You mean disabled?

Dr. MESELSON. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. That would not be true today, would it?

Dr. MESELSON. That is the point, Senator. If a more deadly gas had been available during World War I, one could not have expected that the leaders of both sides would have refrained from using it. I would further point out that a report of the Surgeon General subsequent to the war stated that perhaps two-thirds or more of the so-called gas casualties were fictitious, because many men pretended gas casualties, or genuinely thought they had them, when they didn't. Such men were classified as casualties and hospitalized.

The CHAIRMAN. That was chlorine gas.

Dr. MESELSON. That was mainly mustard gas.

The CHAIRMAN. I would say chlorine.

Senator CASE. Mustard falls into which category?

Dr. MESELSON. Mustard is a currently standardized agent, and it is classed as a blister agent.

Senator CASE. It may be fatal but——

Dr. MESELSON. It may be fatal, but it is generally not considered a fatal but rather a seriously incapacitating gas.

The treaty nevertheless went into force. It has now been ratified by over 60 nations. Some of them in fact have ratified it since World War II.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it ever been suggested that we ratify it?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, it has been discussed and I would like to discuss that point in a moment.

The treaty has been ratified, as I said I believe before, by all members of the Warsaw Pact, by Communist China, and by all members of the NATO alliance except ourselves. The treaty was supported by all of the interwar presidents, Coolidge, Harding, Hoover, Roosevelt.

The CHAIRMAN. It outlaws the use of any gas, whether in a projectile or otherwise?

Dr. MESELSON. The wording of the Geneva protocol is as follows, and it is appended as an appendix of my statement. (See p. 26.) It outlaws the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices.

Now, the Geneva protocol is a no-first-use treaty. It does not outlaw research, development, or production of gas or biological weapons. It does not outlaw retaliation in case one is attacked.

U.S. POST-WORLD WAR II POLICY

The policy of the United States with regard to the prohibition on gas has been different at different times. In 1956 the policy of the United States, as stated in "Army Field Manual 27–10," page 18, this is 1956, was as follows:

The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or non-toxic gases, of smoke or incendiary materials or of bacteriological warfare. A treaty signed at Washington 6 February 1922 on behalf of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, contains a provision forever prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices but that treaty was expressly conditioned to become effective only upon ratification of all the signatory powers, and not having been ratified by all the signatories has never become effective.

That was the Washington treaty. The Army Field Manual goes on to state:

The Geneva Protocol for the prevention of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare signed on 17 June, 1925 on behalf of the United States and many other powers has been ratified or adhered to by and is now effective between a considerable number of states. However, the United States Senate has refrained from giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the protocol by the United States and it is accordingly not binding on this country.

VIEW EXPRESSED BY STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENTS

A similar view was expressed by the Departments of Defense and State in 1960 in response to a joint House-Senate resolution introduced by Congressman Kastenmeier in 1959. The Department of Defense and the Department of State sent letters to the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Defense Department letter dated March 29, 1960, opposes the resolution. I might say that the resolution stated that its sponsors did not oppose research and development of chemical and biological weapons, did not oppose readiness to retaliate in kind if attacked, but did wish at a time when the budget was in fact rising steeply for chemical and biological weapons, to reiterate the policy stated by President Roosevelt that the United States would not use these weapons unless it was first attacked by its enemies. The Defense Department opposed this resolution stating as follows:

Similarly, declarations might apply with equal pertinency across the entire spectrum and no reason is conceived why biological and chemical weapons should be singled out for this distinction.

The letter goes on to develop that argument.

The Department of State in its letter of opposition to the resolution stated——

The CHAIRMAN. What year is that?

Dr. MESELSON. This letter is dated April 11, 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MESELSON (reading):

As a member of the UN, the United States, as are all other members, committed to refrain from the use not only of biological and chemical weapons but the use of force of any kind in a manner contrary to that organization's charter. Moreover, the U.S. has continued efforts to control efforts through enforceable international disarmament agreements. Of course, we must recognize our responsibilities toward our own and the free world security. These responsibilities involve, among other things, the maintenance of an adequate defensive posture across the entire weapons spectrum which will allow us to defend against acts of aggression in such a manner as the President may direct. Accordingly, the Defense Department believes the resolution should not be adopted.

I would emphasize again that the resolution did not oppose research, development, stockpiling or use of these weapons in retaliation. It asked only for the reiteration of our policy of no-first-use.

The apparent policy of reserving the right to use these weapons first was again stated in a State Department historical office publication, research project No. 449, dated November 1960, a portion of which I shall read, which states:

> The Departments of State and Defense have expressed strong opposition to a proposed congressional resolution that would have committed the United States not to use biological or chemical weapons under any circumstances unless they were first used by our enemies. The resolution has not been approved. The President thus remains free to determine American policy on the use of such weapons in any future war.

AMBIGUOUS U.S. POLICY TOWARD GENEVA PROTOCOL

However, our present policy, Senator, has evolved from there. I believe there has been a beneficial direction, and I would like to quote from a letter to Congressman Rosenthal of New York from William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. This is a letter of December 22, 1967. It was in answer to a letter from Congressman Rosenthal dated December 4, 1967, and an important passage in the letter from Assistant Secretary Macomber states:

> We consider that the basic rule set forth in this document (i.e., the Geneva Protocol) has been so widely accepted over a long period of time that it is now considered to form a part of customary international law.

Senator CASE. What is that principle again?

Dr. MESELSON. The principle——

The CHAIRMAN. No-first-use.

Dr. MESELSON. No-first-use of chemical and biological weapons.

However, I would submit that our policy may still seem to be somewhat ambiguous. This is partly because of our previous statements saying that we did not feel bound by the Geneva Protocol, and partly because of certain more recent statements of the Defense Department. I would like to quote from a letter or rather from the testimony of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, which was presented to the Disarmament Subcommittee of this committee on February 7, 1967. In his prepared testimony Deputy Secretary Vance stated:

> We have consistently continued our de facto limitations on the use of chemical and biological weapons. We have never used biological weapons. We have not used lethal gases since World War I and it is against our policy to initiate their use.

Senator AIKEN. Does that comport with Secretary Macomber's interpretation?

Dr. MESELSON. The question that occurs to me is why the State Department characterizes the protocol as customary international law, binding on all nations alike, whereas the Defense Department's prepared statement emphasizes that our policy is de facto.

Senator AIKEN. De facto?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

Senator CASE. There is also a difference in the subject. Mr. Vance doesn't say we haven't or wouldn't use tear gas.

Dr. MESELSON. That is right.

TEAR GAS

I would like to say something specifically about tear gas.

Senator CASE. It does not say that we will not use tear gas?

Dr. MESELSON. No. Our present policy is that tear gas is not covered by the Geneva Protocol.

Senator AIKEN. In this case de facto means subject to change without much notice, doesn't it?

Senator CASE. That is what we are doing.

Dr. MESELSON. I think our policy on this is illuminated by the statement of Mr. Nabrit on behalf of the United States speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on December 5, 1966. Mr. Nabrit spoke as follows:

> The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating and poisonous gas and other similar gases and liquids with equally deadly effects. It is framed to meet the horrors of poison gas warfare in the first World War and was intended to reduce suffering by prohibiting the use of poisonous gases such as mustard gas and phosgene. It does not apply to all gases. It would be unreasonable to contend that any rule of international law prohibits the use in combat against an enemy for humanitarian purposes of agents that governments around the world commonly use to control riots by their own people.

Senator CASE. That is certainly the American doctrine.

Dr. MESELSON. That is our current position, as I understand it, Senator.

However, I believe that Mr. Nabrit was in error to say categorically, that the Geneva Protocol was not framed with the question of tear gas in mind. The reason I say that is, first of all, great quantities of tear gas were produced and used in World War I. Second of all, in 1930 the Government of Great Britain addressed a question to other nations regarding the applicability of the Geneva Protocol to tear gas, and I have here a copy of the British question, a memorandum on chemical warfare presented to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in Geneva November 18, 1930. The British Government points out that there may be some difference of opinion as to whether the Geneva Protocol covers lacrimatory gas—that is, tear gas—and they state that—

> From every point of view it is highly desirable that a uniform construction should prevail as to whether or not the use of lacrimatory gases in war is considered to be contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The British Government states that, for its own part, it considers that tear gas is prohibited. It states:

> Basing itself on this English text, the British government has taken the view that the use in war of "other" gases including lacrimatory gases was prohibited.

The CHAIRMAN. Your point is that if you use one gas it is an open invitation to use any other. As you noted a moment ago, if you used tear gas it would lead to the use of other gases.

Dr. MESELSON. That is certainly a hazard, and I think the question of tear gas might be approached in the following way. The record shows that a number of countries have stated that tear gas is covered by the Geneva Protocol. The response to this British question was that the following month the delegates of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Spain, the U.S.S.R., France, China, Italy, Canada, Turkey

all stated that their governments considered that tear gas was forbidden under the protocol.

Senator AIKEN. Did that include Red China?

Dr. MESELSON. No, this was back in 1930.

The CHAIRMAN. But China has now ratified.

Senator AIKEN. China has ratified though, since.

PROS AND CONS TO USE OF TEAR GAS

Dr. MESELSON. I would like to express the opinion that the question of tear gas might be approached as follows. On the one hand, there is no question that there is a danger of escalation when any gas is used. On the other hand, it might be felt that tear gas is a useful weapon and under some conditions might actually cause less fatalities than other means.

I would point out that one should expect any gas to be used in conjunction with other weapons, and that, therefore, even tear gas, although it is nonlethal, would, under the conditions of war, be used to enhance the effectiveness of lethal weapons. That is indeed the way it had been used in World War I. That is also the way it has been used on occasion in Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. In Vietnam, you mean to flush out soldiers and then shoot?

Dr. MESELSON. For example, Senator, a large quantity of tear gas was dropped in one instance before a B–52 raid. Again a large quantity of tear gas was dropped from the air before an artillery attack. These events are reported in the press. I don't have extensive information as to other ways in which tear gas is used, but a very large quantity of tear gas is being used in Vietnam.

My point is that there are pros and cons to the use of tear gas in war. The argument against it, of course, is that it could lead to a highly undesirable escalation.

NAPALM

The CHAIRMAN. What about napalm, how do you class napalm?

Dr. MESELSON. Napalm is not classed as a chemical weapon because it does not act by poisoning people. It acts—it is described—as an incendiary.

Senator AIKEN. What creates the flames?

Dr. MESELSON. It contains gasoline, jellied gasoline.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

WHITE PHOSPHOROUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. What about white phosphorus?

Dr. MESELSON. White phosphorous is a chemical but again it acts by intense burning, lodging in the skin and burning so that it is not acting primarily because of a poisonous action.

The CHAIRMAN. And no one can claim it is covered by the Geneva Protocol?

Dr. MESELSON. It is definitely not, in my understanding. Flame weapons are definitely not covered.

The CHAIRMAN. By any agreement?

Dr. MESELSON. By the Geneva Protocol.

Senator CASE. And phosphorous raises the temperature. It isn't just a chemical blistering?

Dr. MESELSON. No, it is burning. It ignites spontaneously in the air and the burning continues in the body. A piece of phosphorous lodged in the skin continues to burn.

Senator AIKEN. And defoliants are not covered?

Dr. MESELSON. I am not an expert on what the status of defoliants would be in the protocol. They are not mentioned in the protocol specifically.

Senator AIKEN. I suppose nitrates?

Dr. MESELSON. I would like to say this though, Senator, about the question of nonlethal gas. Various rules can be imagined. One could have the rule that no lethal and no nonlethal gas at all could be used. One could have the rule that it is permissible to use nonlethal gas but not in order to kill, that is, not in order to facilitate the effectiveness of lethal weapons. One could have various rules.

UNIFORM RULE ON TEAR GAS URGED

It seems to me that the important thing is that there be a uniform rule, and that the approach of the United States might be to discuss with other nations what a uniform rule might be. Unless we consider it vital to our security interests to decide this question unilaterally, a reasonable procedure would be to consult with other nations with the objective of finding a uniform rule.

As I have stated, there is an expression on the record by a number of countries that they believe tear gas is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol.

Senator CASE. Were there any dissents to that British inquiry?

Dr. MESELSON. The U.S. representative, Ambassador Hugh Gibson, stated that this was a complicated question and that he hoped it would receive further consideration. He did not specifically say that the United States believed that tear gas was prohibited or was not prohibited. He did point out that tear gas was widely used for domestic purposes.

Subsequently, the Disarmament Convention in Geneva in the 1930's addressed this very question. It set up an advisory committee on which the United States was represented. It eventually came to the conclusion that in any future disarmament treaties the use of tear gas should be prohibited but the manufacture of tear gas could not be prohibited. This point of view was explicitly accepted by the U.S. delegate, Mr. Wilson, at that time, but the treaty, which was being worked on by that conference, never came into effect.

Senator CASE. That you have it for retaliation, was that the rationale?

Dr. MESELSON. No, the rationale was, since it was useful for police purposes at home, it would make no sense to prohibit its production.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I feel this is a very important point. We included it in the material that we sent to State and Defense, and to ACDA, [deleted] and yesterday the ACDA people expressed, well, let's say they didn't know about this, and they were quite intrigued with the 1930 discussion about whether tear gas was included. We included this

discussion in the material we placed in the Congressional Record on April 1, 1969. I think it presents a rather compelling argument that the framers of the protocol intended that tear gas be included.

I might also say that we included in our material the references to the press reports of the use of tear gas in conjunction with bombing and artillery raids. The executive branch had an opportunity to dispute this and say perhaps the press reports were wrong. It didn't, and I assume from it's acquiescence in this suggestion that this has been done. I don't think there is much question about it.

Dr. MESELSON. I don't think so either.

18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

I think this is a particularly opportune time to bring up this question because, as you know, the discussions at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee to which you referred, Senator, will presumably take up this question. President Nixon has written to Ambassador Gerard Smith, our Ambassador at those talks, as follows, and I quote from a letter of March 15 from the President to Ambassador Smith:

> While awaiting the United Nations Secretary General's study on the effects of chemical and biological warfare the United States delegation to the ENDC should join with other delegations in exploring any proposals or ideas that could contribute to sound and effective arms control relating to these weapons.

Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union has also expressed his interest in discussing chemical and biological warfare arms control, and the British have in fact submitted a so-called working paper to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva proposing that the production of biological weapons be prohibited. That would go beyond the Geneva Protocol.

SOVIET UNION'S USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I am told that in a recent briefing made to Congress, Brigadier General Hebbeler said this: "Today the Soviet Union is better equipped, militarily. and physiologically, for chemical warfare than any other nation in the world. And he also said "indications are that they"—chemical weapons—"would be used if this served the Soviet Union's purpose." What would be your comment of that? Is it true?

Dr. MESELSON. I don't have accurate knowledge of what Soviet preparations are. I would make several remarks. The first is that, if possible, one should always search for a policy which is proof against whatever other countries are doing. If there is a policy which is wise enough and general enough that it is not too dependent on what other countries could or might do in the future, that is obviously the best policy.

I think that the policy of no-first-use has this attribute. The policy of ratifying the Geneva Protocol, for example, making it clear to all that we would never use these weapons first, is relatively independent of what other countries are doing.

With regard to research and development programs, stockpiling and so on, I think what other countries are doing becomes more relevant, although even here to a very great extent in the strategic area chemical and biological weapons have been eclipsed by nuclear

ones. Except with regard to what small nations which do not have nuclear weapons may be doing, I think that far more important is what the Soviet Union does in the nuclear field.

EXTENT OF U.S. CBW EFFORT

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in this connection, do you know about the extent of the effort of the United States in chemical and biological warfare?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, I have a rough idea.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you characterize it? Is it great and for how long has it been going on?

Dr. MESELSON. Well, to some extent it has been going on since World War I, of course. The current budget for chemical, biological warfare research and development I understand is in the vicinity of $400 million a year.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it been at about that level for the last several years?

Dr. MESELSON. No, at the close of the Korean War it was much less, I think about $10 million a year. It rose particularly in the late 1950's and then it continued to rise to its present level. It was because of that rather steep rise in the late fifties, I understand, that Congressman Kastenmeier introduced his joint House-Senate resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice General Hebbeler didn't mention biological weapons. Do you think that was on purpose or simply through inadvertence?

Dr. MESELSON. I really don't know, Senator. In discussing the capabilities of the Soviet Union, I think one must go beyond asking simply how much they have, but ask what would really happen in any given contingency, in any given war if one confronted an enemy with these weapons.

What I have in mind is, for example, in Europe, it might be desirable to maintain a limited war fighting capability with nerve gas for use in Europe. However, it is hard to imagine a protracted nerve gas conflict in Europe. What I am saying is that beyond a certain amount, beyond the amount necessary simply to let the other side know that to start this kind of war would be—wouldn't cause anything but trouble to both sides——

CBW WEAPONS AS SECOND STRIKE WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. I want to come back to this. Earlier we talked about this as a first strike weapon and you demolished the idea that it is useful because of the time element, that is, it takes too long.

Dr. MESELSON. That is biological weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Biological weapons. And chemical weapons more or less because they take more time compared to nuclear. But I didn't pursue this idea of their potential use as a second strike weapon, that is as a retaliatory capacity. It seems to me that if we are attacked, if an attempt is made to strike us and we are attacked first, this would still remain a very effective second strike weapon, and, in that sense, it is a deterrent. The theory of our nuclear strategy is that we are going to have a second strike so devastating that the enemy will not launch a

first strike. That is the theory, isn't it; the so-called balance of Terror?

The existence, it seems to me, of a substantial capacity to inflict chemical and biological—we have never said anything about radiological, you might say a word about that before we are through—damage would add greatly to our deterrent, wouldn't it?

Dr. MESELSON. I don't think it would add anything useful, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Dr. MESELSON. I think that nuclear weapons are a far better deterrent because they are predictable. I think that——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, let's assume you had these weapons and they are deliverable. You see, the Secretary of Defense is saying the Russians are going to have a capacity to knock out all Minutemen missiles. They are going to fire the SS–9's at all the Minutemen, leaving us with none. He doesn't say anything about the Polaris, but wouldn't the existence of a weapon of that seriousness add anything to our second strike capacity, assuming that our nuclear force is incapacitated? I don't assume it, but this is a hypothetical I am asking.

Dr. MESELSON. I think if there were no nuclear weapons in the world, that chemical and biological weapons might be considered as strategic deterrents. It is my strong opinion that there is not only no need but there is really no room for chemical and biological weapons as strategic deterrents because I think they would make the situation more hazardous, more dangerous. There are a number of reasons why I think that.

EXTENT OF U.S. CBW STOCKPILE

The CHAIRMAN. You have already stated, but I don't believe you have done so on the record, your estimate of what stockpiles we presently have. You have an estimate, don't you? Are they substantial?

Dr. MESELSON. I don't have at my immediate command the exact size of the stockpiles. I try to forget these numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't ask you the exact size, only the approximate size. Is it substantial?

In my State there is a very secret—at least to me—very large ordnance at Pine Bluff, Ark. I have been told it makes both kinds of weapons. When you fly over it you can see one after another of these storage depots. Can't you give us some idea of the magnitude of our stockpile? If it is classified say so, and we can strike it from the record. I want to know if it is substantial.

Dr. MESELSON. [Deleted.]

Mr. MCCARTHY. Senator, I wonder if I could interject here. This numbers game, and I am sure Professor Meselson would agree, when you get into estimating the lethal doses and so forth, you are getting into a real numbers game. As the professor points out, it depends.

Now, Major General Rothschild, who at one time headed this program, wrote an article for Harper's magazine that appeared—and I have it at the office—either in 1959 or 1960, in which he stated that 6 ounces of a substance that produces Q fever would be enough to kill 28 billion people. That is a quote from General Rothschild.

Are you familiar with that, Professor?

Dr. MESELSON. I am not familiar with that quotation.

Mr. MCCARTHY. It is kind of a maddening estimate.

U.S. SHOULD NOT STOCKPILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Dr. MESELSON. There are a lot of scary things that one can say about biological weapons. My view is that they are nevertheless ridiculous weapons, that we should not concentrate on the scare studies of how if you spoon-feed a certain amount to every person on this planet you can kill them. What we should think about are the realistic military requirements of actual nations and whether these weapons make any sense.

I myself do not see any sense for the United States in stockpiling biological weapons. I think we would do ourselves far more harm than good by stimulating interest in these weapons, by breaking down the barriers against them. I think we are adequately safeguarded, insofar as deterrence is functional at all, by nuclear weapons which are reliable.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, the Secretary of Defense was raising great fears about this. That is why we are asking about it.

Dr. MESELSON. But I do not think our country would want——

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we are.

Dr. MESELSON (continuing). Would want to rely on a totally unpredictable weapon. It is not the kind of weapon that a large power should consider for strategic use. However, I might add that once a country advertises that it is prepared to use biological weapons as strategic weapons, it has in effect announced a program of antipopulation warfare. This is to throw away all chance of a damage-limiting understanding if war gets started. It seems to me that this would be an extremely foolish thing to do.

DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. What you are saying relates only to biological weapons. Does it relate to chemical weapons as well?

Dr. MESELSON. Since it would require far more of chemical weapons than of nuclear weapons, and since chemical weapons also cannot prevent enemy missiles from being launched against us, it also applies to chemical weapons.

Only poor countries or underdeveloped countries, countries that do not have nuclear weapons, it seems to me, could possibly see any attraction in chemical or biological weapons as strategic deterrents.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us assume we are vulnerable and that the Russians are going to outdo us and can destroy our nuclear capability, then you still say they have no utility.

Dr. MESELSON. If you put to me the question if I were advising the Government, and it seemed clear we had absolutely no other deterrents and we were faced by a determined enemy, should we then develop biological weapons as a deterrent? I would answer, "Yes."

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if Secretary Laird is correct, and we are threatened with their overpowering us and being capable of taking out our nuclear deterrent, then you would say, "Yes."

Dr. MESELSON. I would. But I think in this matter, as I said before, that to consider weapon-by-weapon cases or situation-by-situation matters is not a good way to arrive at a policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, I think the whole thing is utterly irrational. What I am trying to do is to elicit information to try to meet irrational arguments. I think what the administration spokesmen have been saying in this ABM debate is irrational. But if you are dealing with this kind of a situation, then you have to do the best you can with what the facts are. I do not want you to say anything you do not believe.

Dr. MESELSON. I would like to outline what I think a good policy would be for the United States in this area.

SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. Before you do, do you know anything about Soviet stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons?

Dr. MESELSON. I spent one day at the Central Intelligence Agency quite a while ago trying to familiarize myself with Soviet capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MESELSON. One must bear in mind two things regarding intelligence estimates. One is the difference between possible, probable, and confirmed capability. If one receives, for example, an estimate that the Soviets have so many pounds of nerve gas, one must know whether this is a possible number of pounds, a probable number of pounds, or a confirmed number of pounds. This is very important.

The second thing is that in the intelligence community, of course, there are priorities. There are certain things we must obviously know with higher priority than others. It is relevant then to ask with what priority, how much effort has been put into finding out these things. Generally speaking, this is a relatively cheap kind of work to do. The Soviet Union is a big country. They have excellent chemists and biologists just as we do. They have, therefore, the possibility of going as far as we can.

[Deleted.]

U.S. RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL URGED

Dr. MESELSON. It seems to me that the main questions before the United States now as these negotiations get underway are, do we want to ratify the protocol and what additional agreements do we want? One can have the largest or the smallest CB establishment you like. The protocol merely would prohibit first use. It seems to me that it is confusing to ask in detail what is being done or what might be done by various countries when considering the question of a no-first-use pledge. I think this is an important point.

Senator CASE. I think you are absolutely right about this, but do you not think under the present circumstances of our domestic troubles—riots on the campuses, cities, too, increased concern about the handling of mobs of people—that it would be very difficult to persuade the American people that the use of tear gas, which is disabling temporarily, is not only highly desirable but indeed humane. To many Americans, it might be a darned good idea for a relatively small country as we are compared to others in manpower to maintain such a stockpile. I wonder, in other words, if we are not going to sell something——

The CHAIRMAN. On a first strike policy.

Senator CASE. What are you going to say about a United Nations force trying to deal with passionate people to whom rationality does not exist, people who are drugged, people like the Japanese kamikaze pilots? Does this apply where you have no nuclear weapons at all? This is not a matter of national policy. We have not said it. We have not disabled ourselves in nuclear weapons as against vastly greater numbers in Europe of Soviet troops and Warsaw Pact troops invading Western Europe, but nevertheless I think most of us are moving in this direction.

Is it wise to attempt at this time to draw an issue on the basis of no gas at all?

BARRIERS AGAINST USE OF WEAPONS SHOULD NOT FALL

Dr. MESELSON. That is certainly an important subject for discussion. I would suggest the following framework for arriving at an answer. I think it is clear that it would not serve the interests of the United States if 10 or 20 years from now we faced a world in which the barriers against the use of chemical and biological weapons were gone and they were regarded as ordinary weapons. At all levels of hostility, I believe this would create a world in which, although the United States could perhaps outmatch all other countries, we would still be much worse off.

At the strategic level, it would mean that countries which do not now possess the ability to cause great devastation would possess it if those barriers and restraints were gone.

At lower levels, even in guerrilla wars, it seems to me, that our position would be greatly worse than it is today if the barriers against poison gas were dropped for this reason: poison gas is a lightweight weapon, with a capability of covering a large area. [Deleted.]

If lightweight mortar shells containing nerve gas, for example, were available to guerrilla forces who knew where government forces are located, this would serve them far better than would such weapons in the hands of government forces, because they know where the government forces are and the reverse is less often the case.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you suppose they have not used them?

Dr. MESELSON. I believe they have not used them because the rules of the game have not gotten to that point. I believe if we were ever to use nerve gas in Vietnam, as has been suggested recently in a book by a U.S. military officer—although he suggested a limited use of it—I do not believe we could expect the enemy to play by the rules we set down.

Nevertheless, let me suggest that if nerve gas ever comes into use as napalm, artillery or other things, this would place in the hands of small forces a destructive capability vastly greater than anything they have now. This would also compel the opposing forces to wear very cumbersome masks and protective suits.

Government forces wearing masks and protective suits would not look very friendly to civilians. Gas would impede movement. It would greatly complicate war.

Furthermore, it would enable guerrillas to have the ability, with a few lethal gas shells launched against a city, to create a situation in which every man and woman in the city demands protection against those weapons.

I do not think the United States or any power would like to see a situation in which small forces can cause that degree of violence and that degree of havoc.

I believe that if we try to visualize what the world would be like if there were no special distinctions about chemical and biological weapons, that it would be a world in which the security of this country and all countries would be vastly reduced.

TEAR GAS AS A STEP IN BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS

Let me return to the question of tear gas. I think it is wrong to look at the question of tear gas in isolation.

If one places emphasis on avoiding a world in which chemical and biological weapons are legitimized, displayed, proliferated, and even used, then one must consider tear gas in the context of a step toward breaking down the barriers.

Now, this is not a question, it seems to me, that can be decided unilaterally. If you are talking about rules of warfare, you have got to talk about what is the practice and custom of other nations. If we were just creating the Geneva Protocol, it would be relevant to ask all the other countries what they wanted to do about tear gas. But we are not just creating it. Although we have not ratified it, over 60 other nations have. We are not talking about a dead treaty. It is the oldest major arms control agreement now in force. It is a live treaty even though it is old.

Therefore, we should approach this question of tear gas I think, as follows: It is not by itself a moral issue; but it is a very important technical issue. Can we find rules under which tear gas can be used that will be respected by most countries or all countries, and, therefore, use it without fear of escalation, or can we not? If we cannot find rules that give us some assurance that the whole spectrum of chemical and biological weapons will not come into use, then I think we should not use tear gas in war. After all, tear gas is only of trifling importance to our national security. The security of the United States in no way hinges upon our ability to use tear gas. [Deleted.]

It may not be possible to find a clear and workable rule that would distinguish non-lethal gas from lethal gas and that would be acceptable to other nations. Experience has shown that when tear gas was used in the First World War or the—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that CN?

Dr. MESELSON. CN is a tear gas developed after World War I. But other tear gases were used in that war and they were used in close conjunction with lethal weapons. This means that the distinction between lethal and nonlethal is robbed of a great deal of its meaning. You must ask the question therefore, How can an essentially meaningless distinction be maintained? I submit that it would be difficult. That was the reason why many nations have held that tear gas was prohibited by the protocol.

One might still, however, create a rule under which tear gas could be used in war but not in order to kill. One could try that way. If the important nations in the world said, "Yes, we see the validity and the reason for doing this, we will modify our position on the Geneva Protocol," we could all then say it is not a moral question, it

is a technical question, we think we have reached a satisfactory approach to it. From now on the tear gas chloracetophenone, used not in order to kill, is all right. But I consider that this would still be risky and also difficult to achieve. Furthermore when you have whittled it down that far, it makes so little difference that one must ask if it is really worth trying to open up the whole question of the protocol which has been ratified by so many countries. Is it really worth causing all that trouble and all that risk for the future?

CONSULTATION WITH OTHER NATIONS URGED

I think the way to approach it is to consult with other nations open mindedly on this issue.

There was a time when even the United States felt that tear gas should be prohibited. There was a time when the leaders of the armed forces believed that. Our views have changed back and forth. I submit this is a question that can be studied in rational form but that the important thing is to get a uniform and workable standard. That is important.

DIFFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN USE OF TEAR GAS

Mr. McCarthy. Senator, I wonder if I could just say this: it seems to me that the use of tear gas against another nation's forces is one thing, and the use against your own domestic population is another.

Dr. Meselson. Absolutely.

The Chairman. The question is, in using it against another nation, the danger of retaliation and escalation comes up, assuming they have the capability? Your own domestic population just does not have it.

Senator Case. This sort of gets around to a couple of things, though. It suggests, as you say, that we should not use scare tactics, talk about the horrible nature of a can of anthrax, which would kill everybody and how awful these things are, and yet this is a pretty tricky business as far as handling public opinion goes. When everybody is conditioned to think about this whole matter as a moral question, is it better to treat your own population brutally than it is to treat others that way? And so it is a pretty tricky business. [Deleted.]

Some of the things you have said suggest it would be a lot better to have this in reserve as a retaliatory weapon than it would be to build up our nuclear arms.

The Chairman. It seems to me the existence of it would certainly——

Senator Case. But you cannot fool around with that idea and follow Dr. Meselson's general idea of this being——

Mr. Meselson. Mr. Chairman, I am not saying we should not do research and development or even that we should not stockpile certain weapons.

The Chairman. The whole theory is you use it only for retaliation, in conformance with the protocol.

Senator Case. It has to be ready in weapons form.

Dr. Meselson. The important thing is to look at it through the lens of preventing the use of these weapons, and it may be that through that lens you need to prepare certain retaliatory forces.

STORING STOCKPILED CB WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, how long will these things stay alive? After all, they are organisms, and you say they are stockpiled. Do they last very long?

Dr. MESELSON. It depends on the type, Senator. In dry form, spores, for instance, can be stored for years.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, they can.

Dr. MESELSON. Bacteria——

Senator CASE. Like dry and wet yeast.

Dr. MESELSON. In dry form they can be stored for a longer time, but in wet form they can be stored for only a matter of hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Take a thing like anthrax which is considered the most deadly. In dry form, could it be stored for quite a while?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, you may have read in the papers that there is an island off Scotland, Gruinard, which was the site of a test of anthrax. It is still off limits, and it would be dangerous.

The CHAIRMAN. Could that be the source of anthrax that has plagued Britain so much? You know they had to kill, I believe, 50,000 animals last year.

Dr. MESELSON. Was that not hoof and mouth disease?

The CHAIRMAN. Is that not anthrax?

Dr. MESELSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought it was. It is similar, is it not? I thought it was similar. I do not know.

Dr. MESELSON. It is similar in that it is a threat to animal stocks, but it is biologically quite a different thing.

HAZARDS OF STOCKPILES

The CHAIRMAN. How much of a hazard to us is the existence of these large stockpiles? I understand they are shipped about occasionally on railroad cars. Supposing one of them suffers an accident and is disrupted, what is the situation?

Dr. MESELSON. I do not know if biological weapons are shipped on railway cars. Nerve gas is shipped on railway cars. An accident could be very serious.

The CHAIRMAN. Could be serious?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, it certainly could.

The CHAIRMAN. How do they ship biological weapons, by automobiles?

Dr. MESELSON. I am not familiar with whether or not biological weapons are shipped and, if so, how.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean all that are made in the Pine Bluff Arsenal stay there?

Dr. MESELSON. I do not know. Field Manual 3–10, the earlier one, states that refrigerated vans are available to transport biological weapons to the field. Whether or not there is any transportation of such weapons actually going on——

The CHAIRMAN. What do you know about that, Congressman?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes, we have a document from Fort Detrick which lays out the procedures by which biologicals can be shipped in commercial airfreight, in commercial canisters of up to 1 gallon, and it gives locations where it can be shipped by air in a cargo plane, not in a passenger plane.

The CHAIRMAN. How do they get it to the airport, by truck?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Well, I am sorry, I do not recall that particular part. I can get that document and send it over.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say it is a substantial hazard, the existence of these stockpiles?

Dr. MESELSON. I would say it is definitely a substantial hazard. We live in a world which is full of substantial hazards.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MESELSON. Another hazard would be if chemical or biological weapons came into wide use and, as a result, a few maniacs—in a population of 4 billion there are going to be some maniacs—decided they would spray it in a city. That is a very serious hazard if these weapons become commonplace. Today they are not commonplace.

One, of course, should maintain reasonable safety standards, but it seems to me the thing we must keep our eye on is what kind of situation do we want 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now. Do we want a world in which these are accepted or not?

RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

The CHAIRMAN. It is getting late. I wonder if it is appropriate to ask you if you know anything about what is referred to as radiological warfare? What does it mean?

Dr. MESELSON. It means the production of radioactive materials for distribution over a target. It would act by irradiating humans. It would cause death due to radiation sickness. This kind of warfare has largely been rejected because it is impractical. It turns out that to produce enough radioactive material to have a significant military effect is an enormous undertaking, whereas the explosion of a nuclear weapon, which also generates radioactivity, is by contrast a relatively simple undertaking.

The CHAIRMAN. The most efficient way to do it.

Dr. MESELSON. Yes. [Deleted.]

CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY OF CB WARFARE

Senator CASE. You recall Senator Clark's amendment last year, that was accepted by the Senate, to require a report on CBW activities annually to Congress. I understand you are not very hot about this as a useful thing. I was thinking about offering it again this year. Why would it not be helpful to get this information out?

Dr. MESELSON. I do think it is important to subject these programs to congressional scrutiny. But my point, I think you are referring to, is this: military programs are, after all, enormously complicated and detailed and one cannot expect any part of our civilian government to maintain full scrutiny of all of these at all times. There just simply is not enough available technical manpower for that task.

On top of that, if you have an effect during one year of stopping an unwise program from going forward, there is always the next year and the next year.

CONSIDERATION OF U.S. RATIFICATION OF GENEVA PROTOCOL URGED

A more effective approach would be to consider the merits of the United States ratifying the Geneva Protocol. Then I think that the

situation would be changed. This is a country which very much respects its treaty obligations.

If we are not bound by the Geneva Protocol, proposals will be made at low levels up to higher levels, for using a particular chemical or biological weapon. That flow of proposals would stop if it was the declared treaty policy of the United States never to start this. It does not mean we would not have the capability, the potential, of doing it in retaliation, but it does mean you would not have to worry about a day on which the President of the United States, faced with a crisis, found on his desk a proposal to use, let us say, a biological weapon, having never had the time to give this deep consideration, but being told by advisers that this would be a good thing to do. In such a case he might authorize it. He would not be protected by a previous treaty commitment.

If you come to the decision that you want to keep out of this business unless somebody pushes us into it, you should implement that decision in the form of a treaty obligation that is lasting.

We have seen that President Roosevelt had one policy, and that other administrations seemed to have different policies subsequently. Now we seem to have returned to the no-first-use policy, at least for poison gas and lethal germs. The policy of a President is not as binding as a treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand you to say, in answer to his question, that you have no objection to the Clark amendment, but that you think adherence to the protocol is more important. Is that what you said?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

Senator CASE. One does not exclude the other.

Dr. MESELSON. Absolutely not. Public scrutiny is needed.

Senator CASE. That was the purpose of it.

RELEASING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Do you see any reason why we should not have a public discussion? Do you see any reason why I should not give your statement to the press?

Mr. MESELSON. My prepared statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. MESELSON. No reason whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. Later we will deal with your testimony.

Your comments that you considered classified and so stated, you will have an opportunity before the hearing is released to go over them and delete those parts that are classified.

Since this statement is prepared for delivery, we can give it out.

Senator CASE. The chart and everything else.

FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICERS INSPECTION OF CB WEAPONS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether any foreigners who come here—we have a great many thousands of military officers who come here—do you know whether they have been instructed in, or are allowed to inspect, our facilities in the field of chemical and biological weapons?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They are?

[Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. Are Spanish visitors allowed to visit?

Dr. MESELSON. I do not know about the Spanish.

[Deleted.]

YEMEN'S GAS WARFARE CAPACITY

The CHAIRMAN. Where did the Yemen get its gas warfare capacity?

Dr. MESELSON. I have looked into this matter. [Deleted.] They are very primitive bombs. They were constructed from ordinary high explosive bombs by milling at the bottom a thread so that one could attach a ring. On the ring were attached hand grenades containing gas, and then more such rings were added with more hand grenades. This is a Rube Goldberg bomb.

[Deleted.]

My impression is that this was a rather primitive effort. Toward the end it was believed that the Egyptians had used a nerve gas, and it was stated that there were cyrillic characters on some bomb casing.

Of course, it is well known that the Egyptians do get their bombs from the Soviet Union. In fact, so do the Yemeni Royalists whom they were fighting. [Deleted.] They are both supplied from Eastern bloc nations. [Deleted.] The Yemeni Royalists bought some of theirs from Bulgaria. So all of them may have cyrillic characters.

I know of no evidence that this was Russian gas. All the evidence I know of was that it was a rather primitive attempt, but it does apparently show that even a country like Egypt is capable of producing and using gas.

I also noticed in the Swedish newspapers that Egypt was now supplying gas masks to its forces.

Senator CASE. What was the kind of gas?

Dr. MESELSON. In the Yemen, they began with tear gas. They then used mustard gas, and phosgene, and the latest gas they used in January of 1967 may have been a type of nerve gas.

I asked a British chemist who had spent some time in Cairo whether he thought that his Egyptian chemist colleagues could have produced nerve gas in Egypt, and he said without doubt yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Senator CASE. Just one more question. Have you any comment on what is going on in the way of defense against these agents?

The CHAIRMAN. Antidotes.

Senator CASE. Antidotes, and the medical things you do with people who are smitten with it?

Dr. MESELSON. Well, to speak about biological weapons, it is my opinion that in terms of present knowledge and technology it is hopeless to try to develop a defense against each possible biological agent. Antisera and drugs may be useful against one agent or against another, but there is no antiserum, no drug, which is useful against all. After all, we cannot cure virus diseases; the common cold has no remedy. Nearly all virus diseases have no remedy at all.

The only realistic defense against biological weapons is a mechanical barrier that prevents the particles of the biological agent from reaching human beings. That is a gas mask or an air conditioned shelter. That is quite an effective defense. In any case, of course, one needs adequate warning.

One can defend against these weapons, but it is an enormous undertaking. You would have to train people in civilian defense so that they could get into shelters quickly and supply them with very good gas masks, make sure the men are always clean shaven so that the gas mask will adhere to the face well. You would have to have an early warning system. It would be a monumental effort.

I think what one should have are contingency plans so that at some future time if it really looks as if there is a threat one can expand those contingency plans. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. You used one term I do not think you defined. I think it was rickettsia or something. I do not find that. Did you not use it? What does it mean?

Dr. MESELSON. Ricketts are like a bacteria, but they are not able to live on their own. They are parasitic bacteria, so to speak.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about all I can think of at the moment. I have learned a great deal.

SCIENTIFIC OPINION ABOUT CB WARFARE

Senator CASE. A general question the staff has suggested, and I wonder whether you might have some comment upon it. What is the general attitude among your academic colleagues about this matter?

Dr. MESELSON. I hesitate to represent the opinion of other persons.

Senator CASE. I know that.

Dr. MESELSON. I would rather speak only about my colleagues who have studied the matter. This whole question of chemical and biological warfare has so many parts, and some of them are so distracting to the imagination, that unless one has time, I would say literally months, to sit down to inquire into the characteristics of these weapons, he might come up with an opinion that might well change with longer study. So I will speak only about two of my colleagues who have been intimately connected with these matters.

They think these are poor weapons for the United States—that they can do us more harm than good, but that we should do a prudent amount of research and development aimed, however, at preventing these weapons from coming into use and that we should make this very clear by ratifying the Geneva Protocol.

Senator CASE. I was thinking of this more with respect to its importance to the job of dealing with public opinion broadly. I would guess that most academic people like most other people have not thought a lot about it.

Dr. MESELSON. I think that is right.

Senator CASE. Is that not about the size of it?

Dr. MESELSON. I think that is right.

Senator CASE. And maybe the question does not help very much.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY

The CHAIRMAN. Assume that the President and the Secretary of Defense are right and that in the midseventies the Russians will have the capability of taking out our nuclear retaliatory capacity. Is this simply a further insurance that they will not destroy our second strike capability. Is this wrong or not?

Dr. MESELSON. I am not a nuclear expert. It goes against everything I understand about our national defense to assume that there could ever be a time when we would be defenseless except for chemical and biological weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not make that assumption, you understand, but it is being made in public statements.

Dr. MESELSON. Let me say this: That if we did have some nuclear retaliatory forces, then I believe that the intrusion of biological weapons considerations in a time of crisis would be a terrible threat to our security.

If I were advising the President of the United States, and we were in a terrible crisis with an enemy and we had nuclear weapons, as we will if such crises ever come, I would advise him to take all the papers on his desk concerning biological weapons and throw them away. Biological warfare would introduce so many complicated considerations, there is so much uncertainty in it, the risks are so high. A biological warfare threat would say to the other side, in effect, "All right, we have abandoned all hope, we are going to wipe each other out. let us get started." It would take the President's mind off the very careful decisions he must make about nuclear weapons that really do work and really must not be used, if at all possible.

The CHAIRMAN. The last three Minutemen did not work; do not forget that we had three tests and all three of them failed.

Dr. MESELSON. Believe me, biological weapons are much less reliable.

The CHAIRMAN. What about chemical weapons; would you say the same thing about them?

Dr. MESELSON. I would say in time of crises that all considerations of chemical-biological warfare should be swept off the President's desk and the situation reduced to essentials.

CAREFUL CB WEAPON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT URGED

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that, beyond a very limited research and development study of these weapons for purposes of retaliation, which is authorized by the Geneva Protocol, you do not think we should put emphasis on the development of biological or chemical weapons, is that right?

Dr. MESELSON. Not quite. Whether or not we place emphasis on any particular CB weapon should be evaluated in terms of our overall determination to keep these weapons from being used. If it requires a certain capability to prevent some other country from using them, then I say let us have that degree of capability. But let us not have the kind of——

The CHAIRMAN. A deterrent capability.

Dr. MESELSON. Yes. But let us not have the kind of research-development production that places these weapons in the hands of others or inspire their use by others.

Senator CASE. Where does retaliation allow us——

The CHAIRMAN. The Geneva Protocol, as I understand it, does not prohibit our having such weapons for, well, call it a second strike or retaliatory purpose. It simply makes everyone who agrees to the protocol not to use it first. That is all it does.

Dr. MESELSON. That is all it does. The British are now proposing that with regard to biological weapons, we go well beyond that and prohibit the use of biological weapons under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a further step.

Dr. MESELSON. And their rationale is that biological weapons are not needed for national security, that they represent instead a Pandora's box that under no circumstances would be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Geneva Protocol relates to both chemical and biological?

Dr. MESELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better let you go. It is 1 o'clock.

I cannot tell you how much we appreciate the trouble to which you have gone to give us this information. I know it must be very trying to deal with people who know nothing about the subject.

Senator CASE. If you have to do it once a year, I think it is worthwhile.

Dr. MESELSON. I am deeply honored and grateful to be of any help in these matters.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we make good use of it. I am not through with the subject yet. You have said many surprising things, the main thing being your estimate that these weapons are really sort of impractical. They are scare weapons but not really practical. The suggestion I made a moment ago was only because of what I think is a wholly irrational and unjustifiable tactic that the Secretary of Defense is using at the moment of trying to scare us into the ABM. That is why I mentioned it.

Thank you very much Dr. Meselson.

(Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

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WASHINGTON

Every once in a while the heady feeling comes over Washington that it is participating in an event of epic and historic proportions. Thus it was this year, in the battle between a significant proportion—compared with the way it had always been—of the Congress and the Administration over the issue of military spending. The journalistic truisms are that it was a "historic debate"; that "never again will the Pentagon's requests go unquestioned." And the participants in the attack fairly unanimously believe that they accomplished quite a lot and that the future is with them. Compared with their announced goals of defeating the anti-ballistic-missile system and cutting $10 billion from the Pentagon budget, their hard achievements were minuscule. Therefore, given the logic and validity of the position that the defense budget is out of proportion, the questions are: What did happen? Why did not more happen? And what can happen next?

The sudden virulence of the anti-military debate drew from a variety of sources. A number of domestic programs were underfunded, and the military budget, traditionally approved by Congress almost routinely, was an inviting target. The Pentagon's budget had nearly doubled since the Democrats took office in 1961, reaching $81.1 billion as Lyndon Johnson departed for Texas. And some politicians were beginning to realize that an end to the Vietnam War would not necessarily bring about a significant reduction in the Pentagon's share of the budget.

The new willingness to question the military was in part due to the fact that they were losing a war. That the ultimate responsibility was with the civilians who sent them into it was of little consequence, probably because so many politicians had concurred in that decision. The military had misled the civilians and the politicians, it was charged, and that was probably all of a piece with how much money they said they needed for national defense. The military were no longer presumed to be omniscient on military matters. Finally, there was the all-important matter of timing. All of these factors might not have counted so much if it had not also been true that the Nixon Administration's slow pace, particularly at the beginning, meant that not much else was going on. And, as is often the case, the press and the politicians reinforced each other, spurring each other on. When, later in the year, the politicians' interest in this "historic" issue flagged, so did that of the press.

The anti-militants

There were, in fact, two separable parts to the attack on the Pentagon this year: one to reject the ABM, and one to pare the budget for other weapons systems. The near victory in the Senate for the opponents of the ABM, as compared with the relative ease with which amendments to cut out other weapons were defeated, is in itself instructive. The ABM was an unusual kind of issue, having to do with a new generation of nuclear weaponry and the delicate possibility of a nuclear agreement with the Soviet Union. More painstaking work was undertaken by its opponents. But even that was not quite enough. In part, the intensity of the anti-ABM sentiment was a fluke, provoked by good old American feelings about real estate as much as by concern about the danger of raising the level of the balance of terror, or spending more billions for a weapons system of dubious efficacy. When various communities found that they had been selected for missile sites (under the former Sentinel plan, before it was modified by the Nixon Administration into the Safeguard plan to protect missile sites instead of cities), they vociferously declined the honor. It was then that the issue became one of major proportions. The halting of the Sentinel site construction by the Nixon Administration, and then the proffering of an ABM system with an entirely different rationale, including a change in the enemy it was supposed to defend us against (Russia in lieu of China), raised more doubts whether its proponents knew what they were about.

No one worked harder to fan those doubts, or had more effect, than a collection of scientists all too familiar with the properties of nuclear power. The Council for a Livable World, a Washington organization of nuclear physicists and other scientists, helped to stir up the "no missile in the backyard" sentiment. Then, through a series of lunches and dinners, they proceeded to educate senators and their staff members about the workings and dangers of antiballistic missilery.

This novelty of legislators sitting down to learn for themselves and make up their own minds about a difficult and arcane matter, and finding that after all they, too, could grasp it, was what set the ABM issue apart from previous defense questions and led to the unprecedented challenge to the Pentagon's authority. Others, in particular former Democratic Administration officials, began to be called to Capitol Hill to explain to the lawmakers about other vulnerable parts of the defense budget, and even about what the politicians had been doing all those

years when they had concurred in whatever the Pentagon and its friendly congressional committees said was needed. One senator who was there reports that when a former official pointed out to a group of senators that they had been equipping the Pentagon for the extremely unlikely task of fighting, simultaneously, an all-out, non-nuclear as well as nuclear war with Russia, and also one with China, and also a limited war somewhere else, even Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, long the Senate's leading defense expert, was amazed.

The legislators were emboldened not only to question the wisdom of the Pentagon but also, and perhaps even more important, that of their own Armed Services Committees, whose militant lead they had, by congressional custom, habitually and willingly followed. During the McNamara years, it was the uniformed military and the Armed Services Committees of Congress against the Pentagon civilians. McNamara's efforts to bar new weapons systems were attacked on Capitol Hill, and often overridden. By contrast, Secretary Laird was able to cancel some systems with impunity.

The challenge to the ABM, however, never would have come as close to success in the Senate had its leaders not been such respected members of the institution as John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, and Philip Hart, Democrat of Michigan. The reluctance to challenge the committee system runs very deep, each senator knowing that there but for the grace goes his own present or future power. Nor would the challenge have come as near to its mark had it not been for the continuing work, the daily contacting and trading of information on the part of Cooper's and Hart's legislative assistants, William Miller and Muriel Ferris, and Edward Kennedy's and Mike Mansfield's assistants, Dun Gifford and Charles Ferris, all working closely with Tom Halsted of the Council for a Livable World. An informal caucus of other senators' aides, sometimes as many as forty, was convened and met frequently throughout the debate. The staff group discovered from the ABM issue that the information on weapons systems can be obtained—often through the clandestine help of sympathetic Pentagon informants—and understood. They then developed material for assaults on other Pentagon proposals. Though not unprecedented in concept, this was as extensive and cooperative a legislative effort as had been mounted in recent memory.

Yet it failed. The effort to block construction of the Safeguard system was defeated—by only one vote, to be sure, an unaccustomed show of strength on such an issue. After that, things fell apart. After two months of debate, opponents had cut only $190 million from the $20 billion bill. Amendments to limit, prevent, or postpone development or construction of a new manned bomber, a new nuclear aircraft carrier, the behemoth C-5A transport plane, a new Navy F-14 fighter to protect aircraft carriers were all rejected, despite serious questions as to their necessity or efficacy. Congress failed to force a halt in development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's), pending a possible agreement with the Soviet Union to bar the weapon; the Administration's negotiating position is let there be MIRV's. The only amendments which carried were those which the defenders of the Pentagon, led by Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, were able to modify or reinterpret to their own purposes.

The more dismal record in the House of Representatives was expected. It is a more conservative body by inclination, and by habit not a place of serious debate. The House is big and unwieldy, and short of chaining the members to their chairs, it is difficult to keep them on hand for any length of time. The House is even less inclined than the Senate to challenge its committees, and in contrast to the Senate leaders, Speaker John McCormack stood four-square with Mendel Rivers, the Armed Services Committee chairman. It is a place where the flamboyant Rivers can still, by way of explaining the defense budget, cry out that "America is too young to die" and not get laughed out of the chamber. Whereas John Stennis, in an attempt to defang the Pentagon's critics, had his committee cut almost $2 billion from the Administration's requests, Rivers' group *added* another billion for Congress' pet service, the Navy, and another several million for a plane that even the Air Force does not want (only its manufacturer, Northrop, does), and is not even to be used by the United States; it will be given away in a Lady Bountiful gesture to our less sophisticated "Free World allies." All of the attempts on the House floor to reduce the amount of military spending in the bill were easily defeated. (At this writing, the military appropriation bill, as opposed to the authorizing legislation which generated the extensive debate, had still to be considered. But, barring major new developments, this second round was not expected to produce a major battle.)

Ego

There are varying reasons why the critics did not do better, all of them instructive. Some were tactical. The debate went on for too long in the Senate and covered too many subjects. Unaccustomed to the pressure of thinking through a difficult subject for themselves, and of having a lengthy debate intrude upon their schedules, the senators were weary of it at the end of the month-long consideration of the ABM. When, after the three-week August recess, they had to resume discussion of several more amendments on other weapons systems, they were anxious to get on to other things, or back to the office, or out to make a speech, and the Pentagon critics seemed pestiferous.

The more the critics pursued, the more soured the Senate atmosphere became. Having shown uncommon opposition to its Armed Services Committee on the ABM vote, the Senate now was anxious to return to its more accustomed and comfortable way of doing business. The recess gave the Pentagon and its allies time to regroup and reinforce their troops. The Navy worked so hard to defeat the amendment to postpone the new nuclear aircraft carrier that Senator Walter Mondale, sponsor of that anticarrier

amendment, remarked, "The last time there were that many Navy people up here in the Capitol was when the British were burning the joint." By seeming to be unselective, the senators who pursued the attack found themselves in the position of being portrayed as zealous disarmers, rather than protectors of the public purse. "Cutting the budget has an inchoate constituency," said Mondale. "The Navy has a real one."

Senators may be just people who happened to end up in the Senate instead of a factory or a boardroom or a law office, but once there they take themselves very seriously indeed. (There are few more pathetic sights in Washington than an ex-senator.) The ego problem was insufficiently appreciated by some anti-Pentagon tacticians, and at various critical points they found that Senator X could not be persuaded to beseech Senator Y for his vote, or compromise an amendment to accommodate Senator Z.

Moreover, liberals seem congenitally incapable of sustained cooperation, and the work against the ABM exhausted their capacities for mutuality; after that, they resumed marching in different directions. There was no real leadership after the ABM vote. On occasion inexperienced or unpopular senators became the sponsors of the various amendments, often by default. There was little work done to persuade senators who might have been persuadable. And here, too, the outcome was affected by chance; the events on Chappaquiddick Island removed Edward Kennedy from a role as a continuing leader of the Pentagon's opposition; the death of Senator Dirksen induced the gleam of leadership in the eyes of a good percentage of Senate Republicans, who tumbled over each other to conduct themselves as party regulars until the question of succession was settled.

But there were deeper reasons for the critics' failure to do better, reasons that will be of more importance over the long term. The central problem was that there was no focus or conceptual framework to their position. They lost not least of all because they conducted the argument on the Pentagon's terms. They took it weapon by weapon, asking, Will it work? Will it add to the nation's defense? In the first case, the answer is unknowable until it is tried, which it usually won't be. The military's defenders are fond of arguing that the fact that a weapon hasn't been used proves just how valuable it is. In the second case, the answer is invariably, to some degree, yes. The more profound issue is whether, after a certain point, any more national defense is worth the expense, but this is not the line of reasoning which politicians were ready to advance.

The attempt to defeat the ABM was almost successful in part because it got beyond the old arguments, but it didn't get far enough. A great torrent of words was spent on what the enemy was doing, and whether ABM would work or not, an issue which only confused the public, if not the senators themselves. Perhaps it would work, and perhaps someone someday in the Kremlin would intend ill, or go mad. And in that case, perhaps the ABM would buy a slim margin of safety. The most fundamental argument against the ABM was that, given the limits of national resources, and given other needs, the money should not be spent on the ABM. Some of its opponents understood this, but apparently the time has not yet come for that sort of talk.

Melvin Laird has said that we should sacrifice "no option necessary to cope with the possible development of potential threats," a concept which leaves limitless possibilities of spending for defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can always argue that a new ship buys more safety than an old one and a manned bomber buys more safety than no manned bomber and win the argument on those terms. And that is precisely what happened when the Senate took up the individual amendments on various weapons.

Sometimes they were even further off the mark. Senator William Proxmire's main argument against the C-5A was that the contracting procedures were poor and had led to unconscionable cost overruns, and when the Pentagon announced that they would fix that, he had nothing left to say. At that point the issue became one of national defense, and the senators were, as always, for that. No amount of railing against the "military-industrial complex" will make it go away, for as long as the government buys arms, there will be one. Perfect contracting procedures and saintly contractors would not resolve the problem of how much it is in the national interest to buy.

Some men who were in the Pentagon under the Democrats are thinking along these lines, and urging that it is time to advance the terms of the debate. Paul Warnke, formerly an Assistant Secretary of Defense, suggests that "now it's time to take another step and say 'let's decide what contingencies are most likely and most important and let's prepare for that.' The political leaders have to be willing to say to the American people we will be 'less safe' than before, and we will be. But that much safety is no longer a good buy." Harold Brown, another former Pentagon official and now president of the California Institute of Technology, argues that "it has always been said that if we're going to make a mistake, make a mistake on the side of safety. But you have to make a distinction between safety and excess. If you had to say one should always err on the side of excess, then it wouldn't be said."

A few of the congressional critics did begin to raise this sort of reasoning. Proxmire, as chairman of a joint economic subcommittee, did hold hearings on the relationships of military expenditures to other national needs, something the Armed Services Committees do not consider. George McGovern, in arguing against the new manned bomber, urged that "we should settle at the outset whether bombers have any meaningful role to play at all. . . . Our tenure as a viable democratic society," he said, "depends as much upon our approach to these urgent [domestic] requirements as it does upon our ability to acquire more, new, and better weapons. We simply cannot afford to build systems which are unnecessary or unworkable. Before we decide to 'err on the side of strength,' we must determine whether it is necessary to err at all." Representative Otis Pike, like McGovern a man who raised questions about military spending before it became the fashion, and a dogged critic of the Pentagon, did speak in the House debate about the relevance of the choices

made for defense to other things. "Our ships are old," he agreed, in arguing against Rivers' extra billion dollars for the Navy. "But there are an awful lot of things in this country that are old. We have some old schools in this country. We have some old hospitals in this country, and we have some old highways in this country. We have air that smells old and water that is just as old. . . ."

Lid

Besides showing that outsiders could invite themselves into discussions of defense, causing the congressional committees to be slightly less magnanimous about the Pentagon's requests, and spreading the awareness to the public that something was amiss, the Defense critics also take justifiable credit for the fact that the Nixon Administration itself made cuts first of $1.1 billion, and then of another $3 billion, in the defense spending planned for this year by President Johnson. Yet the way that the reductions were made shows what the critics are up against, and the limits on their power. First the $3 billion in cuts was evenly allocated among the services —$1 billion each for the Army, Navy, and Air Force; second, except for the cancellation of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, announced earlier in the year, none involved decisions to forgo new and expensive weapons. The Air Force reduced the number of training hours for pilots; the Army cut troop levels in anticipation of planned post-Vietnam reductions; the Navy retired old ships which it plans to replace.

All of this is of a piece with the new system of decision-making which Laird is installing at the Pentagon, one in which the Chiefs will have a far more important role than they did in the McNamara days. In one respect, the Laird system will make more sense. For political ("missile gap") as well as strategic reasons, when the Democrats took over at the Pentagon, their instructions to the Chiefs were simply to report to the civilian leaders what weapons they needed, without qualification, to meet all of the commitments and contingencies which had been assumed during the cold war. Until then, the Eisenhower Administration had been holding down defense costs by relying on the threat of using the United States's then nuclear superiority to keep the world in line, and with a predetermined ceiling on the Pentagon budget.

When Kennedy and McNamara lifted the lid, the Chiefs inevitably requested far more for defense than the political leaders were prepared to permit them. This led to a further discrediting of the judgment of the Chiefs. The civilians did not mind at all letting the press and public know of the absurdity of the military requests, and of how the civilians had chopped them down. Now, under Laird, the Chiefs will be given what is described as a "target area"—an amount roughly equivalent to the final budget figure sought—and told to plan within that. At least in the short term, Messrs. Laird and Nixon have gotten the message about the way the winds of public opinion on military spending are currently blowing, and will request a still further reduced Pentagon budget next year.

A more important question is what is in that budget, and how it is arrived at, and what the long-range prospects are. In that sense, the way the cuts were made this year is not encouraging. Items which cost little now, but will involve great amounts in future years, were not disturbed. The equivalent cuts among the services indicated a lack of central direction. Left to their own devices, the services will make their own plans without regard to overlap or coordination. The Air Force, for instance, has little interest in spending its part of the budget to provide airlift capacity for the Army. The Navy is largely an air force on boats, and the admirals prefer the surface fleet to the nuclear-missile-equipped Polaris submarine, the nation's most effective nuclear weapon. Each service covets its own antiballistic-missile system; Air Force leaders prefer bombers to missiles. It therefore requires very tough leadership at the top, and a willingness to reject the Chiefs' proposals again and again, in order to impose any sense on the Pentagon budget. Yet Laird has made it very clear that the services are to be restored a greater voice in defense planning, and around the Pentagon there is talk about how there is going to be a lot less "second guessing." How much all of this is a matter of atmospherics, or where it will lead, not even Laird yet knows.

But there is precious little that Congress can do about it. The Congress can hector and intimidate and even delete, but it cannot run the government. The Nixon Administration has decided that the Pentagon will now plan for only one major and one minor war. The Chiefs, however, sniffed that change coming some time ago, and have been ahead of the game. They have been saying that as it happens they are in fact prepared to fight only one major and one minor war; they can always write a paper citing the need, in terms of national security, for whatever they say they see a need. It takes a lot of courage to face them down, a quality of which the President has not demonstrated an abundance. The Administration is considering an idea which the Pentagon critics have put forward: an annual statement of foreign policy into which military policy would presumably fit. But, like many changes the critics advocate, this might turn out to be merely a mechanical, not a substantive, reform.

Those who led the assault on the Pentagon budget this year are planning another, better-coordinated fight next year. There have been efforts to hold the congressional staff group together, and provide it with new material. The Brookings Institution, a Washington research center which houses several former Democratic Administration officials who were heavily involved in the educating of the politicians who took on the Pentagon, will be issuing its own studies of strategic policy and the Pentagon budget. These will be drawn upon by the politicians and the press. There is consideration being given to abandoning the weapon-by-weapon approach and trying instead simply to lower the total amount the Pentagon may spend—a primitive approach, and a sign of Congress' limits.

The critics of the Pentagon on Capitol Hill argue that they came a long way this year, and that any major effort of this sort takes at least three years—a time, probably not coincidentally, that brings us to the 1972 elections. But Washington is very fickle about its "great issues"—civil rights, poverty, and does anyone remember reciprocal trade?—and there is simply no predicting how long this one will be with us.

The men at the Pentagon do not exactly plan to sit around and take a battering in the meantime. First, they are very intent upon "restoring the credibility" of the Defense Department, as they put it. That is why Mr. Laird appointed a commission to review its procedures, and why he avoids making predictions about when the Vietnam War will end. A presidential adviser reports "with great sadness" that he expects a reaction on the right against those who have been attacking the war, the Pentagon, and the armaments. As Defense officials view it, when the shouting died this year, the politicians voted, time after time, for defense. Yet they feel that they did not "communicate" the Pentagon's position very well, and they plan to try harder next time around.

As they look to the seventies, and as they read the threats from Russia and China, they find America underpreparing, particularly in strategic weapons, and they see the ABM as only the beginning. "People accused Mel of exaggerating the threats during the ABM debate," says one of his associates. "They are going to find that he understated it." The Pentagon leaders realize correctly that there has been a fairly sudden political change in this country, which for the first time in a long while has made attacking the Pentagon, as one put it, "low-risk politics." He said, "If within a couple of years we have not made it high-risk politics, we will not have done our job."

ELIZABETH B. DREW

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL'S WASHINGTON OFFICE

Seminars: Over the past year the Council has sponsored a series of off-the-record seminars for members of the Senate and their staffs, to present in detail the case against missile defense deployment and the implications of ABM for strategic arms stability. Speakers at these seminars have included Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Scientific Advisor to President Eisenhower, and Dr. Hans A. Bethe, recipient of the 1967 Nobel Prize in physics. Other seminars are scheduled for early June on the implications of current nuclear weapons policy by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Scientific Advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and on control of biological and chemical weapons by Dr. Matthew Meselson, Professor of Microbiology at Harvard and a Council Board member. The seminar program has been broadened by adding to it a companion background briefing for members of the Washington press corps.

Viet Nam: On January 10, 1968 a dozen South Vietnamese professors, lawyers, and intellectuals announced a plan to end the war. Known as the "South Vietnamese Solution", it called for direct negotiations between the Saigon government and the NLF as the prerequisite to a political settlement. Directors of the Council consider the "South Vietnamese Solution" to be the most realistic and promising development to date. The Saigon press made no reference to the plan when it was announced, and in this country, only the New York Times reported on it in a short dispatch on January 15. A copy of the Saigon proposal sent to the Council in January was inserted in the Congressional Record on January 31 (S 671) by Senator Hatfield. Shortly thereafter, we secured a copy of the original Vietnamese document from which we re-worked the first hastily prepared English translation.

This winter the Council distributed copies of the plan to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to other key Senators, and to interested members of the House. As most Council Supporters are doubtless aware, in mid-February the Saigon Chief of Police, General Loan, who had arrested Professor Au Truong Thanh last fall (Council Washington Bulletin, November 1967) took into "protective custody" a large number of political and intellectual leaders. The Council has not been able to determine either the exact number of the arrested (estimates range between 100 and 500) or the names of any more than a dozen detainees. But one thing is certain: the arrested men included all those responsible for drawing up the peace plan. Professor Thanh, of course, was one of those arrested and with him all the experienced, able, and responsible leaders in Saigon qualified to constitute a new government of South Vietnam. Thanh has recently been released after a two-week hunger strike, but he and the others who remain in jail are virtual hostages to the Thieu-Ky regime. The Council is currently engaged in intensive discussions with Congressmen and Administration officials about the "South Vietnamese Solution" and on the necessity of saving the men in "protective custody".

United Nations: This year the Council has initiated a program of activities involving the United Nations. It represents a modest beginning to what we hope will become a full-scale program to provide a more effective link between the Senate and the UN. Present effort is directed at the resolution of the general problem of the divided nations -- China, Germany, Korea and Vietnam. As our activities increase, we will work on such issues as

-- the establishment of nuclear-free zones in South America and Africa
-- restrictions on sales and traffic of conventional arms to less developed countries
-- provisions for the support of United Nations observer and peace-keeping units
-- rationalizing the use and control of peaceful applications of nuclear explosives.

Towards a New American Program for Peace

Since the end of World War II, the United States has invested countless billions of dollars in programs of foreign military and economic aid, aimed at establishing a stable world order and maintaining world peace. Yet, today, peace is far from established and the hopes of the newly developing nations for stability and prosperity are further from reality than they were twenty years ago.

In addition, we are now faced with the most severe internal crisis since the Civil War. Our economic and social stability are threatened by the imbalance of foreign payments, and more critically by the consequences of neglect of our responsibilities toward our own disadvantaged classes, mainly in the urban ghettos and among the Negro population.

The brutal assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King has brought the crisis to the boiling point. It is no longer possible to continue expending some 30 billions of dollars per year on the Vietnam war, not to speak of other aspects of our swollen defense budget, while neglecting the elementary needs for relief of the shocking plight of the underprivileged millions of black inhabitants of our urban slums.

Unless we act immediately with massive programs to improve the plight of the American Negro, our society is in grave danger. The problem is not to know what to do -- there are plenty of practical suggestions around and, indeed, a coherent and sensible program of action has recently been recommended in the (Kerner) report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders. But what holds up the implementation of these programs is money; what is required is the immediate unfreezing of vast sums -- at least 5 to 10 billions of dollars must be spent in the next year, and this rate of expenditure for human rehabilitation must be kept up and even increased until the problem is solved.

To save our society, Americans must look inward as never before. But this does not necessarily mean a new American isolationism. Friends of America abroad should realize that our crisis is theirs as well, that the economic and social disruption of the United States is having the gravest repercussions on the economic and social well-being in all other areas of the world, not excluding those areas under Communist domination. Our problem is thus a global problem, and the measures required for its solution will have global implications.

What can America do now to restore her economic and political health and to free the funds necessary for the rapid re-establishment of internal tranquility? A number of measures can be undertaken immediately, assuming that the current initiatives for achieving peace in Vietnam will be vigorously pursued and that they will be even partially successful. Here are some examples:

1. Obviously it is to the Vietnam war that we must look for the largest saving of money and moral capital. In view of the positive North Vietnamese response to President Johnson's recent bombing reduction, as demonstrated by their lifting of the siege of Khesanh, a significant further de-escalation of the war on our part is both possible and desirable. This could take the form of:

(a) Further reduction of the bombing of North Vietnam, leading as rapidly as possible to a complete cessation as our installations in the region of the demilitarized zone are no longer in grave danger of being overrun.

(b) As a positive move toward a cease-fire, we could withdraw American troops from areas which are substantially under the control of the National Liberation Front. This move toward the "enclave" strategy, proposed by General Gavin and others, would permit a substantial reduction of American forces in Vietnam, the beginnings of which could be effectuated almost immediately and whose tempo could increase as cease-fire agreements are negotiated.

Aside from the obvious positive effects on the U.S. internal situation, which would result from such a military de-escalation in Vietnam and from the removal of the threat to draft hundreds of thousands of reluctant young American men, the monetary saving resulting from such a military de-escalation would be more than enough to cover the costs of the massive domestic programs we need to undertake.

2. It is to be hoped that some of the above measures can be initiated immediately. But real progress towards military de-escalation in Vietnam depends on the progress of the peace talks which are only just starting. In the meantime, we must undertake some immediate measures for freeing billions of dollars, through the curtailment of military programs which are of lesser importance to us at this time. It may well be that later, once the Vietnam war is effectively over and the urban crisis past, we may wish to reinstitute some of these programs, and that this might turn out to be more costly in the end than it would be to maintain them now. However, this is irrelevant. We cannot permit trivial arguments of cost-accounting to stand in the way of saving the country. Two possible prospects for large immediate savings are:

(a) Immediate reduction of our commitments to the military defense of Europe, in the amount of a few billions of dollars in the next year, in recognition of the real lessening of the "Communist threat" to European security. In a sense, the possibility of achieving these savings depends on the recognition, on the part of the Soviet Union, that large expenditures on both our parts, aimed at the defense of our European allies against external attack, are no longer called for. However, almost irrespective of the Russian response, in view of the strong economic and military condition of our European allies, reductions in our expenditures toward their defense, especially in the realm of so-called tactical nuclear weapons production and deployment, can be unilateral on our part without any significant weakening of the security of our European allies.

(b) Postponement of further U.S. deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems, including the "thin ABM". This move should be unilateral on our part, in the expectation that such postponement will be before too long matched by comparable acts of restraint on the part of the Soviet Union. The present state of our strategic forces, and the time-table for deployment of new missile systems are such that we can afford to act unilaterally at this time without fear of serious diminution of our current superiority in strategic nuclear weapons.

3. Our government is spending very large sums of money -- well in excess of five billion per year -- on programs of applied technology whose contributions to basic science are at best marginal, and whose rationale lies mainly in their prestige value. The continuation of such programs in this time of crisis cannot be justified, either on moral or on scientific grounds, and the savings resulting from their postponement would enable us to finance a large fraction of the necessary programs of social rehabilitation demanded by the present critical situation. Furthermore, almost all the valid scientific goals of these programs can be attained by experiments of a much more modest, if less spectacular nature, while at the same time permitting continued expenditure for the basic research programs needed to maintain a healthy American scientific climate. Programs whose postponement would now be in the national interest include:

(a) The project for landing a man on the moon by 1970. It has been amply demonstrated that essentially all the scientific objectives of this program can be achieved by a far less costly program of instrumented moon landings.

(b) The development of the supersonic transport airplane. Considering, especially, the many unsolved questions relating to the supersonic "boom" and its detrimental effects, this project is at best of questionable value at this time and its postponement could be justified even if these were normal times.

(c) Project Plowshare, aimed at the development of peaceful applications of underground nuclear explosions, whose continuation jeopardizes the attainment of a nonproliferation treaty and for which one can not even advance the justification of international competition.

The funds released by the implementation of such measures of economy and retrenchment should be earmarked primarily for the amelioration of our domestic crisis. However, in recognition of the responsibility of prosperous nations for the development of the underprivileged and undernourished portion of the globe, a certain fraction, say thirty percent, of these funds should be devoted to economic measures for the reconstruction of all Vietnam, as well as to programs of aid to other under-developed countries, without political strings attached and preferably through the UN.

The American people have been reluctant to make the sacrifices necessary to pay for an unpopular war -- hence much of the responsible opposition to the President's tax increase and to other Administration measures aimed at redressing the foreign payments imbalance. But the American people cannot, and I'm sure will not, refuse to make comparable sacrifices in the cause of internal and external peace.

What is needed is a positive program of progress in America and in the under-developed world, a program which will turn our current disillusionment into a feeling of optimism and belief in America's future, a future in which the benefits of a healthy American economy will be shared by all of our citizens.

Bernard T. Feld

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 18, 1968

Dear Council Supporter:

Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King lie assassinated; Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern have been rejected; Senator Gruening of Alaska has been defeated for renomination; Nelson Rockefeller, John Lindsay and younger Republican liberals have been driven into the shadows. We can only guess how you feel after the fiascoes at Miami and Chicago where the two major parties engineered the nomination of Presidential candidates who offer little hope of the achievement of foreign or domestic peace.

The one heartening factor which alters this otherwise bleak political prospect is the 1968 Congressional election. Not for a decade has there been such an extraordinary number of courageous and intelligent candidates for the Senate. Up for re-election is a corps of veterans -- men such as George Aiken, Frank Church, Joseph Clark, J. William Fulbright, Jacob Javits, George McGovern, Wayne Morse, and Gaylord Nelson -- who have consistently fought the Administration's policy in Vietnam.

In four states -- California, Maryland, Missouri and Ohio -- extremely promising challengers have a good chance to win Senate seats. These men -- Alan Cranston, Charles Mathias, Thomas Eagleton and John Gilligan -- face difficult races against conservative opponents, one of whom -- Max Rafferty in California -- is an extreme right-winger.

In Ohio, John Gilligan has shown himself a powerful campaigner by defeating the incumbent, Frank Lausche, an old-line cold warrior, in the Democratic Senate Primary. Gilligan is opposed by the Republican Attorney General, William Saxbe, who reportedly has enormous funds at his disposal. A similar situation exists in Missouri where Thomas Eagleton won over the incumbent Edward Long in the August 6 Primary. He is now in a hard campaign against a conservative congressman, Thomas Curtis.

No one can predict today how far to the right the next Administration will go. One thing is certain: should there be a repressive, reactionary Executive the only effective restraint will be a strong Senate. The distinguished men who have been its leaders must be returned to office and the promising new men must win their races.

As you know, the Council generally limits its recommendations to candidates who are running in smaller states where the contributions of Supporters can have a significant impact. The Council is staying out of the New York Senate race for two reasons: campaign expenses are enormous and both candidates are well qualified. In California the Council strongly endorses Alan Cranston against Rafferty but is not recommending Cranston for campaign assistance because of the astronomically high cost of a Senate campaign in this state.

Council Supporters are encouraged to follow Council recommendations unless they have an overriding personal preference for another candidate. If any Supporter desires to contribute to the campaign of a candidate other than those we are recommending, he is urged to mail his contribution to the Washington office of the Council for direct transmittal. In this way, your contribution will help to increase the effectiveness of the Council in Washington.

Council Supporters have already contributed unprecedentedly large amounts to the campaigns of many of the incumbent Senators running for re-election. Now we are asking you to help elect new men to the Senate. We are recommending enthusiastically for your support John Gilligan of Ohio and Thomas Eagleton of Missouri. Both have a good chance of election and would be notable additions to the Senate. This is the major opportunity Council Supporters will have this election year to help bring new blood to the Senate. From our experience in previous elections we have found it essential to make last-minute direct contributions to key races in the Senate as well as to several very important House races. For this purpose some of you are being asked to contribute directly to the Council.

Yours sincerely,

William Doering

William Doering
Chairman

P.S. The Council is conducting a very large mailing in order to attract additional supporters. Should you receive a copy of a Council mailing "To Concerned Americans", please help the Council by using it to convince a friend to become a patron of the U.S. Senate and a Supporter of the Council for a Livable World.

FROM THE MOUTHS OF THE CANDIDATES

Congressman Charles McC. Mathias, Republican candidate for the Senate from Maryland:

On Vietnam: in announcing his candidacy, Mr. Mathias called for "a de-escalation of the war to lower the level of violence in Vietnam to the point where political and social solutions can be brought to bear." (Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1968). The program of the nine Republican Congressmen, made public in July 1967, and referred to in the text of the letter, called for an immediate cessation of U.S. bombing above the 21st parallel, followed by further restriction of the bombing of North Vietnam as both sides respond to our offer of mutual de-escalation.

On Arms Control: (from the Congressional Record, H 1726, March 6, 1968)

> In this difficult year, it is especially important for the Congress and the United States to reaffirm, in clear and unmistakeable terms, not only our constant hope for peace, but our continuing commitment to lessening international tensions, slowing down the arms race, curbing nuclear proliferation, and generally reducing the omnipresent threat of nuclear war.
>
> Passage of H.R. 14940, to extend the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for 3 additional years, would by such a reaffirmation, and I strongly support this bill today.
>
> In general, I feel that far more should be done, beginning now, to increase our readiness not only for any reduction in the level of combat in Vietnam, not only for the distant dawn of gradual general disarmament, but also for such eventualities as the return of significant numbers of American forces from Europe and a reduction in our expenditures in that theater.

On the Reexamination of U.S. Policies in Europe: (from the Congressional Record, H 14187, Oct. 30, 1967)

> One of the highest prices paid for the war in Vietnam has been the lack of attention given in U.S. foreign policy to the pressing needs for change in other areas of the world.
>
> Along with others, Europe and her problems have been placed on the back burner. But in addition to lack of attention, the U.S. commitment in Vietnam undermines U.S. policy in Europe in other ways. . . . . .
>
> . . . . it has imbued U.S. policy and U.S. policymakers with the continuing, if vain, hope that we can procure active support in Vietnam from European governments who do not share our commitment to or our perspectve toward that war. And, finally, it has led Europeans and their governments to question whether our motives in Europe are primarily to seek the evolution of a stable peace in that part of the world or to involve our NATO allies in our commitments in another and far distant part of the world.
>
> In summary it might be said that American foreign policy toward Europe in the 1960's has ignored the hard but important lessons of history. The international order created at the end of one war, if not sufficiently flexible to change with the times, can become more a cause of instability than stability.
>
> In the modern history of the nation-state, time and again the machinery to keep peace constructed at the end of one war has come in time to haunt men. This is not because the peace settlements were wrong at the time when they were devised; it is because they alone were expected to safeguard the peace even when they were no longer relevant . . . .
>
> . . In whatever direction you turn in today's world the inadequacies of our international institutions appear obvious.
>
> The goals of the United Nations are as relevant as ever, but it is painfully clear that the organization is unable to cope with major crises—and its unwillingness to act over Vietnam is evident for all to see. There is a danger that the U.N. is becoming primarily only an institution in which the "have-nots" can quixotically challenge the "haves."
>
> The Organization of American States, without truly meaningful change in 20 years, seems increasingly to be to the Latin Americans the principal evidence of the patriarchial relationship between the United States and the rest of its hemisphere. Rather than a catalyst for stability the OAS is in danger of being reduced merely to a symbol of the cleavage between the Latin Americans and the "colossus of the North."
>
> SEATO, as is evident, is surely an unrealistic entity today.
>
> The purpose of this depressing catalog is not to encourage pessimism. It is merely to emphasize what commonsense would tell us if we were listening: In this age of rapid change it is unrealistic to expect the institutions of one generation automatically to serve well the interests of the next—and when the potential price of failure is nuclear war, the attention of statesmen to the flexibility and evolution of the international order is all the more important. . . . . .
>
> . . Perhaps the most important trade matter at the present time is the extension of long-term credit. . . . . .
>
> The NATO study can serve also to remove some of the irrelevant emotionalism with which East-West trade is discussed. No one has proposed trading strategic goods to the Communist states. No one has proposed a one-way trading agreement which favors Moscow but not the West. No one has proposed terms of trade which are so liberal that they amount to foreign aid to the Soviet Government.

(over)

FROM THE MOUTHS OF THE CANDIDATES

Congressman Charles McC. Mathias (continued):

The U.S. and Western nonstrategic trading policies toward the Soviet bloc should reflect the attitudes of the hard-headed American traders of the 19th century, whose clipper ships roamed the seven seas as living proof of the prosperity of a self-confident free enterprise system. They did not fear that international commerce would somehow subvert their belief in freedom—and neither should we. They did not deal unless the deal was to their benefits—and neither should we. They did not doubt the superiority of their economic system—and neither should we.

A progressive negotiating package to be offered to the Warsaw Pact nations for discussion, on a pact-to-pact basis, for the resolution of Europe's divisive problems. Such a package might well include proposals relating to East-West trade and German reunification—but they might also include: the deliberate expansion of diplomatic and cultural contacts; programs to encourage unlimited citizen travel throughout Europe and the North Atlantic community; proposals for reciprocal troop reductions and conceivably for limited forms of military disengagement; proposals for joint scientific research and exploration; proposals for a multilateral institution to promote East-West development aid to foster economic stability and vitality in the southern half of the globe.

A multilateral North Atlantic development aid program toward nations in the southern half of the globe. Quite aside from any effort to devise an East-West joint development aid program, it is incumbent upon the nations of NATO to devise a more successful means of collaboration among themselves in fostering economic and political stability in the developing nations.

Development aid is not a burden which should be carried by any particular nation; it is a burden imposed commonly on all those peoples whose history has blessed them with abundance. Efforts to date within the OECD and the Development Assistance Group, while promising, have generally been bereft of enthusiasm, creativity, and conviction.

Incumbent Democratic Senator Daniel Brewster:

On the Bombing: Baltimore Sun Oct.26, 1967

Washington, Oct. 25—After a period of reevaluation of the Vietnam war, Senator Brewster (D., Md.) voiced renewed support today of Administration policy as "the best course among the choices available to us."

In a speech on the Senate floor the Maryland Senator rejected calls for the withdrawal of United States troops as "unthinkable and impossible" and added that a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam would be "inconsistent with our goals."...Thus, he said, "we are left only with the course we presently are following in Vietnam. I believe this is the best course among the choices available to us. It has proven effective to date and, given time, it will lead us to the goals we seek in Vietnam."

Baltimore News American Nov.19, 1967

ANNAPOLIS, Nov. 18—His newly-acquired hawk's feathers bristling with indignation, Sen. Daniel B. Brewster today opposed bombing pauses in Vietnam and urged the total destruction of "all targets of military significance."

"I believe we must persevere and neither quit nor trigger a nuclear war," the senator said, contending that a unilateral withdrawal of U. S. forces from Vietnam "would have disastrous results."

On the Tet Offensive (From the Congressional Record, S 1148, Feb.8, 1968)

The events of the past week have shown that the South Vietnamese people and fighting forces backed up by United States and their other allies, are not willing to succumb to Communist aggression. I would hope, Mr. President, that we Americans can, despite the difficulties of the moment, continue to support this brave will to resist Communist aggression and domination.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

WASHINGTON BULLETIN

January 1969

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

The character of the new Senate and the directions in which it will move cannot be determined at this early date. However, in the contests for majority and minority whip the unexpected victories of Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania over Long of Louisiana and Hruska of Nebraska suggest a fresh breeze in the Senate. As Senator Scott, who won by three votes, put it: "Both parties have revived, refreshed and restored their aspect."

Despite the sad defeats of Wayne Morse, Ernest Gruening and Joseph Clark -- among the leading critics of the war in Vietnam -- the results of the 1968 Senate races were more gratifying than generally expected.

In South Dakota Senator George McGovern won re-election by a surprisingly large margin over Archie Gubbrud. Every Supporter of the Council must have felt enormous personal satisfaction when McGovern -- who in 1962 was the first Senate candidate to receive major Council assistance -- achieved national prominence as a presidential candidate and a man of good heart and clear mind. The Council provided very substantial support for McGovern as early as May 1967 and continued to help him throughout the campaign.

In the Arkansas primary last July, Senator Fulbright unexpectedly found himself opposed by three candidates but nevertheless managed to win a majority of the votes, thus avoiding a run-off campaign. The speed with which Council Supporters at the crucial moment provided a very large amount of assistance was a vital factor. In November, Senator Fulbright went on to win a reassuringly strong victory over Charles Bernard.

Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, running for re-election to a second term, was another recipient of early support in May 1967. He won a decisive victory over his Republican challenger, State Senator Jerris Leonard.

After the recount of the Oregon vote, Wayne Morse finally acknowledged defeat by a moderate Republican, Robert W. Packwood. Morse lost by only 3,263 votes. In the primary campaign, thanks in large part to early and extraordinarily generous Council support, Morse defeated the Johnson-supporting hawk, Robert Duncan, by a very small margin.

In Pennsylvania Senator Joseph Clark, who received substantial Council support in his close and successful primary fight against Congressman John Dent, was defeated in November by a moderate Republican Congressman, Richard S. Schweiker.

Most observers, including officers of the Council, had assumed that the Alaska primary contest would present no serious threat to Senator Gruening. To everyone's dismay he was defeated. He attempted a valiant, last-ditch write-in campaign in the general election, but failed to recover what had been lost in the August primary.

Supporters played a most important role in helping to bring to the Senate two new men, both of whom were opposed by candidates whose positions on foreign policy were sharply at odds with the basic principles of the Council and its Supporters. In Maryland, Congressman Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., a progressive Republican, defeated incumbent Senator Daniel B. Brewster. In Missouri the able, energetic young Lt. Governor, Thomas F. Eagleton, ousted Senator Edward V. Long in the Democratic primary and went on to beat Republican Thomas B. Curtis in November.

In the Ohio Democratic primary, John J. Gilligan made a major contribution to the health of the Senate by defeating Senator Frank J. Lausche, one of the most unregenerate hawks on the Foreign Relations Committee. In the November election, Gilligan unfortunately lost a close race to Attorney-General William Saxbe.

Of the nine men who were given major assistance by Supporters, five -- Eagleton, Fulbright, Mathias, McGovern and Nelson -- were victorious.

Four candidates -- Weilenmann in Utah, Church in Idaho, Cranston in California, and Hughes in Iowa -- were not recommended nationally for support. However, they received assistance in significant amounts, either directly from the Council's general election fund or from individual Supporters, who contributed on their own initiative or in some cases at the Council's suggestion.

Of these four, only Milton Weilenmann, in his effort to unseat Senator Wallace Bennett, was unsuccessful. In Idaho Senator Frank Church turned back the challenge of George Hansen and, to the relief of a large part of the nation, Alan Cranston defeated Max Rafferty in California. In Iowa one of the most impressive and promising new men to join the Senate in some years -- three-time Democratic Governor Harold H. Hughes -- won by an extremely narrow margin over David M. Stanley.

Total political contributions of Council Supporters to the 1968 senatorial campaigns amounted to just under $400,000--nearly three times the maximum in any past election. This demonstrates a phenomenal step in the growth of the Council over the past two years. A comparison with amounts contributed in previous years follows:

1962	$58,000
1964	$102,000
1966	$131,000
1968	$375,000

Results of CLW Participation in 1968 Senate Contests
(Based on unofficial returns)

State	Winner	Loser
Idaho	CHURCH (60.2%)	Hansen (39.8%)
California	CRANSTON (52.0%)	Rafferty (46.7%)
Missouri	EAGLETON (51.4%)	Curtis (48.6%)
Arkansas	FULBRIGHT (60.7%)	Bernard (39.3%)
Ohio	Saxbe (51.6%)	GILLIGAN (48.4%)
Alaska	Gravel (46.4%)	GRUENING (15.6%)
Iowa	HUGHES (50.4%)	Stanley (49.6%)
Maryland	MATHIAS (47.9%)	Brewster (38.9%)
South Dakota	McGOVERN (56.9%)	Gubbrud (43.1%)
Oregon	Packwood (50.1%)	MORSE (49.9%)
Utah	Bennett (53.8%)	WEILENMANN (46.2%)
Pennsylvania	Schweiker (53.0%)	CLARK (47.0%)
Wisconsin	NELSON (61.8%)	Leonard (38.2%)

In the new, 91st Congress, twenty-four Senators have been helped by Supporters of the Council. For most of them, the help you provided was a major factor in the success of their campaigns. Your generosity and selfless public interest have established both the Council for a Livable World and its Supporters as a major force on the national political scene.

This report of Council actions in the Senatorial campaigns closes with a list of the Senators whose terms will expire two years from now. The 1970 elections are noteworthy in that only nine Republican seats are at stake, compared with twenty-five held by Democrats, a large number of them courageous, imaginative Senators. Thus there is the possibility that if the swing to the right continues, a large number of liberal Senators may be lost.

Senators Whose Terms Expire in 1970

Republicans

Stevens - Alaska
Fannin - Arizona
Murphy - California
Williams - Delaware
Fong - Hawaii
Hruska - Nebraska
Goodell - New York
Scott - Pennsylvania
Prouty - Vermont

Democrats

Dodd - Connecticut
Holland - Florida
Hartke - Indiana
Muskie - Maine
Tydings - Maryland
Kennedy - Massachusetts
Hart - Michigan
McCarthy - Minnesota
Stennis - Mississippi
Symington - Missouri
Mansfield - Montana
Cannon - Nevada
Williams - New Jersey
Montoya - New Mexico
Burdick - North Dakota
Young - Ohio
Pastore - Rhode Island
Gore - Tennessee
Yarborough - Texas
Moss - Utah
Byrd, Jr. - Virginia
Jackson - Washington
Byrd - West Virginia
Proxmire - Wisconsin
McGee - Wyoming

This fall the Council was granted by the United Nations representative status as a non-governmental organization. Charles Pratt, a New York member of the Board of Directors, will serve as Representative and William Doering, Chairman of the Board, as Alternate. Mrs. Helen Carlson, who has had over ten years' experience at the U.N., is serving as the Council's Consultant.

At the moment there are five issues under discussion at the U.N. which are of vital interest to the Council:

1. Universal ratification of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
2. The establishment of controls on the use and rules governing the sale of conventional armaments.
3. The prohibition of chemical and biological forms of warfare.
4. The control and demilitarization of the ocean beds.
5. Inclusive admission to the U.N. of the divided countries -- East and West Germany, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, and Taiwan and Mainland China.

The Council will attempt to develop closer contact and exchange between members of the Senate and the United Nations, initially by an expansion of the Washington seminar program. The first of these United Nations seminars was held on January 22.

William Doering

William Doering
Chairman

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD
Suite 535, 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

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2380 TORREY PINES RD
LA JOLLA CA 92037
S48

WAYNE MORSE
OREGON

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 6, 1968

Dr. Bernard Feld
President
Council For a Livable World
42 Arlington Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140

Dear Dr. Feld:

Before I let another day pass, I want to express my sincere thanks to you and the supporters of the Council For a Livable World for the wonderful assistance given me in my primary campaign.

As you know, I had a very difficult race, and had it not been for the help of the Council, I could not have waged the campaign I did. It is difficult for me to tell you how much I appreciate everything you did, and I am deeply grateful for your friendship and support.

I look forward to seeing you soon and having an opportunity to thank you, personally, for all of your help.

With appreciation again, and kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Wayne Morse

Wayne Morse

WM:jc

AUG 6 1968

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WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD — R. W. McFALL, PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
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279 PDB 6	EX	PERSONAL CHG	MAIL CONF. TURN. DR WILLIAM DOERING DEPT OF CHEMISTRY EXT 4263 (SNDR MISS RYDGEWAY) HARVARD	445PEDT

Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

AUGUST 5, 1968

MR ROBERT P PARKER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR PROFESSORS FOR HUMPHREY NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS CITIZENS FOR HUMPHREY 1025 CONN AVE NW
WASHDC

IN RESPONSE TO A JUNE 28TH TELEGRAM I WROTE ROBERT SHORT, CHAIRMAN OF CITIZENS FOR HUMPHREY STATING THAT I WAS UNWILLING TO SUPPORT HUBERT HUMPHREY. ON JULY 29TH YOU WROTE ME ON CITIZENS FOR HUMPHREY LETTERHEAD STATING THAT UNLESS YOU HEARD FROM ME IMMEDIATELY YOU WOULD USE MY NAME AS A SUPPORTER OF HUMPHREY. AS I WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY MY SECRETARY TELEPHONED YOU THE DAY THE LETTER WAS RECEIVED, AUGUST 2ND, ASKING YOU NOT TO USE MY NAME. YOU TOLD HER CONTRARY TO THE FACT THAT JULIUS CAHN, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF CITIZENS FOR HUMPHRY, HAD SPOKEN WITH ME AND OBTAINED MY PERMISSION AND THAT YOU WERE GOING TO USE MY NAME DESPITE HER REQUEST THAT YOU NOT DO SO. YESTERDAY NY NAME WAS USED IN A FULL-PAGE NEW YORK TIMES AD AS A SUPPORTER OF HUMPHREY.

THIS HIGH-HANDED CONDUCT IS INEXCUSABLE. I AM CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD WHICH HAS ALREADY RAISED OVER A QUARTER OF MILLION DOLLARS FOR POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS DURING THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN (MOST OF IT FROM PERSONS WHO ALSO DO NOT SUPPORT MR HUMPHREY) AND IS CURRENTLY SEEKING ADDITIONAL POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS. YOUR FALSE USE OF MY NAME WITHOUT REASON AND CONTRARY TO BOTH WRITTEN AND TELEPHONED INSTRUCTIONS HAS CAUSED INCALCULABLE DAMAGE. PLEASE ARRANGE IMMEDIATELY FOR AN EQUALLY PROMINENT RETRACTION IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. WE WILL ALSO EXPECT YOU TO MEET THE COST OF CIRCULATING SOME 8,000 REGULAR COUNCIL SUPPORTERS WITH COPIES OF THIS TELEGRAM. PLEASE WIRE ME THE NAME OF YOUR ATTORNEY WITH WHOM ROGER FISHER, MY ATTORNEY, SHOULD DISCUSS SETTLEMENT OF THE DAMAGE CLAIM AND THE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE FOR YOUR RETRACTION AND APOLOGY.

WILLIAM VON EGGERS DOERING
HARVARD UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
12 OXFORD ST CAMBRIDGE MASS 02138

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

12 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U.S.A.

August 8, 1968

Editor, Letters to the Editor
New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, N. Y. 10036

Dear Sir:

On Monday, August 5th, having returned that day from two weeks abroad, I was distressed to learn that my name had been included in a full page ad in the August 4th New York Times as one of many Professors for Humphrey. This listing of my name – in spite of my efforts to prevent it – is unpardonable and offensive to me.

On June 29th, I had received a telegram from Robert E. Short, Co-Chairman of Citizens for Humphrey, inviting me to become a founding member of the Scientists and Engineers Committee for Humphrey, and on July 10th, I wrote him unequivocably refusing the invitation.

On August 2nd, during my absence, my secretary received a letter (dated and postmarked July 29th) from Robert P. Parker, Executive Director of Professors for Humphrey, written on Citizens for Humphrey stationery. He wrote: "A full page advertisement sponsored by Professors for Humphrey will appear on or shortly after August 2nd in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle. We plan to include your name in the ad among the list of approximately 1,000 founding members of the committee unless we should hear from you by return collect wire indicating your wish to the contrary." Knowing I would not return in time and that I had already expressed my unwillingness to sign a public statement in support of Humphrey, my secretary telephoned Mr. Parker immediately to say that my name should not be used. He replied that Julius Cahn, Deputy Chairman of Citizens for Humphrey, had already obtained my personal approval – which is absolutely untrue. Mr. Parker proceeded to include my name in the ad.

As a citizen and as a scientist, I am dismayed that many of my friends and colleagues may have been led to believe that I support Humphrey's presidential aspirations.

As Chairman of the Board of the Council for a Livable World, I have always maintained, as a matter of principle, a public neutrality with respect to presidential races. The Council is a Washington-based political organization which, among its other functions, has for many years provided campaign assistance to candidates for the United States Senate and which has never become involved in a presidential contest. Furthermore, up to this time, Council supporters have contributed more than a quarter of a million dollars to the Senatorial campaigns of a number of courageous and forthright men, all of whom have been critical of the Administration's conduct of the war in Vietnam.

To present and potential supporters of the Council, I apologize for being forced to state my position publicly: I am not supporting Hubert Humphrey for the Presidency of the United States.

Sincerely,

William von Eggers Doering

William von Eggers Doering
Cambridge, Massachusetts

WvED:ejr

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 12, 1968

Dear Council Supporters:

On Sunday, August 4, an organization identified as "Professors for Humphrey" placed a full page advertisement in the New York Times stating that "A lot of people who think for a living ... think the next President should be Hubert Humphrey." Among the several hundred signers listed was the name William von Eggers Doering, Yale University.

My purpose in writing you is to assure you that Council Board Chairman Doering's name appeared without his knowledge or his consent. We were aware that many Council supporters would undoubtedly see the advertisement and might infer from the inclusion of Dr. Doering's name that he – and by association, the Council for a Livable World – was endorsing the candidacy of Vice-President Humphrey.

Such is not the case. As the enclosed letter to the Editor of the New York Times makes clear, Dr. Doering's name appeared in the advertisement despite his explicit request that it be withheld. Beyond his personal unwillingness to support Humphrey's candidacy, Dr. Doering felt that it would be wholly inappropriate for him as Chairman of the Council's Board of Directors to take a public position with respect to any Presidential candidate expressly because such an endorsement could be interpreted as an endorsement by the Council as well. Although other Council Directors have publicly supported Presidential candidates as individuals, they have never done so as representatives of the Council, and the Council as an organization has consistently avoided taking a position with respect to Presidential candidates of either party. We will continue to adhere to this policy, while concentrating all our energies on the election of all outstanding candidates to the Senate.

In this connection, Council supporters will be interested in recent developments in three Senate primary races. In Arkansas on July 30, Senator J. William Fulbright won renomination over three democratic opponents, narrowly avoiding a run-off contest. Supporters responded to the Council's appeal of June 28 in unprecedented numbers, contributing

to his campaign as they have to no other. In expressing his gratitude to Council supporters, Senator Fulbright said, "Your support and encouragement were invaluable and I am grateful for your efforts in my behalf."

Two other democratic Senate candidates, both newcomers whose campaigns the Council has been following with great interest, have won important victories in recent weeks. In Colorado's State Democratic Convention on July 13, State Representative Kenneth Monfort won first place on the September 10 primary ballot, defeating former Governor Stephen McNichols by an astonishingly wide margin of 1,074 votes to 774. First place on the ballot will give Monfort an important advantage over McNichols in the primary and a good chance to oppose Senator Peter Dominick in November. In the Missouri Democratic Senate primary on August 6, Lt. Governor Thomas Eagleton defeated encumbent Senator Edward Long and a third candidate, W. True Davis. Eagleton will now oppose Thomas B. Curtis, a conservative Republican Congressman, in November.

Yours sincerely,

Thomas A. Halsted

Thomas A. Halsted
National Director

Enclosures

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

QUESTIONNAIRE, May 15, 1968

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY..... STATE..... ZIP.....

Unless you have an overriding personal preference, the Council asks you to make your contribution according to the following plan:

If your name begins with a letter from A through D, please make your check payable to *"Mathias for Senate Committee."*

If your name begins with a letter from E through Z, please make your check payable to *"Council for a Livable World."*

Many Supporters find it more convenient to be billed for support of the Council on a regular basis. If you would prefer to make your contribution to the Council in this manner, please check the appropriate box below.

☐ I enclose a check for $....., made out to *"Mathias for Senate Committee."*

☐ I enclose a check for $....., made out to *"Council for a Livable World."*

☐ I prefer to be billed for my Council contribution. Please bill me bi-monthly for the amount of $.....

Although there are a number of outstanding candidates for whom the Council is not soliciting support at this time, we are prepared to transmit checks from those Supporters who have a strong preference for contributing to one of their campaigns.

☐ I enclose a check for $....., made out to.....
(name of candidate)

☐ Some of my friends might be interested in supporting the Council or the Mathias campaign. I will speak to them directly. Please send me ..... copies of this mailing.

PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE

Please send a copy of this mailing to the persons whose names I have indicated below. Unless otherwise indicated, you may use my name in writing to them.

1. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

2. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

3. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

4. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

5. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

6. Name _____

   Address _____ Zip _____

mba

Point of no return?

abm

Point of no return?

A CRITIQUE OF THE NIKE-X ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

THE COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Drawings by Art Wood

Extra copies may be obtained either singly or in quantity from the Council for a Livable World, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

The question of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) deployment is not a new one. In 1959 the Army recommended purchase of its Nike-Zeus system, forerunner of Nike-X now to be deployed. President Eisenhower turned down the Army's request on the grounds that it had not been adequately tested. Had Nike-Zeus with its "fatal defects" been deployed as the Army urged—at a cost of $14 billion—*it would, in the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, "have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational. . . ."* [1] *ABM did not become a serious issue again until the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended deployment of Nike-X in 1966. They renewed their pressure in 1967 and, backed by influential members of Congress, secured a reversal of the Administration's anti-ABM position. In a speech delivered at San Francisco on September 18, 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the United States would deploy a thin ABM defense against China. This decision, which has vast strategic, political and social implications for the future of this country, may well turn out to be one of the most fateful ever taken by any Administration.*

The Nike-X System

NIKE-X is a dual system. To provide an "area" defense it employs the 3-stage, long-range SPARTAN missile to intercept incoming enemy ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles) at ranges up to several hundred miles, well beyond the earth's atmosphere. A "point" (localized) defense is made by the high-acceleration SPRINT missile which intercepts in the lower atmosphere at distances from 6 to 25 miles during the last few seconds of the enemy missile's flight. SPRINT's function is to destroy attacking rockets which have successfully evaded SPARTAN. Its last-second intercept permits radars to "discriminate" between a real warhead and the "decoys" (false warheads) which burn up in the dense lower atmosphere.

SPARTAN and SPRINT are armed with nuclear warheads because they will miss incoming ICBM's by distances so great that conventional explosives would be useless.[2] The two missiles are linked to advanced multiphase array radars and high-speed computers for target acquisition, tracking, launching and guidance.

The "Thin" China-Oriented Defense

THE MILITARY packaged Nike-X into three convenient deployments: the "thin" China defense priced at $3.5 billion; a "light" defense protecting 25 cities costing $12.2 billion; and a "heavy" 50-city system at $21.7 billion.[3] The Johnson Administration chose the first. It consists of several hundred SPARTANS and a lesser number of SPRINTS. The SPARTANS provide an "area" defense of the entire country; the SPRINTS defend radars and some Minuteman ICBM bases. The SPARTANS are distributed in several batteries below the Canadian border. PAR radars "acquire" incoming enemy missiles at ranges of 1,500 miles or more and the SPARTAN is launched to intercept high above the atmosphere over Canada hundreds of miles from United States soil. The thin China defense does not provide any SPRINT point defense of American cities.

Function and Effectiveness of the "Thin" Defense

THE PENTAGON has defined the function of the China ABM system as providing "a thin cover over the whole United States including all cities." The official evaluation of the system's effectiveness is that it "could probably preclude damage in the 1970's almost entirely" against what are called "simple attacks." [4] By simple attacks the Pentagon means attacks by a very small number of missiles which do not have "penetration aids"—devices such as decoy warheads and "chaff" (clouds of tinfoil)—which confuse ABM radars.

One of the flaws in this optimistic evaluation of the effectiveness of the thin defense is that it gives the impression to the layman that Nike-X defends against all "simple" missile attacks. Unfortunately Nike-X is effective only against high-

altitude delivery systems. It is possible to launch simple nuclear attacks using a number of "primitive" delivery techniques, some of which employ missiles. Against these systems Nike-X is of either minimal value or worthless. The following are examples of primitive delivery systems which should be within Chinese capabilities by the time the thin defense is operational, or soon thereafter:

Attacks by missiles

a. From submarines or surface vessels armed with short-range cruise-type missiles. (No Nike-X protection)
b. From submarines or surface vessels armed with medium-range ballistic missiles. (Possible minimal Nike-X protection)

Attacks by delivery systems other than missiles

a. Nuclear-weapon-carrying seaplanes launched from submarines or surface vessels.
b. Submarines firing nuclear torpedoes.
c. Pre-delivery systems: For example, vessels with bombs in cargo holds; weapons released in port or at sea and detonated by remote control.
d. Underwater nuclear mines detonated at sea. Prevailing winds carry radioactive rain inland.

China already possesses submarines and at least as early as 1966 tested a medium-range missile. A military expert recently wrote that the Chinese "now have submarines, they have fired short-range missiles and they would find it fairly simple to adapt these, or to build rather crude forms of sea-based missiles." [5] China reportedly does not have a submarine-launched missile capability. However, it is possible that Chinese technicians could develop in the next few years some form of sea-based missile capability.

Existing anti-aircraft and anti-submarine systems will be used against these primitive delivery devices, in some cases with effectiveness and in others without. As a general rule all forms of delivery tend to complicate the task of the defense.

The estimate of the effectiveness of the thin defense against ICBM's seems to

be based on at least two key assumptions, both open to serious question:

(1) The Chinese will not—or will not be able to—target their ICBM forces so as to "exhaust" or overwhelm the SPARTAN defenses by launching them *en masse* at an area defended by one SPARTAN battery.

(2) The Chinese will not be able to equip their ICBM's with simple penetration aids which would increase substantially their ability to inflict damage on the United States.

Assumption 1:

IN A CONFRONTATION between ICBM attacker and ABM defender the latter is at a distinct disadvantage. This is particularly true of the thin system, which requires that a very small ABM force be deployed over a vast area. Once an attack has been launched it is obviously impossible to redistribute the defense to meet the configuration of the attack. China, on the other hand, is completely free to study the ABM defense at its leisure, analyze it for its weak spots, and then program the attack to saturate or overwhelm it. If the thin defense had a density factor of, say, 50, i.e., if it could cope at any point with a maximum of only 50 enemy ICBM's, then by firing 55 missiles at any given point in the defense the attacker could be virtually certain of destroying the target. If the Chinese wanted to take out Washington, D.C., they could. If they wanted to get New York, they could. The same 55 missiles could probably get both Washington and New York. Dr. M. M. May, director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in California, made this point clearly to members of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee: "If you send over more offensive warheads than they have defensive warheads to shoot at you with, it won't be that effective." [6] Secretary McNamara said the same thing in his September 18th speech: ". . . any such [ABM] system can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them."

It does not seem reasonable to assume that Chinese leaders, if they build and

deploy a missile force of 50 ICBM's and then discover that the density factor of the United States defense is exactly 50 also, are going to throw their missiles away as useless. They will obviously build a few more which will enable them to penetrate our defenses, thereby making the thin system ineffective by the time it is deployed or shortly thereafter, unless it were to be expanded into a more complex system. If this were done it would undoubtedly trigger further Chinese efforts to penetrate it. A more serious consequence of expanding the thin defense is that it would force the Soviets to improve their offensive capabilities—something they might not feel obliged to do if the thin defense remained thin.

The official view that the thin defense could prevent damage "almost entirely" is tempered somewhat by a Pentagon statistical table indicating that a Chinese attack of a certain magnitude which could, without ABM, inflict 10 million fatalities, would cause 1 million deaths even if the thin defense were deployed. If a false assumption went into that table it could cause the predictions of the effectiveness of the China defense to be off by a factor of five or more. This table was presented to Congress in January 1967, by Secretary McNamara.

Assumption 2:

THE CHINA DEFENSE is designed to defend against "simple" and unsophisticated attacks, that is, attacks by only a few missiles without penetration aids. The same logic that applies to the determination of China's leaders to build a force large enough to penetrate ABM, also applies to penetration aids. To assume that Chinese scientists will not, indeed have not already, initiated a crash program to develop such devices would be irresponsible. A nation need not possess a sophisticated technology or be affluent in order to produce simple, cheap and probably effective penetration devices. In fact, a "naive" but presumably effective penetration aid can be produced at virtually no cost and without any special technology by breaking up the delivery vehicle in such a way that it explodes into fragments which to a radar resemble warheads. Chinese scientists are probably already beyond this stage.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. J. S. Foster, told the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee that it was possible for a "sophisticated opponent to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands on SPARTAN too high." [7] In that case, Foster explained, it would be necessary to use the SPRINT missile for defense. The thin China system which the Johnson Administration has purchased provides no SPRINTS for protection of cities. If the Chinese develop effective penetration aids they can probably exhaust SPARTAN and hit any cities they wish. If they are sophisticated enough to build ICBM's they should be able to design and produce reasonably efficient penetration devices.

What Can the Thin Defense Do?

THE THIN SYSTEM can probably afford complete protection against the accidental or unauthorized launch of a few missiles—at least missiles not equipped with good penetration devices. It could also provide a degree of protection against small numbers of ICBM's, say 25, the sort of force the Chinese would have in the first 18 to 24 months of their deployment program. In the mid-1970's the Chinese could have 100-150 weapons.[8] Against an attack of that size the thin defense would look very thin indeed.

The discussion earlier on overwhelming SPARTAN was based on the assumption, highly favorable to the defense, that all attacking Chinese missiles would be successfully intercepted if their number in any target area did not exceed the density factor of the thin defense. This assumption is incorrect. However, it has gained general acceptance because it has been stated so often by experts such as Dr. May and Secretary McNamara. Actually, there is a finite chance that any given ICBM will penetrate any ABM defense. Assuming an ABM kill probability —the probability that a single SPARTAN will intercept a single incoming Chinese ICBM—of the order of 80%, the probabilities of a 100% successful defense against five different Chinese attacks are as shown below. Chinese missiles are assumed to have a reliability factor of 80% and to be without penetration aids.

Number of Chinese missiles	Number of SPARTANS	Probability of successful defense
20	50	72. %
25	50	44.
35	50	1.6
50	50	0.008
50	100	18.

These figures give a far more realistic picture of the effectiveness of the thin defense than do the official claims. They demonstrate, for example, that a Chinese attack with 35 ICBM's fired at a SPARTAN battery with a missile force of 50, would have a 98% chance of hitting at least one U.S. city. Even with a force as small as 20 missiles launched at the same SPARTAN battery the Chinese would have one chance in four of destroying a target. 50 Chinese missiles fired against 50 SPARTANS would hopelessly overwhelm the defense and China would have a high probability of hitting a number of cities.

Chinese Strategic Objectives

An Unofficial Rationale for deployment of the China defense is that the Chinese, as soon as they have a small operational ICBM force, will hurl it against the United States in a first strike. Richard Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called China a "mad dog among nations" when demanding "immediate" deployment of a thin defense in an interview given in July 1967.[9] To some Americans China's leaders may appear unduly irrational at this moment and China's internal affairs may well be in exceptional disarray, but to base momentous national decisions, if we are doing that, on an assumption that in the early or mid-1970's China will launch a pathetic handful of ICBM's at the United States in the full knowledge that moments later it will sustain a devas-

tating retaliatory barrage from America's vast nuclear arsenal, destroying cities, populations and industry—this in itself is a somewhat irrational attitude.

A more plausible explanation for China's ICBM program is that it fears a United States first strike and would like to be in a position to deter it, something it cannot do today. China, after all, is totally at the mercy of our nuclear strike forces —SAC bases in Thailand and Guam, tactical nuclear bases in South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, carrier-based bombers in the Tonkin Gulf, the North China Sea, the Straits of Formosa, and a fleet of Polaris submarines along her coasts, not to mention Minuteman ICBM's based in the United States.

If under these conditions China's leaders believe they require a small number of ICBM's to deter us—something analogous to de Gaulle's *force de frappe*—they need not be regarded as wildly irrational. The United States possesses today vis-a-vis China a Perfect First Strike Capability; that is, we are able to devastate China without being touched. This enables us to deter China from any activities in Southeast Asia which might be displeasing to us, and it also shields us from Chinese obstruction of those of our activities in Southeast Asia which might be displeasing to them. China's leaders could not be blamed if they assumed that the United States, in deploying the thin defense to counter China's miniscule retaliatory force, was more concerned to maintain its Perfect First Strike Capability than to protect its urban population. In an interview shortly after his San Francisco speech Secretary McNamara said as much. "There has been lingering doubt in some Asian countries that if China in a few years were able to reach the United States with an ICBM, we would be deterred from taking actions that might risk a Chinese attack." [10] It sounds very much as if Massive Retaliation—that Rasputin of strategic doctrines—was still around.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the decision to deploy the China defense is that it was taken not for overriding military, strategic or national security reasons but because of domestic considerations directly related to a forthcoming Presidential election.

The news in June 1967 that China had tested its second thermonuclear weapon brought from many of America's most powerful political leaders and from the military an instantaneous demand to deploy ABM. As far as can be ascertained not a single high-ranking individual from our political, diplomatic or military ranks suggested that, before deploying, the United States make a serious effort to settle its outstanding differences with China, or that we probe the sincerity of her 1966 offer to negotiate a mutual No First Strike pledge. Nobody has been heard to propose that we re-examine our China policy of isolation and containment, that we refrain from impeding China's trade with our allies, that we cease to oppose her entry into the UN, that we ourselves might even try to resume trading with her. We have provided the world with a paradigm of cursing the darkness: Apparently it did not even occur to us to light a candle.

Part Two

Nike X—Critique and Analysis

EVEN BEFORE Secretary McNamara had arrived in California to make his speech announcing the ABM decision the Congressional lobby was calling for the heavy defense and denouncing the thin program as "too little and too late." For them the thin defense is only a stepping-stone to bigger things. It is necessary, therefore, to examine not only the anti-China defense but the larger anti-Soviet system as well. Opponents have criticized the latter on grounds that it was not effective, that its cost estimates were grossly underestimated, that it would intensify the arms race, that it would destabilize international relations, that it would upset the balance of deterrence, that it would be a roadblock to further arms control and disarmament agreements, and that it could lead to a national deep shelter program of considerable magnitude, which might even change drastically the quality of American life. Since these questions are customarily discussed only in Congressional hearings or military conferences and only rarely come to the public's attention, it may be useful to examine them here and provide answers as given by the expert witnesses called to testify before Congress. Unless otherwise noted the quotations throughout Part Two are taken from the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 90th Congress, First Session, February and March, 1967.

Cost of Nike-X

THE OFFICIAL PRICETAG of the China defense is $3.5 billion; that of the light defense is $12.2 billion, and the heavy system $21.7 billion.[11] That these estimates are unrealistic came out clearly in the hearings:

SEC. VANCE: . . . *I think those are very low estimates and the actual costs would probably be 50-100% of those [i.e., more than those], based upon actual experience with the procurement of entirely new weapons systems in the past.*

The costs . . . if past experience is any guide, may be understated by 50-100% for the systems as a whole—of Posture A and Posture B [the light and the heavy systems].

GEN. WHEELER: *I think in all fairness I should point out that Secretary McNamara feels that these costs would be exceeded by perhaps 50 or even 100%.*

Deputy-Secretary Vance brought out a vital point:

SEC. VANCE: *Because of . . . the very rapid rate at which the technology changes, to maintain an effective system one would essentially have to turn over the whole system, the whole $20 billion system every few years. I do not believe that we would do this. As a consequence, I am afraid we would have a heavy deployment of a system most of which was obsolete, made obsolete by changes in the enemy's offense.*

This means that the 10-year cost of the light 25-city system will be on the order of $50 billion and for the heavy 50-city defense it will perhaps reach $87 billion or more. These figures make no allowance for various Nike-X ancillary programs—air defense, anti-submarine warfare, blast and thermal shelters.[12] One recognized expert has stated that the cost of a blast shelter program for urban populations would be comparable to the cost of a major ABM deployment.[13]

How Effective Is Nike-X?

NIKE X has never had full-dress testing under simulated combat conditions. The partial test ban treaty of 1963 limited Nike-X weapons to underground testing. Nike-X remains today—after the decision to deploy has been taken—largely a paper system. This is true not only because it has not yet been adequately tested but also because many of its radars have not yet reached the prototype stage. The record of failures with new weapons systems far less complex than Nike-X, which either were not or could not be tested prior to combat, suggests that Nike-X might fail disastrously in an actual nuclear exchange.[14]

The effectiveness of a heavy anti-Soviet system was thoroughly discussed during the Disarmament Subcommittee hearings. In the exchanges below the

experts are Gerald Tape, a Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Michael May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory; and Dr. Norris Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

SEN. LAUSCHE: *Do you and your experts conclude that we can develop an effective anti-ballistic missile?*

DR. MAY: *We can develop an anti-ballistic missile system that would be very effective against light attacks and the effectiveness of which will go down as the degree of the severity of the attacks go up. I am sorry I can't give you a more definite answer than that.*

SEN. FULBRIGHT: *In short, you don't know?*

DR. TAPE: *No, this goes back to Dr. May's original statement that you can overwhelm an ABM. Also, he is saying if the opponent wants to overwhelm ours, it can be overwhelmed.*

DR. MAY: *It probably can be overwhelmed.*

Another exchange—

SEN. LAUSCHE: *Can we overwhelm their system?*

DR. MAY: *At present, yes, sir.*

SEN. LAUSCHE: *You are also saying that they could overwhelm our system if we established one in accordance with what you think can be done?*

DR. MAY: *I can't answer when a system is perfect. I don't know when a system is perfect, and I can't answer when a system is completely effective. Nobody knows that.*

Dr. John Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering—

DR. FOSTER: *. . . we would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of their warheads would likely explode in our cities. . . . I do not believe that the deployment of a very heavy ballistic missile system is technically justified.*

DR. BRADBURY: *I don't believe the system is reliable and I think the resulting failures you will get against a mass attack would simply make me ask myself, Why am I doing this? . . . It seems to me the task of protecting cities will not eventually completely protect cities. . . . I don't think there will be much of us left over, although it would probably be better than nothing.*

SEC. VANCE: *I would be willing to expend whatever amount of money was required if we could get a truly effective defense. I do not believe we can. Therefore, I feel it would be simply imprudent to waste the funds in an attempt to do so . . . if it cost $60 billion and would truly protect our population, I would recommend that it be deployed. But I do not believe it can. . . .*

A quotation from Secretary McNamara's September 18 speech—

If we could build and deploy a genuinely impenetrable shield over the United States, we would be willing to spend not $40 billion, but any reasonable multiple of that amount that was necessary. The money in itself is not the problem: The penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem.

Technology Week, 20 March 1967—

. . . the performance of the Nike-X radar, communications and information-processing systems will have to be tested against the effects of full-scale high-altitude nuclear explosions before any confidence can be put in the system as a means of destroying more than one or two incoming warheads. [Emphasis added.]

If the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, a Commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, two Directors of government atomic laboratories, and the Defense Department Director of Research and Engineering qualify as credible witnesses, there can be little doubt but that the effectiveness of the anti-Soviet system has marked limitations.

The key issue, however, is not whether the heavy ABM can defend against today's Soviet ICBM's, but whether it can defend against the new Soviet missiles it could be facing when it is finally deployed about 1973. By then both the Soviet Union and the United States may have replaced present missiles with MIRV—the multiple independent re-entry vehicle. A single rocket armed with a MIRV warhead will be able to deliver several individual thermonuclear bombs, each on a separate target, probably assisted by the latest penetration aids. Secretary McNamara has said "The optimistic statements made by ABM proponents haven't taken such things as MIRV's fully into account. . . . Both our missile defense system and

theirs were designed before MIRV's came along."[15] Nike-X now is in much the same position as the ill-fated Nike-Zeus system was in 1959—obsolete before deployment.

How Many Million Americans Can Nike-X Save?

IF NIKE-X had an unequivocal capability of saving lives there would have been no opposition to deployment. The real question about Nike-X—which is never asked—is *not* how many lives it will save, but whether it is not likely to cause a greater number of fatalities than if it had not been deployed.

General Wheeler, representing the Joint Chiefs, stated the position of the military in these words: "The 30, 40, or 50 million American lives that could be saved by Nike-X, therefore, are meaningful, we believe, in every sense of the word." Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, and Dr. Foster took an entirely different view of the life-saving capability of Nike-X. They presented to the Subcommittee two statistical tables. The first demonstrated that if the United States deployed the light defense system, as many as 80 million lives could be saved in the event of a Soviet first strike *provided the Russians did not respond to our ABM deployment by increasing their offensive missile forces.* The second table gave the American casualties if the Soviets did increase their forces—the total was 120 million dead, *precisely the same number that would have been killed if ABM had not been deployed.*

The Joint Chiefs cling to the opinion that the Soviets would probably not respond to United States deployment by increasing their offensive forces. General Wheeler told the Subcommittee that economic and technical expenditures necessary to counter Nike-X might be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union. They would have to pay a "high price," Wheeler said, to overcome ABM.

The civilian side of the Pentagon took the opposite view—

DR. FOSTER: *It is inconceivable to me that we could deploy such a heavy defense and not have the Soviets take measures which would minimize its effectiveness.*

SEC. VANCE: *We believe that the Soviet Union would be forced to such a deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear forces with the result that . . . the damage to the United States from a Soviet nuclear attack, in the event deterrence failed, would not be reduced in any meaningful sense . . . deployment by the United States of an ABM defense which would degrade the destruction capability of the Soviet's offensive force to an unacceptable level would lead to an expansion of that force. This would leave us no better off than we were before.*

SEC. MCNAMARA: *In all probability all we would accomplish [by deploying the heavy system] would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.*

The so-called heavy ABM shield [would be] a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces. . . . [Sept. 18 speech]

TECHNOLOGY WEEK: *Another effect of the uncertainty of Nike-X effectiveness is that the aggressor has to assume that the system works very well and then attack it with a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to overwhelm it completely. That is, the intensity of a nuclear exchange can be greatly increased by the presence of an ABM system.* [20 March, 1967]

The attractive proposition that Nike-X will save lives is based almost entirely on the questionable premise that the Soviet Union would permit the United States to undertake a major ABM program, thereby reducing substantially the Soviet retaliatory capability, without making any effort to redress the balance. The Joint Chiefs rationalize their opinion with the assumption that the Russians really could not afford to increase their forces. This is much the same view as that which maintains the Chinese will not be able to design penetration aids.

It is particularly surprising to hear from the Joint Chiefs that the Russians would not increase their offensive forces to maintain their threatened deterrent capability inasmuch as it is from precisely their offices in the Pentagon that originate countless news releases warning of the latest Soviet progress in building more missiles, of improvements in penetration aids, of ABM's around Moscow, of the ABM capabilities of the Tallinn defense line. Reports of this type are constantly leaked to journalists covering the Pentagon.[16]

Had the United States been able to negotiate with the Soviet Union an agreement to deploy ABM systems in the context of a "freeze" on offensive forces or, preferably, a reduction of forces-in-being, then ABM deployment would undoubtedly mean millions of lives saved in the event deterrence failed. But with massive increases in offensive ICBM forces equipped with the latest and most sophisticated penetration aids, ABM does not look as if it was going to save many lives; and it is not an impossibility, if offensive forces reach unreasonable levels, as they now threaten to do, that deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses could increase fatalities above the pre-ABM level.

Nike-X and the Nuclear Balance

1. *Effect on the Arms Race*

IN HIS SAN FRANCISCO speech Secretary McNamara left no doubt in his listeners' minds that an anti-Soviet deployment would have an adverse effect on the nuclear balance and on the arms race: A heavy defense, he said, would not only fail to provide adequate protection against a Soviet attack but would instead be "a strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly increase their own offensive forces . . . and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on. . . ." On no other issue is the split between the Joint Chiefs and the civilian side of the Pentagon so sharp. As one of his five reasons for recommending Nike-X, General Wheeler, on behalf of the Chiefs, said that it would "stabilize the nuclear balance."

Deputy Secretary Vance has said that the basis of the United States deterrent is its ability to "destroy the attacker as a viable 20th-century nation." This he defined as the destruction of "one-fifth to one-half of the population and one-half to two-thirds of its industrial capacity. . . ." The official term is "Assured Destruction." Vance added: "We believe the Soviet Union has essentially the same requirements for a deterrent or 'assured destruction' force as the United States." In the September speech McNamara spelled it out: "We can be sure that we are both [United States and Soviet Union] going to maintain a maximum effort to preserve

an assured destruction capability . . . we can be certain [if we deploy a heavy ABM system] that the Soviets will react to offset the advantage we would hope to gain . . . we must measure our own response in such a manner that it does not trigger a senseless spiral upward of nuclear arms."

Since 1963 the arms race has been marked by relative stability. However, when the Soviets deployed an ABM system around Moscow the response in the United States was to deploy a thin system across the entire country and to develop new "generations" of ICBM's with highly sophisticated penetration aids. The Soviet Union is now increasing its offensive forces and there is already considerable political pressure in this country to go beyond the modest thin defense to a much larger deployment against the Soviet Union. When the U.S. MIRV system becomes operational in four to five years, the number of thermonuclear warheads in our offensive missile forces will increase from the present total of 1,710 to 7,500 or more.[17] In view of these ominous developments within such a relatively short time span, the claim of the Joint Chiefs that Nike-X will stabilize the nuclear balance has been shattered as thoroughly as the balance itself.

With ABM deployment the arms race, until now in a single dimension, has become a three-dimensional contest in offensive weapons, defensive systems, plus a feverish technological effort aimed at scoring qualitative breakthroughs. The meaning of this new and highly lethal phase of the arms race is that as each side deploys new ICBM's with ever more sophisticated penetration devices and as the other responds with more ABM's and more ICBM's in its turn, neither can be certain at any moment that it has not lost, if only temporarily, its Assured Destruction capability. In short, it may fear it can no longer deter the other from a first strike. Russia and the United States will view each other with constant mistrust and suspicion; tension will replace detente; an action which under less tense circumstances would appear innocuous might seem extremely threatening, in fact, might even be interpreted as indicating an incipient first strike. Forces-in-being will be at much higher levels than they are now; this could mean that fatalities in the event of a nuclear war would be greater than if ABM had not been deployed. In this

new climate of hostility and insecurity the "gap psychosis" will further increase instability. Both military and civilian leaders will be afraid of a deterrent gap, an ICBM gap, a civil defense gap, an ABM gap, a technological gap, and it is likely that every move they make will overcompensate for a suspected gap in any of these areas.

If the military wished to stabilize the nuclear balance they could have proposed a different ABM deployment. Nike-X, if it were emplaced around missile bases rather than cities, would in all probability have a stabilizing effect on deterrence. The reason is simple: A nation launching a first strike would obviously have to aim it at the enemy's missile bases, not his cities. The retaliatory strike is aimed at cities; its purpose is to make the country which struck first pay an unacceptably heavy price. By deploying ABM to protect its civilian population a country is reducing the Assured Destruction potential of the other side thus making its own first strike more feasible. The larger and more effective a nation's ABM defense the more threatening it would appear and the better the position it would be in for launching a first strike. But by deploying ABM *only* around its missile bases a nation would increase its retaliatory second strike capability, making it much more dangerous for another country to launch a first strike against it.

There is no more convincing proof of the destabilizing effect of ABM than the statement to the Disarmament Subcommittee by General Wheeler that ". . . it's also the view of the Joint Chiefs that regardless of anyone's feelings about the situation in Vietnam, we think it quite clear that we would have had even more hesitation in deploying our forces there, had the strategic balance not been in our favor." That statement cuts close to the bone. The General is saying that in order for the United States to be able to carry out its self-appointed role as policeman for Asia and other parts of the world, in order to fulfill our "commitments" to defend first this country and then that, we need something like a First Strike Capability. Surely that is what the Joint Chiefs mean when they claim that Nike-X will "stabilize the nuclear balance."

Another of the General's five reasons for recommending Nike-X is even more revealing: Nike-X deployment, he told the Senators, would "introduce uncertainties which would inhibit Soviet leaders from concluding that . . . the United States would not preempt under any circumstances." To preempt means to *strike first.*

2. *Effect on Arms Control*

NIKE-X, like its abortive predecessor Nike-Zeus, has not been tested adequately. The radars are not yet ready, and the warheads have only been tested underground because of the partial test ban treaty of 1963.

Perhaps it will be possible to install the thin China defense without great pressure being placed on the Administration to test Nike-X in the atmosphere, but it is inconceivable that the larger deployments will be emplaced without an overwhelming demand for full and complete tests of the entire system. This would very likely lead to breaking the test ban treaty.

Technology Week examined this point:

> *It is therefore very likely that the performance of the Nike-X radar, communications and information-processing systems will have to be tested against the effects of full-scale high-altitude nuclear explosions before any confidence can be put in this system as a means of destroying more than one or two incoming warheads. . . . It is very hard to believe that the United States will commit itself to an expenditure of $40 billion for Nike-X without carrying out full-scale tests to see how cost-effective it is.* [March 20, 1967]

In 1966 a deputy director of the Defense Atomic Support Agency told a Congressional committee he did not believe it was possible to test Nike-X underground, that extrapolations from underground tests were less reliable than from those in the atmosphere and gave rise to "some definite doubts" about Nike-X performance.[18]

For the moment little will be heard about the "necessity" to test Nike-X in the atmosphere, but within 12 to 18 months it is likely that members of the military



and of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy will call for a resumption of atmospheric tests in the interests of "national security."

Nike-X will not only jeopardize past arms control accords; it is certainly not going to create the sort of world climate in which we can look forward with confidence to new agreements. Negotiations on the crucial non-proliferation treaty have already been disrupted by plans to deploy the thin defense. The secretary-general of NATO, Manlio Brosio, announced at a news conference the day after Secretary McNamara's speech that a European ABM defense was "under consideration in the alliance." [19] Future arms control measures, for instance a "freeze" or a reduction of ICBM forces, are not going to be speeded up by Nike-X. In *Foreign Affairs* a military expert recently wrote:

> *At the very least, therefore, the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles would in all probability lead to a hiatus in arms control negotiations, while both sides tried out their new weapons, decided on countermeasures to each other's deployment, and reestablished an effective and acceptable strategic balance. It could mean the loss of any chance for an early agreement on a comprehensive test ban and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. . . ."* [20]

3. *Nike-X and Civil Defense*

NIKE-X deployment means that civil defense will soon become a major national program. In Dr. May's words to Congress—

> *The word [ABM] is often also used to refer to a set of shelters which would have to go with the system to make it a reasonable instrument of defense. . . . [Shelters are] probably the first step [in deployment]. . . .*

General Wheeler told the Disarmament Subcommittee that the present total of shelters for 153 million people will be increased to "around 250 million," doubling the fallout program costs from $.8 billion to $1.6 billion over the next four years. But the fallout shelter is only the beginning. It is to civil defense what the thin ABM deployment is to the heavy anti-Soviet system.

Even before Secretary McNamara announced the decision to proceed with the thin China defense, the same men who had forced its deployment began calling for a heavy defense. The Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Pastore, called the Administration's decision "a step in the right direction" which would lead to "an over-all system against the Soviet Union." [21] Washington's Senator Jackson said it was not solely a Chinese problem, but must include a capability to "blunt" a Soviet strike.[22]

There is nothing subtle about these tactics; they are the sledgehammer type and there is no political deployment that can defend against them. One does not have to be clairvoyant to predict a further Administration capitulation on the heavy defense, *perhaps even before the China system has been installed.* The technique that makes this inevitable was explained by General Wheeler to the Senators:

GEN. WHEELER: *These [ABM] costs could be exceeded by perhaps 50% or even 100% . . . the demands of the people for heavier defenses in other areas, would inevitably increase the costs ultimately to something like $40 billion.*

SEN. GORE: *In other words, if St. Louis is to be defended, then Kansas City must be.*

GEN. WHEELER: *That is right, sir.*

SEN. GORE: *And Memphis.*

GEN. WHEELER: *That is right, sir.*

Aviation Week and Space Technology, the trade journal of the aerospace industry, quoted two knowledgeable observers on this question in its October 23, 1967 issue:

America is either too sophisticated a country—or not sophisticated enough—to stop deployment with a light system. There is no question but that, once we start building, we will have to build a complete system, the best that money can buy. [A "neutral Senate source"]

Once the anti-Chinese system is in place, it's going to grow, inevitably, into an anti-Soviet system no matter who tries to block it. That's the American way, and the political pressures will be too great for anyone to stop it. [Source unidentified]

Eventually we will end up with a "super-heavy" defense of every American



city of over 50,000 population. The men who so successfully "marketed" Nike-X on the grounds that it would save lives and stabilize the nuclear balance, who assured us that the Soviets would not increase the size of their offensive forces, will suddenly warn the public that in view of the enormous increase in Soviet ICBM's, the tense state of world affairs and the instability of deterrence, the nation must move quickly to build blast and thermal shelters to protect its people.

In the opinion of a distinguished physicist, Dr. Freeman Dyson of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, N.J., who has served as consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a massive civil defense program will require extensive participation of the civilian population in quasi-military activities. He sees the United States being turned into what military strategists call a "hard society." The term "hard society" Dyson defines as training and hardening a whole population "in a spirit of unquestioning obedience in order to withstand a nuclear attack, much as a missile silo is hardened by encasing it in a certain thickness of concrete." [23]

Dr. Dyson's fears are far from fantasy. In 1958 the RAND Corporation published a paper entitled "Some Specific Proposals for Achieving Early Non-Military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-Range Programs." It is merely a list of suggestions for research projects in civil defense, but it is well worth reading for the candid and sombre insight it gives into the sort of civil defense programs which may be in store for Americans. Among the suggestions are—

MINES AS PERSONNEL SHELTERS: *$1 million, 2-90 day occupancy.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC STUDIES: *$200,000: A study would be made of the preparation for family separation and of shelter techniques for handling this problem.*

STUDIES OF VERY AUSTERE SHELTERS AND LONG OCCUPATIONS *($1.5 million): A study should be made of the survival of populations in environments similar to overcrowded shelters (concentration camps, Russian and German use of crowded freight cars, troop ships, crowded prisons, crowded lifeboats, submarines, etc.).*



Some useful guiding principles might be found and adapted to the shelter program. Research projects might include: Study of available information that might suggest both reasonable standards and limits of human endurance, the latter to be used to determine overcrowding tolerances and for defining the early capability needed in personnel shelter studies ($200,000). Investigation of the use of sedation and chemical tranquilization for long periods and for possible use in shelters ($800,000).

SOCIAL PROBLEMS *(Excerpt): ". . . Prolonged confinement in shelters will unavoidably produce emotional stress. Various measures (work therapy, sedation, recreation, segregated activity, or discipline areas, etc.) ought to be studied and prepared in order to maintain shelter discipline, to lessen the mental strain and to minimize the incidence of psychological aftereffects."*

FOOD PROBLEMS *(Excerpt): "Survival and emergency rations used by the Armed Forces are costly and are not designed to be used by a population for survival. An army survival ration costing 75 cents per person per day would mean a total ration cost of $150 million per day. Based on a minimum cost diet, a suitable shelter ration might cost no more than 40 cents per person per day, a saving of almost 50% which would certainly make research in this area worthwhile."*

There has been talk on and off of other schemes like "Evacuation Cities" which are a sort of second underground city to which urban populations could be removed in times of acute crisis like the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, the idea being that the first country to put its urban populations underground would be in a better strategic and bargaining position than the one which had not. There are serious implications for such basic liberties as the right to travel freely; some experts fear that civil defense regulations will require identity cards, travel permits, surveillance. The effect on already blighted, ghettoed cities can be imagined.

But Isn't It Better Than Nothing?

THE QUESTION is asked repeatedly—Nike-X may not be very good but isn't it better than nothing? If it saves only ten American lives isn't it still worth $5 billion? But what if Nike-X costs ten lives that would not have been

lost had it not been deployed? That question is not asked. If Nike-X disrupts the nuclear balance disastrously, if it accelerates the arms race, increases world tensions, regiments American society, and is not effective—is it then better than nothing? As stated above, if Nike-X were deployed only around missile bases *in the context of a reduction in offensive forces* with, perhaps, a very small SPARTAN defense to protect against accidental or unauthorized launch of one or two ICBM's, there might be good reason to believe that it was better than nothing. But on the basis of the evidence supplied by experts, it appears more likely than not that Nike-X will turn out to be a disaster for the American people.

It is an attempt to solve essentially non-military problems—protecting people and reducing the danger of war—with a purely military solution. From the military it is reasonable to expect a solution like Nike-X. It is less understandable why politicians should lend it such whole-hearted support; their principal commitment should be to an entirely different set of references.

The American people must be clear on one point: By deploying ABM the United States has turned its back on a more stable and livable world and is heading straight toward what Secretary McNamara on September 18th, 1967, so aptly called an "horizon of horror." The holocaust the whole world fears is now that much closer.

During the Disarmament Subcommittee hearings an exchange took place between Deputy Secretary Vance and some Senators. They had been discussing the possibility that China could destroy 20 American ports by having cargo vessels release nuclear bombs in them before leaving for the sea:

SEN. GORE: *This is a frightening world.*
SEC. VANCE: *It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.*
SEN. SPARKMAN: *It becomes more so as we move along.*
SEC. VANCE: *It does indeed.*

ALLEN FORBES, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

References

1. The words "fatal defects" are those of Dr. John S. Foster; Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st Session.
2. Rex Pay, "U.S. ABM Would Imperil Test Ban Treaty," *Technology Week,* March 20, 1967.
3. Until September 18, 1967 the estimate of the cost of a thin defense against China was $3.5 billion. In announcing deployment of the China system Secretary McNamara gave a revised figure of $5 billion. (Costs presented at DSH.)
4. The function of the thin defense is given in a special list of answers to questions posed to Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., by members of the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament. This list was printed in the official transcript of the hearings. The statement on effectiveness was made by Deputy Secretary Vance before the same Subcommittee.
5. J. I. Coffey, "The Antiballistic Missile Debate," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1967.
6. Dr. May's statement is excessively optimistic. It is actually not necessary that the offense outnumber the defense in order to penetrate the thin system. As demonstrated on page 7, a relatively modest Chinese ICBM force can successfully penetrate the thin defense. 55 Chinese ICBM's fired at a defense with a density factor of 50 would score *many* hits. (Dr. May's statement made to DSH.)
7. Foster's remark means that SPARTAN is not very effective against ICBM's carrying penetration aids; it confirms the view that the thin defense is presumed to defend against the simplest possible ICBM forces. (DSH)
8. *New York Times,* 15 September, 1967.
9. *New York Times,* 6 August, 1967.
10. Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Fantasy Come True," *LIFE,* 29 September, 1967.
11. The degree to which these estimates are unrealistic is indicated by the increase in the cost of the thin defense. Between March 1967 and September 1967 it rose from $3.5 billion to $5 billion—a 43% jump. The full deployment cost of the thin defense may accordingly come close to $10 billion.
12. *The New York Times* of September 25, 1967, reported that Secretary McNamara announced a $5 billion additional expenditure for improved air defense, presumably to plug the gaps in the thin system.
13. Freeman J. Dyson, "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* June, 1964.
14. The classic example of a gross miscalculation in the effectiveness of a weapons system is the German air defense in World War II. The kill probability was figured at .25 per round fired; in other words for every four rounds fired they would down one enemy bomber. These calculations were made prior to testing, and were later verified in tests at proving grounds. In actual combat the kill probability turned out to be .0002, one-

one thousandth of the predicted figure. Decision-makers were off not by a factor of five or ten—but by *three orders of magnitude.*

15. Robert S. McNamara, "Defense Fantasy Come True," *LIFE,* 29 September, 1967.
16. Hanson Baldwin, military correspondent of the *New York Times,* is a favorite channel the military use to feed their viewpoint to the public. A Baldwin story in the *Times* for May 21, 1967, cites "one high-ranking officer in the Pentagon who is privy to all intelligence figures and estimates" as saying that the Russians are going to achieve ICBM near-parity by 1970 and will have surpassed the United States in megatonnage and in defensive weapons. An excellent illustration of a different Pentagon technique is a report released in July, 1967 by Mendel Rivers' House Armed Services Committee. The 103-page study was actually prepared by the right-wing American Security Council, a private research organization directed by retired senior military men, among whom are generals Curtis LeMay, Thomas Power, and Bernard Schriever. The report predicted Soviet nuclear superiority over the United States by 1971.
17. *U.S. News and World Report,* 16 October, 1967; also Associated Press dispatch, Bob Horton, 16 September, 1967.
18. Dr. Theodore B. Taylor; Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1966.
19. *New York Times,* 20 September, 1967.
20. Coffey, *op. cit.*
21. *New York Times,* 19 September, 1967.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Dyson, *op. cit.*

(All quotations identified in the text as made before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee were given at the hearings specified in footnote 1 above. The abbreviation DSH in the footnotes means the statements in question were made at these hearings.)

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington 6, D.C., *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202

Pressures are growing to expand the $5 billion "China-oriented" ABM announced in September to a $40 billion or more anti-Soviet system. The Council believes every effort must be made to prevent this and to expose the grave implications in such an expansion. We hope this booklet will be useful in clarifying some of the complex issues involved.

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
Editorials
News Analysis and Interpretation

Livable World Council Formed by Scientist To Curb Nuclear Arms

OCTOBER 1, 1967

Organization Was Founded by the Late Physicist Leo Szilard—Raises Money for Support of Senate Candidates in Sympathy With Its Policies

BY WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Staff Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., Sept. 30.

IN THE ANIMAL KINGDOM of the nuclear world there are not only hawks and doves, but dolphins—those who strive to apply the intelligence and know-how of modern science in the cause of peace.

The late Leo Szilard, eminent Hungarian-born physicist who helped develop the atomic bomb, published a story in 1961 called "The Voice of the Dolphins." It tells of an international effort by scientists to keep the world from blowing itself up.

In the story, American and Russian scientists find a way of tapping the intelligence of dolphins, which are depicted as having an intellectual capacity far surpassing that of man. The dolphins then serve as a kind of oracle in finding solutions to political problems.

SZILARD HAD a consuming interest in peace. In 1962 he founded the Council for a Livable World, a band of distinguished scientists and others. On its communications is a dolphin, symbolic no doubt of the scientist concerned with avoidance of nuclear destruction.

The council has a national headquarters at Washington, D.C., and draws its sustenance from Harvard, Yale, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and elsewhere. Even before Szilard died in 1964, it had become a small but effective political force.

Beginning with the campaigns of 1962, the council has served as a channel through which its supporters — now some 10,000 over the country — can make financial contributions to political candidates the council considers worthy. The effort is concentrated on the United States Senate.

The council has weathered some virulent right wing attacks, particularly in 1964. It has been pilloried as a bunch of East Coast intellectuals trying to run the world, excoriated as part of the "Red China lobby" and accused of advocating unilateral disarmament.

MEANWHILE, it has patiently sought to bring about the election of senatorial candidates who, regardless of party, are in the council's words "convinced of the urgent necessity to control nuclear weapons and to establish international peacekeeping mechanisms."

The council, which is not a tax-exempt group, has also made its presence felt in Washington through striving—

". . . To bring greater insight into problems of national security, to inject new ideas into the appropriate political channels, to encourage discussion of controversial proposals, and to facilitate the involvement of the most knowledgeable and articulate scientists and scholars outside government."

Every year the council sponsors seminars and conferences on such subjects as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Vietnam, the problem of mainland China, the antiballistic missile question and other matters on which it thinks light needs to be shed.

In the past the council has helped further the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and by various means chipped away at obstacles to arms control and disarmament. It had a hand in the drafting and passage last year of Senate Resolution 179 through which the Senate expressed support of efforts to reach an agreement to curb the spread of nuclear weapons.

THE SESSION of Congress that began this year has seen the council active chiefly on the subjects of Vietnam, where it advocates ending the bombing of Vietnam as a prelude to negotiation to end the war, and ABM deployment, which it regards as potentially catastrophic.

In addition, the council in recent days has been prodding the State Department to take steps to insure the safety of South Vietnam's disqualified "peace candidate" for the presidency, Au Truong Thanh. The council has invited Thanh to visit the United States.

The organization has supporters among scientific and professional people and other citizens throughout the United States, but its nerve center is here at Cambridge, the site of Harvard and MIT. Cambridge is a powerful springboard for ideas.

Chairman of the council's 11-member board is William von E. Doering, an eminent organic chemist who has just moved to Harvard from Yale. Now 50 years old, he is noted for many exploits, including the fact that he and another scientist achieved the first total synthesis of quinine in 1944.

DOERING FIRST came into contact with Szilard in the early 1950s when they worked together on the population control problem. He was impressed by Szilard's skill in isolating the essential elements of a problem and parceling them out for solution in a logical, ordered way.

Another eminent Szilard disciple is the Council's president, Bernard T. Feld, 47, who is professor of physics and chairman of MIT's Laboratory for Nuclear Science. He and Szilard worked on the Manhattan Project for development of the atomic bomb in World War II.

The council's treasurer is Matthew S. Meselson, 37, professor of biology at Harvard who won the Eli Lilly award in 1964. Meselson has been active recently in trying to call President Lyndon B. Johnson's attention to the hazards of chemical and biological warfare.

Allan Forbes Jr. of Cambridge, 47, the son of a Boston banker who helped fight isolationism on the eve of World War II, is the vice president. He served in Europe with the Third Armored Division and is a writer and producer-director of documentary films.

IN THE ABSENCE of an executive director, which the council has lacked since Col. Henry Ashton Crosby, a much-decorated World War II Army officer, resigned in January 1966, Forbes has devoted most of his time and energy to the Council. His house serves as a Cambridge

headquarters. He labors incessantly and runs up what must be an enormous telephone bill.

The colonel, a Groton alumnus and first cousin of Forbes, was in the Fourth Armored Division, won four Silver Stars for gallantry and was wounded four times. He left the Pentagon to join forces with the council and served it exceedingly well, his former associates say, for more than two years.

Colonel Crosby, now retired from the Army and living near Washington, told the Post-Dispatch he took the council post with the warm encouragement of Roswell Gilpatric, then deputy Secretary of Defense.

Crosby said he left the council in a divergence of opinion on the Vietnam war. He explained he could not, as a professional soldier, agree with his council colleagues' view that the war was "immoral". An airborne unit that Crosby trained, he said, is fighting in Vietnam and a number of his military associates are there.

IT IS OBVIOUS that a combat record like that of colonel Crosby was helpful to Szilard's organization, if only as a lightning rod to shield it from thunderbolts the right wing is apt to hurl against any group that is working for peace. Crosby still is on good terms with council leaders.

Other board members, most of them recruited by Szilard, include distinguished Americans both inside and outside of the scientific and academic community. Among them are:

Daniel Aaron, director of the American studies program and professor of English at Smith College.

Ruth Adams, sociologist and science writer, co-editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Maurice S. Fox, professor of genetics at MIT, formerly with the Rockefeller Institute.

Dr. Jerome D. Frank, professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins University and past president of the American PsychopathologicalAssociation.

James G. Patton, past president of the liberally inclined National Farmers Union, president of the Freedom from Hunger Foundation.

Charles Pratt, author and theatrical producer, a photographer with the American Field Service in Italy in 1945.

Charles C. Price, Blanchard professor of chemistry, University of Pennsylvania, past president of the American Chemical Society and United World Federalists.

IN GATHERING funds for support of political candidates, the Dolphins have developed some interesting techniques. They have raised more than $800,000 since 1962. They have only three paid employes, all in Washington, and their operations budget is $70,000 to $80,000 a year.

The council itself, as such, does not make the bulk of contributions directly. People on its mailing list—called "supporters" rather than "members"—receive letters periodically in which the council suggests that certain candidates of whom it approves need help.

In their turn, the supporters — about 40 per cent academicians, 40 per cent business and professional people, and the remainder in other categories—mail to the council in Washington checks which are made out to the candidate rather than to the council.

The Washington office, of which Mrs. Marjorie Kent Jacobs is director, forwards the checks to the candidate and that is that. It is money for which the contributors do not expect any personal gain, as the council points out.

Through experience with its mailing list, based on response to previous appeals, the council is able to estimate what the approximate total will be. It can concentrate its effort on a few selected candidates by suggesting that supporters with names starting from A to L, for example, send checks to Senator X, and so on.

LOOKING TOWARD the 1968 election, the council is concentrating support on three Democratic Senators who are up for re-election—Wayne Morse of Oregon, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin. It is reported to have raised more than $100,000.

Leo Szilard

The Dolphins are Smarter

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER ... WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1967 PAGE A24

A Task for Bunker: Prevent Reprisals

By Marquis Childs

United Feature Syndicate

THE REMARKABLE MAN who is American Ambassador in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker, is testing the extent of American influence on the newly elected government of South Vietnam. Of all the tasks he has performed so well in various parts of the world this one, somewhere between diplomat and proconsul, is the most difficult and perilous.

In the aftermath of the elections Bunker put the highest priority on one particular commitment. That was to prevent the new government from taking revenge on the rivals and the runners-up. His dispatches closely followed in the White House and the State Department are said to reflect his concern over how violent reprisals can discredit the experiment in representative government.

The peace candidate, Truong Dinh Dzu, who placed next to the winners, President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, was the first test. Dzu was arrested on a bad check charge several years old and for allegedly sending money to the United States. Denying the bad check charge, he said he had sent money for the education of two of his children in American universities. Dzu, still under house arrest, is rated a shrewd and perhaps not too scrupulous operator and officials here tend, therefore, to downgrade his case.

BUT ANOTHER TEST case cannot be so readily dismissed. Au Truong Thanh, Minister of Economics for a time in the cabinet of Premier Ky, is regarded by Americans who have known him as one of the ablest and most honest of the ruling group in Saigon. His name was stricken from the Sept. 3 ballot on grounds of "pro-communism, neutralism or suspicion of having Vietcong contacts."

After the election he applied for an exit visa to visit the United States. This was in response to an invitation from the Council for a Livable World. The Council, made up largely of scientists and organized in the first instance by the late Dr. Leo Szilard, had become convinced that Thanh is one of the few remaining figures capable of helping to find a peaceful solution of the war in Vietnam.

Shortly after he applied for the exit visa, Brig. Gen. Nguyen Ngoc Loan, head of South Vietnam's force of 90,000 secret police, led a raid on Thanh's house. A riot squad armed with rifles and pistols broke into the house, forcibly drove out reporters who had been alerted by Thanh to the possibility of a raid and took him to a police station. Returned to his house the following day, he continues to believe that his life is in jeopardy, as does the Council for a Livable World.

Council members have used every channel to try to persuade the Thieu-Ky government to grant the exit visa. They insist they do not want to exploit Thanh's views in a publicity campaign but rather to explore with him what he believes may still be avenues to a peaceful settlement of the war. Several Senators, including Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, have asked the State Department to use whatever influence it can to allow Thanh to leave the country.

The Department gives, of course, the formal response that the government of South Vietnam is an independent government and the Thanh visa is an internal matter in which the United States cannot interfere. Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy says that not only did Thanh have previous contacts with the Vietcong but more recently he has been in contact with them.

THE FEAR for Thanh's life is not so much from direct government action as by political assassination all too frequent in Vietnam. While the blame is put on the Vietcong, the suspicion is that the job is done by the secret police.

As no one knows better than Ambassador Bunker the present is a critical testing time for the new government. Reports out of Saigon indicate a growing struggle between Thieu and Ky, the latter said to be unwilling to reconcile himself to a tea-drinking ceremonial role. Loan, with the pervasive power of the secret police behind him, is said to be on Ky's side.

The fact that this is a testing time, with real stability still to be achieved, may be one reason President Johnson has decided to put off his long-rumored conference with America's allies in Asia at least until after the first of the year. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, as his legate, can give Bunker valuable backing in the goal of an orderly government that recognizes even in the midst of a bitter and seemingly endless war certain basic human rights.

The Council for a Livable World may be wholly visionary in its view of Thanh. But the surest way to prove it would be to allow him to expound his views in this country.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

WASHINGTON BULLETIN

NOVEMBER 1967

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Council Supporter:

We enclose for your interest two recent items from the press dealing with the Council and its current activities.

The article by William Wyant in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of October 1, 1967 is a general account of the history, purpose and operations of the Council.

The Marquis Childs column of November 1, 1967 is one of a number of recent newspaper accounts of the attempts of Au Truong Thanh, Professor of Economics at the University of Saigon and a former cabinet minister, to obtain South Vietnamese permission to visit the United States.

Professor Thanh is one of the most knowledgeable and articulate South Vietnamese advocates of a political settlement of the war.

Because of the nearly total lack of informed discussion in the United States of how the war might be ended by a genuine political settlement, the Council has on several occasions invited to its Senatorial seminars and to its Washington discussions persons with first hand knowledge of the possibilities for an alternative to the present slaughter and destruction.

On July 31, 1967 the Council, in association with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, invited Professor Thanh to visit the United States for "discussions on matters of common interest to our respective nations." Subsequently four members of the United States Senate urged Thanh to accept the invitation, telling him that they looked forward to discussions with him.

Professor Thanh has accepted but has not yet been able to obtain permission to leave South Vietnam in spite of continuing efforts on his behalf in Saigon and Washington.

New National Director named. The Board of Directors of the Council has announced the appointment, effective October 23, 1967, of Thomas A. Halsted as National Director. Mr. Halsted, 34, has spent the past six years in government, dividing his time between the Department of State, where he worked on politico-military problems,

and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where he helped to develop the United States negotiating position on such arms control measures as the Outer Space Treaty, the non-proliferation treaty now under discussion in Geneva, various nuclear test ban formulations, and a range of issues related to strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapon developments. He is a native of Massachusetts, a graduate of George Washington University, and a former Army Captain.

Suggestions for New Supporters. As always, we welcome names of potential new supporters from our present supporters. If you know of anyone whom you think we may not have contacted, and who you believe might be interested in supporting the Council's efforts, please send us names and addresses. A return envelope is enclosed for your use.

Allan Forbes, Jr.
Vice President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Philadelphia, Pa.

November 20, 1967

Dear Council Supporter:

Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania is seeking re-election next year. You may remember that he was one of the five winning candidates the Council endorsed in 1962, the first year of its existence. During his two terms of office, he has become one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the cause of disarmament. While others have increasingly turned their attention away from disarmament as the Vietnam War has escalated over the past several years, Senator Clark has persisted throughout. He has worked tirelessly for the non-proliferation treaty, spearheaded the successful struggle against the NATO multilateral nuclear force which could have given West Germany access to nuclear weapons, and has pressed for a comprehensive test ban treaty. No member of Congress has matched his attack on the thin anti- China ABM system which the Johnson Administration has finally elected to deploy. None has more persistently risen above narrow partisan issues and pushed for the solution of international problems that endanger world peace. The Council is again enthusiastically backing his candidacy and urges you to give him all possible assistance in what is certain to be a tough and acrimonious campaign, the climactic effort in the political career of this extraordinarily courageous man.

It will probably begin in May 1968 with a primary race against Justice Michael A. Musmanno, who has been criss-crossing Pennsylvania on speaking trips all year, never missing an occasion to flay Senator Clark for his stands on Vietnam and related issues. Musmanno has yet to announce his candidacy, but the state press already refers to him as the "candidate of the ABC -- Alliance to Beat Clark."

Few critics of the Administration's Asian policies have been more outspoken than Senator Clark; and as the primary approaches he remains outspoken. Four times this year he has called for a halt to the bombing in North Vietnam. In a major speech on April 2, 1967, he proposed a "standstill truce" and a halt to all offensive action including the bombing of the North. The next day U Thant, in what the United Press called "his most dramatic and demanding bid for peace," asked the United States to

"suspend the war in Vietnam unilaterally." Senator Clark's arguments for such a step, Thant declared, had persuaded him to depart from his "customary reluctance to comment publicly on the position taken by officials of any government."

Musmanno, who strongly opposed the test ban treaty, predictably excoriated Clark's "idiotic proposition" as a "gilt-edged invitation to the enemy to slaughter Americans" and likened him to a father who stands by while his daughter is about to be violated. Repeatedly Musmanno has charged Clark with being prepared to sacrifice "such sacred things as the freedom of the Vietnamese people, the security of the United States, and the valor of our gallant soldiers . . . in order to win an election." In his pre-primary campaign -- all invective and jingoism -- peace demonstrations are "communist-dominated," Supreme Court decisions safeguarding individual liberties are "deplorable," draft-card burners are "yellow-stomached cowards," and Senator Clark is a "feather-stained dove."

A Senate race in an enormous state like Pennsylvania is always an expensive proposition. But with the rapid increases of charges for TV and radio advertising, the campaign costs have far out-run the capabilities of the traditional sources of funds. If Joe Clark wins the primary, his chances will be excellent in the general election. But he must get off to an early start; he must make TV and radio bookings and pay for them ahead of time. He needs all the aid you can give him, and he needs it now.

With the Administration telling its critics to "shut up", the least we can do is to "put up" for our spokesmen on the Washington front. Clark's victory over Musmanno and over the Republican candidate he faces in November could well mean a difference of two votes for every important foreign policy issue to come before the Senate during the next six years. His influence within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is a vocal member with steadily accumulating seniority, is of ever greater significance.

In Joe Clark we have a committed and effective advocate of peace. The costs of his campaign will be high. But the cost of his absence from the Senate in 1969 would be far higher.

Sincerely yours,

Allan Forbes, Jr.
Vice President

Daniel Aaron
Board Member

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD - 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Questionnaire, November 20, 1967

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip Code_____

The Council is aware that heavy demands have been made on Supporters during the last six months, but if such demands are extraordinary, so are the times. Contributions which in an ordinary off-election year would have gone for operating funds have gone instead this year to Senatorial candidates. In order that we may pursue effectively our Washington program which has been greatly expanded in response to the emergencies facing us, we are asking some of you to contribute directly to the Council.

Unless you have an overriding personal preference, the Council asks you to make your contribution according to the following plan:

_____ If your name begins with a letter from A through G, please make your check payable to: The Council for a Livable World.

_____ If your name begins with a letter from H through Z, please make your check payable to: Citizens for Clark.

I enclose a contribution of $_____, my final donation for 1967.

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

STUDY PAPER

MARCH 1965

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036

SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM:

Remarks delivered at the Seminar on Southeast Asia
of the Council for a Livable World
5 March 1965

Prof. George McT. Kahin, Director, Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York*

In a number of ways we have during the past decade come full circle in Viet Nam. There are remarkable similarities in a number of basically important conditions which this time we can ill afford to disregard.

The French under General Navarre made their major military effort in 1953-1954 not on the assumption that they could defeat the Vietminh, but as a necessary step in building a position of greater strength in preparation for the negotiations which they envisaged. Like us, they insisted that greater military power had to be brought to bear before minimally acceptable political goals could be achieved. And just as did the French, we close our eyes to political factors which severely delimit the possibilities which military power can yield. And it is these that I want to focus on in particular.

You are undoubtedly aware of the similarity in the extent of political control exercised by the Vietminh in the South on the eve of the 1954 Geneva Conference and now. But this deserves greater emphasis than it usually gets. Look at the map in General Navarre's book, Agonie de l'Indochine, wherein he describes the areas where in 1953 the Vietminh was in full control or at least ascendant. Compare that with a map showing areas entirely controlled or dominated by the Vietcong today, and the congruence is remarkable. Is not the political base of the Saigon government quite as slender, both geographically and in the degree of loyalty it enjoys in those areas it does control, as that of Bao Dai and his Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem when the Geneva Conference entered its final session?

*(This is part of the material contained in a longer and extensively documented article by Prof. Kahin and Dr. John Lewis, to appear in the June issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.)

It has become abundantly clear how little positive support Diem's government was able to develop even in the early post-Geneva years, before Vietcong activity commenced. Are we to conclude after our years of unsuccessful efforts to build up a viable, popularly supported anti-Communist government in the South that once northern infiltrators are withdrawn this is a goal that we can now attain? Actually do we not have considerably less of a political base in the South with which to work today than we had in the years immediately following Geneva? For the regime which we sought to build up there, beginning a decade ago, was in fact left pretty much alone for the first few years of its existence--a great deal better protected not only against Vietminh violence but even against any effective political competition from local pro-Vietminh residents for the allegiance of the population. For a period of three to four years after the Geneva Conference, the area south of the 17th parallel wherein we hoped to see the Saigon government establish an effective base of popular support was insulated by Hanoi's willingness to abide by the Geneva Agreements. Why? Because of the Vietminh's manifest conviction that, in accordance with the Agreements, nation-wide elections would be held with the object of uniting the country under a single government.

And here the question at issue is not affected by the fact that neither the U.S. nor Bao Dai's representative signed that treaty. The point is that initially the Vietminh was convinced the elections would be held and that, presumably because it did not wish to prejudice its chances in them by alienating southerners, it eschewed violent tactics for some three years, and indeed did not until 1958 begin the increasingly more militant tactics which eventuated in full-scale guerilla warfare. Thus, when we first undertook to nourish a regime which we hoped might compete effectively for the loyalties of the Vietnamese people, it had a substantial period of grace to carry out the sort of policies which might have won it popular support. Yet even with this reprieve, as was the case in subsequent years in areas not yet effectively penetrated by the Vietminh, the government which we supported was unable to develop in any significant degree the loyalty of most of the population.

If under those conditions Saigon was unable to win support, why should we assume that it could do so today under the conditions which now exist? Are we again to be so unrealistic as to base our military policies on a wishful thinking which says that the shifting coalition in Saigon can command enough popular loyalty to give the U.S. a sufficient fulcrum for effective and sustained political leverage?

How firm and reliable an ally of the United States is the government of South Vietnam? How solid and how predictable a political base does it provide us? What is the maximum amount of deterioration in the South Vietnamese administration consistent with maintaining an American presence there?

If we do want to achieve a settlement by negotiations, is the Saigon regime likely to hold together long enough to carry them through? What are the possibilities of a sufficient political shift in Saigon to bring to the fore a government which requests that the U.S. leave and which then undertakes its own bilateral negotiations with Hanoi? To what extent is the Saigon government able to speak for the people of South Vietnam? Does it in fact have greater political attraction in the South than Hanoi and/or the South Vietnam Liberation Front? If a negotiated settlement provided for a sealing off of the frontier and evacuation of North Vietnamese infiltrators, is it to be expected that the process of political erosion in the South could be stemmed, and could Saigon then be expected to exert effective control over significantly more of the country than it does today? If the United States really does want a negotiated settlement, what would our position be if Hanoi, in return for a cease-fire and the recalling of infiltrators, stated that as a condition the United States and Saigon agree to abide by the provision of the 1954 Geneva Accords calling for national elections--particularly if it expressed a willingness to do so in accordance with the United States unilateral declaration at Geneva wherein we held that such elections should be held under U.N. auspices?

In assessing the prospects for and possible course of any negotiations, should we not recall that it was in large measure because Hanoi confidently expected national elections in 1956 that at Geneva it yielded to pressure from Moscow and Peking and made such extensive concessions? (For the Vietminh expected that until the elections were held France would maintain responsibility for carrying out the Geneva Accords and see to it that South Vietnam--which they saw as a mere agent of France--would hold the elections to which France was pledged. It was obviously a much surprised Vietminh that came to realize during 1955-1956 that France was bent upon disengaging from the political responsibilities she had accepted under the Geneva Accords, thereby permitting the introduction of an increasing American presence. In 1954 Hanoi was able to induce its numerous supporters in the South to accept Vietnam's partition and abandon extensive Vietminh conquests south of the 17th parallel because this was regarded as temporary and to last only until elections.) But are we warranted in assuming that once again, after additional years of bitter fighting, pro-Communist elements in the South can be expected to give up what they have won through long and difficult struggle? If over the last five years the ideology of uncompromising resistence and the real expectation of victory has been so assiduously nurtured among the southern-rooted Vietcong, is it sensible to assume that Hanoi can abruptly call off their opposition? Is Hanoi capable of enforcing such compliance?

What is the extent of Hanoi's ability to respond politically to American military pressure? What are the limits of its ability to shape conditions in the South in a way consistent with our minimum demands? Have we sufficient basis to assume that Hanoi will respond with a measured and proportionate political reaction to the continuation of our bombings? Are we safe in concluding that they will react rationally and predictably in accordance with our own presuppositions and our own pattern of logic? Does not such bombardment often simply lead to a greater determination to resist? Is there any reason to assume that the Vietnamese are likely to react very differently to the application of force than would Americans?

If Hanoi does agree to a cease fire and the evacuation of several thousands of military infiltrators from the North, must we not face up to the fact that any solution enforceable in the South by Hanoi must provide for some sort of grouping of regional authority and administration there whereby substantial areas will remain under National Liberation Front control? If Hanoi is unable to bring sufficient power to bear on insurgent Southerners to secure their compliance with minimum American demands, what effective policy can the U.S. follow?

Are we indeed correct in assuming that the Administration's principal objective is to achieve a political settlement in Vietnam making possible a dignified American withdrawal and representing the maximum concessions which Hanoi is able to make? Or is our main objective something else? In any case, if we do not agree to negotiation very soon will we not pass the point of no return in our policy of military confrontation? How much more bombing is Hanoi likely to accept before concluding that what remains to be protected in the North is no longer sufficient to outweigh the advantages accruing from striking southward with the full weight of the Vietnamese army? Is Hanoi any less desirous than we to negotiate from a position of strength? Is it possible that for some of those responsible for shaping our policy the new hard line in Vietnam has as its ultimate objective not the increasing political tractability of Hanoi but rather development of a situation calculated either to demonstrate that China is a paper tiger or alternatively to make more acceptable to the American public an all-out confrontation with China?

There is, after all, a not insignificant minority of Americans who have long urged that war with China is inevitable and must be waged soon before she grows stronger. With this in mind, have we not reason to wonder whether some of those who now urge continuing air strikes against North Vietnam regard them not as a means for strenthening our bargaining position with Hanoi prior to negotiations but rather in the expectation that war against North Vietnam will oblige China either to intervene in this war directly or at least to take measures which would make it easier to win sufficient support among Americans for a United States military confrontation with China? And finally, is our increasingly deep military commitment in Vietnam--whether or not it leads to war with China--consistent with our global objectives and priorities?

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 22, 1965

Memorandum to Individuals Interested in the
Council for a Livable World

From: Dr. Bernard T. Feld, President

Many of you have enquired about the Council's position on Vietnam and what we are doing about it. Although, as you know, the Council does not engage in large-scale operations outside of Washington, we propose, from time to time, to pass on to you materials relevant to our Washington activities on this problem. With this, the first such communication, we enclose two very thoughtful recent statements by Senators Church and McGovern, as well as a short paper prepared for the Council by Prof. George McT. Kahin of Cornell University.

We have felt for some time that there is occurring an unfortunate polarization, even among men of unimpeachable good will, between advocates of immediate U.S. military withdrawal from South Vietnam and advocates of extending the war into North Vietnam, even though both are seeking an end to the drawn-out and inconclusive civil war and the achievement of a politically stable peace and both are concerned with the promotion of a Vietnamese regime or regimes physically capable of maintaining the age-old tradition of independence from foreign domination, be it Chinese or Western. Furthermore, we have been concerned with the absence of a clear formulation of the long-term American aims and goals in that part of the world. And we have not understood the basis for the contention that negotiation by the manifestly strongest nation in the world would be regarded as a sign of weakness and undermine our influence in other parts of Asia and the world.

To aid in the exploration of such problems, the Council organized a seminar on Southeast Asia on March 5. The seminar was attended by ten distinguished academic specialists on various aspects of Asia, by a number of individuals from the executive branch of the government, by many senatorial legislative aides and a few Senators, and by a number of the most important members of the Washington newspaper corps. The purpose of the seminar was to consider the Vietnam problem in its appropriate historical and political context, and to explore the broad middle-ground of alternatives to the extremes cited above for extricating the United States from the Vietnamese dilemma.

Naturally, there was no unanimity of opinion as to the best "solution." There was, however, general agreement that the war must not be escalated; that military victory in this case is not only an illusory concept...it is impossible; that every means must be sought to neutralize the area. A number of proposals for neutralization were discussed: encouragement of a "Titoist" government for a re-united Vietnam; guarantees by the U.S. and its allies, or alternatively by the U.N., of the existing boundaries, not only of Vietnam but of other countries in the area; a U.N. supervised cease-fire with guarantees of a U.N. supervised election at some specified future date to determine the government of a re-unified Vietnam. It was recognized that the end of hostilities must include effective

guarantees for safeguarding the approximately one million Catholic refugees from North Vietnam and others who have resisted the Vietcong; but it was widely held that such requirements, no matter how legitimate, should not be set forth (by either side) as preconditions for an immediate cease-fire and initiation of negotiations. Increased U.S. aid and international projects, such as the ongoing Mekong River Delta development project, were considered as offering a long-range hope for supporting the area's neutrality and promoting its tranquility. Even though there is no alternative to our eventual reconciliation with a prominent Chinese role in this area, it was broadly, but not universally, agreed that the effects of eventual neutralization of Vietnam, even under a (nationally oriented) Communist dominated government, need not be followed by Chinese domination of the rest of Asia (the so-called "domino" theory) provided the non-Communist Asian powers, with the aid of the West, could demonstrate the economic and political viability of democratic institutions.

Finally, the discussions clearly brought out the danger that the attempted military solution of the Vietnam problem would have a number of significant undesirable side effects: it is tending to force North Vietnam into a greater dependence on China. It is providing a powerful counter-force to the strong centrifugal forces which have been producing the Sino-Soviet accommodations aimed at a detente in Europe and the adoption of further arms control measures.

Specific papers on various aspects of the Southeast Asia problem are being prepared by participants in the seminar and other experts, and will be circulated by the Council. We are enclosing the first of these, a paper presented at the seminar by Prof.George McT. Kahin, Director of Cornell University's Southeast Asia Program, in which the important issues and questions are raised.

The Council has received some inquiries regarding Senator McGee's position on Vietnam. We regard Senator McGee (who, incidentally, attended our March 5 seminar) as one of the group of Senators of liberal outlook and firm convictions regarding the importance of avoiding nuclear war; we are sure he is following the dictates of his conscience in advocating a course of action which he believes is most likely to avoid a future full-scale war. While many of us may disagree with him on this issue, the Council has confidence in him as a conscientious and thoughtful Senator who has undoubtedly been worthy of our support. It should be remembered that the Council also supported Senator Morse, who represents the diametrically opposite point of view on this issue. We also supported Senators Church and McGovern, so that the Council feels that it has, in fact, been associated with precisely those Senators who have been willing to speak out and advance the public understanding on this vital issue. We are sure that Senator McGee and the others would be very much interested in hearing directly from our supporters concerning their views on such issues.

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Senate

OUR OVERINVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA AND ASIA—A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EX-COLONIAL REGIONS OF THE WORLD

PART I: FROM ONE EXTREME TO ANOTHER

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, "we can never again stand aside prideful in isolation," so spoke Lyndon B. Johnson at his inauguration.

All Americans should agree with the President. Head-in-the-sand isolationism died a generation ago. It isn't likely to be resurrected. The ranks of those who believe that the United States can ever again withdraw from world affairs have been rightly decimated.

As a confirmed internationalist, I favor strong American support for the United Nations. I believe in a sensible foreign aid program to help lift depressed living standards in the underdeveloped world. In the Senate, I have voted consistently to extend the use of our surplus food in hungry lands, and to enlarge the Peace Corps as living work-a-day evidence of American good will.

But the pendulum of our foreign policy can swing from one extreme to the other. Once we thought that anything which happened abroad was none of our business; now we evidently think that everything which happens abroad has become our business. In the span of 30 years, an excess of isolationism has been transformed into an excess of interventionism.

Since the days of the Marshall plan, the United States has constantly expanded the scope of its commitment to foreign governments. From Western Europe, we have moved into Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, until the dimension of our involvement has become global. Our troops are now stationed in no less than 30 countries, we are pledged to defend 42, and we are extending aid, in one form or another, to nearly 100 nations. As a result of this proliferation, Walter Lippmann writes:

> We have become grossly overextended in regions where we have no primary vital interest. We have scattered our assistance to such a degree that we help everybody a little and nobody enough.

Why have we spread ourselves so thin? What compulsion draws us, ever deeper, into the internal affairs of so many countries in Africa and Asia, having so remote a connection with the vital interests of the United States?

The answer, I think, stems from our intensely ideological view of the cold war. We have come to treat "communism," regardless of what form it may take in any given country, as the enemy. We fancy ourselves as guardian of the "free" world, though most of it is not free, and never has been. We seek to immunize this world against further Communist infection through massive injections of American aid, and, wherever necessary, through direct American intervention. Such a vast undertaking has at least two defects: First, it exceeds our national capability; second, among the newly emerging nations, where the specter of Western imperialism is dreaded more than communism, such a policy can be self-defeating. As a seasoned, friendly foreign diplomat recently put it:

> The United States is getting involved in situations where no one—not even a nation of saints—would be welcome.

This is not to say that we should write off Africa or Asia. It is to say that a foreign policy of intervention, which was right for Western Europe, is apt to be wrong for those continents which have just thrown off European rule.

To begin with, the stakes in Europe were different. Had so rich an industrial prize as Western Europe ever fallen into Russian hands, the actual balance of power in the world would have shifted from us to the Soviet Union. We were obliged to regard the dividing line in Europe as though it were an American frontier, to commit our nuclear arsenal to its defense, and to station an army of American troops in West Germany as "tripwire" evidence of our determination to defend that country as though it were our own.

No nation goes this far unless its very survival hangs in the balance.

Even so, our intervention in Europe would not have succeeded without a strong mutual purpose. We were welcomed back to war-devastated Europe in 1945 to be a nuclear sentinel against further Russian aggression. It was the expansion of hostile Russian power which summoned us, not the color of the Red banner, or our distaste for the way of life inside the Soviet Union. There was no confusion among the NATO allies as to the identity of the enemy. As long as the Russian threat remained imminent, we all faced in the same direction, united by a single will.

There was still another reason for the success of our intervention in Europe—a condition so obvious that it is often overlooked, and yet so fundamental that its absence in Africa and Asia accounts for most of our setbacks on these continents. In Europe, we stood among people with whom we shared a common ancestry, whose political and economic systems were similar to our own, and whose traditional values derived from the same mainstream of historical experience that we call Western civilization. This cultural bond meant that most Europeans generally shared our aims and our point of view.

But if the inhabitants of Western Europe tend to see the world as we do, as a global arena in which "free" people are arrayed against Communists, it does not follow that Africans and Asians share this view. They have been participants in a different revolution, more potent and widespread than the Communist brand—a revolution foreshadowed two centuries ago, by the American War for Independence, and whipped into flame by Woodrow Wilson's ringing reaffirmation of the right of self-determination. Neither Marx nor Lenin fathered the revolt against colonialism, and we need not permit their successors, in Moscow or Peiping, to exploit the colonial issue to Communist advantage.

To avoid this, we must understand that, for most Africans and Asians, our concept of self-government and individual freedom is totally unreal, having never been experienced. In many, if not most, of these emergent lands, it is capitalism, not communism, which is the ugly word. The very term evokes images of the old colonial plantation and white man supremacy. Furthermore, any attempt to acquaint Africa and Asia with the miracles of modern capitalism, as witnessed in such places as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, is relatively meaningless. The under-developed world lacks the private capital with which to industrialize. Government is often the only source available to underwrite development programs. Thus, popular repugnance to capitalism combines with economic necessity to cause most of the new governments in Africa and Asia to proclaim themselves Socialist states.

Because these facts are so well known, it puzzles me that American foreign policy in Africa and Asia has not been tied to them. We have plunged into these former colonial regions as though we had been designated on high to act as trustee in bankruptcy for the broken empires.

First of all, we strained relations by trying to induce governments to line up with us in the cold war, a struggle in which few felt any real interest. Forgetting that we ourselves had insisted upon our right to stay neutral for most of our history, we assailed "neutralism" as a kind of Communist trick. Later, having painfully learned that cold war neutrality always served as a badge of, and sometimes even as an umbrella for, independence, we changed tune, but, even then, we kept on administering our aid programs in ways designed to freeze out the Russians and Chinese.

In regions craving aid from any source, our freeze-out policy was bound to give rise to cries of undue interference. Soon, African and Asian governments were demanding aid "without strings attached," while accusing the United States of practicing "neo-colonialism." Worse still, sensing that we feared competition from Communist sources, many a government craftily raised the "ante" on us, threatening to go to the Reds for help if we failed to meet some new demand.

Neither AID nor the State Department will acknowledge submitting to this sort of diplomatic blackmail in the handling of our foreign aid program. But I have no doubt about it. Too often I have questioned an American Ambassador about a misfit project in some forlorn little country, only to be told: "If we hadn't done it, the Russians would have been asked." Knuckling under to such crude pressures has caused our prestige to go down, even as our costs have gone up.

Worst of all, we have permitted ourselves to be drawn into the internal political affairs of so many African and Asian countries that anti-American feeling is rising at an alarming rate. Our embassies are being subjected to increasingly frequent attacks, our information libraries are being sacked, and demagogs from Cairo to Djakarta court popular favor by rebuking us. Afro-Asian delegates at the U.N. castigate us with words of extraordinary violence. Clearly, the policy of intervening too much in the volatile ex-colonial regions of Africa and Asia, is backfiring on the United States.

PART II: MISTAKES IN AFRICA

Much of this could have been avoided. I visited Africa in 1960, immediately after John F. Kennedy's election, in company with two of my colleagues and the President's youngest brother, Ted. Wherever our presence became known,

eager crowds would gather to shout, "Kennedy, Kennedy." The word had spread through Africa that the newly-elected President of the United States had, as a Senator in 1957, spoken up for Algeria in her war for independence against France. For the first time, our country was being identified, by Arab and Black alike, with legitimate African aspirations. Opportunity was beckoning our way.

If we had continued to champion African nationalism, the cause that counts with the people; if we had declared ourselves strongly in favor of rightful independence for the Portuguese Territories, the flaming issue in Africa today; if we had held ourselves at arms length from the shifting factional fights for power within the seething young African countries, regardless of the labels chosen to solicit outside support, I have no doubt that our influence in Africa would have kept on growing.

But we have not yet managed to harness our zeal. Rational restraints give way to emotional involvement, which, in turn, leads to more intervention. Fortunately, the Russians have made the same mistake in Africa, and now the Chinese seem eager to repeat it. Here are two examples, one Russian, one American, which constitute, in my judgment, showcase illustrations of how not to conduct a winning foreign policy in Africa:

Six years ago, Nikita Khrushchev scurried to the rescue of Sekou Touré, strong man of Guinea, after this little west African country had been stripped bare by the departing French. It seemed a perfect marriage, since the Guinean leaders, raised in the radical tradition of the French labor movement, were Marxists anyway, and anxious to establish a model Marxist state.

When I arrived in Conakry, the country's capital, in December of 1960, Guinea had taken on all the appearances of a satellite. The government had been persuaded to abandon the franc in order to impede further trade with the West, and the entire economy seemed welded into the Red bloc. Communist advisors sat beside every Government minister. Numerous Red-donated projects were under construction, including a big printing plant, and the place swarmed with communist technicians, transplanted from countries behind the Iron Curtain. Guinea had plainly been taken over.

Into this captured country, President Kennedy sent a young Ambassador, Bill Atwood. His instructions were to play it cool. He was not to lecture the Guinean dictator on the virtues of democracy, or belabor his commissars with the glories of free enterprise. He was to say it was their business, not ours, to choose the system they preferred; that we were interested only in helping them, in a modest way, with some of their problems of human suffering. Kennedy felt, if we did not press too hard, that Guinea would soon discover the Russians were not 9 feet tall.

And so it happened. It wasn't long before Guinea began to resent the heavy-handed interference of the Russians. Relations became so strained that the Soviet Ambassador was declared persona non grata, and ordered to leave the country. Meanwhile, Guinea began to reassume control over her own course. Today, her attitude toward the United States is much improved, and her ties with the West are growing again.

The mistake of too much intervention, which the Russians made in Guinea, we seem determined to duplicate in the Congo. Africans wonder why the United States, having no historic, economic, or security interests in the Congo, should so involve itself in that country's civil war. I also wonder why.

I know, of course, that the State Department regards the Congo rebels as a Communist front, though their source of supply—Algerian and Egyptian—would seem African enough. Our own envoy in Stanleyville, whose long agony with the rebels was climaxed when they forced him to eat an American flag, declared, after his rescue, that he believed the rebellion to be purely African, not Communist, in character. His statement met a response of stony silence from the American press.

For the fact is that our embrace with Moise Tshombe is popular in the United States. We see him as a vociferous anti-Communist. What matters, however, is how the Africans see him. And African animosity toward Tshombe is so intense that he is even barred from associating with other African leaders, having been physically excluded from their meetings. To them, he is the African equivalent of an "Uncle Tom," a puppet of the imperialists who uses white mercenaries to subdue his own countrymen. I doubt that Tshombe will ever win African acceptance. Our involvement with him serves only to turn the tide of African opinion increasingly against us.

PART III. THE LESSON OF PAKISTAN

Regrettably, we are creating similar problems for ourselves in Asia by the same excess of interventionism. Pakistan is a classic example. At fantastic cost, we undertook to enlarge and modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. Our theory was that this assistance would bolster the country's defenses against Russia, but it was India, contesting with Pakistan over Kashmir, which felt threatened.

Still, we persisted. After all, was not Ayub Khan, that strapping, Sandhurst-educated army man, a ruddy good chap? He had appeared before a joint session of the Congress, and addressed us in the reassuring accents of a British country squire. On the Communist issue, the Indians seemed much too conciliatory, but we felt sure Ayub Khan could be depended upon, come what may. He himself said so. To the Congress, he intoned:

> Let me tell you, that if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of Pakistan.

That is past history now. Having used us for his purpose, Ayub Khan was the first to flirt with Red China, when India was attacked. The fervent courtship of Pakistan only lost us favor there. In the recent elections, the main issue between the two presidential candidates was who was the most anti-American; Ayub Khan won.

PART IV: OUR DILEMMA IN VIETNAM

To the case against excessive American intervention in Africa and Asia, the State Department has a stock answer: The Communists will not let us quit. South Vietnam is pointed to as the proof of our dilemma. If we permit the Vietcong to overthrow the Saigon Government, then the gates are open, so the argument goes, to successful Communist subversion of all the other governments in southeast Asia.

But the hard fact is that there are limits to what we can do in helping any Government surmount a Communist uprising. If the people themselves will not support the Government in power, we cannot save it. We can give arms, money, food, and supplies, but the outcome will depend, in the final analysis, upon the character of the Government helped, and the extent to which the people are willing to rally behind it.

The Saigon Government is losing its war, not for lack of equipment, but for lack of internal cohesion. The Vietcong grow stronger, not because they are better supplied than Saigon, but because they are united in their will to fight. This spirit cannot be imported; it must come from within. It is nothing that we Americans can supply from our side of the Pacific. The weakness in South Vietnam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the spoiling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese themselves can furnish the solution.

As to the other governments in southeast Asia, they are not so many dominoes in a row. They differ, one from another, in popular support, and in capacity to resist Communist subversion. The Malayans, with British help, because of their own determined resistance to communism, successfully put down a long and bloody insurrection. Guerrilla wars—even when nourished from without—can be won by sitting governments, but only in countries where shelter for the enemy is not furnished by the people themselves.

Our reason for being in the Orient is not that of fashioning Asian governments. It is not communism, as such, which accounts for our presence in the Far East, but rather the containment of Peiping. This can be best accomplished if China is ringed with stable, independent governments, which refuse to be the pawns of Chinese ambition. As Yugoslavia has proved in Europe vis-a-vis Russia, even a Communist government can play such a role.

Due to the degree of our involvement in the internal affairs of southeast Asia, an area where China has been feared and resisted for centuries, the Peiping government is now able to pose as champion of Asia for the Asians, defying the United States in the name of opposing the revival of Western imperialism.

Chou En-lai had reason to rub his hands with glee when he said recently to a foreign visitor:

> Once we worried about southeast Asia. We don't anymore. The Americans are rapidly solving our problems for us.

It would be to our national advantage, then, to seek an international agreement for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French Indochina. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a cease-fire in South Vietnam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both sides, and to maintain order, while an independent and unalined new government is formed by the Vietnamese themselves.

The neutrality of the whole region could be guaranteed by the signatories to the international agreement. Thus, the military might of the United States would remain available as a deterrent against Chinese aggression from the north, which is—or ought to be—our governing national objective in southeast Asia anyway.

In like manner, we may find it in our national interest to pledge our armed might behind the defense of India, Thailand, or some other Asian government, against any future Chinese attack, that these governments might avoid the need for developing nuclear shields of their own, while we avoid the dangers of further proliferation of nuclear arsenals. This kind of guarantee, which would be a real deterrent to Chinese military aggression, lies within our capability, and would preclude a power vacuum in Asia, so feared by the architects of our present policy. If this kind of defense commitment is sufficient to prevent an overt Chinese attack upon, say, India or Thailand, it ought to suffice for the rest of southeast Asia as well.

To those who protest that such a policy will fail to protect against growing Chinese influence over such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Burma, or Vietnam, brought on through intensified Communist subversion from within these countries, I submit that the scoreboard on our present policy of direct intervention in southeast Asia shows that we are now losing this contest. Burma and Cambodia, though both non-Communist Governments, have been moving steadily closer to China. Laos is in limbo, after an American involvement, at heavy cost, in that country's internal affairs, turned sour. The war in Vietnam, despite Saigon's preponderant military advantage, is going from bad to worse.

This somber truth is underlined in the events of the past fortnight—the stepped-up Vietcong attacks upon American bases in South Vietnam, and the consequent loss of more American lives. We must hope that our retaliatory bombings of military installations in North Vietnam, intended to demonstrate the strength of our will and purpose, may persuade Hanoi and Peiping that the United States is not, and never has been, a paper tiger. Having made a solemn commitment to Saigon, we intend to keep it. The military might we can bring to bear upon North Vietnam is formidable indeed, and so it would behoove the Communists to explore with us the way

to a peaceful solution in southeast Asia.

As the beat of the war drums intensifies, and passions rise on both sides, I recognize that negotiation becomes more difficult. Already cries of "appeasement" are being directed at anyone who speaks up for a negotiated settlement of this escalating war. So soon the country seems to have forgotten the wise words of John F. Kennedy, that we should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

All of us recognize the heavy burden of decision which our President bears. And we would do well to remember that the seal of his office is an American eagle, clutching a bundle of arrows in one claw and an olive branch in the other. The judicious use of both the arrows and the olive branch represents our best hope for avoiding a widening war in Asia.

Those who would use the arrows alone are actually calling for war. The systematic and sustained bombing of North Vietnam, unattended by any proffered recourse to the bargaining table, can only lead us into war. North Vietnam, lacking air and sea power, must answer on the ground. Her response, in the form of added military pressures against the south, Saigon can hardly be expected to withstand. As a consequence, the next step will be to send American land forces into battle, thus converting the struggle into an American war on the Asian mainland. That China will, sooner or later, enter such a war, I have no doubt.

Let those who urge this course upon us answer for its consequences. A spreading war on the Asian mainland, pitting American troops against Asian troops, is a war we cannot finish. In the end, after a tragic trail of casualties out of all proportion to our real national interest, we will have to negotiate a settlement with the Communists, even as such a truce was finally negotiated in Korea. The question really is not whether we should negotiate, but when.

To those who say that we must not parley now, because we would bargain from a position of weakness, I reply that they take too restricted a view of our strategic position in southeast Asia. They look only to the plight of the war in South Vietnam, forgetting that American power in southeast Asia rests not upon the weakness of Saigon, but upon the strength of our own possession of the sea and air. Our recent retaliatory blows should make it clear to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not quit under fire, nor withdraw, nor submit to Communist coercion. We can strike back with relative impunity, from floating bases which are beyond Communist reach, and inflict heavy punishment upon them. Ours is not a position of weakness from which to deal.

So I would hope that the President of the United States will undertake to use, not only his arrows, but his olive branch as well. Willingness to parley is not a sign of weakness, but the symbol of strength, nor should it destroy what remains of the fighting morale of the South Vietnamese. Negotiations preceded the end of the fighting in Korea by nearly 2 years. In South Vietnam, the active bargaining for a peaceful solution could even lift morale by offering some hope to the people that there might come an end to their ordeal. Moreover, an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement would not be incompatible with the keeping of our pledge to give military aid and advice to the Saigon Government.

PART V: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Although it is natural for our attention to be fixed upon the gathering crisis in Vietnam, I nonetheless commenced this address with the purpose of undertaking a general review of American foreign policy throughout the whole of the ex-colonial world. My thesis has been that we have allowed ourselves to become overinvolved in both Africa and Asia. In saying this, I fully recognize that the United States cannot withdraw to seek refuge within some happy hunting ground of our own choosing.

But it is mandatory, in these former colonial areas, that we establish foreign policy goals which are not beyond our reach; that we observe priorities which correspond with our real national interests; that we concern ourselves less with other peoples' ideologies, and that we adopt techniques which are sensitive to, and compatible with, the prevailing sentiment of the people in each great region of the world. Measured by these criteria, we are too deeply involved in the internal affairs of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia.

I believe that President Johnson intends, in a prudent and responsible way, to redress the balance. His emphasis on attending to the neglected problems at home in sensible. The longrun influences we exert abroad will hinge, in large measure, upon the kind of society we build in our own land.

In any reappraisal of American foreign policy in the underdeveloped world, so recently freed from colonial bondage, we would do well to recall the wise words of President Kennedy, spoken in November of 1961:

> We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, that we cannot always impose our will on the other 94 percent of mankind, that we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity, and that therefore, there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

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THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I want to take a hardheaded, realistic look at the situation in South Vietnam. It is somewhat puzzling to me that the terms "hard line" and "soft line" seem to be reversed when we get over to the other side of the world. Those who discount the present and offer only hopes for the future are considered "hard" whereas those who look at the actual situation and point to the present map of Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam are accused of following a "soft line."

So far as I am concerned, it is both hard—in the sense of being difficult—and hardheaded—in the sense of being realistic—to admit honestly to ourselves what the facts are in Vietnam.

We are not winning in South Vietnam. We are backing a Government there that is incapable either of winning a military struggle or governing its people. We are fighting a determined army of guerrillas that seems to enjoy the cooperation of the countryside and that grows stronger in the face of foreign intervention, whether it be from the Japanese, some 20 years ago, the French, in the 1940's and 1950's, or from the United States.

In this circumstance, expanding the American military involvement is an act of folly designed in the end to create simply a larger, more inglorious debacle.

For nearly a quarter of a century, southeast Asia has been torn by military and political conflict. First was the Japanese invasion of World War II. Then came nearly a decade of struggle with the French, culminating in the collapse of the French Army at Dienbienphu in 1954.

The French lost the cream of their army—a force which reached 400,000 men—in an unsuccessful effort to reestablish French control over Indochina. U.S. aid to the tune of $2 billion financed 80 percent of the French war effort.

Then came the gradually deepening American involvement in southeast Asia in the 10 years after 1954 following defeat of the French.

American expenditures in Vietnam in addition to $2 billion in aid to the French, now approach $4 billion and, according to Defense Department figures, 248, and perhaps a total of over 300 Americans have died since 1964 trying to counsel and assist the Vietnamese forces.

It should be recognized, in the interest of truth, that, unlike the Japanese, who came to conquer southeast Asia, and the French, who set out to reestablish colonial control, we seek neither conquest nor colonies.

Yet we are further away from victory over the guerrilla forces in Vietnam today than we were a decade ago. The recent confrontation of the Vietcong Communist guerrillas and the South Vietnamese Army at Bhin Gia was a painful, dramatic demonstration that the struggle is going badly for our side. Government prestige was hurt seriously in that battle. Communist stock has gone up. Concerned Americans are asking, "What has gone wrong?" and it seems a fair question.

In my judgment, the first answer is that South Vietnam is not basically a military problem but a political one. Neither the Diem regime nor its successors has won the political loyalty and active support of the people of South Vietnam, especially those who live outside town and city limits.

There are rarely military answers to political dilemmas of this nature. Just as the multilateral force plan in Europe—a military gimmick designed to create closer political unity in nuclear policy—has not achieved its objective—in the last few days the Turks have announced their withdrawal from participation in any such scheme—so military proposals in South Vietnam, whether for special forces, strategic hamlets, insurgency programs, or more suitably designed airplanes are not likely to overcome the political weaknesses of the existing South Vietnamese Government. Even the sophisticated weapons of the nuclear age cannot overrule the basic precepts of successful government.

This is a political problem, and it is a South Vietnamese problem. The United States can accomplish much through foreign aid and military support, but we cannot create strong, effective and popular national leadership where that leadership either does not exist or does not exert itself. That is not only expensive and impractical, it is just plain impossible.

For 9 years the United States helped the Diem government, to the tune of $3 billion.

I will not chronicle in detail the years of Diem's rule, the achievement of some measure of economic stability, but the increasing political disaffection. That disaffection was encouraged, of course, by North Vietnam but basically Diem's own arbitrary rule made possible Vietcong gains. The very fact that Vietcong strength was and still is greatest in the Mekong Delta and around Saigon—more than a thousand miles away from North Vietnam—indicates that there is basic popular support for the guerrillas among the South Vietnamese peasants.

It is not isolationism, either of the old variety or the new, to recognize that U.S. advisers, however able, are simply no substitute for a competent and popular indigenous government. It is not idealism either; it is simply realism.

Only the Vietnamese themselves can provide the leaders and the sustained support to defeat the Vietcong. The United States can at most only hold a finger in the dike until the South Vietnamese find themselves.

Therefore, even at this 11th hour, when there is mounting pressure to increase U.S. troops in South Vietnam and step up aid policies, we must be hardheaded realists.

Americans in Asia are basically aliens, of a different race, religion and culture. Moreover, the Vietnamese are nationalistic and race-conscious in their outlook. As one on-the-scene observer pointed out, out, "If you imagine a Chinese sheriff speaking Cantonese and trying to keep order in Tombstone, Ariz., in its heyday, you will begin to get the problem."

More Americans, over and above the 25,000 now in South Vietnam, would not mean more success because victory in the Vietnam countryside depends on accurate intelligence information, peasant support and quick action by Vietnamese troops. These factors cannot be controlled by Americans. They must depend on the South Vietnamese. We must recognize that fact.

I recently spent a long and interesting evening with an astute observer of the Vietnam struggle who argued that victory is possible with a proper military formula. American military advisers in South Vietnam, he said, are highly able men who know how to win a guerrilla war. They have tried without success to persuade the South Vietnamese army to engage in night patrols against the Vietcong. They have urged small, fast moving units to attack the enemy directly with small arms rather than relying so heavily on artillery, airpower and large, cumbersome forces. But, said my friend, the South Vietnamese leaders and military forces will not accept this formula for victory.

Granted that my friend's analysis may be correct, this is still basically a political problem. If we are unable to persuade the Vietnamese to take either the military or nonmilitary steps necessary to insure the defeat of the Vietcong, we are indeed confronted by a dilemma that will not respond to larger imports of arms and advisers.

The more Americans are brought in to do what should be the responsibility of the Vietnamese Government, the greater one can predict, will be the tendency of the Government to rely on U.S. advisers rather than on able Vietnamese, the greater will be the prestige of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese for holding at bay not merely their own countrymen but also the gathered might of the United States and, finally, the greater will be the grassroots reaction against Americans. In theory, our Government has recognized that the South Vietnamese bear primary responsibility for the war and civilian policies. In practice, Americans have assumed roles of increasing influence and leadership with slight military gains but disturbing deterioration on the local political level.

Personally, I am very much opposed to the policy, now gaining support in Washington, of extending the war to the North. I am disturbed by the recent reports of American air strikes in Laos and North Vietnam.

Attacks on North Vietnam will not seriously weaken guerrilla fighters a thousand miles away, fighters who depend for 80 percent of their weapons on captured U.S. equipment and for food on a sympathetic local peasantry. The principal foe is not the limited industrial capacity of North Vietnam, nor the North Vietnamese who have remained at home, and have not become involved in the conflict in the south, nor even their training camps and trails. The target is the 30,000 individual guerrilla fighters from North and South who have no trouble, apparently, finding sanctuary within South Vietnam or the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia. Bombing North Vietnam is not calculated to reduce their determination, but undoubtedly it would antagonize many other Asians and could easily lead to increased Red Chinese involvement in the whole Indochinese peninsula.

We might easily be confronted by the large and well-trained forces of North Vietnam, and perhaps the legions of Red China that took such a heavy toll of lives in the Korean conflict.

The present strength of the North Vietnamese army, an army that is thus far not involved in the conflict in the south, is twice that of the Japanese forces which overran all of southeast Asia during World War II. These are tough, disciplined fighters—tough divisions which defeated the large veteran French army at Dien Bien Phu over 10 years ago.

So, Mr. President, it seems to me that the most practical way, if we are to take further action in Vietnam, is to put pressure on North Vietnam quietly through infiltration and subversion by South

Vietnamese units. The aim of any such infiltration should not be military victory. but bringing Ho Chi Minh to the negotiating table.

The most viable and practical policy for the United States in Vietnam is negotiation and a political settlement. Until such time as negotiation is possible and settlement can be devised which will not surrender South Vietnam to communism, the United States would doubtless not find it feasible or desirable to withdraw. If necessary, we can maintain our military position in Vietnam indefinitely, since it is essentially a policy of holding the cities while taking whatever attrition is possible of the guerrillas in the countryside. But the aim of that policy must be seen as a prelude to diplomatic settlement and not an occasion for war against North Vietnam, or even worse, against Red China, with all the dangers that holds for our own security and for the peace of the world.

There are many ways to approach such a diplomatic settlement. Last August, during the Bay of Tonkin crisis, I suggested that we might take up French President de Gaulle's proposal for a 14-nation conference, including the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, Malaya, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Canada, Poland, India, and North and South Vietnam. More recently, the noted columnist, Walter Lippmann, raised the possibility of a Congress of Asia, dealing not only with Vietnam, but also with other problems relating to the stability and progress of Asia. The groundwork for any such gathering would have to be carefully laid, of course. Therefore, for the present, it would seem that the first step should probably be informal approaches to the interested nations and preliminary private talks. It is my understanding that it was in some such fashion that the conference of 1954 was created.

What are the objectives or terms on which we might be willing to put an end to fighting in South Vietnam? If military victory is impossible—and I am not talking about the stalemate in which we are presently involved, that we could probably continue for some time to come—but if a clear-cut military victory is impossible, we can only settle on the kind of terms that would be generally acceptable to ourselves to North Vietnam, and to other countries which have an interest in this area. We cannot simply walk out and permit the Vietcong to march into Saigon.

The minimum terms which might be acceptable on both sides would probably include:

First. Closer association or confederation between North and South Vietnam, not under a unitary Communist government from the North, but with local autonomy for the South as well as the North.

Second. Renewed trade and rail links between North and South Vietnam, which admittedly would be most useful to the North where there is a pressing need for the food grown in South Vietnam.

Third. Cooperative planning to benefit North and South Vietnam from the Mekong River development. For the South, it would mean primarily flood control. For the North, now outside of this promising Mekong watershed, it could mean valuable hydroelectric power for the industrial sector of the North.

Fourth. Neutralization of North and South Vietnam, meaning specifically guarantees that foreign troops and military advisers would gradually be eliminated as the situation permits.

Although this is a key point, it would not by any means eliminate all U.S. military forces from Asia nor would it bar AID and other civilian advisers. At the same time it would represent some protection to North Vietnam from the North as well as the South, which should be attractive to them.

Fifth. Establishment of a United Nations presence or unit in southeast Asia with the right to enter every country in the area to guarantee national borders, to offer protection against external aggression, and insofar as possible to insure fair treatment of tribal and other minority groups within the boundaries of a given state.

Would such terms be acceptable to North Vietnam? Why, someone might ask, should Ho Chi Minh settle for even half a loaf if he sees the prospect for ultimate victory or thinks the United States might soon be ready to pull out, if he resists any efforts at all toward a negotiated settlement?

Actually, North Vietnam cannot benefit, any more than South Vietnam, from a prolonged conflict. I would hope that we would be prepared to wage such a conflict rather than to surrender the area to communism. The north has much to fear from any spread of the war, even subversion or infiltration. The North Vietnamese know very well what happened to the people and resources of North Korea during that war. Even though the fighting was not on their territory, neither was the subsequent U.S. assistance which helped rebuild the war torn areas in the south. The economic burden was devastating both in North Korea and in North Vietnam.

Moreover, although Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam is closely allied to Red China in what probably amounts to a marriage of convenience, the Vietnamese have for centuries regarded the Chinese with suspicion and even outright hostility and strong resistance.

Obviously, Peiping's desire to exert control over Indochina runs directly contrary to all Vietnamese ambitions.

Escalation of the war by the United States, on the other hand, would make North Vietnam increasingly dependent on Red China and would strengthen, not Ho Chi Minh's influence, but, rather, would strengthen the influence of Mao Tse-tung in southeast Asia.

In fact, apart from Red China, no nation, North Vietnam included, has anything to gain from a long drawn out and inconclusive, struggle in Vietnam. Only Red China gains from continuing the present confusion and weakness in Vietnam. Only Red China gains, in time and resources, so that it will be better able at some future time to exert its influence in southeast Asia.

France, for example, with considerable property and economic investment in North Vietnam, is eager for peace, putting economic stability ahead of almost any political consideration.

Great Britain, with a conflict looming between Malaysia and Indonesia, has never really endorsed U.S. policies in South Vietnam.

Even the Soviet Union can be expected to give quiet support to policies designed to prevent expansion of fighting and to reduce Peiping's influence in southeast Asia. New links both economic and diplomatic, between Moscow and Hanoi in North Vietnam are now being forged. Moscow's influence could well be thrown, as it was in 1954, at the time the French left Vietnam, toward a negotiated settlement in southeast Asia.

The United States certainly is not anxious for broader commitments on the Asian mainland, but the key element in U.S. thinking is whether such a settlement would pave the way for Communist takeover in South Vietnam or elsewhere.

To that question, I recognize, there can be no simple answer, for the answer would depend on the abilities of the South Vietnamese to form a government with popular support and with the ability to cooperate in some fields with the North Vietnamese without losing their own independence.

To be realistic, any settlement in the foreseeable future will have to replace the present hostility between the North and the South, with greater economic cooperation and more political acceptance.

The policies and directions that Vietnam takes will depend on the character of the leadership from Saigon as well as Hanoi. The United States can help that leadership in a number of ways, but in this nationalistic day and age, the United States cannot offer American leadership or American soldiers as a substitute for popular and effective government from Saigon.

ADDRESS BY SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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Senate

THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, before delivering the prepared text of my remarks on Vietnam, which were completed several days ago, I wish to make a few comments that are prompted by recent developments. For several years, a number of Senators, including the majority leader [Mr. MANSFIELD], the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the most senior Republican Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN], and other Senators have warned against our escalating troop commitment to Vietnam. These Senators, myself and others have predicted that each new escalation of forces on our part would lead to a further escalation on the other side, thus setting the stage for a larger and bloodier war on the Asian mainland. One of the difficulties in this formula is that in this kind of guerrilla war, 10 additional soldiers from our side can be offset by one soldier on the other side, which gives them an enormous advantage in a war of attrition. This is the very course that most of our best generals have warned against for many years.

The predictions and the warnings of our generals and the Senate critics have proved to be largely correct.

The glittering military solutions of the war hawks on the other hand, have proved to be wrong.

Now in their frustration, the hawks are trying to blame the failure of their policy on their critics.

I do not blame General Westmoreland for his speech in New York, because obviously he is doing, whether in Vietnam or in New York, exactly what he is told to do by his Commander in Chief.

From General Westmoreland on down, we have in Vietnam our finest soldiers and marines. They are brave men, and they have fought with valor and distinction, as American fighting men have always fought. This only adds to the heartache of those of us who feel that these brave men are in Vietnam because of the shortsightedness of our political and diplomatic policymakers.

In trying to imply that it is American dissent which is causing the Vietnamese opposition to continue the war, the administration is only confessing the weakness of its own case by trying to silence its critics and confuse the American people.

It is not the impact of the dissent on Hanoi that worries the administration; it is the fact that the dissenters have exposed the contradictions, the falsehood, and the resulting credibility gap which surrounds administration policy.

Hanoi knows very well that America is not going to surrender or withdraw from this war.

Hanoi knows very well that not a single U.S. Senator has advocated either U.S. surrender or U.S. withdrawal.

What we have advocated is that the administration quit widening the war; that the administration quit sending more and more American boys to do the job that ought to be done by Asian boys.

Although we have opposed sending American men to Vietnam, we have not urged withdrawal of those men until a satisfactory settlement has been negotiated.

Frustrated by the failure of the escalation policy to produce anything other than a bloodier war as we warned it would do, the administration is now trying to blame their failure on those who have warned them all along that they were playing with fire.

Knowing full well the political hazards involved in questioning the Administration's wartime policy, I can only warn again today that the new level of escalation marked by our bombing of the North Vietnamese airfields has brought us one step closer to a major war involving the legions of China and backed by the enormous firepower of Soviet Russia.

Thus, I do not intend to remain silent in the face of what I regard as a policy of madness which sooner or later will envelop American youth by the millions in a war without end.

Mr. President, our deepening involvement in Vietnam represents the most tragic diplomatic and moral failure in our national experience.

The mightiest nation in history—a nation with a glorious democratic tradition based on the dignity and brotherhood of man—is, with allegedly good motives, devastating an impoverished little state and ravishing the people whose freedom we would protect. In the process we are sacrificing many of our bravest young men, wasting valuable resources, and threatening the peace of the world. We are being pulled step by step into a jungle quicksand that may claim our sons and the sons of Asia for years to come. This is the path of which the late Douglas MacArthur said:

> Anyone who commits American forces to a land war in Asia ought to have his head examined.

If the war continues on its present course, our dreams of a Great Society and a peaceful world will turn to ashes. Vietnam is degenerating into a defeat for America whether we "win" or "lose" on the battlefield; indeed, the more complete our military conquest, the more tragic our real loss may become.

What will we have really won if we succeed at long last in killing enough Vietnamese to bring us victory on the battlefield?

I have no doubt about the capacity of this greatest and most powerful of all countries eventually to score a military decision of sorts in Vietnam.

Shortly before he was killed with a U.S. Marine unit in Vietnam, the learned Bernard Fall, whose expertise on southeast Asia was, in my opinion, unequaled, had an interview in Saigon with a reporter named Bronson P. Clark. I should like to read one paragraph from that interview:

> "The one overwhelming fact about this situation," Fall told me, "which makes all considerations of ideology or politics pale, is the enormous might of American firepower." Operation Cedar Falls in the Iron Triangle twenty miles northwest of Saigon was fresh in his mind: "It looked like giant steel claws had raked the jungle." He spoke of the ground effect of fourteen consecutive B–52 raids which the triangle had received during the operation. "But remember, when it was all over the Vietcong struck again and from the Iron Triangle. That is the real story of this war. The Americans can destroy but they cannot pacify. They may 'win' the war but it will be the victory of the graveyard."

Our policy in Vietnam has been rationalized by a crude misreading of history and a distortion of our most treasured ideals. There was no American interest, no issue of political freedom, no moral imperative that called for sending our troops and bombers into Vietnam. Freedom is worth fighting for, but it cannot be achieved through an alliance with unpopular forces abroad that deny freedom. Communism is a force hostile to American ideals, but we do not meet its challenge by forcing an American solution on a people still in search of their own national identity. Mao Tse-tung

may have claimed that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," but that has not been the chief source of American power in the world, and it does not answer the basic yearning of the people of Asia. After all the dead are counted—American and Vietnamese—and the countryside is laid waste, what will we then have accomplished? Could it be that having sown the wind, we shall reap the whirlwind?

We fight in Vietnam, not for any enduring objective; rather, we fight because of a highly questionable notion that this is the only honorable course. Implicit in our Vietnam involvement is an assumption that we may be ordained to settle the struggles and determine the ideology of the people of Asia.

We fight, also, perhaps, to save the professional reputation of policy planners who have recommended a series of steps, each one seemingly prudent and restrained, yet each one inexorably setting in motion the next step to a larger war. Our policymakers have inadvertently placed American power in opposition to basic forces, including the currents of revolutionary nationalism and social ferment convulsing much of Asia. Our course has run afoul of the desire of many of the Vietnamese people to escape outside interference, whether French, Japanese, Chinese, or American. We seem to be trying to demonstrate that American power can enable unpopular, incompetent regimes in Saigon to offset a widespread insurrection; that bombing bridges, roads, and oil depots—and now the airfields of North Vietnam—will somehow compensate for the weak government in the south.

For years we have been told that some new show of American strength would bring the other side to the negotiating table. Instead, a Vietnamese civil conflict has been transformed gradually into a cruel international war. Our leaders talk about stopping aggression from the north, but this was a struggle among groups of Vietnamese until we intervened.

We seem bent upon saving the Vietnamese from Ho Chi Minh even if we have to kill them and demolish their country to do it. As the native people survey bombed-out villages, women and children burned by napalm, rice crops destroyed, and cities overrun with our military personnel, they are doubtless saying secretly of the Vietcong guerrillas and of the American forces, "A plague on both your houses."

The responsibility for our present predicament in southeast Asia cannot be placed on any one man or on any single administration or agency of government. Its roots go back more than 20 years to embrace four administrations as well as Congress and the American public.

Senators must bear a portion of the blame for the drift of our policy in Vietnam—for we have been slow to speak clearly or even to ask hard questions about obvious contradictions, poor intelligence, and false prophecies involving the highest officials of our Government. Dissent in Congress and the Nation has been sharp and frequent in recent years, but it has come late in the day.

Many of the Senate's most influential members, including the chairman of powerful committees, have believed for years that the United States made a serious mistake in intervening in Vietnam—first by trying to defeat the Vietnamese independence struggle led by Ho Chi Minh against imperial France, and second, by fostering a divided Vietnam leading to civil conflict after the expulsion of the French. Yet, upon this privately admitted error a strange syllogism has been constructed:

First. The United States erred in entering and enlarging the Vietnamese struggle.

Second. We are, nevertheless, now deeply involved in that struggle.

Third. Therefore, we have no recourse except to see it through at any cost, or force the other side to negotiate on our terms.

It is a strange piece of logic, indeed, which holds that, once committed to er-

ror, we must compound the error by more of the same medicine, to salvage the original mistake. It would seem more reasonable, having accepted the premise of error in our involvement, to avoid further widening of the war while devoting our most imaginative efforts to finding a way to end the killing.

Before we take any further steps toward a larger war—and I notice in the press that our commander is said to be asking for considerably more troops in Vietnam—or before we undertake any new ventures of this kind elsewhere in the world, I would hope that we will re-examine the assumptions which have involved us in what I believe to be a mistaken course.

Perhaps the only positive benefit that may come from an otherwise melancholy venture is for us to see the errors of this one clearly enough to avoid being drawn into another one.

To assist in stimulating such a re-examination, I make the following indictments of our Vietnam policy:

First. Our Vietnam policymakers have distorted history to justify our intervention in a civil conflict supposedly to defend a free nation against external aggression from another nation; actually we are backing a dictatorial group in Saigon against a competing group backed by a dictatorial regime from the north.

Second. Our Vietnam policymakers are unwittingly advancing the cause of communism while seeking to contain it.

I do not see how anyone can controvert that statement in view of the developments of the last few weeks, which seem to indicate a cementing of the once splintered Communist bloc.

Third. While orally calling for negotiations, we are practicing military escalation and diplomatic rigidity in such a fashion as to foreclose negotiations.

Fourth. Our policymakers have frequently misled the American public, the result being a serious loss of credibility for the U.S. Government.

Fifth. We are wasting human and material resources needed for the revitalization of our society.

Sixth. We are jeopardizing essential U.S. foreign policy interests, including a promising improvement in East-West relations.

Seventh. We bypassed the United Nations until the 11th hour and have disregarded the opinion and the sensibilities of the international community.

Eighth. We are weakening America's moral position and beclouding American idealism.

Ninth. We are creating at home a climate of intimidation designed to silence dissent and meaningful discussion of policy.

This is a grave indictment. I will summarize briefly the facts and arguments which substantiate these charges.

First. The historical rationalization of our Vietnam intervention is based on the Munich analogy or "the domino theory." At Munich in 1938 the Western allies failed to stand up to Hitler's demand for a piece of Czechoslovakia. The result of this surrender was a series of aggressions leading to World War II. In Vietnam—so the theory goes—we are faced with another Hitler in the form of Ho Chi Minh, or perhaps Moscow or Peking working through Ho Chi Minh. If only Ho or his backers can be stopped in Vietnam, we will have averted another Munich and saved mankind from world war III.

As one of our soldiers was reported to have said, according to a newspaper in my State:

> We are fighting in Vietnam so we won't have to have foxholes and barbed wire entanglements on the Main Street of Aberdeen, South Dakota.

It is said that if we do not crush Ho, his control of Vietnam will topple such other dominoes as Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma, the Philippines, and perhaps India, Pakistan, Australia, and Japan, and then on to Hawaii and San Francisco. We are left to wonder how a flotilla of Vietnamese or Chinese junks is going to

get by the 7th Fleet en route to San Francisco.

This, I think, is a piece of historical nonsense. There is no analogy between Munich and Vietnam, and countries are not dominoes.

Hitler was a madman commanding the world's mightiest military machine—a machine with the mobility, the offensive power, and the assigned mission of leaping across national frontiers until the world was conquered. At Munich, he directly threatened Czechoslovakia, a highly developed democratic state that was ready to fight for its survival with any indication of Western support.

Ho Chi Minh, doubtless guilty of many sins, has nevertheless devoted most of his public life to winning independence for his country. A confirmed Marxist, he is more significantly an ardent nationalist, bound less by the claims of international communism than by Vietnamese nationalism. He is far less interested in what Peking or Moscow want, than he is in what he wants for his own country.

During World War II he stood with the United States against the Japanese and assisted American flyers shot down over Japanese-held jungle areas. With the end of World War II, he resisted French efforts to regain colonial control of his people. After 8 years of fighting, he defeated the French and emerged a national hero. At the Geneva Conference of 1954, he agreed to end the fighting, withdraw his forces north of a temporary cease-fire line at the 17th parallel, and await an election 2 years hence that doubtless would have led to his election as leader of a united Vietnam. President Eisenhower has written that in 1954 after expelling the French, Ho had the support of at least 80 percent of the Vietnamese people, both north and south.

But the promised elections were blocked by Premier Ngo Dinh Diem whom we were instrumental in installing in South Vietnam. Of equal significance—and this is sometimes lost sight of—Diem cut off all trade and other relationships with North Vietnam and ruthlessly suppressed his internal opposition.

I remember that the late Bernard Fall, whom I referred to a while ago, said that the cutting off of trade between the north and south had as much to do in causing the conflict that eventually developed as anything else.

This was the background for the Vietcong revolt in the south, aided by Ho Chi Minh from the north. Although marked by bloodshed and violence, it is scarcely analogous to Hilter's attempted global conquest in moving against international frontiers with a mighty military machine. The insurrection in Vietnam grew out of local conditions which pitted one group of Vietnamese against another. Even if there had never been such a country as China, the probability is that that revolt would have taken place.

Ho Chi Minh heads one of the smallest and most impoverished states in the world. Neither in capacity nor by inclination can he be seriously seen as a Hitler-type conquerer threatening the security of America and the world.

As for the falling dominoes that are said to be marked for "wars of liberation" elsewhere in Asia and therefore seems to be the rationalization for the enormous commitment we are making there—it is clear that the challenge to them is not a Hitler or a Ho from the outside, but their own domestic political, economic, and social problems. A country that builds a government responsive to the needs of the citizenry—that faces up to the internal problems of misrule, injustice, and human misery need have little fear of falling victim to a "war of liberation." A government that ignores these fundamental concerns of its people as the dictators of South Vietnam have done is headed for trouble and does not deserve to be saved—indeed, it probably cannot be saved—by American soldiers.

The late Winston Churchill, who predicted the subsequent aggression of Hitler if he were not stopped at Munich, just as clearly warned in 1954 against any intervention in Vietnam by Britain or the United States. He saw no analogy between Ho and Hitler and flatly rejected the appeal of Secretary of State Dulles in the spring of 1954 that Britain and the United States should intervene against Ho on the side of the French. It is regrettable that the world did not listen to Churchill before Munich; it is also regrettable that we did not follow his warning against the Vietnam intervention.

One final note of irony in the Munich fallacy is the testimony by our ally in Saigon, General Ky, that his only political hero is Adolf Hitler.

Second. To contain Communist Chinese influence and power in Asia, we have set up a series of unpopular dictators in Saigon. Ignoring Vietnam's deep-seated historic opposition to China, we have assumed that since Ho Chi Minh was a Communist, he must therefore be a tool of Peking or Moscow.

Mr. President, it is an uncontested historical fact that for a thousand years the people of southeast Asia have resisted the Chinese more than any other outside power.

Actually, the most powerful force moving in Vietnam as elsewhere in Asia is nationalism—not international communism. Ho Chi Minh left to his own devices might have united the Vietnamese as an effective buffer against Chinese penetration of southeast Asia. U.S. policy, far from containing Peking or Moscow, is most likely to draw outside Communist power and influence into southeast Asia. It may even reunite the feuding Communist world.

Since I wrote that statement, there has been all kinds of evidence conpiled by our best observers, that that is exactly what is happening. The war is reuniting Peking and Moscow in a common policy with reference to southeast Asia.

The destruction of South Vietnamese villages by American bombers and the growing occupation of city and countryside by American forces raises the unpopular specter of a Western-style occupation again and plays into the hands of Communist propagandists all over Asia. In the north, American bombers are pounding away at the North Vietnamese economic and industrial strength. The resulting chaos or vacuum is hardly calculated to provide a formidable barrier to Chinese penetration.

Third. Our diplomacy before, during and after the Geneva Conference of 1954 has been narrow and self-defeating. For years we made no effort to negotiate or even offer to negotiate an end to the violence. When Ho Chi Minh indicated in 1964 to the Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, that he was ready to talk about a settlement, we rejected this opportunity as we rebuffed other peace feelers before and since. The Johnson administration has insisted it is prepared to embark on "unconditional discussions." Thus, on April 27, 1967, President Johnson said:

> I will talk to any government, anywhere, any time *without any conditions*, and if they doubt our sincerity, let them test us.

When tested, however, as it has been on a number of occasions, the administration has insisted on conditions—and pretty harsh ones at that. Some of the conditions would, in effect, virtually require the prior capitulation of the other side. This was the central fact that emerged from President Johnson's celebrated letter to Ho Chi Minh in February, a letter which far from representing a new and more moderate approach to peacemaking was, in fact, a hardening of our previous position in terms of the conditions we demanded of Hanoi.

Fourth. The American people have been given in the past decade a bewildering array of false assurances, contradictory interpretations, and mistaken predictions about Vietnam. We were assured that our role would be limited to an advisory function—that this was a war which the Vietnamese people must

win or lose. Time after time, top administration officials contended that this was basically a political struggle that could be decided in Saigon's favor only if the government there could draw together enough grassroots support to offset the guerrillas. We were repeatedly assured that American troops and bombers could not solve that problem and in fact would make it worse. For example, speaking on June 12, 1966, just a few days before the first bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, said:

> It would be foolish to expand the war and destroy North Vietnam's economic and military capabilities since this would only double the price of the war because the United States would have to ultimately rebuild what it destroyed.

Yet, only days later, we began doing exactly what General Johnson had said it would be foolish to do. Repeatedly, administration spokesmen have explained in vigorous terms the limits of our policy and our operations in Vietnam only to have those limits abruptly exceeded before the previous words had died away. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk's major pronouncements on the war have been marked by one consistent quality—they have all proved to be wrong.

In the 1964 presidential campaign, millions of Americans rejected Senator Goldwater's prescription for victory in Vietnam through bombing, jungle defoliation, and a major escalation of American forces. President Johnson and his top Cabinet officers built a convincing case against bombing and the escalation of American ground forces. "We seek no wider war" was the winning slogan of 1964.

Yet, the mandate for peace of 1964 has been translated into the Goldwater prescription on the installment plan. Little wonder that the administration is faced with a credibility gap as wide as the Grand Canyon.

If one were to attempt a balance sheet on the costs and benefits of our Vietnam venture, high on the cost side would be the planting of doubt and resentment leading to a loss of faith in Government on the part of many of our people, especially the youth. One of the invaluable sources of national strength is the capacity to enlist the enthusiastic support of the young for essential national interests. To blunt that enthusiasm and vital faith in the reliability and fundamental honesty of our Government is a grievous blow to a democratic society.

Fifth. There are other incalculable costs to America and to the world that stem from Vietnam. We are now pumping Federal funds into the war effort at a rate of over $2 billion monthly. This is a serious drain on our balance of payments, our dollar, and our fiscal health. It represents money urgently needed to rebuild our decaying, explosive, riot-ridden city slums; to strengthen educational, recreational, and employment opportunities in rural America; to clean up our polluted rivers and streams. It would be ironic, indeed, if we devote so heavy a proportion of our resources to the pacification of Vietnam that we are unable to pacify Los Angeles, Chicago, and Harlem.

Sixth. It may be that the greatest cost of our Vietnam involvement is its regrettable impact on other vital foreign policy interests of the United States. The improved relations with the Soviet Union that followed the sobering Cuban missile crisis of 1962 gave promise of a detente between the world's two great nuclear powers. Likewise, the fragmentation of the international Communist bloc opened the way for new U.S. initiatives. The reaction against heavy-handed Chinese interference in Africa, Indonesia, and elsewhere suggested further opportunities for a sensitive, flexible U.S. policy. In eastern Europe, the so-called Soviet satellites have seemed to beckon for better relations with the West. Progress toward nuclear control was promised by the limited test ban treaty of 1963.

All of these hopeful and challenging

foreign policy opportunities have been threatened or thwarted by the fast-deepening, U.S. preoccupation with the the war in Vietnam. Our policy planners, the Congress, and the American people are devoting so much energy and attention to one tiny corner of southeast Asia that we tend to lose sight of the fast-changing global panorama that is unfolding before our eyes.

Seventh. The United States was founded by men who declared our national independence with "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind." Our Nation 170 years later, took the lead in establishing the United Nations to preserve the peace. On several occasions we worked through United Nations channels to meet international crises—the Arab-Israel conflict, the Suez crisis, Korea, the Congo, Cyprus, Kashmir, and Yemen. But in Vietnam, we have plunged in alone with only a belated reference to the United Nations.

The United Nations Charter commits us to seek the settlement of disputes through the international machinery of that organization. Our SEATO treaty commits us only to confer with the other treaty signatories on possible action. Yet, in the name of a vague international commitment we fight on in Vietnam with no backing from the United Nations, no broad SEATO support, and, indeed, little support from any source other than a few small states heavily dependent upon our favor. The only important power publicly backing our Vietnam course is Britain which is dependent upon American support for maintenance of the pound. Even in this instance, Prime Minister Harold Wilson has disassociated his government from our bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi.

Eighth. America's greatest asset in the world has been our democratic tradition, our concept of human dignity, and a humane society devoted to peace. But Vietnam presents a different view of America. Here the world sees America intervening with massive military power—napalm, artillery, and bombing—on a scale heretofore used only against Nazi Germany and Tojo's Japan in the 1940's. American actions in Vietnam, however well intentioned, do not square with the image of America that the world has traditionally admired.

In November of 1965, I visited a civilian casualty hospital in Danang near the site of one of our largest airbases in Vietnam. The poorly equipped wards were jammed with terribly burned, broken and torn men, women and children, innocent victims of our bombs, napalm and artillery. They lay silently—two persons on each cot—their pained eyes following me as I walked from bed to bed. I wondered that day, as I do now, if this great Nation of ours has the right to make so costly a decision on behalf of another people who have already suffered so grievously.

Ninth. Our course in Vietnam does not square with the conscience of the judgment of many thoughtful Americans. But as the tempo of the battle increases and the martial spirit rises, the dissenter will need to draw deeply on his courage. Our official spokesmen have demonstrated a growing resentment toward the doubter and the dissenter. The impression is being created that while freedom of conscience and expression are desirable theoretical principles, they are too dangerous to practice in wartime. Even when the claims of top level officials prove to be groundless or contradictory, the presure is on to accept the next pronouncement without question. To challenge the soundness of our policy judgments is more and more being equated with "letting down the boys in Vietnam" or giving aid to Hanoi. It is almost as though we are fighting so intently to secure freedom in Vietnam that we are willing to sacrifice it in America. It is still a regrettable truism that truth is the first casualty in wartime. Yet, it is in times of national crisis and conflict that America most urgently needs men who will speak out with maximum candor.

For my own part, I reject the assump-

tions that lie behind our involvement, and I regret each new step toward a deeper involvement. Before we take those fateful additional steps that may lead to Armageddon, I recommend now as I have in the past, but with a new urgency and a deeper concern, that we:

Stop the bombing, north and south, end search and destroy offensive sweeps, and confine our military action to holding operations on the ground. Bombing the north has failed to halt or seriously check the flow of troops to the south and may, in fact, have prompted a much greater war effort by Hanoi. Secretary McNamara himself told a Senate committee:

> I don't believe that the bombing . . . has significantly reduced (nor would reduce) the actual flow of men and material to the South.

In the south, our bombs have killed or maimed countless numbers of innocent people and alienated others whose support we covet. A defensive holding action in the south as advocated by Generals Gavin and Ridgway could be pursued while determined efforts are being made to negotiate a ceasefire. It is the bombing of North Vietnam that presents the greatest obstacle to a settlement and greatest danger of involving Russia or China in the war.

We should clearly state our willingness to negotiate directly with the Vietcong with some recognition that they will play a significant role in any provisional government resulting from a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement.

We should use what influence we have to encourage a more broadly based civilian government in Saigon—a government willing to start discussions with the other side looking toward arrangements to end the war.

We should advocate an international presence to police a ceasefire, supervise elections, provide an umbrella for the resettlement of Vietnamese concerned about their safety, and arrange for the withdrawal of all outside forces and the conversion of military bases to peacetime uses.

The path to sanity and peace in southeast Asia will not be easy. The ways to a larger war is enticing and simple. But before we make that choice, let us recalls the words of Virgil:

> Easy is the descent to Hell; night and day the gates stand open; but to reclimb the slope and escape to the outer air, this indeed is a task.

But if we can accomplish that task, we should use the Vietnam experience as a guide to future policy. The enormous destruction of life and property in Vietnam, both American and Vietnamese, will have served no useful purpose unless we learn well the lessons that this tragic conflict can teach us. Those lessons, I believe, include the following:

First, conflicts of this kind have historical dimensions which are essentially political, economic, and psychological; they do not respond readily to military force from the outside. Surely, the military might of the United States can subdue little Vietnam, south and north.

But is this what the struggle is all about? I think not. We are confronted in Vietnam with an indigenous guerrilla force that has enjoyed the sympathy or the complicity of much of the local peassantry. The ineffective and unpopular remiges of Saigon have not earned the confidence of their subjects. Urgent priorities, of which land reform is probably the most important, have been ignored. Thus, the destruction of the military power of the guerrillas and of North Vietnam leaves fundamental political and economic problems still festering to set the stage for future conflict or continued tyranny and injustice.

Second, in the future the United States should avoid committing its power to internal struggles of this kind. The factors involved are so complex and confusing that it is beyond the capacity of an outside nation to know which group deserves support and which opposition. In spite of the administration's strenuous

efforts to picture the situation as a war of aggression from the north, it is essentially a civil conflict among various groups of Vietnamese. The Vietcong control is strongest in the delta country of the south a thousand miles from North Vietnam and that control is exercised by indigenous forces who enjoy the cooperation of the local peasantry.

Such internal disputes should be fought out by the competing groups without outside interference, or be referred to the United Nations. We have no obligation to play policeman for the world and especially in Asia, which is so sensitive to heavy-handed interference by even well-meaning white men.

Third, unpopular, corrupt regimes of the kind we have been allied with in Saigon do not deserve to be saved by the blood of American boys. Local governments that have done a good job usually have the confidence of the local citizens. They ordinarily do not have a guerrilla problem and when they do, their own people are loyal enough to the Government to take care of the guerrillas instead of depending on us to do that for them.

Even if one assumes that we are faced with a battle for power between Ho Chi Minh of the north and Marshal Ky of the south, there is no clear issue here of black and white or tyranny and freedom. Ho is a Communist tyrant, but does Marshal Ky with his admiration for Adolf Hitler represents the kind of ideals and morality that American men should die for?

I have never regretted my service as a bomber pilot in World War II when we stopped the madmen Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo. But I do not believe that Vietnam is that kind of testing ground of freedom and free world security. It is a confusing civil conflict with no real certainty as to the issues at stake. I do not want to see my son or other boys die in that kind of doubtful struggle.

Fourth, those who believe that American military power has an important role to play in the Pacific should return to the once-accepted doctrine of our best generals that we should avoid committing American soldiers to the jungles of Asia. Our power in the Pacific is in naval and air strength as a deterrent against aggression. Local governments must deal with their own guerrilla problems.

Fifth, Congress must never again surrender its power under our constitutional system by permitting an ill-advised, undeclared war of this kind. Our involvement in South Vietnam came about through a series of moves by the executive branch—each one seemingly restrained and yet each one setting the stage for a deeper commitment. The complex of administration moves involving the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon, AID, and various private interests—all of these have played a greater role than has Congress. Congress cannot be very proud of its function in the dreary history of this steadily widening war. That function has been very largely one of acquiescence in little-understood administration efforts. The surveillance, the debate, and the dissent since 1965, while courageous and admirable, came too late in the day to head off the unwise course charted by our policymakers.

For the future, Members of Congress and the administration will do well to heed the admonition of Edmund Burke, a distinguished legislator of an earlier day:

> A conscientious man would be cautious how he dealt in blood.

United States of America

Congressional Record

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THE MESS IN VIETNAM—VII

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, swiftly escalating events in Vietnam pose for the people of the United States the fundamental question of whether a great nation—a nation economically and militarily the most powerful in the history of the world—can admit publicly that its position in South Vietnam has deteriorated to the point of nullifying its original objectives, and that it now seeks to bring peace to the area, through taking the issues to the conference table, as requested by friendly nations and by a growing and very substantial segment of American public opinion.

That is the issue confronting the people of the United States today.

In my opinion, the United States is economically, militarily, and morally strong enough to take such a position.

It is a course of action which I have been advocating for a year, now—a year which has seen our position in South Vietnam steadily deteriorate, while the war is steadily escalating, and is, indeed, becoming the "wider war" which President Johnson has stated we do not seek.

My mail is running more than 100 to 1 in favor of my stand that we should take the issues in Vietnam to the conference table.

Typical of the letters received is one from Dr. Jerome D. Frank, the eminent nationally and internationally known psychiatrist, who states the issue as follows:

> It seems to me that the chief problem today is how to persuade the United States to admit that it has made a mistake, so that we can cut our losses and wage the battle for freedom and human worth more successfully. In individuals the ability to admit an error is a sign of moral courage, maturity and true strength. Surely if a nation in the world were secure and powerful enough to admit error, it is the United States.

I ask unianimous consent that Dr. Frank's letter to me, together with his attached analysis of the situation in Vietnam, be printed in the RECORD in full at the conclusion of my remarks, together with a biographical sketch of Dr. Frank, taken from "Who's Who," which reveals his eminent qualifications.

There being no objection, the letter, the analysis, and the biographical sketch were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE JOHNS HOPKINS HOSPITAL,
Baltimore, Md., March 3, 1965.

Senator ERNEST GRUENING,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR GRUENING: This is to congratulate you on your courageous stand with respect to South Vietnam.

It seems to me that the chief problem today is how to persuade the United States to admit that it has made a mistake, so that we can cut our losses and wage the battle for freedom and human worth more successfully. In individuals the ability to admit an error is a sign of moral courage, maturity and true strength. Surely if any nation in the world were secure and powerful enough to admit error, it is the United States. It is only highly respected persons like yourself who might be able to get this message across.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a statement on Vietnam which you may find of interest.

With kind regards.

Sincerely,

JEROME D. FRANK, M.D.

Senate

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 1965

STATEMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

The war in southeast Asia seems to be degenerating into a battle of wills, centering on our military presence in South Vietnam. The Vietcong are determined to drive us out and we are determined to stay, so that the national prestige of both sides is involved.

Once a conflict assumes this form, two great dangers arise. One is that long-term goals will be lost sight of. The other is that the conflict will escalate to a disaster. In battles of will, the conflict becomes polarized and the issues oversimplified. For example, the State Department white paper no longer recognizes the agonizing complexities of the situation, nor admits any flaws in our policy toward South Vietnam. This despite the facts that, though possessing overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment, the South Vietnamese have steadily lost ground to the Vietcong, that most of the recent recruits to the Vietcong are South Vietnamese, and that the Buddhists want the United States to withdraw its forces. The struggle is presented as simply the effort to repel infiltration by the North Vietnamese. We are told that our withdrawal would lead automatically to Chinese domination of all south Asia, ignoring the deep-seated fear of China by all nations that border on her. It is also claimed that thousands of our South Vietnamese supporters would be massacred, as if there were no way of arranging for their protection after our withdrawal.

Further evidence for polarization of the conflict is that the question of whether or not we can maintain our military forces in South Vietnam has come to overshadow everything else.

We probably have the power to keep our troops in South Vietnam at the cost of inflicting vast destruction and misery on its inhabitants and those of neighboring countries including noncombatants. It would be hard to maintain that such a policy wins friends for us or defends freedom. On the contrary, it strengthens the false image of Americans as ruthless white imperialists—probably the most effective of all propaganda weapons used by the Communist Chinese.

We are increasing the distrust and fear of the white race among all the nonwhite races of the world and thereby making new converts of communism.

The danger of escalation to a disastrous level arises because each side feels impelled to respond to a blow from the other with a counterblow. This leads to a steady increase of emotional tension. That emotion interferes with judgment has been demonstrated by the disastrous mistakes in almost all wars made by military commanders when under great stress. When combatants are emotionally aroused, furthermore, they tend to rely more and more on naked violence. Any conciliatory move by one side is interpreted by both as a sign of weakening of its will and purpose. Those who suggest negotiating instead of fighting are accused of cowardice, and of undermining their side's will to resist. In the past, the risk of progressive escalation under these circumstances was tolerable because the limited destructive power of weaponry prevented too great damage. Today, when escalation could eventually involve the use of civilization-destroying nuclear weapons, the risk becomes intolerable.

The struggle with communism is essentially an ideological one. We are engaged in a worldwide effort to defend and promote a social philosophy of freedom and individual dignity and a political system based on consent. This is a battle for men's minds and hearts. It is most successfully waged by propaganda and by promoting education and economic prosperity under conditions of peace.

The sparing use of limited, carefully focused violence and intimidation may perhaps be necessary occasionally to check our opponents. On a large scale, however, violence negates the very values we are trying to promote.

Ideological wars have almost always ended indecisively after inflicting enormous misery on all involved. Apparently the lesson that one cannot change men's thoughts by violence is never learned. There is every reason to think that the current ideological war, like most previous ones, cannot be conclusively won by either side, but it carries the new danger that it may end with the destruction of all societies involved.

Sometimes it is necessary to admit error. In view of the demonstrated failure of our policy in South Vietnam, a strategic acceptance of a short-term setback, in order the better to promote our long-term objectives, should be seriously considered. This might require an open admission that our policy needs modification. In an individual, the ability to admit error is viewed as a sign of moral courage and of self-confidence, maturity, and strength. If any nation in the world's history is secure and powerful enough to do this, it should be the United States.

Insistence on maintaining an untenable position weakens the chances of achieving our long-term goals and steadily increases the likelihood of a major disaster. If we can find the courage to admit that this round has been a bad one for us, and seek to arrange for a military withdrawal, requiring only that the physical safety of persons loyal to us in South Vietnam be safeguarded, we could put ourselves in a much better position to win the ultimate victory for freedom and human dignity.

JEROME D. FRANK, M.D.

"WHO'S WHO" BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Frank, Jerome David; psychiatrist, educator, born New York City, May 30, 1909; son of Jerome W. and Bess (Rosebaum) fm; A.B. summa cum laude Harvard 1930; A.M. 1932; Ph. D. in psychology 1934; M.D. cum laude 1939; married Elizabeth Kleeman, January 4, 1948; children, Deborah, David, Julia, Emily; instructor psychiatry Johns Hopkins Medical School 1942–46; research associate group psychotherapy research project VA, 1946–49; instructor Washington School Psychiatry 1947–49; clinical associate professor Howard University, 1948–49; faculty Johns Hopkins Medical School 1949–; professor of psychiatry 1959; psychiatrist in charge of psychiatry outpatient department Johns Hopkins Hospital 1951–61; director of clinical service Henry Phipps Psychiatric Clinic 1961–; acting chief, department of psychiatry 1960, 1961, 1962; advisory board of Patuxent Institute, 1954–; member Advisory Commissions National Institute of Mental Health, 1951–55, 1957–58, 1959–61; Advance Committee Psychiatry and Neurology Service, Department of Medicine and Surgery, VA Central Office, 1960–; board of directors Metropolitan Baltimore Association of Mental Health, 1952; national sponsor National Committee SANE Nuclear Policy; member National Advance Council Student Peace Union, fellow Center Advanced Study Behavioral Sciences, Palo Alto, Calif., 1958–59; served to major, U.S. Army, 1943–46; fellow, American Psychiatry Association, American Psychology Association, Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (member council 1962–); American Group Psychotherapy Association; member, American Psychopathological Association (president 1963); Group Advancement Psychiatry, AMA; American Association University Professors; Phi Beta Kappa; Sigma Chi; Alpha Mega Alpha. Author: "Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy," 1961 (with Florence Powdermaker); group, "Psychotherapy: Studies in Methodology of Research and Therapy," 1953; also articles. Home: 603 West University Parkway, Baltimore 10; office: Phipps Clinic, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, Md.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

To: Supporters of the Council for a Livable World

From: B. T. Feld

Re: The Council and Vietnam

In recent weeks, the Council has received many inquiries concerning our position and role in the Vietnam crisis. It should be clear from past communications that we are very deeply concerned and very actively interested in all measures which may bring an honorable end to these unfortunate hostilities. Over the past year, we have, on a number of occasions, brought information and knowledge from the Academic community to bear in Washington on these difficult issues, and we are continuing to do so. For example, we helped to bring to Washington many of the academic discussants on both sides at the recent "teach-in".

Our general position on Vietnam as established by the Board of Directors in July of 1964 and set forth in the current Action Program is as follows:

> "Urge the United States government to avoid escalation of the war in Vietnam, and instead to press for negotiations on a nonaligned North and South Vietnam, either as separate or as reunified states, whose neutrality would be protected by firm international guarantees and peacekeeping forces. In addition, the Unites States should place increased emphasis on economic aid programs in Vietnam, both now and after neutralization."

We do, of course, continue to seek for specific measures which could bring closer a solution in this area. But we must recognize that the Council is not a mass-action organization. Nor do we, as a matter of principle, try to intervene in the voting on specific bills in Congress. The strength of the Council is in our ability to maintain open and effective channels of communication between the community of scholars, the Congress and the Administration. The fact that this becomes more difficult in such times of crises makes it all the more important for us to continue and strengthen our efforts in that direction.

We hope that in our pursuit of important foreign policy goals, in a manner appropriate to the character and talents of the Council, we will continue to merit your support and understanding.

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld
President

June 10, 1970

Dr. Bernard T. Feld
Professor of Physics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Bernie:

At the beginning of the primary campaign for Senator from California, you asked me who is the better candidate, George Brown or John Tunney. I responded by telephone to Tom Halsted that George Brown was the better of the two but that John Tunney was likely to be more successful in winning the primary and certainly more successful in beating Murphy.

I became one of Tunney's unofficial advisors but campaigned for Brown in the primary. Now I'm in a position to be helpful to Tunney in respect to providing him information on issues. More particularly, if he is successful in his election I will be in a good position to contribute to the courage of his convictions in respect to world peace-keeping matters. John Tunney is an intelligent man although his voting record to date has been nearly as reprehensible as that of George Murphy. I believe, however, that he now sees the difficulties that this country has gotten into in Vietnam and that he would be a good person to receive information in respect to both our disengagement from Southeast Asia and our efforts in respect to disarmament. He's so much better than Murphy that he is a good candidate for the Council to urge members to support. Unfortunately, a great amount of money is needed for campaigning in California so that Council influence will be less vital financially. Nevertheless, the Council can be very useful in reference to the transmission of advice to John Tunney before and particularly after the election. I believe that he can be elected.

There has recently been formed a group called University Community, a local organization which I hope to persuade to implement its lobbying interests inter alia through supporting the program of the Council for a Livable World.

Enclosed is a copy of a letter written by students from each of the two colleges at UCSD and me urging support for the CLW. The editors cut off the address and telephone number of the CLW but we will post notices and otherwise pass the information. Because of the typographic omission, it looks as though we were representing CLW which we are not.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

Robert B. Livingston, M.D.

RBL/jkm

cc: Dr. Robert C. Fahey
Dr. Gertrude Weiss
Mr. Mark Siegel
Mr. John Gruner
Dr. Thomas A. Halsted

Enclosure

June 9, 1970

DR. ROBERT C. FAHEY
4226 Physics-Chemistry Building
Department of Chemistry
UCSD

Dear Dr. Fahey:

Enclosed is information on the Council for a Livable World. This group emerged from the brow of Leo Szilard after consultation with students and faculty throughout the country in 1962. It is highly successful as a lobby and as a "sweet voice of reason" to the Congress and the Administration.

I believe the Council would serve well the interests of the group you have initiated on this campus. Members of your (our) group can work together or individually to support political candidates and have effect on legislation and governmental policy through the CLW. Perhaps the effectiveness of an already existing lobby in Washington which is so perfectly akin to our interests can be strengthened by our group, and our group's own purposes be most effectively fulfilled by such a facilitative opportunity. There is nothing to do except to bring this possibility to the attention of the appropriate committees and to pursue action through the CLW if the group approves, and as needed according to events.

With every good wish and thanks for your initiation.

Yours sincerely,

Robert B. Livingston, M.D.

RBL/jkm

cc: Dr. Gertrude Weiss (Szilard)
Dr. Bernard T. Feld, President - Council for a Livable World

The Council for a Livable World was founded in 1962 by the late Leo Szilard, nuclear physicist and molecular biologist. The Council unites American citizens in a sustained effort to reduce the risk of a nuclear war and to bring about arms control, disarmament and world order.

Most of this effort is focused on the Senate of the United States, which has a primary influence on foreign and defense policy. The effectiveness of the Senate depends on the intellectual understanding, the political courage, and the breadth of outlook of its members. As each Senator must be concerned with issues affecting the United States as a nation, so each citizen, regardless of his place of residence, has a profound stake in every Senate race.

Each year the Council asks its Supporters to make campaign contributions to a small number of distinguished Senatorial candidates who are convinced of the urgent necessity to control nuclear weapons and to establish international peace-keeping mechanisms. Candidates are selected without regard to party affiliation, taking into account their chances of success, their need for financial support and the nature of their opposition. The Council tries to recommend participation in close races between candidates of highly disparate qualifications where its support can be decisive. The Council does not place explicit or implicit conditions on the acceptance of campaign contributions, nor do its Supporters expect any personal gain in return for their help. This type of national campaign backing assists members of the Senate to maintain their political independence, integrity and effectiveness.

The Council and its Supporters have participated in each Congressional election campaign since 1962. That year, six of the eight Senatorial candidates backed by the Council won their contests. In 1964 the Council supported nine candidates for the Senate, including two challengers. All nine were victorious. In 1966 seven of ten Council-supported candidates were elected; in 1968, eight of thirteen.

MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AIDED THROUGH THE COUNCIL, 1962-1968

Senator	*State*
1962	
Frank Church	Idaho
Joseph S. Clark	Pennsylvania
J. William Fulbright	Arkansas
Jacob K. Javits	New York
George McGovern	South Dakota
Wayne L. Morse	Oregon
1964	
Albert Gore	Tennessee
Philip A. Hart	Michigan
Eugene McCarthy	Minnesota
Gale W. McGee	Wyoming
Joseph M. Montoya	New Mexico
Frank E. Moss	Utah
Edmund Muskie	Maine
Joseph Tydings	Maryland
Ralph W. Yarborough	Texas
1966	
E. L. Bartlett	Alaska
Edward Brooke	Massachusetts
Clifford Case	New Jersey
Mark Hatfield	Oregon
Lee Metcalf	Montana
Walter Mondale	Minnesota
John Sparkman	Alabama
1968	
Frank Church	Idaho
Alan Cranston	California
Thomas Eagleton	Missouri
J. William Fulbright	Arkansas
Harold E. Hughes	Iowa
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.	Maryland
George McGovern	South Dakota
Gaylord Nelson	Wisconsin

In addition to supporting candidates for national office, the Council conducts an extensive Washington program in which it strives to bring greater insight into problems of national security, to inject new ideas into appropriate political channels, to encourage national discussion of controversial proposals and to facilitate the involvement in vital national issues of the most knowledgable and articulate persons from outside of the government.

The Council conducts a regular series of seminars for Senators and their staffs, to which key members of the executive branch, outstanding non-governmental figures and key journalists are often also invited. Frank and off the record, these discussions have in recent months given first priority to the military and political implications of new strategic nuclear weapons programs, in particular the issue of anti-ballistic missile deployment and the urgency of meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union on curtailing the strategic armaments race. Other seminars have dealt at length with the war in Vietnam and prospects for peaceful settlement, with the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, with chemical and biological warfare and other significant issues of defense and foreign policy. More than forty of these seminars have been held since the Council's formation; more than sixty Senators have attended.

In a number of cases where crucial issues are involved, the Council also has sponsored full-scale conferences. Council seminars and conferences have been effective in extending the scope of Congressional debate, in developing new initiatives within the administration, in encouraging more enlightened discussion in the press, and in fostering further study and action in the academic community.

The Council recently was granted representative status by the United Nations Secretariat as a non-governmental organization accredited to the UN. Under this arrangement the Council hopes to increase unofficial communication between representatives of member delegations and interested members of Congress.

Although the Council is more occupied with policy considerations than with specific legislation, it presented testimony in support of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; it provided substantial assistance to the first significant hearings on the problems of conversion of the economy from military to civilian spending; it helped provide a stimulus to Congressional efforts to encourage the negotiation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in recent months has provided significant assistance to Senators and their staffs in an effort to demonstrate the undesirability of deploying the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

The Council's Supporters are asked to contribute up to 2% of their annual incomes for its programs and as campaign assistance in crucial Senate contests. Admittedly, this is a sizable sum, but it is both commensurate with Council goals and essential to its activities.

Campaign contributions from Supporters are in the form of checks *made payable to the candidate.* They are sent to the Council for tabulation and are then transmitted directly to the candidate.

Students and others who are not in a position to contribute substantial sums may receive Council publications and mailings by making an annual donation of at least $10.

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Founded in 1962 by Leo Szilard

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, *Phone:* 265-3800, ac 202, *Cable:* DELPHINI WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICERS

BERNARD T. FELD *President*
ALLAN FORBES, JR. *Vice-President*

JOHN SILARD *Counsel*

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Baltimore, Md.
MATTHEW MESELSON
Cambridge, Mass.
JAMES G. PATTON
Denver, Colo.
CHARLES PRATT, JR.
New York, N.Y.

October 10, 1966

Dear Sir:

Most thoughtful people understand the necessity for arms control, disarmament, and peace-keeping machinery, but few feel that they can work in any significant way for these goals. The weapons are remote and awful. Peace-keeping forces should be international in character. The treaties must be negotiated and ratified by specialists and statesmen whom few of us meet or know. Where can the private citizen bring his influence to bear?

The Council for a Livable World was founded to enable individuals throughout the United States to pool their resources for practical political action in foreign affairs. One major way in which it does so is to recommend thoughtful, forward-looking Congressional candidates to whom it asks its supporters to contribute campaign funds. The Council is the only organization which analyzes national political contests solely on the basis of the views which candidates have on the role of our country in international affairs. The enclosed Council Program, 1967 explains the aims and methods of the Council. The letter to our supporters, which we also enclose, indicates how you may help the Council in its work.

We hope that you will find the basic assumptions of the Council coincident with your own ideas of what is useful and essential in a world that appears increasingly to call for the participation of all of us if peace is to be assured for ourselves and our children. If you do share these assumptions, we urge you to make your voice felt by contributing to one of the candidates whom the Council recommends.

Sincerely,

Bernard T. Feld

Bernard T. Feld
President

COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD - 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Questionnaire: October 1, 1966

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip Code _____

As a Council supporter, I enclose a political contribution of $_____, my donation for the second half of 1966.

Please send your contribution to the Council's office for transmittal to the candidate.

The Council asks you (unless you have an overriding personal preference) to make your contribution according to the following plan:

_____ Governor Mark Hatfield (check payable to "Mark Hatfield for U. S. Senate Committee" if your name begins with a letter from A-G inclusive)

_____ Senator Lee Metcalf (check payable to "D. C. Montana Committee" if your name begins with a letter from H-R inclusive)

_____ Roy R. Romer (check payable to "Romer for U. S. Senate Committee" if your name begins with a letter from S-Z inclusive)

☐ Some of my friends might be interested in the Council or some of the candidates it is supporting. I will speak with them directly. Please send me _____ copies of this mailing and the 1967 Program of the Council for a Livable World.

☐ Please send a copy of this mailing and the 1967 Program to the potentially interested persons whose names I have indicated on the back of this Questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, you may use my name in writing to them.

Please send this mailing and a copy of the 1967 Program of the Council for a Livable World to the following persons (please include zip codes where possible):

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

NOVEMBER 1966 ELECTIONS

National Office: 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036

September 30, 1966

Dear Council Supporter:

The approaching Congressional elections may well be the most crucial of this century. At a time of widespread and ominous reports of an imminent, massive escalation in Vietnam, November 8 will mark what is probably the last chance that individual citizens will have to get the country off the road to nuclear war.

Because recent primary campaigns have not accomplished their purpose of giving strong political expression to the general distress over the course of the war, it is all the more essential that in November the few men who counsel moderation and restraint be elected. Their defeat would give disastrous encouragement to those who promise a quick end to the war by a rapid expansion of the conflict.

In the past, the Council has consistently sought to work for the election of Senatorial candidates who have shown deep concern for the control of nuclear weapons and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Council has not assumed that its goals would be achieved in one enormous stride, but rather through a time-consuming series of small steps such as the extension of the partial Test Ban Treaty, an agreement to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, mutual reductions in missile deployment, and the revitalization and strengthening of the United Nations.

As their final recommendation to supporters in this election year, the Directors of the Council urge your unqualified support for the following candidates:

Governor Mark O. Hatfield, Republican, Oregon
Senator Lee Metcalf, Democrat, Montana
Roy R. Romer, Democrat, Colorado

These men will work for the long range goals of the Council and, more important, their election to the Senate will add desperately-needed strength to the valiant group of Senators who are urging caution and restraint in the conduct of the war. Accompanying this letter you will find a brief analysis of each of the three contests.

The Council has given direct support to a number of primary candidates out of funds already provided for this purpose by supporters earlier in the year. The Directors are following carefully a number of other Senate and House races and plan to make further contributions of this nature out of these funds.

We urge you to support these campaigns with as large a contribution as you can reasonably make. All these races are close, and their outcomes are in doubt. Your help and that of your friends can make the difference.

Yours sincerely,

William Doering

Allan Forbes, Jr.

William Doering, Chairman
Allen Forbes, Vice President

ANALYSIS OF THE THREE SENATORIAL CONTESTS

(I) Governor Mark O. Hatfield vs. Congressman Robert B. Duncan, Oregon

This Senate contest, between one of the most thoughtful and articulate critics of our Vietnam policy, and an all-out supporter of the Administration, represents the sharpest and most clearcut confrontation on the issue of war and peace in the 1966 Senatorial races.

At the 1966 National Governors' Conference in Los Angeles, Governor Hatfield cast a lone dissenting vote on a resolution endorsing the Administration's conduct of the war. Over the last few years Hatfield has again and again warned that our escalation is moving us toward an Asian land war and that our intensification of the war has not been matched by our attempts to work for a settlement.

We are enclosing Hatfield's "Statement of Concern" on Vietnam which we believe to be a striking declaration.

His opponent, Congressman Duncan, defeated Howard Morgan in the Democratic primary. Duncan has repeatedly advocated escalation of the war. He said of the July bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, "The oil depots were a legitimate military target." "(The bombings) are necessary to bring a total military decision to this far-flung battlefield."

Duncan is an opponent of open discussion of the conduct of the war. He has said, "Our problem is not with the hamlets of South Vietnam. The problem is with the Shakespearean-type "Hamlets" in the United States. This war will not be lost in South Vietnam, but it can be lost on the political battlefields of the United States."

As a nationally known leader of the moderate wing of the Republican Party, Hatfield has lost the financial support of right-wing Republicans and is now in an extremely close race.

(II) Senator Lee Metcalf vs. Governor Timothy Babcock, Montana

Council supporters responded handsomely ten months ago to the original recommendation of support for Senator Metcalf. We are now asking for additional support for Metcalf because we believe his reelection to the Senate is a matter of the greatest urgency.

Senator Metcalf is an influential and highly respected member of the group of men who constitute the basic nucleus of thoughtful, considered, and responsible opinion in the Senate. Within a single term of service, Metcalf has made an impressive record. He is on four committees: Finance, Interior and Insular Affairs, Government Operations, and the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress. He is also on the National Security and International Operations Subcommittee.

Metcalf's defeat would mean the loss of a man who has vital seniority on important committees; it would remove from the Senate a man whose reputation for sober and considered judgments is highly regarded by members of both parties, and it would deprive the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, Senior Senator from Montana, of a valued political colleague.

Metcalf's concern with the Vietnam war and with arms control is a nationally recognized fact. It is a remarkable testimony to Metcalf's integrity that facing a close race for reelection he should have voted against the appropriation for an Anti-Ballistic Missile System and, most notably, that of the 16 Senators who wrote the President last January asking him to extend the bombing pause, Metcalf and one other Senator alone are up for reelection.

His opponent, Governor Babcock, supports the Administration on Vietnam. He has said, "The full weight of United States wealth and resources should be directed toward bringing the Vietnam conflict to an end." As Governor of Montana, Babcock has had little or nothing to do with foreign policy.

He is primarily noted for having consistently refused to proclaim a United Nations Day, although he was quite willing to set aside a National Golf Day (May 30), a whole month for eggs (February 1966), and a Strategic Air Command Day (March 19, 1966). Of the United Nations, Babcock has said, "I cannot endorse an organization which has undermined American prestige everywhere." He has said recently that his main reason for running is to restore "sanity" to the Senate.

(III) Roy R.Romer vs. Senator Gordon Allott, Colorado

Roy Romer is one of the most brilliant and promising younger men to enter Colorado politics since the end of World War II. He has served in the State Legislature for eight years and is presently Assistant Minority Leader and head of the Judiciary Committee.

Romer has issued an eight-point Vietnam program in which he calls for a "negotiated settlement", "willingness to sit down at the negotiating table with those who are fighting us", "reconvening of the Geneva Conference", "effective reciprocal de-escalation of the fighting". Romer has said, "Ultimately this war will be won or lost on the political, economic, and social front, and not on the military front."

Incumbent Senator Gordon Allott's position on Vietnam is crystal-clear. During the bombing pause in January of this year, he called for an immediate resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. In July 1966 he urged increased bombing with "every fighter and bomber we have over there." Speaking in 1963 against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Allott said, "This nation has been black-jacked into a ratification of this treaty." Allott was an early and ardent supporter of the Goldwater presidential candidacy. His position on international affairs is expressed unequivocably in his statement that, "There can be no co-existence in this ideological world." Allott is supported in his reactionary positions by the Junior Senator from Colorado, Peter Dominick, who will be up for reelection two years hence.

The 37-year-old Romer, who has a long and promising political career before him, is waging a vigorous, uphill struggle at this point in the campaign.

Governor Mark O. Hatfield
State Capitol, Salem, Oregon

Re: Vietnam A Statement of Concern, July 23, 1965

The American people now face in regard to Vietnam one of the major crises of their one hundred and eighty-nine years of independence.....

It is the inalienable right of the people of the United States, as it is of the people of each nation, to determine the main lines of their own future. In particular, it is their right to decide those matters of peace and war upon which depend life or death for many of its citizens and especially its sons. In no democracy may government by experts take the place of government by the people.....

The United States of America cannot undertake the military defense and economic development of all peoples but only of the American people and of those nations who share the American faith in freedom, but an American promise of assistance must, when requested, be honorably fulfilled through diplomatic effort as well as through military valor.....

Policy based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, however logical it may appear to a military mind, makes a travesty of the very idea of national security. National leaders who resign themselves to policies that accept the potential sacrifice of millions of their people, old and young, provide for national revenge rather than for national security.....

World War III, whether sudden or mounting by escalation from smaller conflict, would shatter the political institutions and social and economic organization necessary for democracy and would open the door to communism and fascism the world over. The prevention of such a war must, therefore, be a major goal of United States policy.....

Terroristic or indiscriminate bombing must involve the deaths of non-combatant men, women and children and merits the general condemnation of humanity. It cannot be justified as an instrument for the fulfillment of U.S. foreign policy.....

Policies involving risks of nuclear conflict can never be exempt from the moral judgment of all humanity. International peril demands international judgment.....

Finally, the United States is dedicated to the goal of a world of law, not war. To that end, its policies must as in honor bound conform with its treaty commitments.

THEREFORE, It is my conviction

1. that the President of the United States should give meaning to his noble appeal for negotiation in regard to Vietnam, made to the United Nations at San Francisco, by taking the practical steps that would put his theme into immediate operation. In a nuclear world, war is no alternative to continuing mediation -- a war of liberation cannot liberate if its result is to annihilate.....

2. that the United States, therefore, striving to guarantee that no life be needlessly lost and no American GI be sent unnecessarily overseas, demands that the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations be set in motion so that the continuing process of mediation or negotiation be kept in constant operation and so that South Vietnam in her agony receive from the United Nations that consideration and support which in like circumstances was given to the Republic of Korea.....

3. that the United States should publicly welcome a United Nations resolution for a cease-fire in Vietnam and should promise to abide by it so soon as United Nations forces can ensure its fulfillment; to this end, failing any better plan, the United States and its allies should be willing to offer to meet the necessary cost as a contribution to humanity and to peace -- far less expensive than the contribution of war and far more likely to assure security to South Vietnam.....

4. that the President of the United States should have every support in fulfilling the American desire to assist in the economic development of Southeast Asia and other underdeveloped areas. This is urgent. In economic development and political cooperation lie the real means of weaning these peoples away from the dangers and allurements of Chinese or Russian communism. Even when the sound of the guns is ended and men may dwell in peace, the problems of human betterment and reconstruction will remain to be dealt with. The confidence of the peoples in Southeast Asia in the validity of the American ideal can only be won, if we shall have provided the economic and political leadership of which we are capable.

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COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD - 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Questionnaire: October 1, 1966

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10. Name _____

    Address _____

Tel: Benj. Cohen
Wilson Feb '65

Vietn vs. Malaysia
if close

Bundy in
Pnom Penh

Feeling — exaggerates
imp. of N. Vietn.

Hopeful: Russians want
to prevent
escal.

Hard to be neutral

struggle

Feeling - [illegible]

Europe not likely

Young freedom

McNamara

McNaughton

- Long clean struggle
b/w US – China
might even ~~be~~ strengthen
their position