

Second Rough Draft

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This is a rough draft for distribution to friends in the hope of obtaining their criticism of form and content.

PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

Introduction

The Purpose of the Paper:

The Atomic Stalemate between the Soviet Union and America towards which we are rapidly moving, poses a problem to the world for which there is no precedent in history. At stake now is the survival of Man. How will the governments of the great powers respond to the Atomic Stalemate that will confront them within the next few years? At this point, history does not provide us with a precedent upon which a reasoned prediction could be based and any optimistic prediction must therefore be based on faith rather than on argument and proof.

The acute power conflict between the Soviet Union and America might perhaps be resolved without going beyond the devices that have been used in the past in the field of foreign policy. But today this is no longer enough.

In the past the legitimate aim of foreign policy has been to prolong the peace. Good foreign policy was one which resolved the most acute conflicts and left the remaining problems untouched in the hope that they would disappear in time. Time does in fact solve many problems, but unfortunately it creates as many problems as it solves.

A good foreign policy meant in the past a policy which prolonged the peace, i.e., it lengthened the interval between two subsequent wars. And thus far, that is all that any foreign policy ever has done. Clearly today it is not enough to postpone the war; today we must somehow create a world community perennially at peace.

If it were possible for the governments to reach a meeting of the minds, on just what kind of a world they would like to see in existence, say, 50 years from now, they could then begin to discuss the necessary steps which must be taken in order to evolve such a ~~XXXXXX~~ world. But until we have a clear image of an ordered, as well as desirable, world that may remain perennially at peace, there is no clear goal towards which governmental negotiations can be directed.

It will take resourcefulness and imagination to develop such a goal in sufficient detail to make it meaningful. New political devices will be needed to guide the world towards such a goal in comparative safety. Political and social inventions are needed at this juncture.

A world community cannot be evolved by statesmen negotiating piecemeal, in the absence of any clear long range goal, just as engineers could not build a machine piecemeal without first having a clear conception of its function and general construction. In the political field it is not even possible to ask the right questions unless one already knows the right answers.

Today nobody is in possession of the right answers. One thing is clear -- the problem is indivisible. There might be several satisfactory approaches to it, but each approach must deal with the problem as a whole.

Groping my way, I shall attempt to convey in this paper the outlines of one possible approach to the general problem. It would be difficult to describe such an approach in abstract terms, and therefore I shall describe it in terms of specific measures. Upon further consideration many of these ~~measures~~ are likely to turn out to be invalid and yet the questions which they raise will retain their validity provided only that the general approach I have adopted has in fact validity. By suggesting specific measures, I am really raising questions in the form of assertions.

Clearly no one man working alone is likely to come up with an adequate analysis of all the problems involved, nor are the political and social inventions which are needed likely to come from any one man. All I myself can do here is to indicate the scope of the problem, substantiate the need for new devices in general and give some examples of the kind of social or political inventions which may be considered.

Real progress in this field could, however, come very fast if it were possible to gather -- from among the several nations involved -- men who would work as a group and, being free from governmental responsibilities, could experiment with ideas and explore the feasibility of various solutions without in any way committing their governments. There is room for more than <sup>just</sup> one group to try their hands at the task.

The inadequacies of this paper should demonstrate the need for some such group efforts and if they do, the paper will have fulfilled its purpose. In the end our thinking might be best crystallized through public discussion, provided only that intellectual leadership will raise the public discussion to <sup>the</sup> / level of political thinking required by the nature of the issue.

serve as a guide to statesmen in future negotiations, but they would also have a chance realistically to assess the political difficulties which must be taken into account.

There is room for more than one group to try their hands at such a task. But any one group will be able to work successfully only if they are agreed at the outset on some one set of basic premises.

The purpose of this memorandum is to describe one general approach to the problem and thus to furnish one set of basic premises which one such group might adopt as the basis of their deliberations. The details given in this memorandum serve only one purpose, i.e., to illustrate a general approach. These details represent merely tentative thoughts thrown out as a challenge. Yet all the details taken together will, I hope, get across a general approach to the problem which would be difficult to describe in abstract terms.

The technique adopted in this memorandum is to raise questions in the form of assertions. Upon further consideration, the assertions might turn out to be invalid and yet the questions which they raise would retain their validity.

"The Good News of Damnation":

Right after the second World War ended, it looked like another world war was in the making. The Russian-American power conflict seemed to be affected by the very same factors which shaped the events in the conflict between Sparta and Athens. That ancient conflict arose because the rising power of Athens threatened Sparta and the rising power of Sparta threatened Athens, and it led to the Peloponnesian War, which destroyed Greece.

After the second World War, the rising power of the Soviet Union threatened America and the rising power of America threatened the Soviet Union. And again there was the same polarization of the world with more and more nations falling into the orbit of either America or the Soviet Union. Up to a short time ago, we were moving in this classical pattern toward another world war. Ironically in this war America might have helped Germany to conquer Russia and Japan to conquer China, even though she fought the second World War in order to prevent these very conquests.

The atomic bombs which have become available to America and Russia in large quantities have broken this classical pattern in which power conflicts have moved in the past toward their resolution by war, and as the Atomic Stalemate approaches the very concepts which led to the formation of alliances begin to lose their validity.

The Atomic Stalemate is not yet an accomplished fact. Yet I propose to discuss here exclusively those political concepts which are adequate to meet its challenge. Governments concerned with matters of practical policies will, of course, have to operate in the interim and handle the situation as best they can. But there is no time left for shaping through public discussion a national policy for the interim period. By the time the right policies might find public acceptance, the Atomic Stalemate will be an accomplished fact and ~~this~~ paper will therefore ignore the problems of this interim period.

The Atomic Stalemate Between America and the Soviet Union:

Just what do we mean by the expression "Atomic Stalemate," and what is its significance?

The Atomic Stalemate will have arrived when the Soviet Union will have enough hydrogen bombs to devastate America to the point where organized government would cease to exist and America could do the same to the Soviet Union. America will be able to rely on intercontinental bombers which can refuel in air, as will the Soviet Union, and neither country will any longer need outlying air bases such as, for instance, the air bases in the Middle East which America maintains at present. Both America and the Soviet Union will be in the position to protect their Strategic Air Forces against attack. They will have a large number of air strips properly dispersed throughout their own country and no sudden massive attack by one could appreciably diminish the power of the other to retaliate. There would thus be no substantial incentive for either party for striking the first blow. This will remain true later on also if intercontinental ballistic missiles take the place of the jet bombers.

The assumption that there is no strong incentive for striking the first blow, is quite essential for our discussion of the Atomic Stalemate. Only if the facts justify this assumption can the Atomic Stalemate have a sufficient degree of stability.

Neither America nor the Soviet Union have so far gone far enough in protecting the power of retaliation of their Strategic Air Forces against a massive attack, but it stands to reason to assume that they will remedy this defect before long.

I am not implying here that if the Strategic Air Force of either Russia or America could in one single blow largely destroy the power to retaliate, such an attack would be ordered by either government as a result of a conscious policy decision.

But in such an unstable situation an all-out atomic war could be triggered by a false intelligence report, asserting that the enemy's Strategic Air Force has taken off.

It also could be triggered maliciously by some third power which sends a fleet of planes across the North Pole and penetrates through the northern radar screens of either Russia or the United States. If America's power to retaliate can be destroyed in one single attack, and if unidentified planes cross the northern radar screen, would the strategic Air Force wait until fighter planes can take a close look at the invading planes and are able to identify the nationality of the invaders?

The Never-Never Land of the "Stalemate":

The Atomic Stalemate is coming about so fast, and is so unprecedented, that few people have been able to adjust their thinking to it. As will be seen, once the Atomic Stalemate has been reached, both America and the Soviet Union will be unconquerable, and from there on they will remain unconquerable forever.

Yet, even today thoughtful men continue to talk in terms of "Russia's war potential" and the "great strength which might accrue to Russia if the industrial development of China is permitted to continue undisturbed," and in vague terms of "strength" in general. True enough in the past one had always to keep in mind that the ultimate resolution of a political conflict might occur through war and that the "strength" of a nation might determine who will be vanquished in that war. But today this kind of thinking is about to lose its validity forever.

Only comparatively few people have in this sense grasped the significance of the hydrogen bomb, and even those of us who have grasped it will talk intelligently one day and another day we will lapse into our old habits of thought. What can we do to bring home to ourselves the need to operate with concepts that are meaningful in the new setting of the Atomic Stalemate? I shall now try to take the reader into the "never-never land" <sup>of the Stalemate</sup> and perform some mental gymnastics for the purpose of forcing him -- and myself as well -- to try to understand the real meaning of the Stalemate.

Right now we cannot even try to guess in what manner the Governments of the great powers will actually conduct themselves in the Atomic Stalemate. But we can analyze the various rules of rational conduct consistent with their enlightened national self-interest, which the Soviet Union and America might each adopt, and we can state what the consequences will be in case of each rule. Our analysis assumes that these two nations will abide by the rule of rational conduct which they may lay down for themselves. This, of course, might be an unwarranted assumption and thus the whole discussion here presented is moving on the borderline of fact and fiction.

Since we are dealing with a crazy situation, all the rules of conduct examined will be crazy rules, even though some of them might not be quite as crazy as the conduct of the governments involved might actually turn out to be, if the onset of the Atomic Stalemate is not preceded by a political settlement.

We intend to talk only about conduct guided by rational considerations, but here we must watch our step because conduct counselled by passions may easily masquerade as rational. Take the following instance for example:

Many people believe that America's ability to annihilate Russia in retaliation to a massive Russian attack against American cities will safeguard America against such an attack in all circumstances. This belief is based on the assumption that both Russia and America will act rationally, in line with their enlightened self-interest. I consider a sudden unprovoked Russian attack against the cities of America as an unlikely occurrence, but let me now assume, for the sake of argument, that such an attack has occurred; that in one sudden single blow all of America's cities and all her essential production facilities have been knocked out and that such an attack would in no way affect America's ability to retaliate and to annihilate Russia. Now, it may be perfectly rational for America to threaten Russia with a massive counter-attack and thereby to deter Russia from attacking. But assuming now that such an attack has in fact occurred, is it then really rational conduct on the part of America to annihilate Russia? Would it not be more rational for America to speak to Russia as follows: "Our power to retaliate is undiminished and we could completely destroy your country now. But it is not to our interest to do so, and we are willing to refrain from doing so on condition that you will from here on give us half of the produce of your industries for the rebuilding of our cities and of our production facilities."

This, of course, is not what America would be likely to do, but this is what would be rational conduct.

I am stressing this here for one purpose only -- to caution the reader, and myself, about various other courses of action which are advocated and which masquerade as rational, when in reality they are something quite different.

#### Rules of Conduct in Never-Never Land:

Let us now discuss several rules of conduct which America may adopt and which Russia may adopt and see what the consequences of each rule would be, always assuming that they both abide by the rules which they have laid down for themselves.

If America adopts the rule of hitting Russia with all she has when one single bomb is dropped on one American city, and if Russia adopts a similar rule for herself, we may have a very explosive situation. In this case, full-scale atomic

destruction of both countries could be triggered accidentally. And it could be triggered maliciously, if an unidentified attacker -- some third nation for instance -- drops just one bomb on either an American or a Russian city.

Suppose, however, America adopts the rule of dropping two bombs on Russia for every bomb that is dropped on her and suppose Russia adopts the same rule. Such a rule may sound quite satisfying to "patriots" in both countries and it would not lead to an atomic catastrophe quite as fast as the rule discussed above, but it would lead to an atomic catastrophe all the same, if an atomic war gets started somehow somewhere.

The Principle of Measured Demolition:

We could, of course, now go one step further and assume that the rule is "drop one bomb for each bomb received and no more!" And once we go this far, we may as well assume that America and Russia would go the whole hog and say each the following: "There is no need to use bombs for killing and maiming people in warfare. We can prevent the penetration by troops, of any area which we have determined to protect without engaging in a real war in which people are killed. We will list ~~all~~ the areas in our orbit and attach a price tag to each one of them. If Area (1) is penetrated, we will demolish five medium-sized cities of the enemy. We shall give these cities a week's warning to enable them to evacuate all people. We shall expect that the enemy will retaliate by dropping five bombs on five medium-sized cities of our own, and we shall evacuate the population from our cities in anticipation of such a blow. For these bombs we are not going to retaliate, but, if any more bombs are dropped on us, we shall drop one bomb for each bomb received and no more."

If both sides adopt this rule of conduct, what will be the consequences? If the price tags attached to the various areas set a price sufficiently high, then penetration of these areas would cost so much to the would-be conqueror that he would rather desist. Losing five medium-sized cities, for instance, would be hardly worth the conquest of Iran to the Soviet Union, even though the United States would also lose five medium-sized cities in the process. And, if five medium-sized cities are not considered high enough a price, the price could be set at seven or ten. Similarly, the Soviet Union could set a price on the pene-  
for instance  
tration of Poland/ by German troops who might cross the Oder-Neisse line armed with American made weapons and with the acquiescence of the United States and the price could be made dependent on the depth of penetration.

As long as we are dreaming, we may as well embellish our dream with some

details. If America and the Soviet Union should both embrace the principle of measured demolition -- the principle we are discussing here -- it would be entirely rational for them to abstain from putting up any defense against such demolition. Thus in the case of penetration of Iran by Russian troops, <sup>for instance,</sup> the United States could name the five cities it will demolish, one by one, and these cities could be evacuated by the Soviet Union, one by one. Otherwise, the United States could only issue a general warning and the Soviet Union would have to evacuate all cities, not knowing which five would be demolished.

~~Oddly enough the principle of measured demolition, here described, would permit the United States to protect its allies on the continent of Europe. But if there is no way of predicting what policies will govern the use of Strategic Air Forces by the Soviet Union and by America, then there is no way for America to convince her allies on the continent of Europe -- short of endowing them with hydrogen bombs and a Strategic Air Force of their own -- that their cities would not be destroyed in case of war, while the cities of the Soviet Union and the United States might remain intact.~~

If the principle of measured demolition were adopted by both America and the Soviet Union and if they both believed that the other would live up to its professed intentions, then no territory protected by either would be invaded by troops armed by the other, and with the acquiescence of the other.

But would both America and Russia believe that the other is in fact willing to pay the price? Will not one or the other take a risk and make a try, and if a try is made, would in fact the party affected go through with its professed intentions?

I believe it is too early to say what, in the absence of a political settlement, the governments would or would not do in the Atomic Stalemate. And if there is a political settlement, as we all must hope there will be, then we shall never find out -- which perhaps is just as well.

Even though in all of our discussions so far we have only examined rational behavior and we have not attempted even to guess what the actual behavior of the governments might be, yet I believe out of such discussions one may derive two points which have validity:

1. If there is an Atomic Stalemate between Russia and the United States and if these two nations adopt a code of behavior which is adequate to this situation, neither of them could ever be conquered thereafter.



It is well to remember that the United States has engaged in two World Wars in this century. In both cases she was largely motivated by the belief that if she permitted Germany to win and to dominate the continent of Europe, Germany would become so strong that in a subsequent war with America, she could vanquish America. Time and again great powers have gone to war in order to prevent a shift in the balance of power which would involve the risk of being vanquished in a later war.

From here on, once an Atomic Stalemate becomes an accomplished fact, neither the Soviet Union nor America need to be guided by such consideration. Neither of them need to fear the emergence of any nation as a major industrial power, be it Germany, Japan or China.

2. The Atomic Stalemate between the Soviet Union and the United States can have a certain degree of stability and need not lead to an all-out atomic war provided only that they adopt some adequate code of behavior with respect to strategic bombing and provided that there is a political settlement, so that there will be no local conflicts that lead to fighting in which America and the Soviet Union ~~may line up on opposite sides.~~

This conclusion, if valid, may be very important for as will be seen later, we may have to live with such an Atomic Stalemate for some time to come.

This does not mean, however, that the situation could remain stable when four, five, six or seven nations come into the possession of atomic bombs and means for their delivery. In such a situation the survival of Man will be in jeopardy and unless further examination can convince us that such a situation could be somehow stabilized, it will have to be avoided at all cost.

~~Once the Atomic Stalemate will be an accomplished fact, neither Russia nor America will intentionally make an all-out attack on each other's cities. Nor are they likely to threaten to do so, for the threat of "murder and suicide" is not an effective threat. But in the absence of a political settlement, there remains ever present the danger of an armed conflict in which the Soviet Union and the United States line up on opposite sides. If either America or the Soviet Union resort to the use of atomic weapons in such a conflict, they might be trapped into an all-out atomic war. In the beginning of such a local war the use of atomic bombs might very well be limited to military targets in the tactical areas. But as the war goes on the pressure will mount for using them also against military targets in the strategic areas.~~

For America There Is No Military "Solution":

Once the Atomic Stalemate is an accomplished fact, neither Russia nor America will ever intentionally make an all-out attack against each other's cities, nor are they likely to threaten to do so, for clearly the threat of murder and suicide is not a very effective threat.

If there is no political settlement, there is no satisfactory military policy in sight for the United States.

The Strategic Air Forces, whether or not the nations plan to use them in case of war, are in existence and exert an effect no matter what the professed policy regarding their use may be. In Europe the cities on the Continent are faced with the implied threat that the Soviet Strategic Air Force may annihilate them in case of war and there is nothing America could say that would convince the people on the Continent of Europe that America would be willing to risk the destruction of her own cities in defense of their cities. It might therefore happen, so the people in Europe will think, that the cities of Europe would be destroyed in case of war, while the cities of America and the Soviet Union may remain unharmed. There is no way for America to change this situation -- short of endowing the nations in Europe with hydrogen bombs and a Strategic Air Force of their own.

America of course may retain these allies in Europe as peacetime friends, but she cannot count on their participation in any major war against the Soviet Union. Nor can America count on the use of the air bases in Europe, North Africa or the Middle East.

Once the Atomic Stalemate becomes an accomplished fact and its meaning clear to everybody, NATO may be regarded in retrospect as just one more 4-letter word that has been added to the language.

But NATO or no NATO, there need of course be no war in Europe.

Yet in the absence of a political settlement there remains the ever present danger of a conflict breaking out in some more remote area. If either America or the Soviet Union resorts to the use of nuclear bombs in such a conflict, then they might be easily trapped into an all-out atomic war against their wishes. Even though in the beginning of such a local war the use of atomic bombs may be limited to military targets in the tactical areas, pretty soon there will be irresistible pressure for using bombs also against military targets in the strategic areas.

The danger from radioactive fall-out resulting from bomb tests has been grossly exaggerated, but the situation will be very different when atomic bombs are used in warfare. When tests are made they are postponed again and again until weather conditions are favorable. The tests are made when the wind conditions guarantee that the radioactive products will be dispersed rather than remain concentrated and be brought down by rain in a densely populated area. In actual warfare, an army that has to rely on atomic weapons cannot observe such precautions.

Once the psychological revulsion which has gradually built up against the use of atomic energy for the purpose of killing and maiming human beings is broken, no one may be able to say with any degree of assurance "destruction so far and no further." The only clear line of demarkation that could be held is the principle of keeping the civilian population unharmed. This would mean that there must be no bombing of cities by any means and no use of nuclear weapons of any kind.

Even after the onset of the Atomic Stalemate, for a number of years, the United States may have superiority in tactical atomic weapons, and therefore there may be an incentive for the United States to use them in local conflicts. But a few years after the onset of the Atomic Stalemate, **their use**

might no longer favor the United States; **two can play this game.**

If the United States wanted to adopt right now the policy of refraining from the use of atomic bombs unless such bombs are used against her first, she would have to maintain a very large military establishment based on conventional weapons alone. If she did so, she could resist in many of the areas of the world where local conflicts threaten, sufficiently vigorously and for a fairly long time, and make it very expensive for a would-be conqueror to conquer. From the point of view of discouraging an attack on these areas, this might be quite enough even though America could not hold all those areas indefinitely against an all-out attack. Yet this would hardly satisfy the requirements of those who try to hold on to the belief that there is no substitute for victory.

It may be seen that the United States is thus faced right now with the choice between taking the grave risk involved in the use of atomic weapons in a local conflict and shouldering the economic burden of a large military establishment based on conventional arms, as well as giving up/<sup>right now</sup>"victory" as the main aim of armed resistance.

Clearly, there is no substitute for a political settlement.

But what should be the guiding principle of a political settlement? Should we think in terms of setting up -- in the pursuit of security -- a rigid system of spheres of influence that would perpetuate the status quo? This, I believe, is almost certainly the wrong answer. Just as it is impossible for the individual to secure happiness by pursuing happiness, so it might be impossible for the nations to achieve security by pursuing security. Could it be perchance that the nations might achieve security by pursuing happiness?

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THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Is it possible to resolve the power conflict between America and the Soviet Union and to create a setting in which the possibility of war could be regarded as remote? What would be the nature of an over-all agreement that could accomplish this? And could such an agreement provide for the right kind of disarmament?

It is futile to discuss any disarmament proposals without discussing also some proposal for a political settlement, since the political settlement provides the framework within which the disarmament provisions must operate. We shall, therefore, describe further on the general principles of a political settlement, that may be adequate.

In the absence of such a settlement the great powers might agree to some reduction of armaments, but sooner or later fighting would break out somewhere and if the great powers line up on the opposite sides, then disarmament will once more give way to rearmament.

In the discussion that follows, I shall assume that a political settlement will go into effect before the implementations of any serious disarmament provisions may begin.

But before we can discuss any agreement whatsoever, it is necessary first to give an answer to the standard question: "Can Russia be trusted to keep an agreement?"

"Can Russia Be Trusted To Keep An Agreement?"

Neither the Soviet Union nor America could be coerced to observe an agreement if they no longer want to keep it in operation. Therefore a far-reaching agreement will remain in operation only if it offers America and the Soviet Union and some of the other great powers involved strong and continued incentives for keeping it in operation. In this sense, the agreement must be self-sustaining or else it cannot serve our purpose. What shall these incentives be?

Clearly for the agreement to be really attractive, it should provide military security for the nations involved, political security for their governments and economic prosperity for their people. We shall try to indicate later on in what manner an agreement could secure such results for America, the Soviet Union and several of the other nations involved.

In the discussion that now follows we shall assume that somehow we have succeeded in devising an agreement that both Russia and the United States want very much to keep in force, and with the validity of this assumption will stand and fall our conclusions.

Basic for the general approach here presented is further the assumption that the agreement reserves both for America and the Soviet Union the right to abrogate it without cause either in toto or in part. There would be provided in the agreement a number of specific clauses of abrogation, differing in kind and degree and any of these could be invoked without cause either by the Soviet Union or America. A few other nations, perhaps all permanent members of the Security Council (this would then include Britain, China and France) might retain the right to abrogate, but no such right would be retained by the vast majority of nations.

The right to invoke abrogation clauses without cause is the magic key to the solution of a major difficulty; it opens up the possibility of concluding an agreement very fast, once the great powers reach a meeting of the minds on general intentions. Clearly, in the existing circumstances both the Soviet Union and America want to make certain that there shall be no secret major evasions of the disarmament provisions of the agreement. But, if it were necessary to spell out in the agreement an inspection system that will provide ironclad guarantees for every conceivable contingency which might arise, the lawyers might take years to write such an agreement -- if indeed such an agreement can be written at all. If, on the other hand, the agreement provides for the right to abrogate, then -- as will be seen -- it is not necessary to spell out in the agreement the provisions of any particular system of inspection.

If at any time after the agreement goes into effect the Soviet Union fails to convince America that there are no dangerous secret evasions taking place in her territory, and if America can obtain no satisfaction on this point, then America will have no choice but to invoke some of the specific abrogation clauses of the agreement. And as time goes on she might be forced to abrogate the agreement in toto. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wants to keep the agreement in force -- as we have assumed it is her interest to do -- she would want to dispel any American suspicions of secret evasions. The same holds true of course in the reverse also, as America would not want Russia to entertain such suspicions. The question that is really relevant in this setting may therefore be phrased as follows: In what ways could the Soviet Union

and the United States convince each other -- assuming that this is what they want to do -- that no major secret evasions of the disarmament provisions are taking place in their territory?

We are assuming here of course, that the agreement has been entered into in good faith, i.e., that it has not been entered into with the intent to abrogate it shortly after it has been signed. By making the "down payment" high enough we can make reasonably sure that this ~~assumption~~ <sup>is</sup> justified. We shall discuss this point now, along with the question of what kind and what degree of disarmament we have in mind.

General Principles of Disarmament:

Disarmament would presumably go into effect in steps or stages, with all stages agreed upon in advance, <sup>most of them</sup> and going into effect according to a predetermined schedule. What should these stages be and what should be the ultimate state of armaments towards which these steps are directed?

There is no direct relationship between the degree of disarmament and the stability of peace. The political settlement established is much more relevant in this respect than the level at which arms are maintained. Yet there are good reasons why disarmament ought to be very far-reaching. We shall assume of course that the disarmament provisions are part of a general agreement that provides for a far-reaching political settlement.

I propose to experiment here with the following general concepts:

There shall be a first period of disarmament during which disarmament is carried very far in conventional weapons and may include all tactical heavy mobile equipment, but leave the Strategic Air Force of the Soviet Union and the United States and their bombs wholly untouched.

During this period Russia and the United States will remain unconquerable and no evasions of the agreement would represent a vital threat to their security. This will make it much easier for Russia and the United States to convince each other that there are no dangerous evasions occurring in their territory; no secret manufacture of conventional weapons or any tactical weapons could vitally affect the security of either the Soviet Union or America during this period.

In one sense this first period will be the most critical one. Even though a political settlement has been reached, conflicts might arise out of differing interpretations and in the absence of a "common enemy" these conflicts might be insoluble. To some extent the Hydrogen Bomb, if retained during this period, might play the role of the "common enemy" and increase the willingness of the nations of <sup>ing an</sup> ~~reach~~ accommodation. This holds not only for America and the Soviet Union, but <sup>perhaps</sup> ~~even more so~~ for some of the other nations involved.

This first period of disarmament would be followed by a second period during which the bombs and also all means for their delivery would be eliminated; all manufacture of such equipment would stop at an early date. During this second period secret evasions might vitally threaten the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union. This may force both the United States and the Soviet Union to adopt novel, unusual and unprecedented measures for the sake of convincing each other that there are no secret evasions taking place, and that there is no need to invoke any of the abrogation clauses.

Throughout this second period the United States and the Soviet Union might still wish to continue the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles for fear that the other might push the development <sup>to completion</sup> and acquire overwhelming advantages in case of an abrogation.

The second period ends when all research and development directed at the creation of new weapons stops and all official secrecy surrounding this kind of activity is abandoned.

In the final state of disarmament towards which the world would move in passing through these two periods, there would be eliminated -- with insignificant exception to be discussed later -- all heavy mobile weapons, leaving free the manufacture of machine guns and defensive equipment, such as antiaircraft guns, short range fighters, radar detection devices, <sup>also</sup> and permitting / built-in fortifications and heavy guns built into such fortifications.

We shall examine later on what the consequence of such a state of affairs will be for the security of the various regions, always assuming, of course, that this <sup>dis-</sup>state of /armaments exists in the world in which a far-reaching political settlement has been reached by the great powers with the approval of the other nations involved.

The question of disarmament is inseparable of that of the political settlement. This works both ways. If, for example, the state of disarmament here described were in fact adopted, the issue of whether United Germany shall be free to join NATO would evaporate. All that will be left might be the question of whether Germany should be free to choose between building a Maginot Line on her eastern frontier and building a Maginot Line on her western frontier -- assuming that she wants to go to the expense of building such a line at all.

#### The First Period:

During this period, disarmament in all heavy mobile equipment might be carried very fast step by step to almost complete disarmament in these categories, with a few exceptions that will be discussed later.

The very first step might involve the physical destruction of three-fourths of heavy guns, heavy tanks and other heavy mobile equipment needed in tactical warfare and all manufacture of such equipment would stop at the same time. There would be a corresponding reduction in the size of the mechanized armies.

Making this first step a very large one will serve a dual purpose. The first step represents then a "down payment" so large that no nation will enter into the agreement with the intention of abrogating it shortly after it has been signed. And it will provide at an early date a great reduction in the cost of manufacture of arms and the maintenance of highly mechanized armies. The ensuing economic benefit would be noticeable at once; it would provide a tangible incentive for the people to keep the agreement in force and it might contribute to the political security of some of the governments affected.

We do not need an elaborate inspection system to supervise the destruction of this equipment or the stoppage of its manufacture. Both America and the Soviet Union, as well as other nations involved, can specify in advance what equipment is going to be destroyed when and where, and agents of all these nations could witness and certify their destruction. A few American agents installed in the Soviet factories where such equipment has been heretofore manufactured, and a few Russian agents installed in the corresponding American factories could make sure that the manufacture of such equipment is not continued.

Evasions are during this period, of course, physically possible. But we must, above all, ask ourselves what reasonable motivation would there be for such evasions. At this point, the Atomic Stalemate will still continue, and no hidden manufacture of tanks or guns could vitally threaten either America or the Soviet Union. Evasions would involve the risk of leading to an abrogation of the agreement which both the Soviet Union and America would want to avoid. Nor could evasions substantially affect the outcome of the war to which such an abrogation might lead. And, since a political settlement goes into effect at the same time when disarmament begins, there should be during this period no wars in any remote areas with Russia and America lining up on opposite sides. What then would be the motivation for secret evasions during this first period?

Because of the development of intercontinental bombers which can refuel in air, the Strategic Air Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States will be in no need of air bases outside of their own territory any longer. It would seem, therefore, that during this first period of disarmament all outlying American Air Bases could be dismantled at an early date without ~~destroying~~ the capabilities of the American Strategic Air Force.



During the first period, there will be attained far-reaching disarmament, but the Strategic Air Forces of America and the Soviet Union will remain untouched. Therefore it will be essential to adopt some policy of measured response by the Strategic Air Forces to acts of "aggression" as well as to any limited (assumed or real) attack carried out by means of atomic bombs, in place of a vague policy of unlimited <sup>retaliation</sup> / in case of provocation. Such a policy of measured or limited response must be clearly spelled out and be understood by all.

This will also <sup>eliminate</sup> / the danger that an all-out attack by the Strategic Air Forces of America or of the Soviet Union might be triggered accidentally or by some third party -- maliciously. But in addition, America and the Soviet Union should reach an understanding on the instructions under which their Strategic Air Forces will take off in response to an assumed impending attack.

#### The Second Period:

Naturally as long as Hydrogen Bombs and Strategic Air Forces remain in existence, an element of danger will remain. Yet it would be inadvisable to set a fixed date in the agreement for the start of the second period, for the Strategic Air Forces cannot be eliminated until the Soviet Union and America are ready to do so. They should take this step as soon as they are ready to adopt the novel measures that are needed -- but not any sooner, lest mutual suspicion lead to an abrogation of the agreement.

What are these novel measures and why are they needed?

During this period bombs and air bases will be dismantled, equipment of the Strategic Air Forces will be destroyed and manufacture of such equipment will stop.

Clearly it is not sufficient to eliminate bombs from the national armaments for the suspicion that bombs have been secretly hidden away would be difficult to dispell. Great emphasis must therefore be put on the control of the means of delivery. The measures needed to safeguard against secret evasions will depend on the amount of distrust remaining at the time when the second period begins. To be on the safe side, I shall assume that the present "unlimited distrust" will still largely prevail. If it does not, the task will be that much easier.

During the second period of disarmament, the danger of an aerial attack against the Soviet Union or America will disappear. ~~The Soviet Union and America should~~ therefore be able to accept measures which they were unwilling to accept as long as this danger existed.

Step by step as the Strategic Air Forces are dismantled and factories close down or are reconverted, a larger and larger area in America and the Soviet Union might be opened up for aerial survey to the other. The purpose of such a survey would be to

detect equipment, factories and installations and single them out for inspection if there is doubt as to their function. It is difficult to believe that such an aerial survey would be acceptable to the Soviet Union prior to the time when the Strategic Air Forces are being dismantled or for any purpose other than to convince the United States once an agreement has been reached -- that the agreement is not evaded.

It would be a mistake to believe that aerial inspection alone is sufficient or that we can spell out in advance what has to be inspected and which of the manufacturing activities will have to be regarded as dangerous. No one can foresee today what potent means of mass extermination might be available and would remain undetected by specified acts of inspection.

Assuming that anything like the present degree of distrust will still prevail, then the agreement will be in constant danger of abrogation as a result of unwarranted suspicion unless America and the Soviet Union -- recognizing the need to avoid suspicion -- will adopt a fresh attitude towards the whole problem of "inspection."

It is well to remember that after the first World War there was an Inter-Allied Control Commission in Germany which had considerable difficulty in obtaining information; for any German who gave them information about a secret evasion of the disarmament provision of the Treaty of Versailles could be tried and convicted -- if discovered -- under the German Espionage Act which had never been revoked. Clearly, it is inconsistent to sign a treaty providing for disarmament and also to maintain an "espionage act" on the statute books and thus to prevent citizens from reporting violations of the Treaty. Because the Treaty of Versailles was imposed on Germany, it is understandable that the German Government tried to evade it.

But the agreement here discussed would come into being as the result of a meeting of the minds. It would be in the interest of the Soviet Union and of America to maintain the agreement in force and they can maintain it in force only if they can convince each other that it is not secretly evaded. It may be therefore understood that the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of America would regard it as a patriotic duty of every citizen to disclose evasions of the agreement. Only if this attitude can in fact be achieved will it be possible to maintain the agreement in force in the long run.

In a state of virtually complete disarmament, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have any defense secrets (other than perhaps research and development secrets) left that have to be safeguarded. In these circumstances perhaps the simplest way for America and the Soviet Union to convince each other that there are no secret evasions would be to permit each other to maintain spies in each other's territory on whom they feel they can rely.

This may sound odd. But, unless Russia and the United States can convince each other that there are no secret evasions, sooner or later one of them will begin to suspect that atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs ~~are~~ produced in one place or another in the vast territory covered by Russia or America. Then there will be no other course than to invoke one abrogation clause after another. Pretty soon the arms race would be on again and we would end up in the same unsatisfactory state in which we find ourselves today -- if not worse. Actually, tolerating spies might turn out to be the only reliable means to keep the others from having unwarranted suspicions of secret evasions.

America would want her spies in Russia to be Russians who can go about unobtrusively in the Russian territory. Those who do not want to be regarded as spies might be designated as "plainclothes agents whose identity is not known to the Government." These "agents" would carry a badge and in the setting which we are discussing here (a setting which is admittedly difficult to visualize while we are still living in a cold war atmosphere) it would be understood that American agents would be immune from arrest. If the Soviet Government were to arrest any of these agents when their identity is discovered, then it would become so difficult for America to recruit agents that she might have to abrogate. Similarly, if the Russian Government arrested Russian citizens who gave information to American agents, these agents would be unable to collect information, and America might be forced to abrogate. It is therefore not in the interest of Russia to do any of these things. Of course, once the Russians discover the identity of one of the American agents, his usefulness has ended, and unless he can find some other satisfactory way of earning a living, he would have to elect to leave Russia. At that point, he would become America's headache and not the headache of the Russian Government.

Of course, all this is true in the reverse also, and America would have to tolerate agents of the Soviet Union.

The presence of American agents in Russian territory will hardly be acceptable to the Soviet Government unless America can somehow convince the Soviet Government that her agents are merely spies and that they are not trying secretly to organize<sup>a</sup> political conspiracy that could become dangerous to the Soviet Government. In order to convince the Soviet Government on this point, America might have to facilitate spying on her agents by the Russian Government. If the Russian Government can discover each year the identity of a sufficient number of American agents, put them under surveillance, and observe their activities unbeknown to them, then the Soviet Government can convince herself that these agents are indeed merely "spies." If this can be done, the Soviet Government would have no reason - no rational reason at least - to object to the presence of American agents.

During this second period of disarmament, there might still be fear that an abrogation might leave either America or the Soviet Union in a vastly inferior position. This could occur, for instance, if at the time of abrogation, one of these countries had completed the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles whereas the other had not. For this reason, it is conceivable that both the Soviet Union and the United States should want to continue weapons research and development throughout the second disarmament period. Their research and development secrets (which might include the construction of a variety of atomic and hydrogen bombs) should be very well safeguarded during this period in the same way in which industrial secrets are usually safeguarded. The ordinary spy is not capable of penetrating into this kind of secret; it takes a "traitor" to divulge them.

The second disarmament period reaches its end when the Soviet Union and America will stop weapons research and development and at this point new possibilities will open up for making progress toward a real world community.

The Principle of Compensation:

Some of the measures here proposed and others necessary to create an orderly world will be politically unacceptable unless it is possible to compensate vested interests who would suffer losses or forego profits if these measures were adopted.

After the first World War, the issue of whether or not the Germans should build battleships became a hot political issue in Germany which affected the outcome of elections to the Reichstag. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not permitted to build large battleships but was free to build cruisers up to 10,000 tons. After one such cruiser had been built, the question of whether Germany should go on building further cruisers became a political issue. The German Navy fought hard for these cruisers. I lived in Germany at that time, but I didn't understand what was going on until I had occasion to discuss the issue with an Admiral of the German Navy. When I asked him if he thought the possession of such cruisers would make any real difference in a war in which Germany and England fought on opposite sides, he said to me: "You do not understand. If we can't have capital ships, the whole promotion system of the German Navy will be in jeopardy."

From the point of view of the national interests involved, there ought to be drastic shrinkage of the military establishments during the first period of disarmament. This might meet with irresistible political opposition in America and perhaps also in the Soviet Union unless the principle of compensation is applied to this problem, as well as to some of the other problems which will arise during this period.

All those who would be adversely affected by measures provided for in the agreement ought to be amply compensated, in every nation affected, not only for losses they might suffer, but also for profits which they might forego.

All personnel of the United States Armed Forces, for instance, who may be retired because of the shrinkage of the military establishment ought to be compensated by an increase of perhaps 20 per cent in their retirement pay and in addition, reimbursed for Federal income tax payable on their full retirement pay.

For a limited period of time, say for five years, compensation for profits which they will forego should be paid also to arms manufacturers, many of whom may have to reconvert to the manufacture of other goods. And compensation ought to be paid also to Labor in order to facilitate relocation and retraining.

Compensation for losses, and even worse for profits that corporations will forego, would subject Congress to irresistible pressure from various interests if the compensation were paid by the Governments, and the very principle of compensation paid by the Governments might/therefore be strenuously opposed by Congress.

Compensation could, however, be paid out of an International Fund set up for the purpose<sup>and</sup>, according to rules set forth in its charter. The ordinary methods of bringing political pressure on Congress would not be applicable to this Fund and if American pressure groups should succeed in devising new methods of exerting pressure, at worst a somewhat bigger slice of compensation would fall to America's share.

The possibility of paying compensation might be essential also for making tariff reductions politically acceptable. Again compensation would have to be paid both to manufacturers who forego profits, and to Labor for relocation and retraining. But compensation paid to manufacturers need not amount to more than about 10 per cent of the actual increase in import volume that results from the tariff cut, since this amount would presumably about equal the loss in profit.

If provisions were made to pay adequate compensation to those who forego profits because of tariff cuts, Western Europe might move very fast toward<sup>a</sup> customs union. From the ensuing increase in trade and prosperity in Western Europe, the Soviet Union could derive great benefits once East-West trade gets under way.

The principle of compensation might also be essential for permitting the liberation of each colony at the appropriate time, for which<sup>the</sup> general political settlement may have to provide. Only very few colonies are profitable to the nations that hold them, but many colonies are profitable to certain groups of investors within those nations. In order to make the liberation of those colonies politically acceptable, the agreement should provide for paying of ample compensation by the Fund to those whose interests will be adversely affected by the liberation of any one colony.

Arms Cost and Economic Prosperity:

In the Soviet Union the population of the cities has risen from 27,000,000 in 1927 to about 80,000,000. Further rapid increase in the economic prosperity of the Soviet Union is possible only if the urban population will continue to increase at a fast rate. Today twenty or twenty-five per cent of the Soviet Union's national income is invested each year, but much of it is invested in facilities for arms production. Moreover, fifteen per cent perhaps of the Soviet Union's national income is currently spent for the production of arms and the maintenance of an increasingly mechanized Army.

The kind of disarmament which would permit the Soviet Union to reduce arms cost at an early date to the point where she could invest for the next ten years say thirty per cent of her national income in a productive manner would permit the Soviet Union to increase the take-home pay of the workers about ten per cent each year for the next ten years and an equally rapid increase in the standard of living of the rural population. The standard of living of the Russian people could double in seven to eight years. Clearly, such rapid and sustained increase in prosperity would contribute to the political security of the Government in the Soviet Union.

In the absence of a political settlement, the United States might have to spend in the next decade 46 billion dollars per year for direct military expenditures, for plant dispersal and above all for effective measures of civilian defense. If the United States can divert this amount into the right channels, then the American people could enjoy great benefits, depending on the channels into which the resources thus liberated would be directed. There is a political decision involved here which will be difficult to reach in America, and, in this respect, things are not going to be quite as simple for the United States as they might be for the Soviet Union.

The Federal Government could, for instance maintain a high level of taxation and just disburse \$46,000,000,000 each year by mailing every family each year a check for \$1,000.00 with the urgent request to please spend it. There are, of course, less unorthodox ways for achieving approximately the same result.

For the United States there are essentially three basic solutions:

- A. America can increase its civilian consumption;
- B. Consumption can be maintained and there could be a major increase in leisure. Leisure could take the form of, for instance, two months of additional paid vacations for everybody;
- C. America could export capital or purchase services abroad. Or she could give money away either in the form of foreign aid or in the form of payments to

certain international funds.

Any number of combinations of these three possibilities, could of course be also chosen:

For instance, extended paid vacations could lead to a major expansion of the resort industries and transportation facilities so that we might have a combination of increased consumption and increased leisure. Or, if arrangements were made to make it easy for a large number of vacationers to spend their vacations abroad, then we would have a combination of increased leisure and the purchase of services abroad.

In the absence of a political settlement, many of the nations would spend ten per cent of their national income on their military establishments. A political settlement, making it possible to disarm in the right manner, would enable these nations to invest this much each year, with the result that their standard of living could rise an additional three per cent per annum. Their standard of living would thus double every twenty-five years due to saving on arms expenditure alone.

#### POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

During the last war Wendell Willkie urged again and again that the United States should reach a post-war settlement with the Soviet Union while the war was still on and these two countries had a common enemy. Had that been done, the world would be a different place today.

To some extent the Hydrogen Bomb may be regarded as a common enemy of all nations. It would seem necessary now to reach a far-reaching political settlement that will also provide for disarmament rather than to disarm and eliminate the Strategic Air Forces and the bombs and then try to negotiate about each conflict subsequently as it arises.

Most, if not all, of the major conflicts that may arise in the next 50 years are foreseeable. If they are not disposed of in the agreement in one way or another, and are left to negotiations at the time when they become acute, they will be negotiated under the threat of abrogation by one or the other <sup>of the</sup> great powers involved and in the end they might lead to such an abrogation. Many issues can of course not be settled now in the sense that the settlement could be implemented today. But they can and must be settled in principle even though a far distant date may have to be set for their implementation.

There is no hope that America and the Soviet Union could arrive at an agreement that would provide for a procedure for the settlement of future conflicts. It would be much easier for them to agree on what the law should be in any one particular case than to agree on how the laws should be made. Perhaps the agreement to be written

should be a "50-year plan" that will make provisions for gradual changes in anticipation of the foreseeable issues that will become acute and that will have to be met one after the other.

This agreement cannot be a peace treaty in the ordinary sense of the word. It has to do more than postpone the war and thus has a problem to solve which has never been solved before.

Spheres of Influence, Yes and No; The Principle of Predetermined Gradualism:

Some of the old devices used in foreign policy may have to be used again, but they will have to be used with modifications.

After the second World War England and Russia tentatively reached an agreement providing for Rumania to be in the Russian sphere of influence and for Greece to be in the British sphere. President Roosevelt found the principle objectionable and therefore the agreement was not put into effect. Soon thereafter fighting started in Greece.

Reaching an agreement on spheres of influence is an old device in foreign policy which has not entirely lost its usefulness and within limits may be used again. We might have to agree on spheres of influence for a limited period of time, but we will have to attach a time schedule for the liberation of one area after another from "influence." A new device, the device of predetermined gradualism may be applied to this problem.

The framework for a general time schedule for the liberation of all areas, which are now under foreign domination, might be set by Great Britain. One might start out by asking Great Britain to submit a schedule stating for each colony at what date British power will be withdrawn from that colony. It is less important for a colony

whether it may look forward to its liberation in 25, 50 or even 75 years than it is to be able to look forward with certainty to the date at which they will be liberated and ~~to be able to~~ build up a civil service that will provide them with a governmental machinery that is capable of taking over.

The British know very well that they cannot keep their colonies forever. The earlier the date they are able to set for the liberation of any one colony, the less trouble they will have with the native population. People will fight for the abstract concept of freedom with great fervor but few people are willing to die for something that they know will come to pass within the foreseeable future -- whether they die for it or not.

Such a British schedule will make it easier to fix for all other dependent areas dates for their liberation.



It is conceivable that by the time an over-all agreement is reached there will be no Soviet troops left in Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, <sup>and</sup> Hungary.

This does not mean that these countries will revert to a parliamentary form of democracy or that they will change their governments or that their governments will fall under American influence. But once a country is free from occupation and does not have to fear that it may be reoccupied any day, it is essentially in the same situation as most of the countries which are not economically self-sufficient and depend on the cooperation and good will of one of the great powers. The governments of these powers may be sovereign, but they are not free. This situation will change only slowly as a world community will gradually be developed.

Germany:

That the over-all agreement must set up a united Germany is, I believe, a foregone conclusion. If disarmament goes as far as we have indicated it might go, and if machine guns are essentially the only mobile weapons available in unlimited quantity to the national governments in Europe, the issue of whether or not Germany should be neutral or be permitted to form alliances will be void of any tangible meaning and will be no obstacle to the unification of Germany. But what shall be done about the Eastern frontiers of Germany?

Clearly the political settlement which we are discussing will be satisfactory only if it eliminates the foreseeable causes of conflicts before those conflicts become acute. The issue of the Eastern frontier of Germany is almost certainly one on which sooner or later the whole German nation, without difference of party affiliation, will unite, and it would seem wise to dispose of this issue. Here the principle of predetermined gradualism might be applied. The over-all agreement could provide that Germany would obtain from Poland each year a 2-mile strip beyond the Oder-Neissa line until Germany has reacquired her pre-war territory in the East. Similarly, Poland might acquire a 2-mile strip each year on her Eastern frontier from the Ukraina so that she gains as much territory as she loses to Germany. Because these changes are slow, it should be possible to make available a very large sum for the relocation of each family that moves out of these <sup>two</sup> zones. The compensation may be set so high as to make the population desirous to move even before the scheduled time and to make the relocation provisions of the agreement politically acceptable to the governments involved.

The Remaining Controversial Issues:

The most acute controversial issues, such as Formosa, Korea and Indo-China are products of the cold war. Once a new setting is created in which a major war is unlikely to occur, the great powers need not be concerned just how these issues are settled, provided only that they are settled one way or another. The unfortunate people who happen to live in these areas may of course be vitally affected by the settlement and I do not know in what way their real interests should be taken into account. The wishes they might express in an election might have some relation to their real interests, or they might not.

Imaginative Study Needed:

The problems involved in a general political settlement that is supposed to last 50 years will have to be very carefully thought through. That new political devices will be needed to make the necessary changes politically acceptable can hardly be doubted. The type of settlement here envisaged has not been sketched here in sufficient detail to indicate the areas in which these new political devices may have to operate.

The settlement must lead to, and be instrumental in, creating an ordered world community. And only if a clear image of the functioning of such a world community can be presented can different political settlements that may be proposed be judged on their merits.

Depending on the type of settlement envisaged, the question of enforcement against nations who have no right to abrogate might have greater or lesser importance. If the settlement sets up rigid spheres of influence and if it is believed that the great powers would be able to <sup>and strengthen</sup> maintain/their influence, enforcement might not represent an urgent problem. Even if disarmament goes very far the great powers would still have enough arms left to keep order within their orbits.

But if the agreement provides for gradual withdrawal of influence and the gradual dissolution of the spheres of influence, then we have a very different situation. When atomic energy will be widely used for power production then if no enforceable provisions are made to the contrary, a number of smaller nations will end up with atomic bombs in their ~~arsenals~~, whether through open defiance or through secret evasion of the agreement. Thus we are more or less forced to face the issue of enforcement.

Enforcement:

The question of enforcing disarmament provisions cannot arise with respect to any nation who has the right to abrogate. But what about other nations? When is enforcement needed and how could it be accomplished?

What if one of the industrial nations who has no right to abrogate should arrest international inspectors or agents of any of the nations who have the right to abrogate, and there is suspicion that illicit manufacture of atomic bombs or means for their delivery has been started, or is about to start? Then clearly measures of enforcement will have to go into action, or else nations who have the right to abrogate will be forced to abrogate.

How shall enforcement take place in such a situation? Not by sanction against the offending nation, nor by war against the offending nation, but rather by arresting the officials personally responsible for the evasions.

How can such an arrest be effected and what organization should be responsible?

It seems to me better to avoid the setting up of a centralized international police force. Instead, in a few areas of the world -- to begin with perhaps in Europe, in Japan, in Brazil and Argentina -- there should be set up in each area a regional police force. Each such police force would be under the control of perhaps seven to eleven nations selected with the concurrence of the nations of the region and specifically named in the over-all agreement. The nations who have the right to abrogate would not be members of any of these regional organizations. The members should be rather selected with a view to allay the fear that the regional police might intervene in the internal affairs of any of the nations in the region.

The only function of the regional police force would be to arrest officials of a national government in the region, whom they hold responsible for dangerous evasions or violations of the agreement. In order to be able to do this, the regional police force must be more heavily armed than the police forces of any of the nations in the region so as to make sure that no national police force will be able to interfere with their operations. Could the regional police force be relied upon to take action if there are dangerous evasions?

Such evasions would presumably threaten the security of the member nations themselves who control the regional police force, and therefore it would seem likely that these nations could be relied on to take action for this reason alone. But they are likely to take action in any case for another reason: The majority of the member nations would want to keep the agreement in force, and if they permitted secret evasions to occur and to continue in their region, one of the great powers who has the right to abrogate would pretty soon be forced to abrogate.

Will the regional police forces safeguard the peace within the region? What will happen if one nation in the region sends her forces armed with machine guns (we assume no other weapons are available at this stage of disarmament, to any national government) across the frontiers of another neighboring nation within the same region?

In such a case, the regional police might intervene. But the decision to do so would rest with the nations which control it, which would presumably include many of the nations of the region. Since this kind of aggression might not endanger any of the great powers who have the right to abrogate and who might be geographically remote from the area of the conflict, there may be no real pressure for such intervention from any of the great powers. Thus, the regional police forces do not represent a fool-proof system of security. This defect might be mitigated perhaps by the proper selection for each region of the member nations for the control of the regional police force.

The regional police forces could not be counted upon to intervene in favor of established government in case of a revolution. Therefore the established governments that exist today and that rely heavily on the possession of tanks and guns in order to keep themselves in office might be reluctant to give up these weapons within the general framework of universal disarmament. This might, for instance, hold for Iran or Egypt and a number of other nations within the American sphere of influence. The problem might be solved by permitting these governments to retain these heavier arms, enough to protect them from their own population but not enough to resist the regional police. For how long shall they be permitted to retain these arms? Is 25 years enough?

In the long run, the general effect of this ~~system~~ system of security will be to make revolutions easier. This is perhaps not wholly desirable, but probably not preventable. Presumably the revolutionists will have no difficulty in obtaining all the machine guns they want and the established government will presumably be in possession of all the machine guns it can use. The outcome of the fighting, with machine guns plentiful on both sides, will presumably be determined by the organization and determination of the two fighting factions. The revolutionists might be Communists and they might be victorious, but this does not mean that the victorious government would necessarily be subservient to the Soviet Union or that it would remain subservient for long. In any case, the outcome of such revolutions has no bearing on the Soviet-American power balance in any meaningful sense in the age of the Atomic Stalemate.

Can a better security system be devised that might be acceptable in the near future to both America and the Soviet Union, than the one here described? This point would seem to deserve a thorough inquiry.

#### Conquests Without War:

Nothing so far said will, of course, prevent subversion. Just what is subversion? In the setting of the cold war, both America and the Soviet Union were eager to have, wherever possible, governments in office that would be subservient to them.

Subversion may be defined as the action of a nation that helps to bring about a change of government in another nation for the purpose of bringing into office a government that is subservient to the former, or at least not subservient to someone else. In this sense, one may say that the United States or Great Britain "subverted" Iran, which has now a government based on the support of the Army equipped with American tanks and guns. For us here the most relevant point about subversion is that both parties can play at this game.

It is not a good game from the point of view of the native populations. It would seem likely that if there is an over-all political settlement both America and the Soviet Union will be less interested in playing this game than they are today. But this point calls for a closer examination than I am able to provide at this time.

The problem would be far less troublesome if it were possible to establish stable native governments in underdeveloped areas. Unfortunately here we have come up against an unsolved problem that calls for a set of political inventions.

The parliamentary form of democracy is not suited for the self-government of undeveloped countries. There is little doubt that other forms of government could be devised which would be no less democratic, in any meaningful sense of the word, than the parliamentary form of democracy. And they could be far more suitable for undeveloped countries. Intellectual leadership in the West has been grossly remiss in neglecting this problem. As it is, there is a scarcity of ideas which makes practical experimentation impossible at present. But, if ideas were developed, as they certainly could be developed, and if Great Britain intends to give independence to some of her colonies within the next 25 years, those colonies could be used for cautious experimentation with ideas in this field.

#### Interdependence and Political Organization:

I have stressed the need for political inventions so much that I ought to give perhaps an example of a concrete political invention designed to solve a concrete political problem.

During the next 50 years the world will have to make progress from a setting in which war is unlikely toward an organized world community in which the waging of war will be impossible. The concept of creating some supernatural authority, in Europe first and later perhaps on a world scale is familiar to most people. The need ultimately to have a world government is frequently discussed even though it is not quite clear just what the functions of such a "government" should be.

If we wanted to move in a straight line towards some supernatural authority that will limit the sovereignty of the individual nations, we would have to sail against

the wind. Sailing against the wind may be possible, as everybody knows, but it requires taking an oblique approach. Is there such an approach towards a political organization that will reflect the interdependence of the nations?

The regions of the world where the interdependence of the nations is greatest today is in Europe. What the German Government does affects all her neighbors and what the French Government does affects all her neighbors. Yet this interdependence which exists in effect is not reflected/<sup>today</sup>in the political organization of Europe. Delegating bits of national sovereignty to some supra-national European authority is comparable to sailing straight against the wind which is not possible at all. What would be the oblique approach?

When a united Germany is created and Germany is about to decide on a constitution perhaps the German Constitutional Assembly could be persuaded to take the lead in this respect. Germany could reserve a number of seats in the German Parliament (to which the German Government will be responsible) for delegates from parliaments of the neighboring nations, who would be full members. The number of these foreign delegates could be initially quite small and increase slowly according to a fixed time schedule to perhaps 30 per cent of the total membership of the German parliament within about 25 years.)

Within a fixed number of years, the French, the Dutch, the Belgian, the Danes, etc. would have to adopt similar provisions or else those nations among them who fail to do so would lose their representation in the German Parliament.

What would be the result of this kind of political organization of Europe? I cannot spell this out in detail, but this much is clear: The governments would remain "sovereign" just as the administration of two corporations which happen to be controlled by the same shareholders are "independent." Yet if the same shareholder group controls both corporations, a merger could be accomplished any day when the shareholders decide upon it.

World Income Tax and Constitutional Amendments:

I may have been the first to propose -- in an article that appeared in May 1947 in the Saturday Review of Literature -- that if disarmament can be established through an international arrangements, nations may make annual contributions to an International Agency that would use these funds for developing the lesser industrialized nations. In the article I suggested that the contribution of the United States might be 7 to 15 billion dollars depending on the economic situation, and be lower during booms and higher during recessions. It seems that today there is general acceptance for the idea of using savings that result from the hoped for arms reduction for the industrial development of underdeveloped nations.

If this thought is taken seriously at all, one might think of implementing it by setting up a world income tax which would be contributed to by all nations, depending on the economic standard they have reached. In the United States for instance, the Government could collect a contribution to the world income tax along with the Federal income tax. The contribution towards the world income tax should have a very high personal exemption and a flat rate. The contribution of the other nations might be raised in a different manner, but should be computed on the basis of the same exemption (based on the per capita national income) and represent the same flat rate above the exempt level.

This and many other measures that might be provided for in the agreement under discussion, might make it necessary to pass Constitutional Amendments concomitant with ratification of the agreement. It is not easy to pass a Constitutional Amendment in America. But two Amendments that were passed within this century established prohibition and repealed prohibition. I seriously doubt that perennial peace can be obtained at a lesser price than we were willing to pay for regulating the drinking habits of people. And if we only live under the threat of the Hydrogen bomb long enough to understand what that threat means, we might be willing to pay this much of a price.