UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO
25th ANNIVERSARY ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Interview with Dr. John Galbraith
December 18, [1984]
Interviewer, Dr. Kathryn Ringrose

RINGROSE: On December eighteenth we locked ourselves in a faculty office here. I want to start with the period when you were chairman of the southern section of the Senate.

GALBRAITH: I was chairman of the division.

RINGROSE: The division.

GALBRAITH: There was a chairman of the southern section who was different.

RINGROSE: Oh, ok. Yeah, I better get straight.

GALBRAITH: The southern and northern sections at each campus had a chairman.

RINGROSE: Had, had a division within the section.

GALBRAITH: That's been abolished since 1963 I think it was.

RINGROSE: At that time, the plans obviously were going forward for UCSD, and faculty was being selected for the campus. And I think it would be interesting to have your perspective on the planning down here since you at that point were at UCLA.

GALBRAITH: I was the chairman of the budget committee before I was chairman of the Senate, so I had a good deal more to do with UCSD as a member and eventually chairman of the budget committee. The attitude of the budget committee in my opinion, maybe it wasn't representative of the campus but what is representative of the campus? There are different points of view. One was supportiveness of public development of the UCSD campus mixed with a bit of envy that UCSD was getting these highly paid luminaries and UCLA did not have the resources to compete. This was the UCLA line. Now I understand from the UCSD point of view it was held that these people were not being paid any more than what were being paid to top people at UCLA. That's an arguable matter. But I suspect that there was more money being put out per capita at UCSD than at UCLA but there was no disposition to try to block development of this campus. It was recognized that this was a major center and we had to expand. After all Clark Kerr had plans for nine [campuses] including San Francisco. And after 1965 he was talking about eleven. One intercity campus in Los Angeles and one intercity campus in San Francisco. So, the development of UCSD as an undergraduate/graduate institution was inevitable. There was nothing that could be done to stop that once it was given that we needed more campuses to accommodate the burgeoning student population.

RINGROSE: Did you, from UCLA's perspective, see this as essentially developing as a science campus

GALBRAITH: Yes. In fact, I think that Roger [Revelle] saw it developing as a science campus. I believe it not incorrect to say that Roger could visualize this as being the University's Caltech. But better, of course.

RINGROSE: But better, right. I get the impression that there was some discussion among the UCLA faculty about whether UCSD would pull its weight where undergraduates were concerned. Did that ever get to the budget committee or was that discussed in other places?

GALBRAITH: I think that attitude would be an attitude of individuals rather than—. I don't think there was that much notice being taken about UCSD. Louis Slichter opposed the development of the campus I believe and thought that the needs could be provided by UCLA. But that's Louis Slichter I could probably name several other people; George Mari the chairman of the statewide committee was involved in a recommendation that would have delayed the development of this as a burgeoning campus. I believe he didn't involve the idea that San Diego state might have a component.

RINGROSE: Well, there was a point, in fact [Clark] Kerr talks about this, when the offer was made to San Diego State that they would become the university down here. And that didn't go through for reasons that I think are internal to San Diego State.

GALBRAITH: Probably. Anyway, the attitude of people that were on committees at UCLA, the committees that related to the problem, was that they were not going to have a dog in the manger attitude toward San Diego that Berkeley had had to UCLA. And I think that was a pretty general attitude. There was a supportiveness of what Revelle was trying to do rather than obstructionism. I think that was generally true with the UCLA campus.

RINGROSE: When I look at some of the early planning, really early planning materials down here, it looks to me as though the original intention was for a very high-level collection of technical institutes. Science oriented.

GALBRAITH: That's right, in fact, they were calling them institutes not departments.

RINGROSE: With a few very talented, very mature graduate students.

GALBRAITH: Yes

RINGROSE: And then you watch the plan gradually moving over, you aren't going to have more graduate students, you're going to have some undergraduates, but they are going to be very select. And so, on and the place gradually develops in an undergraduate direction. And you know, what do you think was the stimulus for that move?

GALBRAITH: It's a response to an imperative that's been the view of our central administration.

RINGROSE: As opposed...

GALBRAITH: We had to have a large student population here because otherwise we would be turning away lots of students. And in fact, we are turning away lots of students now. The projections of population were excessively optimistic, as it turned out, and we had an excessively pessimistic prediction later on which caused them to shut down expansion, reduce capital improvements and so forth. But at the time that San Diego became a general campus it was a response, as I say, to the fact that there were a lot of people that had to be accommodated, a lot of undergraduate students and the existing six campuses could not accommodate them.

RINGROSE: So, could one safely say that the price that [Roger] Revelle had to pay for getting his high-level science campus was to agree to teach undergraduates?

GALBRAITH: Eventually, that's right. At first, it appeared that he might be able to develop a research institute which was an enlargement from Scripps [Institution of Oceanography] into other areas of the sciences. But, as I say, when you move toward 1960, and the planning of the all-university program, it was quite clear that Revelle would have to accommodate that. He couldn't have an elite group, but I think the second stage was to be a very small number of undergraduates, that was the intermediate stage.

RINGROSE: And they were going to be very, very careful in selecting...

GALBRAITH: An elite, yes.

RINGROSE: And when I talked with Jim Arnold, and he started talking about the first group of undergraduates indeed they were a highly select group. And the faculty almost loved them to death.

GALBRAITH: Yes. Revelle College in its nascent stage had a very high, on any basis you calculate it on, a very high level of undergraduates. I think it still does. If you compare the SAT's at Revelle with the Berkeley SAT's I think you would probably be at least even.

RINGROSE: But they are nothing like they were at the beginning.

GALBRAITH: No.

RINGROSE: I sat down and plotted them out once. It's a big change from what they were.

GALBRAITH: But they are still high by comparison. Pick any other campus: Los Angeles.

RINGROSE: So, the UCLA faculty who were involved in planning saw this and understood what was going on down here.

GALBRAITH: I think they did.

RINGROSE: Now were you also involved in the early plans for Irvine?

GALBRAITH: Yes, I was the chairman of the Irvine Advisory Committee. At the time I came down here I was the chairman of the Irvine Advisory Committee, and our function was to act as the budget committee and essentially mini-academic senate before the faculty arrives. So, the Irvine recommendations for faculty went through our committee. On the committee there were representatives from the other southern campuses. Carl Eckert was on the committee and there was a representative from Riverside, one from Santa Barbara. I guess that's it. The one from Santa Barbara never showed up but that committee set up ad hoc committees and acted as the budget committee and sometimes did both. We had a record of about one week from the submission of the application for an appointment to our recommendation for approval or disapproval. It was quite remarkable.

RINGROSE: That's very remarkable. Would you say that there was a tendency to sort of, you know, just to use UCSD and Irvine as an example, to treat these new campuses in the same way or were there significant differences in the way they were developing and the attitudes about them?

GALBRAITH: The character of the founding father at San Diego and the character of the founding father at Irvine were very different. Dan Aldrich was from an agricultural discipline; he'd been dean of agriculture. His ideas were to develop a major campus in terms of getting very good people but from the beginning enthusiastic. There's nobody more enthusiastic than Dan Aldrich when he has his mind made up—to develop a very large campus and he saw his faculty as being people who are involved in teaching and in research. Whereas our faculty, in first instance, came in with the research component almost exclusively. A big difference. So, the character of the campus was reflected to a great extent in the outlook and personality of the respective people who were involved in the first instance, Revelle and Aldrich. As the campuses have developed, they've moved toward each other. I don't mean one is going down and one is going up, but they moved toward each other.

RINGROSE: Right. No.

GALBRAITH: The Irvine campus is being very active in terms of fundraising. It's tapping into a very large Orange County population, and there's a lot of money up near Irvine.

RINGROSE: Sure, they're well situated.

GALBRAITH: And they're doing very well. Aldrich did very well and [Jack] Peltason did very well. And you can see similarities between the emphasis of [Richard] Atkinson and Peltason. They are both very actively promoting large contributions from private sources. That's almost a requirement for a presiding officer at the present time to be involved in massive fundraising.

RINGROSE: Even in a public institution?

GALBRAITH: ...around across the country, yes.

RINGROSE: It's a fairly new phenomenon. Is there anything else you would like to say about that early period, you know, I'm trying to fill in the blanks and the conversation you had with [Harry] Tuchmayer, in your UCLA interview...

GALBRAITH: The blanks. Well, I could tell you this is the personal side. It's really quite accidental that I would have to come down here in the first place. If my daughter had not been so obstructionist, she insisted that she wanted to finish high school and she didn't want to go with us to England. I had a sabbatical leave. I was going to take a year off.

RINGROSE: Is that really how it happened?

GALBRAITH: Yes, '63-'64 I would have been in England. And I wouldn't have been appointed to that committee. They went around to see the new university. A lot of things would have happened differently. So, I stayed on '63–'64 and this was the time when Herb [York] resigned.

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: And there was a place, there was an opening for a chancellor at Riverside. So that got me involved, I was on the committee to seek a successor to Herb, so he could turn up on committees. And the first choice of the committee as you might expect was Roger Revelle. There was a forlorn hope that maybe he might be appointed. The next choices, I can't give you them in order, a list, a short list, were Dean Rusk...

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: ...and George Bundy, who were in high favor at that time. That changed very drastically after the Vietnam War became a focus. Those were the people that the committee was recommending. I don't believe that Kerr ever considered those alternatives. In fact, Kerr told me that he could rely heavily on his selection in the first instance.

RINGROSE: So those possibilities never even went to the regents?

GALBRAITH: I don't think, no they didn't go to the regents.

RINGROSE: Now you had been down here as vice chancellor in '64.

GALBRAITH: I came down as vice chancellor on the first of July 1964 and Kerr's invitation to me in the first place was "why don't you go down there as vice chancellor?" And I said, "I don't want to go down as vice chancellor. I'm not prepared to commit myself to leaving the professorial activity for administration." And then he said "Why don't you go down for a year. We have an emergency situation." Which I think was true. So, I agreed to go down for a year and the seductions of office crept in and I became more and more involved from July up to whatever it was, September or October, when Kerr came down here. We had a conversation down at Scripps [Institution of Oceanography].

RINGROSE: It was kind of about November that things really started to move.

GALBRAITH: Well, the regents appointed me in November. Yeah, November—the regents meeting.

RINGROSE: Now, it seems to me looking at the paper that there was an enormous administrative job down here because there hadn't been much administrative building on the campus. It was a new campus and really it had only three years with a chancellor and still quite small.

GALBRAITH: That's right.

RINGROSE: Would you talk about how you developed the administrative structures down here?

GALBRAITH: Or how I didn't develop the administrative structures. We had very few people on the top rung available. Bob Biron, as you know, was appointed at the same time I was as vice chancellor. I didn't appoint Bob Biron, Kerr appointed Bob Biron.

RINGROSE: And he was a local person.

GALBRAITH: He was a local person, and he was very active in promoting the authorization of this campus. He was very actively involved with the citizens groups, and he had experience as a businessman, vice president of, oh what was the name of it... General Atomics.

RINGROSE: Yeah.

GALBRAITH: Before that, that airplane firm down in a down in...

RINGROSE: Was it Lockheed?

GALBRAITH: Not Lockheed.

RINGROSE: Yes, we both know what we are talking about, we'll sort that out.

GALBRAITH: Anyway, Bob Biron was vice chancellor. There was no other vice chancellor with no vice chancellor for academic affairs. And that was the slot which I felt was the most important to fill because I was acting as, in my early months, as chancellor and as vice chancellor, involving such things as approving or disapproving recommendations for appointments which takes a lot of time. There were a lot of appointments being made at that time. As I indicated to you, I did make an effort to get one of the stalwarts from this campus, that is vice chancellor, and I failed. Jim Arnold was my first choice, and he had the good sense to say no.

RINGROSE: He would have been a good V.C.

GALBRAITH: Anyway, eventually Carl Eckart became vice chancellor for academic affairs, and I sought to expand the academic area of administration by appointing [Robert D.] Tschirgi, to be vice chancellor for planning. This would be primarily leading to the college system, how we would develop that. And eventually Fred [Frederick T.] Wall, who was up in Santa Barbara as

the graduate dean, I selected to be, that is with the advice of the faculty committee, to be the vice chancellor for graduate studies and research. It would be a powerful job and these people were approved in March 1966. They would have been approved in February if it hadn't been for the fact that I had resigned at that time. So, they were approved February not March of 1966, and that was the top administration for the duration of my tenure.

RINGROSE: Now who was managing the money under York, how was that handled?

GALBRAITH: Jack, Jack Clark, who went off to Cal Arts was in charge of that, also Herman Johnson. But Jack Clark was primarily the person that was doing the control of the money. Herman Johnson was also involved in the business area, and he became an assistant essentially to Biron.

RINGROSE: That was a fairly new change. Was not, one of the things that Revelle talks about is the problems, of when he was running the institute of trying to manage the money essentially out of UCLA. His money was handled up there, and it was very difficult so that, then that shift must have been made with York...

GALBRAITH: Yes, right. We had a pretty inadequate financial structure to control the finances. But Biron shaped that up enough. Biron's a controversial character.

RINGROSE: Yes, it was a very unusual appointment, wasn't it?

GALBRAITH: Well, it was bound to be fraught with difficulties because Biron's view on the universities and the faculty's view on the universities were directly opposed. And the faculty detested Biron.

RINGROSE: Now this was more than, I know he was very conservative politically, but this was more than just his political conservatism? Did this have to do with what the university is all about?

GALBRAITH: Well yes, I'm speaking about his view, he was certainly not sympathetic to the manifestations of unrest around here.

RINGROSE: But I'm trying to pin this down a little bit more. Perhaps he felt the purpose of the university is oriented toward educating undergraduates or, or…?

GALBRAITH: Well, I don't think he thought that much in those terms.

RINGROSE: I'm trying to see a little more specifically where the conflicts might have been.

GALBRAITH: He came in at the time that faculty, depending on your point of view, were at their best or at their worst. I regard the faculty who were the noisy element as being highly irresponsible people, who took no risks whatsoever and involved the campus in difficulties with the community which I thought were unnecessary. That may make me appear to be a conservative, which I suppose in a way I am. But here I was as the Chancellor defending these

people before the community, and the community's regarding me as the person who was setting the tone of the campus. It's a very interesting position to be in if I may use a passive adjective. Although some of the things they did were really not worthy of a mature person. And I don't have to quit to tell you that...

RINGROSE: No, no those...

GALBRAITH: ...some of these people are still around.

RINGROSE: And I think for some of them there's a certain embarrassment about it at this point.

GALBRAITH: They don't like to talk about it.

RINGROSE: They don't like to talk about it. No. But those were times when I think lots of people got very, very tied up in the moralities of things.

GALBRAITH: When I left in 1968, I got quite a few over the four years I was here, quite a few anonymous communications and there was one anonymous postcard which said something to the effect, "Three terrible things happened in nineteen hundred and seventeen: the United States entered World War I, the communist revolution broke out, and you were born." You can read an awful lot into that, sick hate. But anyway, now the University is regarded with great respect by the community. There are very few· people who seem anti-university point of view. It's remarkable how that has changed.

RINGROSE: It is. And I think that's a fairly recent change I think when we came out here in the early seventies you still felt a lot of hostility among a certain kind of old guard, about the university and we've been watching that change. It's been good to see. You said that you developed camp Matthews as a staging area for the new colleges. I'd like you to talk about that and about the college system and how you worked that out because it's a very complex structure. It would have been a lot easier, I'm sure, to develop UCSD in a conventional manner, wouldn't it?

GALBRAITH: To develop UCSD in a conventional manner...

RINGROSE: Well, the way Irvine...

GALBRAITH: ...would have made it very difficult to have the college system working very well. Because in the conventional manner you get a building and then you get another building. There's a spacing of years. What Matthews represented to me and to Harry Wellman, who had a great deal to do with this, was an opportunity to have students housed and going to class in these ex-Marine Corp barracks at a minimal cost. Renovation of camp Matthews was nothing like what it would take to build a building. And we provided residential accommodations, you've seen these wooden housing units down there. The idea was that with these students being in Matthews for three year or so we would have a basis for building a college all at one time. A college should have a unity, it should be relating to the fact that it has a distinctive identity which

is rather difficult to do if you are building a building at a time. Now you might say that Revelle college has a distinctive character, we'll never build another Revelle college.

RINGROSE: In fact, it was built essentially all at one time.

GALBRAITH: Yes, right. So that's the basis on which the state authorized us to renovate Matthews. The state recognized that it was a good deal. Whoever the state was at that time. The director of finance, that was the [Gov. Edmund G.] Brown administration at the time of the beginning and they were perhaps more supportive than Brown's successor. I've forgotten who he was. Ah, the actor, I guess. Anyway, that was, that was a step and that's how Muir got built as a unit through the fact that we had these students in Matthews for that period of time. And the idea was Third college was going to be the same way, and it has worked. There were a lot of people at UCSD who thought that it was, that the best thing to do with Matthews was to demolish it, that it was an eyesore. I think what happened turned out to be quite attractive. A lot of people over in Matthews would rather be there than any of these big cement buildings.

RINGROSE: Do you think it's going to continue to be used as a staging area in that way or that it's just going to be Warren college forever with patches on it?

GALBRAITH: Well, the agreement no longer holds with the freeze on capital money. That changed the whole character of the thing, no longer getting these large amounts for a college. So, I hope that it's not going to be the Warren campus indefinitely. I hope it's going to be Warren elsewhere and I hope they'll go back to calling it Matthews. Matthews represents the link with the occupants before, Warren doesn't mean a thing as far as that area is concerned.

RINGROSE: And you also were responsible for developing a number of departments... you worked on some.

GALBRAITH: I was responsible for developing some departments and John Stewart was responsible for developing others. The history department was nonexistent, there was no historian on campus. There was a committee meeting which was seeking a chairman for the history department. The committee in my opinion committed a capital crime by the way it proceeded. It sent out broadcasts around the country asking people if they would be interested in being chairman of the history department at UCSD. A lot of my friends were invited to respond. And a lot of these people took the letter and went to the administration and said, "Here I am an author," which was not true but that's what they did. And this spread around the country that UCSD was asking all these people to be chairman and it made it a very, very difficult task to find anybody who would take it. UCSD was just regarded as a nothing and a no prospect campus for a historian. We didn't have library resources and what would be the reason to go down aside from getting money for it. There are people who will do that, but generally speaking the best are going to ask questions beyond what's the salary.

RINGROSE: But you are absolutely right, I mean it was just in the profession it was seen as a bit of a joke, what was going on out here.

GALBRAITH: So that carried over, into the time I was here. We didn't have a chairman as I mentioned to you on those previous occasions. We had three— We had two people that had been appointed, neither of whom should have been chairman for different reasons. Geoffrey Barraclough was the first appointment, an outstanding historian. And Gabe [Gabriel] Jackson. Gabe was an excellent historian, but he wasn't the chairman type. We wanted Leftonsta Rianos as the third and for reasons which were not entirely clear, but which involved his disinclination to come down because of the antipathy for a relative I believe, in the San Diego area.

RINGROSE: He's mentioned that there really were personal reasons of that sort for their not making the move at that time.

GALBRAITH: But he might possibly have been a chairman, I don't know. But nevertheless, he decided to stay at Northwestern.

RINGROSE: And his wife had a career at Northwestern.

GALBRAITH: Yes, that's right. So, throughout the period up to '68 we had people essentially rotating as acting chairman, though they did quite call it that. [Samuel] Baron was chairman for a year or so, Gabe took the chairmanship about the time that you came in, before [Ramon] Ruiz.

RINGROSE: Ruiz was chairman when we came in.

GALBRAITH: Ok. Then before him then I think Jackson was chairman for a while.

RINGROSE: I know that he was chairman, I'm not absolutely sure what the chronology was before we came.

GALBRAITH: Anyway, there was no chairman who had the attributes of what a chairman should be prior to Ruiz.

RINGROSE: Now did you, did you personally select any of these people or...

GALBRAITH: I personally selected Barraclough and Jackson. And these two then proceeded to make a search for other people and they got involved with [Guillermo] Céspedes' appointment. Of course, I had to approve that they initially came from Jackson and Barraclough, Céspedes, [Stanley A.] Chodorow.

GALBRAITH: That was a little later, a little later. In the first group it was Céspedes and Baron and Curtis Wilson who was at St. John's in New Mexico. Those were the initial and Chodorow came in later and also Franz Nauen. These were all involved with people who had come into the history department, I didn't interfere with the history department. It was not my job to sit there in department meetings and say I think you should do this or do that. It was not an entirely satisfactory situation and I think that certainly transformed. Mike Parrish by the way was appointed in '68 that was the last year I was here I was appointed and who else.

RINGROSE: I think [Robert C.] Ritchie came at that point.

GALBRAITH: I'm not sure about Ritchie, Harry Scheiber, I think maybe.

RINGROSE: Might have been, might have been the year after...

GALBRAITH: Yes, I think it was after.

RINGROSE: ...you were here.

GALBRAITH: But they were, they came in about that time. But Harry was appointed and came here in '68. And maybe Scheiber, was here. I think he was here.

RINGROSE: But we were talking earlier about the department and the fact that it was slow developing as a department.

GALBRAITH: Well, there were a variety of reasons for that. Perhaps it would have been better to start out with a larger component of younger people.

RINGROSE: But that wasn't the UCSD pattern.

GALBRAITH: No, it wasn't, right. Well, that was the first department then the other departments did have chairmen from the beginning. We didn't have that problem of that albatross around our neck with regard to anthropology, Mel [Melford E.] Spiro became the chairman. I think he's created an outstanding department. I believe it's one of the best of the humanities. And Joe Gusfield was recommended by Fred Wall who had known him at the University of Illinois. And I think he came, he had very good credentials too. I don't know very much about sociology. Sociology has its own characteristics. I think it's a respectable department...

RINGROSE: Now, was there a plan to the order in which you started departments like this? I've never been sure of that.

GALBRAITH: That had to do perhaps with my sense of priorities. We had in mind a political science department, but I didn't think it had the same degree of urgency as a history department or anthropology or sociology department. Political science is a field that touches history in a way I suppose. We had in mind the next chairman to be from political science.

RINGROSE: Ah...

GALBRAITH: It was somebody, I think Falk from Princeton was the one that the faculty had recommended. We got Richard Falk.

RINGROSE: So, this was a matter of thinking in terms of undergraduate needs?

GALBRAITH: Yes.

RINGROSE: Essentially developing an undergraduate curriculum and these were the courses you needed to staff.

GALBRAITH: With people with the same characteristics as scholars though that we had been looking for in the first place. We were not looking for a person primarily in terms of his undergraduate teaching ability. We were looking for a person with considerable ability demonstrated by his research to be a member of these departments. And I think we have done that over the years and still do.

RINGROSE: And your choice of departments, you are making very conservative departments. You're starting or choices of departments, you're starting your very traditional, I mean old line, philosophy...

GALBRAITH: Irvine did not do that. And I think that the fact that they didn't do it was responsible for a real mess on the Irvine campus.

RINGROSE: Oh really? I don't know anything about that.

GALBRAITH: They appointed, I think Ivan Enderoc would admit this, I've forgotten the man's name, he wanted to have a school of social science. Taking everything. And his view of social science was going to be... his personal view was going to infuse that whole school. It didn't work and he went off to Stanford and he's up there now. I don't think he created anything up there, he's working with the political science department. You can make… you can throw dice, of course and develop another institution, it's going to be a department. Whatever you want to call it. That's the way our university is structured. The efforts that have been made to break away from that departmental structure, have uniformly lasted about two to three years and then they succumb. Like Joe, Joe what's his name? I've forgotten his name. Who had us develop an integrated program across the departmental lines up at Berkeley? Mustine did one up at Berkeley. But they don't last.

RINGROSE: That's true and everyone notices. Many people have remarked about that where this campus is concerned, that interdisciplinary programs just don't seem to thrive down here. And everyone pays lip-service to the fact that we ought to have them. That there is something wrong with us if we don't have more interdisciplinary programs.

GALBRAITH: Well, they do perform a good function if the people are willing to work at it and recognize that it may not be to their academic interest in shaking things up for a while.

RINGROSE: Now some people see this as related to the college structure and I'm wondering if you'd comment on that. They suggest that the original college plan was designed to foster interdisciplinary work within colleges.

GALBRAITH: The original plan for first college, for Revelle college, envisaged a great tight curriculum which was across departmental lines. The humanities program was involved from the beginning and the integration of humanities and science which was envisaged was in the original plan. And the options of students were very, very restricted. And the linguistics programs, I think they had to learn to speak the language, that was very ambitious. That didn't really reflect the character of undergraduates that we were getting even in the first instances.

This place was a real grind to the students if you read the comments of that first freshmen class. The fact that they are just working all the time to stay afloat.

RINGROSE: Jim Arnold makes some marvelous comments in the interview I did with him about this. You know they loved them to death, they were so excited to finally have students. And have such bright students, that they just kind of were all over them.

GALBRAITH: Well, the students developed neurological problems in the process by being loved to death. Well, the colleges were supposed to do that, yes. Whether they are doing it is a matter of argument. Obviously, the Muir program is somewhat different from the Revelle program. And it is primarily, I think it would be fair to say, primarily under the lower division programs which show distinctive identity. Muir's lower division is somewhat different from Revelle's. Third is different from fourth. Maybe that's the way it is but departments do crib and confine options.

RINGROSE: Well, one of the things that several people have observed, and I'm curious to see what you think about this, is that it seems that initially, well let me back up a minute. A faculty will group itself into clusters, in one way or another within an institution. And the original hope was that the faculty would group itself into clusters by college. And yet...

GALBRAITH: It was a forlorn hope. That no one...

RINGROSE: It was a forlorn... and yet ultimately it has done what happens everywhere else the faculty has grouped itself by discipline. And several people have speculated about why this should be so and there are the obvious reasons that your very existence in the profession almost depends on the fact that you...

GALBRAITH: Your career is dependent on what your colleagues in your discipline think of you.

RINGROSE: As opposed to someone in literature who has similar interest but never could, so write you a letter. And this seems to be the answer that everyone comes down to and I, and I wondered if you would agree with this or have some other ideas about why we have ultimately evolved in this very traditional direction.

GALBRAITH: The people who came into universities in the sixties were, I think, probably the most spoiled generation of academics. And certainly, in living memory. They were courted by universities, offered inducements financially and the competition was as great as the competition for the really top students. More so maybe. And they came to the university feeling that they were doing the university a favor. And I'm not speaking just about here, I'm speaking generally. I know from what I've seen of other campuses that it's the same way. There was no particular allegiance to the university. The allegiance was to self and self-writ-large was the department.

RINGROSE: And the profession.

GALBRAITH: It wasn't always that way. There were faculty members in the previous era who had different sets, of course, of priorities, but obviously wanted to advance themselves. But there was a feeling of commitment to the institution. It was a privilege for them to be in the institution, so forth and so on. There was a great deal more of this back and forth among departments then, in my opinion, than there has been since the sixties despite these efforts. I can't remember Joe's last name. He really put a tremendous amount of effort into that college of his. But the departments' evaluations of these people were affected adversely by their being involved in this kind of... You can't keep people very long under these circumstances. They resign. So, it is partly a matter of a structure, or maybe it's the inertia, I don't know, that works with the whole whatever the force is against interdisciplinary activity.

RINGROSE: Well, it is certainly true that the techniques for evaluating faculty have changed over the years.

GALBRAITH: Yes, that's right.

RINGROSE: And this is something administrations have bought into, too.

GALBRAITH: Administrations have compounded the felony. Administrators complain that the faculty don’t show much inclination to deal with freshmen undergraduates, that they want to concentrate on research and graduate students. Well, that's the monster that our Frankenstein produced. The administration that always complains about all these things is still busy bringing in people with precisely the characteristics they deplore.

RINGROSE: If they are going to take the books and weight them on a scale...

GALBRAITH: Exactly.

RINGROSE: ...people are going to try to write more books to put on the scale.

GALBRAITH: That's right, that's what they help to create.

RINGROSE: One of the things that went on during your time as chancellor that you didn't discuss in the UCLA interview and that I think is very interesting has to do with the negotiations for the purchase of Black Farms property. I am only beginning to get anywhere near the bottom of everything that was going on. Black Farms. The relationship between Mr. Black and [Edwin W.] Pauley, Regent Pauley. The problems with John Stull. Then there was the later investigation that Reagan made into the price that was paid for the property. Someone named Tom Gibson supposedly came down and looked into all of that. And it is very clear that as chancellor this must have been very difficult to deal with and a lot of it was aimed at you and reflected the times. But what was really going on there?

GALBRAITH: Ah, I can't say very much in terms of direct knowledge. It isn't that I'm disinclined to say anything, but it is a fact that I did not have direct knowledge. In the division of authority, well of course the regents are always the ultimate authority, but in particular the regents have jealously kept to themselves the matter of real estate. This is not, it is not now and was not...

[END PART ONE, BEGIN PART TWO]

RINGROSE: So, chancellors...

GALBRAITH: Chancellors had no authority whatsoever in the real estate area, acquisitions real estate. That is the province of the regents and of the Regents' Committee in particular. That's the appropriate committee and the treasurer working for these regents. I met Bill Black, Senior, only once. We, Bob Biron, and I went down to see him before the negotiations started.

RINGROSE: Now there—

GALBRAITH: We did that on our own. That was not authorized by the regents, and we could not make any deals with Bill Black, and he recognized that.

RINGROSE: There had been interest in the property to predate your time as chancellor.

GALBRAITH: Oh, yes. And Mark Herd told me that the university freely was very much interested in this property as an equivalent of the Irvine inclusion area.

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: Irvine, as you know, has an inclusion area which can be used for different purposes than strictly academic. If they wanted to build faculty housing, they could do that. The Black Farms or the La Jolla Farms offered a very desirable area that could be developed for purposes which were not quite the same as those on campus. There are a lot of vacant lots, there were some beautiful properties; but the knoll particularly is probably one of the best properties in Southern California, certainly the best undeveloped property. I hope it stays undeveloped. But anyway, Bob Hammond negotiated with Black and the arrangements that were made were not referred to us at all. We had no knowledge whatsoever of the details, of the negotiation price or any such thing. Now you mentioned John Stull, this brings John Stull into the picture. John Stull was friendly prior to the Black Farms purchase. He was friendly up till the news came out of the intending closure of the deal. John Stull called me from the airport. He was very irate, and he wanted details on what had taken place. I said 'Well, why don't you come out and we'll have a drink and talk about this.' This was when I was living on Green Tree Lane before the University Housing. He came out and he asked me questions about what does this involve in terms of the protection of the residents and the risk as we go down the line, price of this and that. I said I didn't know. And his conclusion was that I was stonewalling. So, this is the case where the chancellor takes the heat.

RINGROSE: And you could understand his thinking, you ought to know, and I can also, given how the regents operate understanding you’re not knowing.

GALBRAITH: I can understand that. Sure, anyway. I told the regents that they were going to get quite a lot of negative effect from all this. Not just the residents would be irate, a lot of other people would be irate. And that was dismissed out of hand. I remember Ed Carter saying it was ridiculous. What I was saying was you'd better try to carry on a campaign to explain these things

to people to the best of your ability. They didn't do it. But we tried to move into the matter in terms of getting information to the residents. We talked; our administration talked to the residents. But without any authority to do anything beyond just saying well we'll refer this up to the regents.

RINGROSE: Now at this point about perhaps a fifth of the properties had been sold. Right? The Farms area.

GALBRAITH: About that I'll bet.

RINGROSE: And it was presumably covenanted property and there was the use of the horse track and...

GALBRAITH: Well, that's what the residents thought. That's what the residents thought.

RINGROSE: ...and the private beach and so on.

GALBRAITH: That was in the brochure, but it wasn't in the legal document by which the person acquired the property.

RINGROSE: I see. Ok.

GALBRAITH: That's a small detail. I mean they had no rights whatsoever. The person that they should have been focusing their attention on was Bill Black Sr.

RINGROSE: Bill Black, yes.

GALBRAITH: Who essentially sold them out. He didn't carry through the promises that were being made in the brochure which attracted these people.

RINGROSE: Because I've seen that brochure and it's very clear...

GALBRAITH: Yes, oh it is.

RINGROSE: ...exactly what they thought they were getting.

GALBRAITH: But the document, the transfer doesn't have any such records. That wasn't just accidental.

RINGROSE: But he probably couldn't have gotten away with selling that property to anything but some kind of a big state institution.

GALBRAITH: Well, I think that's probably right. Not on my estimate. And he wanted money then. Of course, it was made impossible for his son to live very well. That's a lot of money there. I think I mentioned to you that as far as the house was concerned, which the chancellor occupies, we could have had it for nothing.

RINGROSE: Now when, how did you learn this?

GALBRAITH: Clark Kerr informed me, I think it was Clark Kerr, that Black who was a good friend of Ed Pauley, had offered the house and the contents to the university. And Pauley for reasons that remain obscure did not refer this to the full Board of Regents.

RINGROSE: Would this have been part of the land deal? Or a separate... this was a separate thing.

GALBRAITH: No, it was separate. It was before the land deal. It was strictly the house that was involved. Now when the land deal went through the valuation of that house raised a lot of anger. I forgot what it was valued at but five acres and so forth and so on. It was up in the millions somewhere. And people were saying they are buying a house for the chancellor. He's going to live in oriental splendor up there. Of course, no chancellor has ever lived there, or any interest. Mind you, I don't like the house particularly. But that became a symbol of the extravagance of the university. And of course, that relates in a way to these workmen who were building the mailbox with the representation of the library on top. That was John Stull's supporter who was taking the pictures of this sort of thing. They were out to do anything they could to embarrass the university. Now how do you embarrass the university? You embarrass the university representative on the spot. You don't embarrass the regents.

RINGROSE: Now Stull, you said that Stull really made a very sudden turnaround and his...

GALBRAITH: Oh yes.

RINGROSE: ...attitudes toward the university. And it has looked to me as though he was working on behalf of real estate interests that perhaps his arguments involved taking real estate off the tax rolls. And well, what do you think his real motives were?

GALBRAITH: I think his dominant motive was peak resentment, anger bordering on fury that he had not been informed. This was his area and he felt that he should have been informed. And his espousal of the rights of the residents was politically in his interest. And his denunciations of the subversive activities, so called on campuses, was also in his interest. Now he hadn't been doing that prior to the Black Farms negotiations being completed.

RINGROSE: I never really put it all together, but it's right after that he starts watching the flags go up and down the flag poles and all of that.

GALBRAITH: Oh, that's right.

RINGROSE: And all of that kind of business that there is a real harassment that starts going on.

GALBRAITH: The whole San Diego delegation prior to that time had been supportive of the university despite the activities on this campus because it was our university, San Diego's university. And they wanted it to grow and prosper. In the ways that they thought proper. Pete

Wilson, Clair Burgener, the whole delegation, Jack Schrade who is a neanderthal. Right. Never criticized the university, in fact, he didn't even after the Black Farms matter. He was in the Senate. And they were, they represented a very strong lobby for the University. Very strong indeed.

RINGROSE: Now it is clear there were some fairly important and very vocal people that lived on the Farms at the time.

GALBRAITH: Yes.

RINGROSE: What did they stand to lose? It seems to me that I saw something about some kind of a right of first refusal written into those contracts if they ever sold their properties. There's something, wasn't there something like that that went on?

GALBRAITH: I'm not aware of that, maybe but I don't really know. I don't think so. But nevertheless, they were fearful that the value of their property would be reduced by what the university was going to do. What was the university going to do with this property? How is it going to affect our lifestyle? Well, it's the same issue that's permeated the so-called Black Horse.

RINGROSE: Right, I was about to say what we are really saying here is nothing has changed.

GALBRAITH: Now I can accept a share of the responsibility because during my last year we worked out a plan for the Black Horse ridings. It wasn’t called Black Horse Farm; it was just called the ridings.

RINGROSE: The ridings, the stables.

GALBRAITH: Yes, right. We had a plan. This was at the time we were thinking very big about theater. And Michael Langham had agreed to be the director of the theater. And a very well-known Chicago architect was selected by the name of Goldberg.

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: And Langham and Goldberg had a love feast working on the great theater which had among its other attributes a very very high price tag. Eventually came out to about seven million, something like that. Maybe a little bit more than seven million. But seven million was worth seven million.

RINGROSE: That's a lot for a theater.

GALBRAITH: A big. But what we were talking about, prior to that time, was about three million. Robert Peterson supplanted Marion Longster, much to her distress. And justifiably so. And we thought he would be a great fundraiser. After all he had a lot of money himself. And he became part of the threesome. That this great theater, a very large theater much larger than Mandeville actually.

RINGROSE: Now I guess it was the plans were written up in major theater magazines and it was...

GALBRAITH: Oh yes. There are these plans. They exist. Anyway, we couldn't come anywhere near seven million dollars. And the thing lapsed, but one of the things that spun-off from that was Mandel/Weisse because part of the money that the theater and arts foundation got came from this Zoro Ranch, which was decreed to be an illegal arrangement.

RINGROSE: This was the Templeton Foundation properties...

GALBRAITH: That's right.

RINGROSE: ...which is also an interesting story...

GALBRAITH: That involves Bob Peterson too.

RINGROSE: ... in itself.

GALBRAITH: But anyway, they got that money as part of their component. Somehow the other half of the money dropped out, the original arrangement was that the Theater Arts Foundation would put up a million and a half, which they didn't have. And the University would put up a million and a half from fees. And I don't know how students would have reacted to that. But it would be three million dollars, well we didn't have the three million dollars much less the seven so this was a real fiasco. Well relating to this, that's related to what we were planning for the horse area. We'd have the theater over there and across the highway from the theater there would be a parking building.

RINGROSE: Very sensible plan.

GALBRAITH: Parking building and we'd have an overpass over to the theater. And then we would have a small shop related to students. Does this sound familiar?

RINGROSE: It sounds terribly familiar!

GALBRAITH: All shops related to students in that area. We weren't talking about hotel rooms or anything like that. And that was, that never came up to the light because at the time that I left it was still, well a hole had been blown in it by the fact that it didn't have a theater. But it would have been wonderful to have a theater there.

RINGROSE: Oh, I'll bet right now the people who live, the neighbors would give anything to have that instead of what they are ultimately going to get.

GALBRAITH: Well, they hated it then anyway, they would have hated it if it had been publicized. We never got to the point where the plan was ever formalized. Then Bill McGill came in about that time and the plan essentially, Bill had other preoccupations, and that went by the

boards until now, before Dick Atkinson was the beneficiary of the outrage. Did I get off of the subject?

RINGROSE: No, no you really didn't, that whole business is very important to the campus community relations. La Jolla is a funny community.

GALBRAITH: Is it a community? Is it what they call, what is it, a good address? I suppose there is a community there somewhere. It's mostly refugees, a lot of them are refugees from Texas and various other areas of the country. Community to me connotes an area where people have taken root and are maybe part of the environment rather than having recent associations with other places where they made their money and so forth. La Jolla has a lot of money they say but it doesn't show up very much in terms of what they contribute. There are some exceptions. Cecil Green, of course did contribute very handsomely to Scripps. Naming Cecil Green though where do you go from there, there's not that much money that's being made available. But maybe that will be proved to be wrong with our thirty million. I don't know how that's going.

RINGROSE: Earlier, you mentioned that Regent Pauley didn't take the offer of the house to the regents.

GALBRAITH: That's right.

RINGROSE: And Pauley is...

GALBRAITH: It's hard to believe but that seems to be it.

RINGROSE: Pauley is a very enigmatic figure in the whole founding of UCSD. He was so opposed to it. It comes up again and again. And I wondered if you had any comments you wanted to make about that.

GALBRAITH: Pauley was in the tradition of the dominant chair or chairman of the regents. He succeeded another individual who dominated the regents. He was the lawyer of the first...

RINGROSE: Yes, I can't remember his name either.

GALBRAITH: ...involved with loyalty...

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: Anyway...

RINGROSE: It's not on the top of my brain right now.

GALBRAITH: Anyway, he was that kind of a Regent. And when he passed off the regents, Pauley became the power. Looking at Pauley, at the time that I observed Pauley, I wondered how he had all of that power. The man seemed to be on his last legs. He very rarely had much to say. He came in obviously a crippled individual, whatever it was that he had wrong with him. And you thought, well, this man doesn't have much time to live. Where is all of this energy

coming from? Well apparently, it was there. It's remarkable that he was able to exercise such influence over people who were themselves very strong-minded individuals. These were not just cream puffs that were sitting around. They were powerful people. Buff Chandler was not an insignificant personality, she was a powerhouse.

RINGROSE: She tended to side with him on a lot of issues.

GALBRAITH: Yes, that's part of the problem, I guess. That Ed Carter, Buffy Chandler, the Los Angeles regents, represented a caucus essentially which worked on the UCLA issues.

RINGROSE: You make the comment in your interview for UCLA that Chancellor [Franklin] Murphy seems to have been able to tap into that.

GALBRAITH: He had that power base. We had nothing. By the way, DeWitt Higgs was admirable, he was not a San Diego Regent. He was a University Regent. But that wasn't the way the UCLA people played it. The Los Angeles component backed the nationalism of Murphy. It was a very, very strong combination which Kerr could not resist. They were too much for Kerr. We got our regent as a consequence of this resignation issue. Pat Brown promised that we'd have a San Diego Regent, that was part of the inducement for me to remove my resignation. That one regent of course doesn't really provide much in the way of clout, whoever that regent might be.

RINGROSE: Well, Higgs was admirable because he managed to get along with those people.

GALBRAITH: Yes.

RINGROSE: Which I find truly remarkable.

GALBRAITH: Yes, he was a very good Regent. But we don't have a plaque...

RINGROSE: Well, I, leaving Regent Pauley aside, you know everything I've read about Regent Chandler inclines me to feel like she is a good person.

GALBRAITH: She is. But she's also a person who when she has something in mind is single-minded, forceful and works for the good. At the same time, she is intolerant of anybody getting in her way. She is a “madam theater” in Los Angeles. She twisted arms and they got lots of money from people because of Buff Chandler's importuning is not quite it, it's not strong enough. They were putting the arm on people.

RINGROSE: Now she... Was she supportive of the theater effort down here?

GALBRAITH: Yes.

RINGROSE: She was.

GALBRAITH: But not in terms of money.

RINGROSE: But not supportive enough.

GALBRAITH: We tried to get Norton Simon to get interested in the theater. And we were going to put Gregory Peck on, and Norton Simon made it clear that he didn't want anything to do with the theater. I thought, you know, that he was so much of an ego maniac that he'd love to have a theater named for him.

RINGROSE: Well, the impression that I get, that I got talking to other people about the whole theater issue was that the community down here was not really united about the style of theater they wanted.

GALBRAITH: Oh, there's the Old Globe. The Old Globe regarded this theater as menace.

RINGROSE: Well but there was also a kind of community campus split about what kind of a theater this would be.

GALBRAITH: Yeah, but I didn't see that manifestation so much as the Old Globe feelings of concern. Greg Noll and company came out on several occasions and voiced their fears. This theater was going to be doing Shakespeare, it would be drawing away from the Old Globe and I can understand its point of view. Our response to that it was going to make both better. The elements, they work together actually. I think probably that would have been the case. But the Old Globe constituency, they had a very strong constituency, were not supportive of the University's ideas for the theater. That was one of the factors in the inability to raise funds because these people were not just passive, they were negative.

RINGROSE: Well, it's a shame, that was a really fine opportunity that got away...

GALBRAITH: Yes, that's right.

RINGROSE: Almost killed by an excess of enthusiasm. At least that's the impression I get when I read some of the other things that people have said about it.

GALBRAITH: That's right the enthusiasm was not matched by the resources.

RINGROSE: Now at the time you were Chancellor the community plan was also starting to develop and certainly it was not the community plan that we have now. But initially the hope was that some kind of an integrated plan for this area could be developed, and we all know that's pretty much gone by the boards. I'm curious to know where things were when you were Chancellor and, and what you envisioned for this area. What people had hoped to do here.

GALBRAITH: The original community plan involved a development of industries, light industries, non-smokestack industries. High technology industries which would relate to the University's eminence in the scientific field. That's still of course involved. It also involved the University having, if not a veto, a right-of-participation in changes that would be made in the plan. The original plan had as part of it the development of what is now called the La Jolla Village as a place which would relate to the University. Residential apartments which would be

within the means of the faculty and students. That was still the way it was in the sixties. There was a golden triangle that was not in the picture at all at that particular time. Somewhere this original agreement was ignored or broken, whatever you want to call it, by the city which was subject to very strong pressures from the developers. My impression is that the city ignored protest from either or both the chancellor and the faculty. The faculty committee was supposed to be overseeing this and I know that they did protest. But that wasn't considered, apparently, seriously by the city. But that was something which was not part of the sixties, as far as I know, especially in 1968. There was a very close liaison between us and UCSD and the mayor and the city manager.

RINGROSE: My impression is that it was continued through the McGill administration so I think this must have pretty much fallen apart on Chancellor McElroy. Though one could suggest that it may have been related to the loss of prestige that the University suffered in the early seventies and the very late sixties.

GALBRAITH: We didn't have the image that we had before. But anyway, they were still cooperating in the sixties at a time when our publicity wasn't that great. I have high regard for Mayor [Frank] Curran, who I think has been rather maligned, he wasn't a particularly impressive individual physically, or he didn't make eloquent speeches. He did recognize the obligation of the city to honor its agreement with the University to have us as part of the decision-making process. So did Walter Hahn who was the city manager. Incidentally, his name, his last name, is the same as that of the developer, Ernest Hahn, the developer.

RINGROSE: Right, right.

GALBRAITH: Very different people.

RINGROSE: Very different people. I also get the impression that in about the late sixties there were pieces of this area that were picked up by some large developers who had a fair amount of outside funding and clout.

GALBRAITH: Yes, I think that's true. There was a, I'm trying to remember the...

RINGROSE: Well, there's a big Chicago developer that tries to move in. There's a lot of discussion about that.

GALBRAITH: But I don't think that the plan had been changed in the sixties.

RINGROSE: No, they held out against this particular, this particular one.

GALBRAITH: I think we still had access to the people in charge, of course, with Pete Wilson, I think. When did Pete become mayor? About, it was after I left, I think. It had been the election with Butler and Wilson. I forget when it was, maybe 1970 or something like that. But peak developers, if they were in the picture, weren't getting what they wanted. They were trying to remember the half Chinese individual who was a developer. What was his name? He was half Chinese, and he had a Spanish name so he must have been half Chinese and half...

RINGROSE: This would have been in the late sixties.

GALBRAITH: Yeah, I'm trying to remember, it wasn't Blanco, it was something like that. There were two people who were involved, one of whom was the innocent one of whom was the black head. You could look it up. It was an amazing scandal.

RINGROSE: Yes, I'll have to dig that out.

GALBRAITH: They had ambitions in this area. One of them went bankrupt.

RINGROSE: Hum, OK.

GALBRAITH: But they were pretty small potatoes by comparison with some of the developers moving in. The city council perhaps was a different kind of city council from what we have.

RINGROSE: Well, the faculty members I have talked to who served on the community planning committee, funny you know I've asked them, you know, what kind of clout they thought they had. And it's as though when the committee was first set up, and the community and the campus began working together, these people felt as though they were listened to and even though the University didn't own this land, that there really was a serious commitment to rational development. And you can just hear their frustration as they talk about how things developed over the years.

GALBRAITH: Well, the faculty committee, in itself, didn't have a lot of, to use that much overused word, a lot of clout. Faculty committees in the sixties, they formed faculty committees for a variety of purposes, including amusingly enough, promoting close relations with the community. But it's something of the nature, we have met the enemy and they are us. The enemy was the faculty as far as they were concerned and this faculty committee was talking about how we can promote a close relationship with the community, when the faculty as a whole showed no interest whatsoever in involvement with the community. Very few faculty members were involved in any civic activities leaving aside the matter of politics. They just didn't involve themselves.

RINGROSE: Do you think this is generally characteristic of faculty members or just the group here?

GALBRAITH: It probably is different where they involved themselves with their peers and their preoccupations aren't with their own particular community divorced. And of course, there is no greater contrast than between this University and La Jolla. I guess Westwood would be similar, except that Westwood isn't really that quite the same thing. Westwood and Bel Aire are not quite the same as La Jolla.

RINGROSE: You couldn't find a more conservative community than La Jolla.

GALBRAITH: Oh, it is a tremendous contrast.

RINGROSE: And ah...

GALBRAITH: It wasn't just anti-Semitism though; anti-Semitism is emphasized a lot. It's a feeling that these people represent a threat, whether they are Jews, Christians, or atheists, represent a threat to the way of life, whatever that may be, of La Jolla.

Gabriel Jackson was the object of attention of an outraged neighbor, you'll probably find him in one of the clippings around, who was demanding that something be done about these Jacksons who were dirty and didn't keep up their property and a variety of other things.

RINGROSE: Didn't close their garage door.

GALBRAITH: All of that kind of thing. It was quite clear what it was all about was that Gabriel Jackson and his wife were academic types. And this woman was obviously of unsound mind any way, that she represents the lunatic fringe. She didn't want these faculty members ruining their property.

RINGROSE: Well, and then conversely, in on one of these tapes you'll find one of the senior faculty members saying, "Well we turned this into a pretty good town, the first thing we did was fix up the high school." So, you know there are obviously, there are interests the faculty have and ways in which they are going to impose themselves upon a community, that won't necessarily be welcomed by all parts of the community.

GALBRAITH: Well, that's true.

RINGROSE: So, who knows, perhaps Regent Pauley was right, that this was a terrible place to put a university. Maybe we should have been stuck way out in the boonies in Mira Mesa somewhere.

GALBRAITH: Of course, the option wasn't there really, there’s no realistic option. UCLA was put down in a community that developed around UCLA. And Westwood is a creation of UCLA. Not because of UCLA's ideas but because its existence attracted a lot of people regardless of their attitudes toward the university and bought property around there and the developer made a lot of money in the process. Well, we have the same thing here except that La Jolla was there when Westwood was not. And both of them represent a development which is very, very sad since the university did not have the opportunity, maybe it had the opportunity but didn't exercise it, to have a border area which was university oriented, like Berkeley's. A lot of people would say we don't want anything like Berkeley, look what happened there with all of the street people and so forth. But it's an environment that is appropriate for a university and we do not have that immediately right around. We've got La Jolla Farms instead of these shops and so forth.

RINGROSE: Well, doesn't part of the problem lie in the conditions of land occupation that are imposed upon the University. I mean we really have a very substantial piece of land here, but we are very limited in what we can do with it.

GALBRAITH: That's right the deed prohibits us from doing certain things. If we had unlimited jurisdiction, we could do such things as develop within the university's own area, housing, and shops and so forth. But we can't do it under the conditions of the grant.

RINGROSE: And perhaps that's something that there aren't that many universities that are founded from scratch.

GALBRAITH: That's true.

RINGROSE: And I think that's one lesson that someone can learn for the future in founding a university.

GALBRAITH: If they ever have another university founded, I suppose they might learn from our experience.

RINGROSE: That it really isn't a matter of owning a very large piece of property, you have to have proper controls over that property so that you can have a large buffer zone that's multiple use. I was hoping we could talk about the Medical School which really is a big can of worms. There are a number of things that we can talk about where the Medical School is concerned. Dr. Kerr made the comment in the interview with him that the budget went from twenty-five to one hundred and twenty-five million dollars and that when he realized that it happened, he was afraid to take it to the regents. I have a feeling you are going to have a lot of things to say about that. Obviously, there was a lot of controversy over the kind of the medical school we were going to have down here. And I've sort of heard discussion from various sides about this and the relationship with the community is also an interesting issue where the med school is concerned. I think I'm just going to turn you loose and see what you want to say about it from your perspective because you really had to take the heat about it as chancellor.

GALBRAITH: The Medical School was visualized by faculty members, in particular David Bonner as you know, as being a new type of institution entirely in the matter of functions in medical school. It would have, obviously, the responsibility for doing research, but it was not going to involve people in two categories, the basic sciences and the clinical. They would be integrated. Medicine is a branch of Biology, I think that was [David] Bonner's statement, but he may have put it more eloquently. That's what, essentially, he was talking about. And all of the facilities of the Medical School would be in the area of the campus. The Medical School in turn would be part of the general campus and not, as medical schools tend to be, off by themselves, with their own particular ambience unrelated to the rest of the campus. This was going to be a medical school like no other medical school. Now we were talking earlier about the problems of doing something different. They are immense and they are tremendous when you consider what kind of money these ideas have. These ideas have a tag on them for a very substantial amount of money. At the least, it is a piece of a very substantial amount of money. Now what it involved in the first instance was the attempt of an administration of the medical school without really having any guidelines aside from the Bonner ideas by which they would proceed. Coming up with a translation of these ideas into a plan and a plan which would be costed out at such and such and so on. What would be the basis on which they could make these calculations.

Well, in the first place it was quite obvious to a lot of people that the Bonner plan could not survive intact. The delightful dream of the clinicians and the basic scientists I'd better not say lie down together, communing together in blissful harmony was not realistic at all, as was demonstrated by subsequent events. And that a state university which is dependent upon on legislature for funds could expect to get that kind of money, was an unrealistic expectation. All that. Now the emphasis of the Kerr analysis, which incidentally reflects the fact that he wasn't in touch with these things, if he didn't know that the thing had gone from twenty-five to...

[*TAPE STOPPED AND RESTARTED*]

RINGROSE: OK I think we can get going again here.

GALBRAITH: Alright, where were we?

RINGROSE: The floor polisher has gone around the corner.

GALBRAITH: Anyway, the guidelines were not quite clear as to how they were to proceed. There was not an agreement between us and the University-wide Administration as it was then called. And Clint Powell was sadly, he was Kerr's adviser for medical affairs, who in my opinion could have been more helpful in asserting this is the way it's going to be. There wasn't that much of a break with being allied by central administration, but they had an obligation to give the campus some guidance as to how far the campus could go and what they were prepared to give and were not and what they support. There wasn't enough of that. On the other side, our campus really didn't have the machinery to carry out the intentions of the founding father, in this case Bonner and company. Joe Stokes had no experience on the level of deanship of a medical school and a particularly tough job of being the dean of a medical school which had to be built from the bottom.

RINGROSE: Had he ever been really intimately involved with any medical school?

GALBRAITH: No, no he had not, no.

RINGROSE: I didn't realize that.

GALBRAITH: He'd been at a medical school, but he was not a top administrator.

RINGROSE: I see, ok.

GALBRAITH: He was the son of a very distinguished medical man that had been... Well, Joe was presented with a peculiarly difficult job. It would have been daunting to anybody so I'm not attacking Joe as the... I'm saying that we should have appointed somebody with more experience. And you put all of that together and you come up with what looks like a Berkeley, the workings of an awkward squad. They can't seem to make up their mind. That this plan has changed this way and that way and so forth and that is a response to the various pressures that occurred. The nearest the Medical School recruiting topflight people. The one that went back to Harvard, that became disillusioned, what was his name, the heart specialist.

RINGROSE: Right.

GALBRAITH: And the surgeon, he's still around, what...

RINGROSE: I can't come up with it either. I know who you mean.

GALBRAITH: You know who these people are that I'm talking about, these were topflight people and they had requirements. So how do you accommodate them? So, plans change as each element comes into the picture and it changes into more and more money. The only guideline which apparently has any significance is the guideline of this campus asserting that we should be able to get as much as UCLA got for its medical school, which the statewide administration found not really something they could sell.

RINGROSE: You mean as much as UCLA got totally for its medical school as opposed to a sum that's equal to what UCLA was getting at that time toward big expansion.

GALBRAITH: The total picture.

RINGROSE: Yes.

GALBRAITH: And that was just in view of those who were involved in the university... that was something that couldn't occur. Well, the situation then was that Joe, well, was essentially appearing to be a person who really had no commitment to any particular plan. He was just moving; well, he's still trying to get everything put together in a way which would satisfy the various constituents. And with no, not entire success. People who were doing the costing out here probably weren't as competent, some didn't have the competence to handle that job. It was a very difficult job for them to carry out. There wasn't enough input from Berkeley to be helpful in this. It became a situation where there is opposition, where people are fighting with each other rather than cooperating on the matter.

Now to make a long story short, it became necessary in my view to replace Joe. There were various things which were coming together which would have meant a disaster. Absolutely undedicated disaster. Medical School had been authorized during Herb's time, and when was it, when the dean was about sixty-three, maybe sixty-three. We were supposed to be producing doctors in medical school and that involves getting students into medical school.

RINGROSE: This was...

GALBRAITH: And when all of this hassling is going on, and which is delaying any decision being made about the requirements, the buildings, the hospital and so forth and so on. And we're not moving ahead. Charlie Hitch, who was very definitely a whiz kid in matters of accounting and so forth and I had conversations about this. His view was that this is going to have to be resolved or we're going to have very serious developments. These early luminaries came to see me also and said they could not support Joe as the dean. That included the one who went to Harvard. And here we are confronting almost an enemy, the central administration. That is not an accurate way of describing the relationship or what it ought to have been. They

did not consider themselves enemies. They tried to accommodate the campus, but they didn't take a strong enough forceful stand in the first place to be helpful in this regard. Well, we had to get rid of Joe and we got Bob Tschirgi who is a medical doctor as well as a Ph.D. And the myth developed that Tschirgi had been sent down by Kerr.

RINGROSE: By Kerr, right. I've heard that from all kinds of people.

GALBRAITH: Which has no foundation whatsoever. It was my initiative to bring Tschirgi down as a vice chancellor of planning. It wasn't envisaged as having to do with the medical school at that point. Just one of these accidents that occurs. He had resigned from Kerr's staff as vice president.

RINGROSE: Is that the reason he was not included in the, the [Robert] Hamburger ah...

GALBRAITH: Well, that involves some personality...

RINGROSE: ...affair?

GALBRAITH: ...problems. There's a personality problem between well, Tschirgi has his own distinctive characteristics, and I won't go into that.

RINGROSE: Ok, no it's not the place.

GALBRAITH: Well anyway he, he was asked, I asked him to get busy on the planning and he had meetings with the faculty, and they began to organize. We were getting things put together and this worked out to the point where we were...

[END OF PART TWO, END OF INTERVIEW]