

*Jan. 8<sup>th</sup>*  
~~December 29,~~ 1962

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

From: Leo Szilard

To: ~~Dr. Robert B. Livingston~~

This memorandum describes the genesis of a project aimed at utilizing private channels of communications with the Russians for the purpose of finding out what kind of an agreement ~~concerning~~ *on* "arms control" might be negotiable.

At the Pugwash meeting held last August in Cambridge, England, one of our Russian colleagues, R., talked to me about the need of making some progress on the issue of disarmament. There was a note of insistence and urgency in what he said to me which was not present in any of our previous conversations.

For a number of years I have attended the so-called Pugwash meetings; R. was one of our Russian colleagues whom I met repeatedly and we have a relationship of mutual trust. Whether he likes or dislikes what I say to him, R. knows that I say it because I believe it to be true and not for any other reason. Nor has R. ever said anything to me that he, personally, didn't believe to be true.

On this occasion, I ~~told~~ *discussed with* R. ~~the~~ *the possibility of setting up* privately sponsored project aimed at getting around the current impasse in the disarmament negotiations. What struck me was his insistence that we do in a hurry whatever we intended to do. He said that Khrushchev had expected to reach an accommodation with the Kennedy Administration and that as long as he had hoped that this would be possible, he had kept the lid on the arms race, but that with this hope virtually gone, *now* the lid was *now* ~~off~~ *off now*.

*In this context R. talked*

~~W~~ indicated to me <sup>about</sup> a number of different lines along which technical development was proceeding in Russia <sup>at full speed</sup>. He thought that unless there were to arise some fresh hope that arms control may be obtained in the near future, before long we would reach a point of no return in an all out arms race. I have heard the same concern expressed ~~before~~ by some of our American colleagues, but never before by any of our Russian colleagues.

When I got back to Washington I called on a few people in the Administration and told them about this conversation with R. <sup>Most people</sup> ~~Everybody~~ in the Administration knows that America cannot be made secure by trying to keep ahead in the arms race. Some of them are on the side of the Angels and would be willing to give up, if necessary, certain temporary advantages we hold at present, for the sake of ending the arms race. Others seem to want to eat their cake and have it too; they would like ~~to~~ to have an agreement with Russia that would stop the arms race, <sup>and</sup> but they also want to hold on to any temporary superiority that we may have, for as long as possible.

I found the Angels frustrated and groping in the dark. They were unsure whether Russia would be likely to accept any kind of an agreement providing for arms controls, nor did they know which of the various ~~acceptable~~ <sup>be acceptable to</sup> approaches to this problem would be ~~likely~~ likely to ~~find~~ <sup>find</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Russians. They told me that ~~there~~ <sup>they</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> been occasionally very friendly informal conversations with Russian negotiators but that these had been wholly unproductive and didn't furnish any guidance as to what kind of arms control Russia would be ~~most~~ <sup>most</sup> likely to accept.

Some of the obstacles that seem to block the road to arms control are rather formidable, but perhaps they are not unsurmountable, and it would be rather tragic if a failure in communications were to cause an impasse. Therefore I asked myself whether it might not be possible to explore, through privately arranged conversations ~~between Americans and~~ <sup>with the</sup> Russians, what form of arms control may be negotiable.

Such conversations would be useful only if both the ~~Americans~~ <sup>the participants</sup> and the ~~Russians who participate in them~~ feel free to speak their minds. The Russians are perfectly capable of speaking their minds freely, but only if <sup>they are</sup> instructed to do so, and no one except Chairman Khrushchev is in a position to issue such instructions.

I have met Khrushchev about two years ago. Our conversation was scheduled to last fifteen minutes but went on for two hours. It was a good conversation and a month later when I attended the Pugwash meeting in Moscow I discovered that those of our Russian colleagues of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who participated in the meeting had a detailed report of this conversation.

~~Before writing to Chairman Khrushchev~~ <sup>first</sup> I outlined the project that I had in mind to a few people in the Administration. I also discussed the project with a number of those from among whom the participants in the project might be chosen.

Encouraged by the responses I then talked with <sup>Ambassador</sup> Dobrynin and I had a good conversation with him. <sup>He</sup> ~~He~~ <sup>Dobrynin</sup> drew my attention to a difficulty which had not previously occurred to me. He pointed out that in America there are a number of distinguished men, many of them scientists, who act as consultants or advisers to the Government on arms control, but who are not ~~involved in the day to~~ <sup>functionaries</sup>

stuff,

day operations of the Government, and that there are no counterparts  
to these men in the Soviet Union. Dobrynin <sup>also</sup> said ~~further~~ that the ~~stuff~~  
~~number~~ <sup>governmental & familiar with</sup> of government employees who work ~~full time~~ <sup>on</sup> the problem  
of arms control, is much smaller in Russia than in America; he said  
he could count on his ten fingers the <sup>people in Moscow</sup> ~~people in Moscow~~ who could  
participate in the proposed project and be good at it. Still,  
Dobrynin thought that the project ought to be seriously considered  
~~and he~~ offered to transmit a letter from me to Chairman Khrushchev.  
The text of my letter, dated October 9, is below:

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Washington, D. C.  
October 9, 1962

N. S. Khrushchev  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.  
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. Khrushchev:

When I had the privilege of talking to you in New York, a year ago last October, I thought that no matter whether Nixon or Kennedy were elected, a fresh attempt would be made to reach an understanding with the Soviet Union that would end the arms race. Events have not borne me out so far. With President Kennedy, a number of young and exceptionally able men moved into the Administration; many of them are deeply concerned about our drifting into an all-out arms race, but so far matters have not taken a turn for the better. It would seem that something would have to be done at this time if the arms race is to be halted before it reaches a point of no return and it would appear that there is perhaps something that I myself could undertake at this particular point. The purpose of this letter is to find out whether what I propose to do would meet with your full approval.

First, I wish to say, if I may, the following:

Contrary to what one might think, most people closely connected with the Administration are keenly aware of the need of avoiding an all-out arms race. Moreover, there are a number of men among them who are "on the side of the angels" and who have consistently taken the position that the United States should be prepared to give up certain temporary advantages it holds, for the sake of attaining an agreement with the Soviet Union that would stop the arms race. These "angels" do not dominate the scene in Washington at present but, given certain favorable circumstances, their influence could be very considerable and perhaps decisive. Some of these "angels" hold key positions in the Administration; others hold junior positions in the White House, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and owe their influence not to their rank but to their ability and perseverance; and still others are consultants to the Government and owe their influence to the high respect in which their opinions are held.

Recently, I attended the Pugwash Conference in Cambridge, England, where I had good conversations with some of our Russian colleagues. Upon my return to Washington, I met with some of the "angels" who hold key positions and found that they were groping in the dark. They were quite uncertain just how far-reaching the reduction of armaments in the first stages of any proposed disarmament agreement would have to go and what form it would have to take in order to make the proposals acceptable to the Soviet Union. Moreover, some of them have begun to doubt whether Russia would accept any reasonable disarmament proposal, even if it were to provide for a very far-reaching reduction of armaments in the first stages.

In the past, many of these men have worked very hard trying to persuade the Government to put forward proposals in Geneva which the Soviet Union would be able to accept, as a basis of negotiations. On many occasions,

they did not prevail in Washington, and on the occasions when they did prevail, it turned out that the proposals which they had drafted were not acceptable to Russia. If their proposals are to be accepted in Washington, these men must put in long hours of work, must be willing to quarrel with their friends, must risk being politically exposed and must be ready to resign their jobs, if necessary. One cannot expect them to go on indefinitely putting up a fight again and again only to find, if they prevail in Washington, that their proposals are not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The "angels" have not as yet given up the fight but they are rather close to it, and if they were to give up, we would be in serious trouble; for if these men cease to exert themselves in Washington, then there can no longer be any useful negotiations on disarmament.

In order to appraise the chances of the Geneva negotiations we must first of all realize that even though America may submit a good draft agreement on general and complete disarmament in Geneva, it would at present be impossible to give the Soviet Union any real assurance that America would in fact go through, stage by stage, all the way to general and complete disarmament; as long as Russia and America do not reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world, the later stages of any draft agreement will remain couched in such general terms as to be virtually meaningless. (It is impossible to say how long it might take for Russia and America to reach a meeting of the minds on this issue, but something should be done now in order to prepare the ground for a constructive discussion of this problem. I have touched upon this point in a conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin and hope to pursue this topic with him further.)

At the present time, only the provisions of the first few stages of a disarmament agreement can be defined clearly enough to offer reasonable assurance that if the agreement were accepted, the provisions would be implemented on schedule. Therefore, the immediate concrete task before us is to try and devise a draft for an agreement which might be acceptable to America and which would provide in the first, clearly defined, stages for sufficiently far-reaching arms reduction to make the agreement attractive to Russia - even in the absence of any real assurance that disarmament would proceed beyond these first few stages in the predictable future.

The project which I propose to discuss addresses itself exclusively to this issue. Assuming your full approval, I would invite three of the American "angels" to meet for a period of two or three weeks with three of their Russian counterparts. I would not include among the American participants anyone who holds a key position in the Administration. Rather, I would select the American participants from among the consultants to the Government and those who hold a junior position in the Government. They would be expected to draft, together with their Russian counterparts, a proposal for the first stages of the disarmament agreement which they personally would be willing to advocate in Moscow and Washington. Presumably, they would examine various alternative proposals in the course of their discussions and they would be expected to state in each case frankly whether they are personally opposed to a particular proposal and, if so, why, or whether they would be personally

in favor of a given proposal but would be unwilling to advocate it because they saw no chance of being able to persuade their government to accept it. The draft agreement that would emerge would commit no one, except those who prepared it; they would be expected to advocate and, if necessary, to fight for the provisions which it contains.

The Russian participants would be expected to fulfill much the same function as the American participants. I propose to discuss tentatively the identity of the American participants with Ambassador Dobrynin and if the project is approved, I would need later on to discuss with him the precise instructions which the Russian and the American participants would have to receive in order to make it likely that the discussions would be productive.

Such a project would be bound to fail if either the participants, or their governments, were to regard these discussions as a negotiation. Certain precautions will have to be taken in order to avoid this pitfall and I would be somewhat reluctant to invite anyone holding a rank above that of a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Government to participate in the discussions on the American side.

I explained what I proposed to do to a number of men in high positions in the Administration whose opinions I respect. I made it clear to them that I am not seeking at this point the permission of the Government to go forward with this project. (Naturally, if invited to participate, Americans who are connected with an agency of the Government would need to clear their own participation with that agency.)

Having listened to what these men had to say, I saw Ambassador Dobrynin on September 18, told him what I proposed to do and had a good conversation with him.

Thereafter, I approached individually about ten of the "angels" about their possible participation in the proposed discussion. Because I met with a very encouraging response, I am now ready to take the next step. I shall see Ambassador Dobrynin, discuss with him some of the details with which I do not need to trouble you here and ask him to transmit this letter to you.

If this project meets with your full approval, I would want to go forward with it at once. Because of the forthcoming American elections, it would not be advisable to try to hold the meeting before November 8. It would be, however, desirable to hold the meeting as soon as possible thereafter, so that it may take place before the Berlin issue reaches a crisis stage.

If it were possible for me to discuss this project with you personally, I would be able to state in Washington with full assurance that the project is not being misunderstood by the Soviet Government and that it is not looked upon as a negotiation, so to speak, through the back door. This would greatly improve the chances of securing the participation of those who, among the men I have approached, have the greatest influence in Washington.

I understand that you might be coming to New York and, in this case, I would hope to have an opportunity to see you there; however, if this would mean a delay of more than two weeks, and if you were able to see me in Moscow at an early date, then I would prefer to fly to Moscow for the sake of avoiding such a delay.

The invitation to the American participants would be issued by me either personally or in my capacity as the Chairman of a committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston - a non-governmental institution which has been lately sponsoring the Pugwash meetings.

A reply would reach me fastest in care of your Ambassador in Washington, D. C.

Respectfully,

s/

Leo Szilard  
Hotel DuPont Plaza  
Washington 6, D. C.



My letter of October 9 was written before the Cuban crisis. The text of Khrushchev's reply, ~~which was~~ written after the Cuban crisis, on November 4, is below:

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Unofficial translation

Dear Dr. Szilard,

I have received your letter and I am very glad that you are healthy and full of new ideas. I should say that I have read your letter with great satisfaction, I was especially pleased to learn that you display great concern over the intensification of the armaments race and seek ways toward safeguarding peace.

The international crisis that we have just survived reminds to all people of good will in a very acute form how actual and urgent is the question of a reasonable solution of the disarmament problem. Disarmament is necessary to exclude the danger of a destructive and devastating thermonuclear war, and during those days the world was practically on the brink of such a war.

I was interested in what you write about your "angels" who realize all the dangers of the continuing all-absorbing armaments race and feel responsibility before history.

For a great many years the disarmament negotiations have been carried on among the Governments at various levels but these negotiations bring no results whatsoever. It appears that the main reason for such a situation lies in the fact that the forces which determine the policy in the countries of capitalist world feel great uncertainty about their future. They seem to be afraid that disarmament may, so to say, bring nearer their end and they hope that the armaments race and the building up of the armed forces which they have created can prolong the existence of the capitalist system.

This is, of course, a dangerous delusion. How can one expect to retard the succession of one social system by another by the force of arms,

against the will of the peoples themselves?

In the era of rocket and nuclear weapons only a madman could pursue the objective of reaching his political ends by unleashing a thermonuclear war. The war between the states would lead to the total defeat of the aggressor. But it would bring untold sufferings to all the peoples of the world, because it would mean a nuclear war which would probably quickly develop into a world war.

But some statesmen seem to underestimate the consequences to which a war of today might lead. But even if they realize it they are unable to overpower the negative forces. Moreover, they themselves have no desire to make the necessary efforts for they are the product of the same environment and they are subject to the same delusion.

I have considered your proposal for an unofficial Soviet-American meeting at a non-governmental level to exchange views and examine the possibility of coming to an agreement on disarmament. I like this proposal. I also thought that perhaps there should be held a meeting on the disarmament problem with the participation of scientists or public figures. My understanding is that the participants of the meeting which you have in mind are not to be officials or representatives of governments of their respective countries. They are to hold their discussions without, if I may say so outsiders, without microphones, without short-hand typists, without correspondents, without representatives of television or radio corporations. And the conclusions to which they would come are to be considered as their personal views. But at the same time they are to be the people enjoying respect and confidence of the public opinion in their countries. Otherwise such a meeting could turn into an idle tea party talk and pastime and nobody would attach any importance to the agreement reached there.

It would be another matter if these persons were people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them.

If you are willing to undertake this task which, I would say, is rather a difficult one, - we welcome your idea and we are ready to try this as another possibility of strengthening the cause of peace. We leave it to you to decide how this could be done. You may forward your further considerations to our Ambassador to Washington, and should you wish, as you write, to come to Moscow, we shall be glad to welcome you on the Moscow soil and to see you.

With respect

N. KHRUSHCHEV

November 4, 1962

Khrushchev's letter of November 4 reached me on November 15 in Geneva. While it seems to be a warm personal letter and appears on the face of it very positive, it contains a passage which is not clear. This passage reads:

"It would be another matter if these persons were people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them."

I felt that I ~~had to~~ <sup>I had to</sup> make sure that there was no serious ~~misunderstanding~~ <sup>misunderstanding</sup> before basing any further action on Khrushchev's ~~letter~~ <sup>reply</sup>. ~~The text of the letter dated November 15 which I wrote in response is given below:~~ <sup>Therefore I wrote him on Nov 15</sup> ~~a letter, of which the text is below:~~ <sup>The text of my letter, dated Nov. 15 is below:</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL COPY

Geneva, 15th November 1962

N. S. Khrushchev,  
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,  
Moscow,

Dear Mr. Khrushchev,

I was very much moved by your kind letter of November 4th which reached me last night in Geneva. Since I can imagine how disturbing the recent crisis must have been for you I am all the more grateful that you found the time to answer my letter of October 9th.

Your answer raises the issue of who the American participants in the proposed project ought to be in order to make the project really effective. You will find the names of those among whom I would propose to choose the American participants - and some other relevant information - in the Appendix which is attached to this letter.

As you will see most of those named are consultants to the Department of State, Department of Defense and the White House. Because of their special relationship to the US Government they could be very effective in fighting for specific disarmament proposals which would make sense, if the proposed project were carried out. However, because of this relationship they would have to fight for any such proposals in Washington and they would not be in a position to influence the Government through the pressure of public opinion. In spite of this limitation these men could be effective, I believe, because so many key people inside of the Administration know by now that America cannot be made secure by keeping ahead in the arms race.

If what I am saying makes sense to you, then I would propose to go from Geneva first to Moscow and to return thereafter from Moscow to Washington. In Moscow I would want to discuss with someone designated by you

who the American and Russian participants ought to be in order to make the project as effective as possible. In a preliminary conversation which I had with Ambassador Dobrynin on this subject we discussed the difficulty of finding the exact Russian counterparts to the American participants, which arises from the fact that the Soviet Government has very few, if any, consultants in the field of disarmament. I believe that Ambassador Dobrynin has communicated at that time with Federov, General Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in this matter, and perhaps you would want me to talk to Federov also.

It is my thought that if I could discuss these matters in Moscow with someone designated by you, and if I were able to see you also, then on my return to Washington I would be in a good position to help the Americans invited to participate in the project in clearing their participation with the governmental agency with which they are connected. This is my main reason why I would prefer to visit Moscow before I return to Washington.

I trust that you will let me know if there is a date in the near future when you could be reasonably sure that you could see me, if I came to Moscow for a few days. My wife, who also functions as my doctor, would accompany me on the trip.

Your letter of November 4th was transmitted to me by Mr. Moliakov, Permanent Representative of the USSR, to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. I am now asking him to transmit my letter to you and to transmit a copy of it to Ambassador Dobrynin. Mr. Moliakov could transmit a reply from you to me in Geneva.

Respectfully,

/s/  
Leo Szilard

In response to my letter of November 15 the head of the Russian Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, N. J. Moliakov, conveyed to me, a few days later, the Chairman's invitation to come and see him in Moscow.

It was thereupon arranged that I would fly, with my wife, to Moscow on November 26.

Two days before that date <sup>or Robert B. Livingston</sup> ~~you~~ phoned me from Washington and told me that <sup>he</sup> you had decided to advise a high Government official <sup>into</sup> of <sup>MM</sup> the project because <sup>he</sup> you felt that <sup>he</sup> ~~he~~ ought to know about it at an early date. <sup>He</sup> You told me that <sup>he</sup> you approached this official through an intermediary and that <sup>he</sup> you understood that this official had <sup>serious</sup> ~~misgivings~~ misgivings about the proposed project.

I <sup>led</sup> ~~decided~~ thereupon <sup>and</sup> to cancel my flight to Moscow, <sup>and</sup> explained to Chairman Khrushchev what had happened, <sup>and</sup> left it up to him whether he preferred that I come to Moscow before I returned to Washington or whether he preferred that I <sup>straighten out</sup> ~~clear~~ matters in Washington first.

Khrushchev's reply reached me in the form of a telephone message, brought to me by Moliakov. He said that Chairman Khrushchev thought that I would know best whether in the circumstances I would want to go to Moscow or whether I would rather go back to Washington and <sup>straighten out</sup> ~~clear~~ matters there first. The Chairman felt that perhaps it would be better for me to go first to Washington but that it was up to me to make this decision.

~~Thereupon~~ I told Moliakov that <sup>in the circumstances</sup> I <sup>would propose to</sup> ~~would~~ return to Washington and communicate with the Chairman later on through Ambassador Dobrynin. Moliakov stressed that I was free to change my mind, my visa was valid for another two weeks and if I went to Moscow the



Chairman would see me.

I did not go to Moscow, but returned to <sup>Washington</sup> WASHINGTON. I ~~believe~~ <sup>now</sup> can go to Moscow at any time, but I would want to do this only if I can bring with me the names of those who have definitely agreed to participate in the project, ~~if invited to do so~~

This is meant to be a non-governmental <sup>operable one</sup> project and it would be well to involve the United States Government as little as possible. ~~I did not~~ <sup>I do not intend</sup> therefore, ~~propose to~~ ask that the Government officially take a stand <sup>to the</sup> on the project. ~~My~~ <sup>demands</sup> The success of the project ~~is~~, however, <sup>necessary</sup> that the Government ~~should~~ smile on it rather than frown on it, and I am therefore <sup>keeping</sup> engaged in the process <sup>informal</sup> of informing a number of people in the Government about the <sup>progress of</sup> proposed project.

On December 31 I called on the official who <sup>was reported to</sup> had serious misgivings about the project, and on January 3 I had <sup>an extended</sup> conversation with his deputy. ~~It~~ It seems that there has been a misunderstanding and that we now have a meeting of the minds on what the objectives of the project ought to be.)

As matters stand at present we may get the green light to proceed ~~from the Administration~~ if we <sup>formulate</sup> ~~draft~~ ~~instructions~~ under which the American participants would operate which makes sense to the Administration. ~~I anticipate no difficulty in arriving~~

Since there is no disagreement on the objectives, I anticipate no difficulty in arriving at an adequate formulation of the instructions.

~~A tentative draft~~

instructions

to have

to

Geneva, 5 December, 1962.

Memorandum Regarding Letter of October 9 to Chairman Khrushchev

by

Leo Szilard

The reply to the attached letter of October 9 was written on November 4 and reached me in Geneva on November 14. A copy of it is attached also.

This reply contains a passage that reads - "It would be another matter if these persons were the people of a definite reputation in public opinion. In that case they would be able to carry out some serious work. Their conclusions could greatly influence the public opinion and even officials and governments would have to listen to them."

In order to make certain that there is no misunderstanding I replied on November 15 that I had in mind choosing the American participants in the proposed project to a large extent from among consultants of various Government departments, because such men could be very effective in fighting for specific disarmament proposals which would make sense. Because of their special relationship to the Government they would not be in a position, however, to influence the Government through the pressure of public opinion. I concluded my letter by saying that if this made sense to him I would propose to proceed from Geneva to Moscow before returning to Washington.

Thereupon I received an invitation to come to Moscow and it was arranged that I would leave Geneva for Moscow on November 26.

On November 24 I received a telephone call from Washington and learned that someone had discussed the proposed project with a high ranking Government official in the direct chain of command and that this official had serious misgivings. Thereupon I cancelled my reservation to Moscow and sent a message to the Chairman telling him that the project received a serious set back in Washington and raised the question whether he thought that in view of this situation the trip to Moscow had better be postponed.

The reply which I received 48 hours later leaves the door open for me to go to Moscow if a re-examination of the situation in Washington leads me to conclude that the project could be set up in a manner that will be useful. By visiting Moscow I would then be able to make certain that Moscow would play its part right and and the project would pursue the objectives that it is meant to attain.

Geneva, 5 December, 1962.

Memorandum Regarding Letter of October 9 to Chairman Khrushchev

by

Leo Szilard

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*Khrushchev*  
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Preliminary exploration of the above suggestion has met with favorable response by five of the named individuals (Szilard, Reuther, Rabinowitz, Cohen, Read) and there is every reason to believe that there will be no difficulty in obtaining the participation of others of equal calibre.

\* \* \* \* \*

P.S. It has been suggested that in addition to the people who might be the active participants in such a meeting, some 3 or 4 others, selected as potential writers, might be present to observe or to participate on a more limited basis, so that the collective wisdom of the group could be reduced to written form after the meeting is concluded. Such a joint writing effort could in turn become a useful tool for public education and discussion in the larger political community.

private session of exploration along the foregoing lines. Such a meeting could be convened upon the request of a person like Benjamin Cohen, might be chaired perhaps by Harrison Brown or Victor Reuther and might have among its other participants persons such as the following:

Roger Fisher (Harvard Law School)

Senator William Fullbright

John Hersey (Author)

Field Havilland (Brookings)

Henry Kaiser (Industrialist)

Walter Lippmann

Fred Neal

Coke Prentiss (with Senator Cooper)

Eugene Rabinowitz (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists)

Benjamin Read (with Senator Clark)

David Riesman

Leo Szilard (Scientist)

Ambassador Wadsworth

The above list is in no sense meant to be definitive, but only indicative of the type of persons of independent intelligence who might make useful contributions to a private meeting of the kind suggested.

MEMORANDUM

*file*

[1962?]

In recent months there has been considerable concern expressed in political, scientific and editorial circles with trends in the accelerating arms race, particularly in the disturbing implications of concentration on first strike, defense shelters and the like. Many in Washington and elsewhere have felt the need for a thorough analysis and projection by the best thinkers in the country of the spiraling arms race and the intensifying cold war. It has been felt that such an analysis might produce a valuable critical appraisal of the limitations and dangers of the armament spiral and also might serve to define courses of conduct by the United States in coming years which would minimize the risk of nuclear war, slow the arms race and create new and more positive avenues of national response, promoting a peaceful and more stable world situation.

The best test of the potential of an effort along the lines above described, would be an actual meeting of top level independent thinkers in the country to explore these lines of thought. Out of such a meeting there might come a concensus of thinking, which could in turn be the basis of a subsequent written effort to define a blueprint or chart for possible United States policy in the arms race as well as the "peace race." Accordingly, it is suggested that early in February of 1962 a dozen people be gathered together for a week somewhere near (but not in) New York or Washington, for an extended

I wrote Chairman Khrushchev  
~~about~~ the attached letter dated Oct 29  
and received from him the attached  
reply, dated Nov 4, which reached  
me in Geneva on Nov 14.

Khrushchev's reply (1)