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This is a very rough first draft for distribution to friends in the hope of obtaining their criticism of the contents.

PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIFIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

The Atomic Stalemate between the Soviet Union and America towards which we are moving poses a problem for which there is no precedent in history. The devices used in the field of foreign policy in the past might perhaps do the trick if our problem were merely to resolve the present power conflict between the Soviet Union and America. But this is not enough today. Clearly today we must create once and for all a setting in which the possibility of war can be regarded as remote. Can this be done?

The answer that any man can give to this question must depend on the assumptions that he makes about human nature. What is the likely response of the governments of the great powers to the Atomic Stalemate that will confront them within the next few years? At this point, history does not provide us with a precedent upon which a <sup>reasoned</sup> reasonable prediction could be based. Faith must therefore take the place of arguments and proof.

To my mind the first immediate question before us is this:

Is it possible to devise an agreement that is acceptable to America, the Soviet Union, as well as all the other nations who would be involved and that will provide for the great powers such strong continued incentives for keeping the agreement in operation that it would be self-sustaining?

The kind of imagination and resourcefulness needed to conjure up a consistent picture of a really durable agreement cannot be expected from the governments and will have to be provided through private initiative if it is to be forthcoming at all.

No one man working alone is likely to come up with an adequate analysis of all the problems involved. But thinking can be clarified through discussion and a group of men who dedicate themselves to the task of working out these problems should be able to do so in sufficient detail to make their conclusions meaningful. Yet, only if the members of such a group can agree at the outset on one specific approach, can their work really be fruitful.



The purpose of this memorandum is to describe one approach, that one such group could take as the basis of their deliberations, in the hope that it will facilitate the setting up of a group.

In order to define this approach in a meaningful way, it is necessary for me to go into details which illustrate the nature of this approach better than any abstract treatment could do. My purpose here is not to give answers, only to raise questions, but for the sake of simplicity I shall raise them in the form of assertions.

#### The Facts of Life

Right after the second World War ended, it looked like another world war was in the making. The Russian-American power conflict seemed to involve the very same factors which shaped the events in the conflict between Sparta and Athens. That conflict arose because the rising power of Athens threatened Sparta and the rising power of Sparta threatened Athens, and it led to the Peloponnesian War, which destroyed Greece.

After the second World War, the rising power of the Soviet Union threatened America and the rising power of America threatened the Soviet Union. And we had again the same polarization of the world with more and more nations falling this time into the orbit of either America or the Soviet Union. Up to a short time ago, we were moving in this classical pattern toward another world war. Ironically in this war the United States might have helped Germany to conquer Russia and Japan to conquer China, even though she fought the second World War in order to prevent these conquests.

#### "The Good News of Damnation"

The atomic bombs which have become available to America and Russia in large quantities have broken this classical pattern in which power conflicts have moved in the past toward their resolution by war. Today the world is still polarized, but the Soviet Union and America can rely on allies in peace time only; these "allies" are not likely to participate in an all-out war if they can help it.

Also, at the time of this writing, the shouting war, that has been going on unabated for a number of years, has stopped, temporarily perhaps but possibly for good.

### The Pressure for Preventive War

Most people believe that the Atomic Stalemate between the Soviet Union and America is still a few years away. Quite a number of people in America believe moreover that there is no chance of reaching a political settlement with the Soviet Union and that therefore war must ultimately come. Some of them draw the conclusion that America ought to provoke a war right now or at least keep on taking calculated risks that might lead to war in the near future. Few of those who hold these beliefs will admit it openly, and it is difficult to know how many there are and who they may be. Retired admirals and generals who are free to speak their minds are prominent among those openly favoring a preventive war. They can hardly be regarded as a representative sample of the officers of the armed forces, but they might be fairly representative of a majority of the officers nearing retirement age.

The pressure for preventive war in America is at present counter-balanced by moral revulsion against such a war, by the genuine love of peace of many including President Eisenhower, by the desire to keep the budget balanced and by sheer inertia.

Yet as far as I can see, this issue will not be resolved in any clear-cut fashion until either the Atomic Stalemate becomes an accomplished fact or else Americans will see more clearly the outlines of a possible settlement and thereby acquire greater faith in the possibility of achieving real peace.

At this time we are rapidly approaching an Atomic Stalemate between the Soviet Union and America. Chet Holifield of the United States House of Representatives, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, said for instance recently in a speech that in all probability we shall have it within four years and possibly we may have it within two.

In a number of recent conflicts, in the Korean war for instance, the Soviet Union and the United States were lined up on opposite sides. People in America believe that America's threat of "massive retaliation" had restrained Russia from giving all-out aid to North Korea and China. The war in Korea was brought to a draw by using conventional weapons alone, and Americans in general believe that this could not have been done successfully had Russia not felt restrained by the threat of "massive retaliation" and had she thrown in all she had available in conventional weapons.



It is clear that no threat of "massive retaliation" would restrain Russia in future local conflicts of a similar kind once the Atomic Stalemate has become an accomplished fact. For then she could devastate America just as well as America could devastate her. In some of the more remote areas, America could then no longer hope to win a conflict by the use of conventional weapons alone.

For this reason, at present the declared policy of the United States is to use atomic weapons against military targets in tactical warfare even in local conflicts, such as might arise over Quemoy, Matsu or Formosa.

It would seem that this is a very risky policy.

Even though in the beginning of the war atomic bombs may be limited to military targets in the tactical areas, pretty soon they will be used also against military targets in the strategic areas. And if this is done, who can doubt but that things will go from bad to worse and that pretty soon we would have a full-scale Atomic War?

The present official concept of civilian defense in America assumes that the Atomic War will start with a massive attack on the cities of America and that the main problem of civilian defense is to evacuate the civilian population within the four to six hours that may be available after an air raid alarm has been triggered by enemy aircraft crossing the radar screen.

I personally believe it unlikely that this is how Atomic War will come to America's cities. Rather if Atomic War comes to them, it will probably come through the back door. A local conflict may start in some remote area and lead to fighting in which the Soviet Union and America line up on opposite sides. One or the other side may begin to use atomic weapons in tactical warfare and after a period of exercising a restraint, they may find themselves drafted into a full-scale Atomic War.

According to this view, the real problem of civilian defense would thus be the orderly relocation and billeting of the city population at the outbreak of a major local war and not the hurried evacuation of the cities at the time when the air raid alarm is sounded. It is even conceivable that at the outbreak of such a war there may start a race of relocation between the Soviet Union and America and that the outcome of this race may determine the outcome of the war.



With the resort to the use of atomic weapons in a local conflict, the psychological revulsion which has been gradually built up against the use of atomic energy for the purpose of killing and maiming human beings will go overboard. The only clear line of demarcation that could be held would thus be broken and no one will be able to say thereafter -- "destruction so far and no further."

In the absence of a political settlement, the possibility of further local conflicts remains open. Could the United States adopt a policy not to resort to the use of atomic bombs in any local conflict as long as no atomic bombs are used against her forces?

If the United States adopts this policy, then she will not be able to defend some of the more remote areas successfully, which today she could hold indefinitely by using atomic weapons. On the other hand, the United States could still resist in those areas quite vigorously and for a fairly long time by using only conventional weapons and thus she could make it expensive for the would-be conqueror to conquer. From the point of view of discouraging an attack on these areas, this would be quite enough, even though it may not satisfy those who believe that there is no substitute for victory. However, it would be very expensive indeed to maintain a strong enough force armed with conventional weapons only.

Thus, today the United States is faced with the alternative of discouraging the outbreak of local wars either by maintaining a very expensive military establishment equipped with conventional weapons or else to base her strategy on the use of tactical atomic weapons. This strategy will avoid the cost which the conventional arms policy would entail but will involve the risk of a full-scale atomic war arising from any local conflict and in the end perhaps the loss of the United States itself.

As one may see, there is no substitute for peace!

#### The Atomic Stalemate Between America and the Soviet Union

We have spoken of the Atomic Stalemate above, but now it has become necessary to state more precisely the meaning of this term. What would be the state of the world once the Atomic Stalemate is an accomplished fact?

In this Stalemate, the Soviet Union has enough hydrogen bombs to devastate America to the point where organized government would cease to exist



and America could do the same to the Soviet Union. America will rely on intercontinental bombers which can refuel in air and so may the Soviet Union and neither country will need any longer outlying air bases such as for instance the air bases in the Middle East which America maintains at present. Both America and the Soviet Union will be in the position to protect their Strategic Air Forces against attack. They will have a large number of air strips properly dispersed throughout the country. When the Atomic Stalemate is clear-cut in this sense, then no sudden massive attack by one could appreciably diminish the power of the other to retaliate. And, with the hope of being able to do so gone, this hope no longer affords an incentive for either party for striking the first blow.

The Atomic Stalemate is coming about so fast and is so unprecedented that few people have been able to adjust their thinking to it.

Once the Atomic Stalemate has been reached, both America and the Soviet Union will be invincible -- in a very real sense, as I will try to demonstrate presently. And from there on they shall remain invincible forever.

Yet, today even thoughtful men keep on talking in terms of "Russia's war potential" and the "great strength which might accrue to Russia if the industrial development of China is permitted to continue undisturbed," and in vague terms of "strength" in general.

True enough in the past one had always to keep in mind that the ultimate resolution of a political conflict might occur through war and that the "strength" of a nation might determine the outcome of the war. But today this kind of thinking is about to lose its validity forever. Only comparatively few people have in this sense grasped the significance of the hydrogen bomb, and even those of us who have grasped it will talk intelligently one day and another day we will lapse into our old habits of thought.

What can we do to bring home to ourselves the desperate need to operate with concepts that are meaningful in the new setting of the Atomic Stalemate? I shall now try to take the reader into the "never-never land" of the Atomic Stalemate and perform some mental gymnastics there for the purpose of forcing him -- and myself as well -- to try to understand the real meaning of the Stalemate.

At this point, we cannot even try to guess in what manner the governments of the nations will, in fact, conduct themselves in the Atomic Stalemate. But



we can analyze the various rules of rational conduct which, consistent with their enlightened national self-interest, the Soviet Union and America might each adopt. And we can state what the consequences will be for each rule -- always assuming that these two nations will abide by the rule which they may lay down for themselves.

This, of course, might be an unwarranted assumption, and thus we are now going to dance on the borderline of fact and fiction. Since we are dealing with a crazy situation, all the rules of conduct examined will be crazy rules, even though some of them might not be quite as crazy as the actual conduct of the governments involved might turn out to be.

We intend to talk only about conduct guided by rational considerations, but we must watch our steps because conduct counselled by passions will sometimes masquerade as rational conduct. Take the following instance for example. Many people believe that America's ability to annihilate Russia in the retaliation of a massive Russian attack against American cities will safeguard America against such an attack in all circumstances. This belief is based on the assumption that both Russia and America will act rationally, in line with their enlightened self-interest. I said before that I consider a sudden unprovoked Russian attack against the cities of America as an unlikely occurrence, but let me ~~now~~ assume, for the sake of argument, that such an attack has occurred and that in one single sudden blow all American cities and all her essential production facilities have been knocked out. Such an attack would in no way affect America's ability to retaliate and to annihilate Russia. Now it is of course perfectly rational for America to threaten Russia with a massive counter-attack and thereby to deter Russia from attacking. But assuming now that the attack above mentioned has in fact occurred, is it then rational conduct on the part of America to annihilate Russia? Would it not be more rational for America to speak to Russia as follows: "Our power to retaliate is undiminished and we could completely destroy your country now! But it is not to our interest to do so, and we are willing to refrain from doing so on condition that you will from here on give us half of your production of your industries for the rebuilding of our cities and of our production facilities."

This, of course, is not what America would do, but this is what would be rational conduct. I am stressing this here for one purpose only -- to caution



the reader, and myself, about various other courses of action which are advocated and which masquerade as rational, when in reality they are something quite different.

Let us now discuss several rules of conduct which America may adopt and which Russia may adopt and see what the consequences of each would be, always assuming that they both abide by the rules which they lay down for themselves.

If America adopts the rule of hitting Russia with all she has when one single bomb is dropped on one American city and if Russia adopts a similar rule for herself, we may have a very explosive situation. In this case, full-scale atomic destruction of both countries could be triggered accidentally. And it could be triggered maliciously, if an unidentified attacker -- some third nation for instance -- drops one bomb on either an American or a Russian city.

Now let us examine another possible rule of conduct. Suppose America adopts the rule of dropping two bombs on Russia for every bomb that is dropped on her and suppose Russia adopts the same rule. Such a rule may sound quite satisfying to "patriots" in both countries and it would not lead to an atomic catastrophe quite as fast as the rule discussed above, but it would lead to an atomic catastrophe nevertheless, if an atomic war gets started somehow somewhere.

We could, of course, go one step further and assume that the rule is "drop one bomb for each bomb received and no more!" And once we go this far, we may as well assume that America and Russia would go the whole hog and say each the following:

"There is no need to use bombs for killing and maiming people in warfare. We can prevent the penetration of our orbit by hostile troops without engaging in any war in which people are killed. We will list a number of areas in our orbit and attach a price tag to each one of them. If Area 1 is penetrated, we will demolish five medium-sized cities of the enemy. We shall give these cities a week's warning to enable them to evacuate all people. We shall expect that the enemy will retaliate by dropping five bombs on five medium-sized cities of our own, and we shall evacuate the civilians from our cities in anticipation of such a blow. For these bombs we are not going to retaliate, but, if any more bombs are dropped on us, we shall drop one bomb for



each bomb received and no more."

If both sides adopted this rule of conduct, what would be the consequence? If the price tags attached to the various areas set a price sufficiently high, then penetration of these areas would cost so much to the would-be conqueror that he would rather desist. Losing of five medium-sized cities, for instance, would be hardly worth the conquest of Iran to the Soviet Union or China, even though the United States would also lose five medium-sized cities in the process. And, if five medium-sized cities are not enough, the price might be set at seven or ten.

If such a rule of conduct were adopted, there might be perhaps still one attempt at the conquest of territory which is either in the American orbit or in the orbit of the Soviet Union, but if America and the Soviet Union abided by this rule of conduct that would probably be the end of attempted conquest. America and Soviet Union having thus demonstrated that they are invincible, there would be no further need for them to maintain an Army or a Navy or anything else except the Strategic Air Force.

Would this be peace? Of course not; it would be a mockery of peace.

Yet, this much may be true: as long as essentially only America and the Soviet Union are in the possession of a Strategic Air Force and the bomb, for a limited period of time there could be peace, provided only that a meeting of the minds has been reached between these two nations on the rules of conduct they propose to observe.

But what would happen if a number of other nations enter the arena and build a Strategic Air Force and hydrogen bomb?

Could we then assume that the general revulsion from the horror of atomic war would induce these governments to settle all their conflicts by amicable discussion and negotiations?

#### The Myth of Good Governments and Bad Governments

A society composed of governments may lack stability even though each government might be guided by her enlightened self-interest.

Human society is as stable as it is not because each individual is guided by his enlightened self-interest, but because in human society there is a restriction on the means even though there may be no agreement on the goals. Human beings are guided not only by their enlightened self-interest but also by custom, traditions, love, moral considerations and generous impulses.



Governments are not human beings; the people delegate to their governments their self-interest but not their generosity. Custom tradition and moral considerations play a very minor role in a government's decision in times of peace and practically none in times of war.

It was quite possible in the past to have some illusion in this respect and to believe that some governments may be bad but the others are good. The history of modern times seemed indeed to support this view up to the second World War.

The cause for America's entry in the first World War, for instance, was the sinking of the "Lusitania" by a German submarine. America took the position that a submarine which cannot save the civilian passengers of the boat has no right to sink the boat. Naturally America's entry into the war was consistent with her national self-interest, but moral considerations seemed to play a major role at least in the timing of her entry into the war.

In 1939 President Roosevelt warned the belligerent in Europe about waging war against the civilian population by resorting to aerial attacks against their cities, and when he did so he undoubtedly gave expression to the conviction of the American people that the waging of war against civilians was wrong.

When, in the second World War, the Germans bombarded Warsaw and later, by bombing Rotterdam, precipitated the surrender of Holland which was already defeated, this was interpreted as an atrocity; the German Government did this because she was German and not because she was a government. But then America suddenly began to wage war against the civilian population of Japan by dropping jellied gasoline bombs which burned over a million men, women and children in Japanese cities, and this was done without explaining to the American people why her government deemed it necessary to resort to this kind of warfare. A little later America, by dropping a bomb on Hiroshima, precipitated the surrender of Japan which was already defeated. What was the difference between Rotterdam and Hiroshima?

The waging of war against civilians which was regarded as an atrocity when the Germans did it, became respectable when Great Britain and America adopted a similar practice. Did the British and American Governments commit these acts because they were British or American, or did they commit them because they were governments and everything is permissible to governments



that is physically possible as well as "useful"?

A world in which quite a number of nations may possess hydrogen bombs is probably instable even if each government would act rationally and consistently with her enlightened self-interest. There is probably no stability in any "society", in which the members are not restrained by moral consideration, i.e. if there are no accepted rules as to the permissible means.

If the great powers will permit a situation to arise in the world in which a number of nations in pursuit of their sovereign rights will proceed to make hydrogen bombs and maintain a Strategic Air Force, then the survival of mankind will be at stake. What will the governments of the great powers do at this juncture? Our best hope in this respect is that the members of these governments will act in a double capacity and be aware not only of their governmental responsibility but also of their responsibility as human beings.

I personally doubt moreover that peace will be secured if it merely means the absence of war. It is impossible to achieve happiness by pursuing happiness, and it might be equally impossible to achieve security by pursuing security.



THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Is it possible to resolve the power conflict between America and the Soviet Union and to create a setting in which the possibility of war could be regarded as remote? What would be the nature of an over-all agreement that could accomplish this? And could such an agreement provide for the right kind of disarmament?

It is quite conceivable that once the Atomic Stalemate between America and the Soviet Union becomes an accomplished fact the great powers might find it convenient to agree to certain measures of disarmament. But in the absence of a political settlement, it is likely that sooner or later fighting would break out somewhere, and, if the great powers line up on the opposite sides, then disarmament will be quickly replaced by rearmament. Therefore, disarmament can be discussed in any meaningful way only if we are able to say what kind of a political settlement we have in mind and this we will have to discuss further below.

"Can Russia Be Trusted To Keep An Agreement?"

Neither the Soviet Union nor America could be coerced to observe an agreement if they no longer want to keep it in operation. Therefore a far-reaching over-all agreement will remain in operation only if it offers America and the Soviet Union and some of the other great powers involved strong and continued incentives for keeping it in operation. In this sense, the agreement must be self-sustaining or else it cannot serve our purpose. What shall these incentives be?

Clearly for the agreement to be really attractive, it should provide military security for the nations involved, political security for their governments and economic prosperity for their people. We shall try to spell out further below in what manner an agreement could secure such results for America, the Soviet Union and several of the other nations involved.

Only if we succeed in spelling this out in a satisfactory manner can it be properly judged whether an agreement offers sufficiently strong incentives to the great powers to make them want to keep it in operation. And only if the agreement does this, can it be regarded as self-sustaining.

In the discussion that follows, we shall describe the cart before the horse and just postulate here that we have succeeded in devising an agreement



that both Russia and the United States want very much to keep in force. With the validity of this assumption will stand and fall the conclusions which we shall draw from this discussion.

Basic for the general approach here presented is further the assumption that the agreement reserves both for America and the Soviet Union the right to abrogate it without cause either in toto or in part. There would be provided in the agreement a number of specific clauses of abrogation differing in kind and degree and any of these could be invoked without cause either by the Soviet Union or America. A few other nations, perhaps all permanent members of the Security Council (this would then include Britain, China and France) might retain the right to abrogate, but no such right would be retained by the vast majority of nations.

The right to invoke abrogation clauses without cause is the magic key to the solution of a major difficulty and opens up the possibility of concluding an agreement very fast, once the great powers reach a meeting of the minds on general intentions. Clearly, in the existing circumstances both the Soviet Union and America will want to make certain that as long as the agreement stands there shall be no secret major evasions of its disarmament provisions. But, if it were necessary, in order to make sure of this point, to spell out in the agreement in detail an inspection system that will provide ironclad guarantees for every conceivable contingency which might arise, then the lawyers might take years to write such an agreement -- if indeed such an agreement can be written at all. If, on the other hand, the agreement provides for the right to abrogate then -- as will be seen -- it is not necessary to spell out anything in the agreement that relates to an inspection system.

We shall assume in this discussion that the agreement has been entered into in good faith, by which we mean that it has **not** been entered into with the intent to abrogate it shortly after it is signed. Of this point we must make sure; and we can make sure of it by making the "down payment" high enough. This will be spelled out further on.

Now if at any time after the agreement goes into effect the Soviet Union for instance fails to convince America that no dangerous secret evasions take place in her territory, then America will have no choice but to invoke some of the abrogation clauses of the agreement and will probably soon thereafter be



compelled to abrogate the agreement in toto. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wants to keep the agreement in force -- as we assume she does -- she would want to dispel American suspicions of secret evasions. Thus, the really relevant question becomes this: In what ways can the Soviet Union and the United States convince each other, assuming -- as we must -- that they want to do this, that no major secret evasions of the disarmament provisions take place in their territory?

But before we can deal with this question -- perhaps the most urgent one of the real questions which are involved -- we must say what kind and what degree of disarmament we have in mind.

#### Arms Costs and Political Security of the Government

There is no direct relationship between the degree of disarmament and the stability of peace. The political settlement established is much more relevant in this respect than the level at which arms are maintained. Yet, there are good reasons why the very first steps in disarmament ought to be far-reaching in the sense that they should permit a very large reduction in arms costs. For only if this is the case will the agreement provide, during its first, and most critical years, strong economic incentives to the great powers.

In the Soviet Union the population of the cities has risen from 27,000,000 in 1927 to about 80,000,000. Rapid increases in economic prosperity of the Soviet Union is possible only if the urban population will continue to increase at a fast rate. Today twenty or twenty-five percent of the Soviet Union's national income is "saved" and invested each year, but much of it is invested in facilities for arms production. Moreover perhaps fifteen percent of the Soviet Union's national income is currently spent for the production of arms and the maintenance of an increasingly mechanized Army.

The kind of disarmament which would permit the Soviet Union to reduce arms cost at the very outset to the point where she could invest for the next ten years say thirty percent of her national income in a productive manner would permit the Soviet Union to increase the take-home pay of the workers ten percent each year for the next ten years and an equally rapid increase in the standard of living of the rural population. The standard of living of the Russian people could thus double in seven to eight years. Clearly, such rapid and sustained increase in prosperity would contribute to the political security of the government in the Soviet Union.



In the absence of a political settlement, the United States might have to spend in the next decade 46 billion dollars per year for direct military expenditures, for plant dispersal and above all for effective measures of civilian defense. If the United States can divert this amount into the right channels, then the American people could enjoy great benefits, depending on the channels into which the resources thus liberated would be directed. There is a political decision involved here which will be difficult to reach in America, and, in this respect, things are not going to be quite as simple for the United States as they might be for the Soviet Union.

The Federal Government could, for instance, maintain a high level of taxation and just disburse \$46,000,000,000 each year by mailing each year every family a check for \$1,000.00 with the urgent request to please spend it. There are, of course, less unorthodox ways for achieving essentially the same result; for instance, a very large increase of the personal exemption in the personal income tax.

For the United States there are essentially three basic solutions:

- a. America can increase its civilian consumption;
- b. Consumption can be maintained and there could be a major increase in leisure. Leisure could take the form of, for instance, two months of additional paid vacations for everybody;
- c. America could export capital or purchase services abroad.

Any number of combinations of these three possibilities could, of course, be also chosen:

For instance, extended paid vacations would lead to major expansion of the resort industries and transportation facilities so that we might have a combination of increased consumption and increased leisure. Or, if arrangements were made to make it easy for a large number of vacationers to spend their vacations abroad, then we would have a combination of increased leisure and the purchase of services abroad.

In the absence of a political settlement, many nations would spend ten percent of their national income on their military establishments. A political settlement, making it possible to disarm in the right manner, would enable these nations to invest this amount each year, with the result that their standard of living could rise an additional three percent per annum.

Their standard of living would thus double every twenty-five years due to the saving on arms expenditure alone.

#### General Principles of Disarmament

Disarmament would presumably go into effect in stages, with all stages agreed upon in advance and going into effect according to a predetermined time schedule. What should be these stages and what is the final state of disarmament towards which they should be directed?

For the purpose of this discussion, let me submit that in the final state soon to be reached, there should be eliminated -- with a few unimportant exceptions that may be discussed later -- all mobile heavy weapons suitable for tactical use such as guns, tanks, flame throwers, and also all strategic weapons such as bombs and means suitable for their delivery.

The manufacture of machine guns and traffic in machine guns would be left free. And there would be permitted also any sort of equipment for defense such as radar detection devices, short-range fighter planes, and anti-aircraft guided missiles. Permitted would be also heavy guns in built-in fortifications.

When this state of disarmament is reached, there will be essentially no military secrets left even though research and development on weapons might continue for a while, so that the development of long-range guided missiles, for instance, might be carried on beyond this point.

I propose to submit here, for the sake of discussion, the thought that the first stages of disarmament shall be very far-reaching in conventional weapons and perhaps in all tactical weapons, but that they leave the Bombs and the Strategic Air Forces of both America and the Soviet Union (as well as that of England) untouched.

Thus, throughout the first period, America and the Soviet Union would remain invincible. During this period, no secret evasions of the agreement by either America or the Soviet Union could vitally threaten the security of the other as long as the Atomic Stalemate is continued. Only when the bombs and the means for the delivery are eliminated will secret evasions of the agreements become really dangerous.

The very first step of disarmament, if it's a very large step, may serve a dual purpose. It will represent a down payment so large that no great power will enter into the agreement with the intention of abrogating it shortly after it is signed. And it will provide a great reduction in the cost of the



manufacture of arms and the maintenance for a highly mechanized Army.

Disarmament -- First Period

This first step might involve the physical destruction of three-fourths of all heavy guns, heavy tanks and all other mobile equipment needed in tactical warfare. All manufacture of such equipment will stop at the same time.

We do not need an elaborate inspection system to supervise the destruction of these weapons or the stoppage of their manufacture. Both America and the Soviet Union, as well as other nations involved, can specify in advance what equipment is going to be destroyed when and where, and agents of the nations involved could witness and certify their destruction. A few American agents installed in the Soviet factories where such equipment has been heretofore manufactured, and a few Russian agents installed in the corresponding American factories could make sure that the manufacture of such equipment is not continued.

Evasions are at this stage, of course, physically possible. But we must, above all, ask ourselves what reasonable motivation there would be for such evasions. At this point, the Atomic Stalemate will still continue, and no hidden manufacture of tanks or guns could vitally threaten either America or the Soviet Union. Evasions would involve the risk of leading to an abrogation of the agreement which both the Soviet Union and America would very much want to avoid. Nor could evasions substantially affect the outcome of the war to which such an abrogation might lead, and, since a political settlement goes into effect at the same time when disarmament begins, there will be during this period no crisis or local war in some remote areas with Russia and America lining up on opposite sides. What then would be the motivation for secret evasions during these early stages?

Because of the development of intercontinental bombers which can refuel in air, the Strategic Air Forces of the Soviet Union and the United States are in no need of air bases outside of their own territory any longer. It would seem, therefore, that during this first period of disarmament all outlying American Air Bases could be dismantled at an early date without affecting the capabilities of the Strategic Air Forces of America. In order to remove the incentive for a sudden surprise attack, it would be essential, as long as the Strategic Air Forces are maintained, to build a large number of air strips



in America and in the Soviet Union and thereby to make sure that no sudden surprise attack could appreciably affect the power to retaliate.

One must keep in mind that a massive attack of the Strategic Air Force of one country against the other country could be triggered accidentally by a false intelligence report or a maneuver by the Russian or the American Strategic Air Forces that is misinterpreted.

Such an attack could also be triggered maliciously by some third nation. If, for instance, a fleet of airplanes were to fly from the direction of the North Pole into Canada and were to breach a radar screen, it will be impossible at first to know whether Soviet bombers are on their way to destroy America or whether some nation was attempting to goad the American Strategic Air Force into a massive attack against Russia and thereby to bring about the destruction of both the Soviet Union and the United States. It would be necessary to wait several hours until American fighters are able to meet the "attackers" and identify the nationality of the planes. Would the American Strategic Air Force hold back that long?

These dangers can be avoided, however, if an understanding is reached between America and the Soviet Union on the procedures by which each nation will be guided in ordering a counter-attack.

#### The Principle of Compensation

Some of the measures necessary to create an orderly world will be politically unacceptable unless it is possible to compensate vested interests who would suffer losses or forego profits if these measures were adopted.

After the first World War, the issue of whether or not the Germans should build battleships became a hot political issue in Germany which affected the outcome of elections to the Reichstag. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was not permitted to build large battleships but was free to build cruisers up to 10,000 tons. After one such cruiser had been built, the question of whether Germany should go on building further cruisers became a political issue. The German Navy fought hard for these cruisers. I lived in Germany at that time, but I didn't understand what was going on until I had occasion to discuss the issue with an Admiral of the German Navy. When I asked him if he thought the possession of such cruisers would make any real difference in a war in which Germany and England fought on opposite sides, he said to me:



"You do not understand. If we can't have capital ships, the whole promotion system of the German Navy will be in jeopardy."

From the point of view of the national interests involved, there ought to be drastic shrinkage of the military establishments in the early stages of the first period of disarmament. This might meet with irresistible political opposition in America and perhaps also in the Soviet Union unless the principle of compensation were applied to this problem, as well as to some of the other problems which will arise during this period.

We ought to ~~examine~~ examine the possibility of setting up an international fund which would compensate all those who would suffer losses or forego profits as a result of changes that are brought about by implementing the overall agreement.

Such a fund might operate on the basis of detailed rules agreed upon from the outset. It could grant all general officers of the United States Armed Forces, who are retired because of the shrinkage of the military establishment a 20% increase in their retirement pay and freedom from federal income taxes on their full retirement pay.

All tariffs should be abolished early during the first period of disarmament, but this will be politically acceptable only if manufacturers are compensated for the losses they would forego and if labor is compensated for the ensuing relocation and the retraining which might be needed. The compensation paid to manufacturers might amount to 10% of the increase in import volume arising from the tariff cut, and the compensation paid to labor might perhaps be of the same magnitude. The elimination of tariffs in the United States might greatly reduce the amount of foreign aid that America would pay and thereby result in a very substantial net saving.

The principle of compensation may also be essential in making territorial changes that the political settlement might prescribe politically acceptable. This will be discussed further, below.

#### Spheres of Influence -- Yes and No

After the First World War, England and Russia had tentatively reached an agreement providing for Rumania to be in the Russian sphere of influence and for Greece to be in the British sphere of influence. President Roosevelt did not go along with this agreement. Therefore, it was not put into effect and soon thereafter fighting started in Greece.



Reaching an agreement on spheres of influence is an old device in foreign policy. The old devices have not entirely lost their usefulness and within limits will probably have to be used again. Yet, they are not enough, for now we are faced with a problem for which there is no precedent in history:

Always in the past the legitimate aim of foreign policy has been to prolong the peace. A good foreign policy was one which succeeded in eliminating the most acute causes of conflict and left the remaining problems untouched in the hope that they would disappear in time. Time does, in fact, solve many problems but unfortunately it creates as many problems as it solves.

A good foreign policy meant in the past a policy which prolonged the peace, i.e., one which lengthened the interval between two subsequent wars. And so far that is all that any foreign policy has ever done. But today it is no longer enough to postpone the war, and, since the devices applied in the past can do no more than just this much, it is now necessary to find an entirely new approach.

Again we might have to agree on spheres of influence for a limited period of time, but at the same time we will have to set up a time schedule for the liberation of one area after another from such spheres of influence. Here a new principle is needed -- the device of predetermined gradualism:

#### Predetermined Gradualism

The framework of this general time schedule for the liberation of areas under foreign domination might be set by Great Britain. One might start out by asking Great Britain to submit a schedule for each colony and to say at what date British power will be withdrawn from each colony. It does not matter so much whether most colonies are liberated in 25, 50 or even 75 years as long as each colony can look forward with certainty to a date at which it will be liberated.

The British know very well that they cannot keep the colonies forever. The shorter they set the period for each colony during which it remains under their rule, the less trouble they will have with the population. People will fight for the abstract concept of freedom with particular relish, but few people are willing to die for something that they know will come to pass within the foreseeable future, whether they die for it or not.

A particular problem is presented by colonies like the Belgian Congo which is profitable both to the Belgian Government and to private interests. The "principle of compensation" should be applied to the liberation of colonies



of this kind.

We may assume that the over-all agreement will set up a united Germany. If disarmament in heavy tactical weapons is virtually complete early during the first period of disarmament, the issue of whether or not Germany should be neutral will be void of any tangible meaning. But what shall be done about the eastern frontiers of Germany?

Clearly, the political settlement which we are discussing will be satisfactory only if it looks to the future and eliminates causes of conflicts before the conflicts would actually arise. The issue of the eastern frontiers of Germany is almost certainly one on which sooner or later the whole German nation without difference of party affiliation will unite.

It would seem wise to eliminate this issue as a cause of conflict by providing in the over-all agreement that Germany shall obtain from Poland each year a two-mile strip beyond the Oder-Neisse line until Germany has reacquired her pre-war territories in the east.

Similarly, Poland might be assured a two-mile strip each year on her eastern frontier until she too reaches her pre-war boundaries in the east.

Because these changes are slow, an international fund might make available a very large sum for the relocation of each family that wishes to move out of the zones that will be transferred from Poland to Germany or from the Soviet Union to Poland. Here the principle of compensation -- provided only that compensation is generous enough -- might make these changes politically acceptable.

#### Change of Policy Vs. Change of Government

Undoubtedly, there will be major policy changes within the governments of many areas of the world in the future. Need these policy changes come about by the people changing the governments or can they come about by the governments changing their minds?

Churchill said once that in the French Government the men change but the policy remains, whereas in the British Government the men remain but the policy changes.

It is conceivable that by the time an over-all agreement is reached there will be no Soviet troops left in Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and perhaps even some of the Baltic States. This does not mean that these countries will revert to the parliamentary form of democracy or that they



will change their governments or that their governments will fall under American influence. But once a country is free from occupation and does not have to fear that it may be reoccupied any day, it is essentially in the same situation as most of the countries who are economically not self-sufficient and depend on the cooperation and good will of one or several of the great powers. The governments of these countries may be sovereign, but they are not free. This situation can change only slowly as a world community will gradually develop.

No political system, however firmly entrenched, will last forever, and what we must be concerned about at this point of history is not so much how fast we are moving, but where we are going. It is on this last point above all that a meeting of the minds of the great powers is needed.

#### Strong Central Governments -- A Stepping Stone to World Community

American support to Chiang Kai-shek's regime on Formosa seemed to arise -- inasmuch as it can be rationally explained at all -- from considerations which were valid in the past, before America became invincible, but which are not valid any longer. No one in his right senses in America seems to believe that Nationalist China will ever reconquer the Mainland, but some people seem to believe that by maintaining pressure on China, China might once more fall apart into various provinces and China will thus cease to exist as a great power. Why should this be desirable? Thinking in terms of patterns of the past, one might indeed argue that China under a strong centralized government -- whether Communist or not -- might become an industrial power that will overshadow perhaps all other nations including America and threaten the very existence of the United States. This kind of thinking which operates with concepts like a "war potential" and "strength" does not take into account that America today and forever hereafter is invincible.

If we free ourselves of this kind of thinking, then the path is open for the universal adoption of a policy that will favor the establishment of strong centralized governments in all areas of the world which have reached a certain stage of development. For only through the cooperation of such strong governments can the world move fast toward a world community where the component parts are making rapid progress.

#### The Acute Controversial Issues

The present acute controversial issues such as Formosa, Korea and Indo-China, are products of the cold war. Once a setting is created in which



war is unlikely to occur, it does not matter, from the point of view of the world at large, how they are settled, as long as they are settled one way or another. The unfortunate people who happen to live there may, of course, be vitally affected by the settlement, and I regret that I do not know in what way their real interest could be taken into account. The wishes they might express in an election might have some relation to their real interests or they might not.



Disarmament -- Second Period

If all goes well early during the first period of disarmament, all tariffs will be abolished, East-West trade will flourish, and through credit made available to all industrialized nations, the Soviet Union will be enabled to partake in the technological progress of the western world by purchasing modern production facilities.

As a result of all this, there ought to be a continued rapid increase in the standard of living in the Soviet Union and a related economic prosperity in the rest of Europe.

If all goes well, there will be no political conflicts during that period which lead to fighting and there will be no resort to the use of force in any of the local conflicts that might arise. Should fighting occur, however, in some local conflict, then because of the political settlement reached, there will be no danger that America and the Soviet Union might line up on the opposite sides.

If these conditions are fulfilled, there will be a favorable setting for the beginning of the second period of disarmament. When should this second period begin?

I believe the date should not be set in the over-all agreement, but it should be left to America and the Soviet Union to determine the beginning of the second period whenever they are both ready and willing for it to begin.

At the onset of this second period, there will be complete elimination of all bombs. Because of the possibility that bombs may be hidden, the main emphasis would be laid on eliminating or controlling all effective means by which bombs could be delivered. This would include long-range fast aircraft, aircraft carriers and any boats or submarines that could launch planes suitable for the delivery of bombs. The destruction of equipment could be witnessed and certified by inspectors and inspectors in factories could make certain that the manufacture of such equipment is discontinued.

If there is apprehension that commercial aircraft might be used for a massive aerial attack by any one nation, then transcontinental commercial aviation might be placed into the hands of several regional international organizations. Their operating personnel could be recruited in a manner that would preclude such danger.

Bombs, of course, could be delivered into ports by boats, but there



would be no motivation for an attack that would destroy a few ports without decisively affecting the outcome of the war that would be brought about by such an attack.

During the second period of disarmament, the Soviet Union and America will be no longer in danger of an aerial attack -- as long as the agreement is observed and the only real threat against the security is possible major secret evasions of the agreement.

Once the danger of an aerial attack is gone, the Soviet Union and America will have no military secrets left that have to be safeguarded, and this will make it possible for them to find ways for convincing each other that there are no major secret evasions taking place within their territory.

In this phase of the developments, neither the Soviet Union nor America need to have any objection to an aerial survey conducted by the other. The purpose of such a survey would be to detect the manufacture of planes or guided missiles which might be used for the delivery of bombs that could have been secretly hidden.

It is possible, however, than an aerial survey will not be sufficient to allay all suspicion. It is difficult, today at least, to foresee what potent means of mass extermination might be available which would remain undetected by aerial surveys.

It is well to remember that after the first World War there was an Inter-Allied Control Commission in Germany which had considerable difficulty in obtaining information. For any German who gave them information about a secret evasion of the disarmament provision of the Treaty of Versailles could be tried and convicted -- if discovered -- under the German Espionage Act which had never been revoked. Clearly, it is inconsistent to sign a treaty providing for disarmament and also to maintain an "espionage act" on the statute books and thus to prevent citizens from reporting violations of the Treaty. Because the Treaty of Versailles was imposed on Germany, it is understandable that the German Government tried to evade it.

But the agreement here discussed would come into being as the result of a meeting of the minds. It would be in the interest of the Soviet Union and of America to maintain the agreement in force and they can maintain it in force only if they can convince each other that it is not secretly evaded. It may be therefore understood that the government of the Soviet Union and the government of America would regard it as a patriotic duty of every citizen to disclose evasions of the agreement. Only if this attitude can in fact be achieved will it be possible



to maintain the agreement in force in the long run.

In a state of virtually complete disarmament, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have any secrets (other than perhaps research and development secrets) left that have to be safeguarded. In these circumstances perhaps the simplest way for America and the Soviet Union to convince each other that there are no secret evasions would be to permit each other to maintain a sufficient number of highly-qualified spies in each other's territory on whom they feel they can rely.

This may sound odd. But, unless Russia and the United States can convince each other that there are no secret evasions, sooner or later one of them will begin to suspect that atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs and means for their delivery are produced in one place or another in the vast territory covered by Russia or America. Then neither of them will have any other course open to her than to invoke one abrogation clause after another. Pretty soon the arms race would be on again and we would end up in the same unsatisfactory state in which we find ourselves today -- if not worse. In the end, tolerating spies might turn out to be the only reliable means to keep the others from having unwarranted suspicions of secret evasions.

America would want her spies in Russia to be Russians who can go about unobtrusively in the Russian territory. Those who do not want to be regarded as spies might be designated as "plainclothes agents whose identity is not known to the Russian Government." These "agents" would carry a badge and in the setting which we are discussing here (a setting which is admittedly difficult to visualize while we are still living in a cold war atmosphere) it would be understood that American agents would be immune from arrest. If the Soviet Government were to arrest any of these agents when their identity is discovered, then it would become so difficult for America to recruit agents that she might have to invoke some of the abrogation clauses. Similarly, if the Russian Government arrested Russian citizens who gave information to American agents, these agents would be unable to collect information, and America might be forced to abrogate. It is therefore not in the interest of Russia to do any of these things. Of course, once the Russians discover the identity of one of the American agents, his usefulness has ended, and unless he can find some other satisfactory way of earning a living, he would have to elect to leave Russia. At that point, he would become America's headache and not the headache of the Russian Government.



Of course, all this is true in the reverse also, and America would have to tolerate agents of the Soviet Union if she wanted the Soviet Union to tolerate American agents.

The presence of American agents in Russian territory will hardly be acceptable to the Soviet Government unless America can somehow convince the Soviet Government that her agents are merely spies and that they are not trying secretly to organize political conspiracy that could become dangerous to the Soviet Government. In order to convince the Soviet Government on this point, America might have to facilitate spying on her agents by the Russian Government. If the Russian Government can discover each year the identity of a sufficient number of American agents, put them under surveillance, and observe their activities unbeknown to them, then the Soviet Government can convince herself that these agents are indeed merely "spies". If this can be done, the Soviet Government would have no reason -- no rational reason at least -- to object to the presence of American agents.

During this second period of disarmament, there might be still fear that an abrogation might leave either America or the Soviet Union in a vastly inferior position. This could occur, for instance, if at the time of abrogation, one of these countries had completed the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles whereas the other had not. For this reason, it is conceivable that both the Soviet Union and the United States would want to continue weapons research and development throughout the second disarmament period. Their research and development secrets (which might include the construction of a variety of atomic and hydrogen bombs) could be very well safeguarded during this period in the same way in which industrial secrets are usually safeguarded. The ordinary spy is not capable of penetrating into this kind of secret; it takes a "traitor" to divulge them.

The second disarmament period reaches its end when the Soviet Union and America will stop weapons research and development and at this point new possibilities will open up for making progress toward a real world community.

#### Enforcement

The question of enforcing disarmament provisions cannot arise with respect to any nation who has the right to abrogate. But what about other nations? When is enforcement needed and how could it be accomplished?



What if one of the industrial nations who has no right to abrogate should arrest international inspectors or agents of any of the nations who have the right to abrogate, and there is suspicion that illicit manufacture of atomic bombs or means for their delivery has been started, or is about to start? Then clearly measures of enforcement will have to go into action, or else one of the nations who has the right to abrogate will be forced to abrogate.

How shall enforcement take place in such a situation? Not by sanction against the offending nation, nor by war against the offending nation, but rather by arresting the officials personally responsible for the evasions.

How can such an arrest be effected and what organization should be responsible?

It seems to me better to avoid the setting up of a centralized international police force. Instead, in a few areas of the world -- to begin with perhaps in Europe, in Japan, in Brazil and Argentina -- there should be set up in each area a regional police force. Each such police force would be under the control of perhaps seven to eleven nations selected with the concurrence of the nations of the region and specifically named in the over-all agreement. The nations who have the right to abrogate would not be members of any of these regional organizations. The members should be rather selected with a view to allay the fear that the regional police might intervene in the internal affairs of any of the nations in the region.

The only function of the regional police force would be to arrest officials of a national government in the region whom they hold responsible for dangerous evasions or violations of the agreement. In order to be able to do this, the regional police force must be more heavily armed than the police forces of any of the nations in the region so as to make sure that no national police force will be able to interfere with their operations. Could the regional police force be relied upon to take action if there are dangerous evasions?

Such evasions would presumably threaten the security of the member nations themselves who control the regional police force, and therefore it would seem likely that these nations could be relied on to take action for this reason alone. But they are likely to take action in any case for another reason: the majority of the member nations would want to keep the agreement in force, and if they permitted secret evasions to occur and to continue in their region, one of the great powers who has the right to abrogate would pretty soon be



forced to abrogate.

Will the regional police forces safeguard the peace within the region? What will happen if one nation in the region sends her forces armed with machine guns (we assume no other weapons are available at this stage of disarmament, to any national government) across the frontiers of another neighboring nation within the same region?

In such a case, the regional police might intervene. But the decision to do so would rest with the nations which control it, which would presumably include many of the nations of the region. Since this kind of aggression might not endanger any of the great powers who have the right to abrogate and who might be geographically remote from the area of the conflict, there may be no real pressure for such intervention from any of the great powers. Thus, the regional police forces do not represent a foolproof system of security. This defect might be mitigated perhaps by the proper selection for each region of the member nations for the control of the regional police force.

The regional police forces could not be counted upon to intervene in favor of established government in case of a revolution. Therefore the established governments that exist today and that rely heavily on the possession of tanks and guns in order to keep themselves in office might be reluctant to give up these weapons within the general framework of universal disarmament. This might, for instance, hold for Iran or Egypt and a number of other nations within the American sphere of influence. The problem might be solved by permitting these governments to retain these heavier arms, enough to protect them from their own population but not enough to resist the regional police. For how long shall they be permitted to retain these arms? Is 25 years enough?

In the long run, the general effect of this system of security will be to make revolutions easier. This is perhaps not wholly desirable, but probably not preventable. Presumably the revolutionists will have no difficulty in obtaining all the machine guns they want and the established government will presumably be in possession of all the machine guns it can use. The outcome of the fighting, with machine guns plentiful on both sides, will presumably be determined by the organization and determination of the two fighting factions. The revolutionists might be Communists and they might be victorious, but this does not mean that the victorious government would necessarily be subservient to the Soviet Union or that it would remain subservient for long.



In any case, the outcome of such revolutions has no bearing on the Soviet-American power balance in any meaningful sense not in the age of the Atomic Stalemate.

Can a better security system be devised that might be acceptable in the near future to both America and the Soviet Union, than the one here described? This point would seem to deserve a thorough inquiry.

#### Conquest Without Wars

Nothing so far said will, of course, prevent subversion. Just what is subversion? In the setting of the cold war, both America and the Soviet Union were eager to have, wherever possible, governments in office that would be subservient to them. Subversion may be defined as the action of a nation to bring about a change of government in another nation for the purpose of bringing into office a government that is subservient to the former, or at least not subservient to someone else. In this sense, one may say that the United States or Great Britain "subverted" Iran, which has now a government based on the support of the military armed with American tanks and guns. For us here the most relevant point about subversion is that both parties can play at this game.

It is not a good game from the point of view of the native populations. It would seem likely, however, that, if there is an over-all political settlement and if the danger of war will be regarded as remote, both America and the Soviet Union will lose interest in this game.

The only sure remedy against this kind of interference is the establishment of strong native governments and here, unfortunately, we come up against an unsolved problem and one that must be solved if we are to develop a world community in an orderly fashion.

The parliamentary form of democracy is not suited for the self-government of undeveloped countries. There is little doubt that other forms of government could be devised which would be no less democratic, in any meaningful sense of the word, than the parliamentary form of democracy. And they could be far more suitable for undeveloped countries. Intellectual leadership in the West has been grossly remiss in neglecting this problem. As it is, there is a scarcity of ideas which makes practical experimentation impossible at present. But, if ideas were developed, as they certainly could be developed, and if Great Britain intends to give independence to some of its colonies within



the next 25 years, those colonies could be used for cautious experimentation with ideas in this field.

Conquest without wars will become inevitable unless science will provide the means by which families can regulate their size according to their wishes, without having to take recourse to the unsuitable methods of birth control which are at present conventionally used in industrial countries.

Even though religious and political prejudices are at the moment predominantly against the exercise of birth control, the main obstacle is the inadequacy of the methods that are available. If a medicine could be provided in the form of a pill, that women could take once a month or once a week, and if these "pills" were made available to all, they would be taken where they are really needed. This holds for all countries where the population approaches the limit, where not enough arable land can be made available any more for those who are in need of land.

Again, the West has been grossly remiss in not solving this problem. Once "the pill" is available, the world may adopt the principle of "freedom of access to the pill" and then let nature take its course.

In countries like the United States and the Soviet Union there is still room for an expanding population and once disarmament goes into effect, it is possible in both countries to have an adequate increase in the standard of living in spite of the increasing population. But is it clear that within 25 years we shall have a population explosion in China if the Chinese Government is successful in improving the standard of living and in reducing child mortality. When the time comes when it will be possible to discuss with the Chinese Government the real issues (unobscured by such fake issues as Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa), then the single most important issue that will have to be discussed will be this impending population explosion in China.

#### Racial Security

It should be the responsibility of an international fund to make available the "pill" all over the world to every family that wishes to use it.

The ability of the individual family to control its size is probably also the key to the problem of "racial security". In areas where there are three racial sectors, say, white, black and mixed, both the white and the black sector are in danger of disappearing and they respond to this danger with racial resentment and with the suppression of the less powerful color by the more

powerful color.

The solution to this problem is not to forbid or discourage inter-marriage. Intermarriage is usually a slow process amounting to a few percent of the marriages. And all it takes to safeguard the white sector and the black sector against being obliterated is to keep the birth rate of the white sector and the black sector slightly above the birth rate of the mixed sector. This could be accomplished by the community offering financial inducement to the black sector and the white sector for having larger families.

#### Towards Organized World Community

Everybody seems to agree that the world will be at some time under one government, even though there is considerable confusion today just what functions such a world government would have to exercise. But whether it takes 25, 50 or 100 years until we have an effective central direction of an organized world community is not the important issue for us today. The important issue is rather along what path we can make progress towards this goal without first going through another world war.

The United Nations is not the beginning of a world government. It could be transformed into a world government perhaps, just as you can perhaps transform a steam engine into an electric generator. But clearly if we want to have an electric generator, it is easier to build one from scratch.

How can we make any progress towards the remote goal of a world government when it is clear that the direct approach would require national governments to give up sovereignty to a supra-national authority, and this is precisely what they do not want to do. Clearly, the direct approach will not work.

#### The Oblique Approach

If we want to move towards world authority that will limit the sovereignty of the individual nations, including the great powers, we would have to sail against the wind. Sailing against the wind is possible as everybody knows, but it requires taking an oblique approach. Is there an oblique approach for moving towards world government?

Let us take a concrete example. The regions of the world where the inter-dependence of the nations is greatest today is in Europe. What the German Government does affects all her neighbors and what the French Government does affects all her neighbors. Yet this inter-dependence which exists in effect



"In America a man born in the state of New York may go to study at Harvard in Massachusetts and may, if he chooses to do so, settle in California. Few men born in New York State will actually do this, but the fact that all of them are free to do so, if they so desire, makes them look upon other states as potential places of study and potential places of residence, rather than potential battlefields. Can we bring about a similar situation in the world without opening the door to large-scale migration and can we by doing so materially change the present pattern of loyalties?

"Many of the men who influence public opinion by speaking or writing come from a small class of people -- the class of people who have had the advantages of higher education. Their attitudes and their loyalties will in the long run affect the set of values accepted throughout the whole community.

"Any agency in charge of student migration might be given the right to place, say, up to twenty percent of 'foreign' students into the colleges of any one country and could pay for their tuition and living expenses. Moreover, twenty percent of the 'foreign' students who graduate in any one country might be given the right to settle in that country, if they choose to do so.

"In the United States we have at present an inflated student body of about two million college students. According to this scheme, about four hundred thousand might be 'foreigners'. Since students spend an average of four years in college, this means that every year one hundred thousand 'foreign' students would enter the United States and out of these every year about twenty thousand might decide to stay permanently in this country. This is well within the limits set by the immigration laws, but new legislation would be required in some other countries before they can participate on equal terms.

"If such a scheme were in operation, the total number of persons involved in this migration would be small, but every high school student, all over the world would look upon the United States and other major countries as potential places of study. Only a small fraction of the 'foreign' students graduating in the United States might finally decide to stay here for good; most of them would not make up their minds about this until they actually graduated and saw what positions were open to them. But, in the meantime, all those who study here in the United States would look upon this country as their home -- at least potentially.

"Assuming that every one of these 'foreign' students received in the United States an allowance of \$2,000 per year, all of them together would cost less than one billion dollars per year, and this amount would come out of the general contributions of the United States towards the budget of the world agencies. Similarly, American students in England and Russia would receive yearly allowances paid out of the English and the Russian contributions. Many American students might be induced to study under this scheme abroad where they can study free rather than at home where no one takes care of their living expenses and tuition."

It is clear that a number of other social inventions will be needed if we wish to bring about fast enough a change in the old pattern of loyalties and develop a new pattern within which a world government could rule with the consent of those governed.