1 VICTOR HARRIS LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC. FILED 2 964 Fifth Avenue San Diego, CA 92101 3 Telephone: (714) 239-9611 JUL 3 - 1975 4 DIANE S. GREENBERG CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER 1212 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 864-2752 8 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 9 10 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 11 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 12 LOUIS O. LOPEZ; CASA JUSTICIA,) Civil Action No. 75-0219-GT individually and on behalf of 13 all persons similarly situated,) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 14 Plaintiff, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND 15 vs. AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO DISMISS INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 16 JOHN DUFFY, individually and as Sheriff of San Diego County; 17 SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY; C. HUGH FRIEDMAN, TROY 18 MOORE, CHARLOTTE ROBERTS, KING TAYLOR, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, 19 individually and as members of the San Diego County Civil Service 20 Commission, 27 Defendants. 22 INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiffs submit this Memorandum in opposition to 24 defendants' following motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b), Federal 25 Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to state a 27 claim upon which relief may be granted; and (2) to dismiss 28 individual defendants from particular claims for lack of juris-29 diction. Plaintiffs respond to defendants' contentions in the 30 order they have been raised. 31 32

PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED CLAIMS UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED UNDER
42 U.S.C. §§1981 AND 1983, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND TITLES VI AND VII OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

In determining whether to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must not only assume that the facts set forth in the claim are true, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46(1957), but must resolve all doubts in favor of the plaintiff. E.g., Supchak v. United States, 365 F.2d 844, 845 (3rd Cir. 1966). It is well settled that a case, such as the one at bar, brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts should not be dismissed at the pleading stage, unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. Scher v. Board of Education of West Orange, 424 F.2d 741, 744 (3rd Cir. 1970); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1973).

Thus, defendants carry a heavy burden on this motion which they have clearly not met.

A. Plaintiffs Have Stated A Claim For Relief Under Title VII Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act

In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege numerous facts under which they can establish a <u>prima facie</u> case of employment discrimination by each of the two methods recognized by the United States Supreme Court. <u>See Alvarez-Ugarte v. City of New York</u>, 391 F.Supp. 1223, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

First, pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing (1) that he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) that

A COURT

-2-

despite his qualifications he was rejected, and (4) that the employer continued to seek applicants of plaintiff's qualifica-2 tions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this standard 3 in Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 4 1974). The Second Amended Complaint contains sufficient 5 allegations under each of the four elements stated in McDonnell 6 Douglas. In Paragraph 6, plaintiff Lopez alleges he is a 7 Mexican-American. In Paragraphs 6 and 12 through 14, plaintiff 8 alleges he was qualified for the Deputy Sheriff position, but 9 10 was rejected despite his qualifications. Finally, Paragraph 6 alleges that a less qualified individual was 11 selected. Therefore, the Second Amended Complaint states 72 a claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. §2000e 13 et seq., pursuant to McDonnell-Douglas guidelines. 1/ 14 Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint goes beyond McDonnell 15 Douglas by satisfying the approach outlined in Griggs v. Duke 16 17 Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971), and applied in its progeny. According to Griggs, a plaintiff establishes a prima 18 19 facie case if he demonstrates that the selection criteria utilized by the employer have an adverse impact on the minority 20 21 group. The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate 22 that the challenged criteria are closely related to job per-23 formance. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st 24 Cir. 1972); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridge-25 port Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2nd Cir. 1973); 26 Arnold v. Ballard, 6 EPD 98675 at 5020 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Western 27

In light of the controlling decisions in McDonnell Douglas and Gates, plaintiff is not required to identify the individual who was hired by defendants, as apparently was thought necessary in Nishiyama v. North American Rockwell Corp., 49 F.R.D. 288 (C.D. Cal.1970), relied upon by defendants.

^{31 2/} When judicial decisions are not yet officially reported, plaintiffs refer the Court to the citation in the Commerce Clearinghouse publication "Employment Practices Decisions" (EPD).

Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 330 F.Supp. 536, 539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1971).

Pursuant to the principles stated in the foregoing and similar cases, the instant complaint alleges facts which make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination. The statistics alone referred to in Paragraph 17 have been held sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's burden. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 9 EPD \$\mathbb{q}\$997 at 7157 (6th Cir. 1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, supra, 330 F.Supp. at 539; Officers For Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, C & C of San Francisco, 371 F.Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. Cal. 1973). At the very least, such statistics are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sargent, 9 EPD \$\mathbb{q}\$10,083 at 7423-24 (D. Mass. 1975); Nowlin v. Pruitt, 62 F.R.D. 121,123 (N.D. Ind. 1974).

Also following the <u>Griggs</u> model, plaintiffs allege that the selection criteria set forth in Paragraph 18 have an adverse, disproportionate impact on Mexican-Americans and are not sufficiently job related. Contrary to defendants' contention (Def.Mem., pp.2-3), Paragraph 18 expressly incorporates the allegations of plaintiff Lopez' individual discrimination set forth in Paragraphs 13 through 16 (<u>see</u> Affidavit of Louis Lopez attached hereto as Exhibit I). And, it is important to note that other federal courts have invalidated similar selection criteria where their use results in gross under-representation of minority groups. <u>See</u>, e.g., <u>Wallace v. Debron Corp.</u>, 494 F.2d 674

As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971),

In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer . . .

(8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating wage garnishment criterion); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F.Supp. 723, 728-29 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (invalidating written examinations, credit ratings and neighbor-hood references); United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 556-557 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (invalidating subjective interview criteria which considered credit rating and neighborhood references); Officers For Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, C & C San Francisco, supra, 371 F. Supp. at 1336-39 (invalidating examinations).

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.

1.9

B. Plaintiffs Have Stated Claims For Relief From Employment Discrimination Under The Fourteenth Amendment And 42 U.S.C. §§1981 And

Although both Griggs and McDonnell Douglas were Title VII suits, charging violations of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the courts have uniformly applied their reasoning to employment discrimination suits predicated upon the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, supra, 459 F.2d at 733; Vulcan Society of the New York City Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 394 n. 9 (2nd Cir. 1973); Officers For Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, C & C of San Francisco, supra, 371 F.Supp. at 1335-37; Crockett v. Green, 9 EPD \$10,029 at 7257 (E.D. Wis. 1975). Therefore, since the Second Amended Complaint states a proper claims under 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., it also states proper claims under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §\$1981 and 1983.4/

Plaintiff Lopez' individual claim of retaliatory-racial rejection for employment, set forth at Paragraphs 25 through 27, is also adequate under 42 U.S.C. §\$1981 and 1983. See, e.g., Hudson v. International Business Machines, 9 EPD ¶9991 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); See also Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1966); Porcelli v. Titus 302 F.Supp. 726, 736 (D. N.J. 1969).

C. Plaintiffs Have Stated A Claim For Relief From The Unequal Provision Of Sheriff's Department Services Under The Equal Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment And 42 U.S.C. §1983.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

In arguing that plaintiffs have not stated a claim because "there is no right . . . that a public entity must employ persons who are 'bilingual-bicultural'," (Def.Mem., p.4), defendants misconstrue the Fifth Cause of Action.

Plaintiffs make numerous allegations in Paragraphs 28 through 31 which, taken together, demonstrate that the defendants have failed to deliver County Sheriff's Department services to plaintiffs on a basis equal to that on which they deliver such services to English speakers. The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the employment actions and inactions of defendants have created significant language barriers for plaintiffs and those similarly situated, thus creating two classes of recipients of services: first, persons who can effectively communicate in English with Deputy Sheriffs and other Sheriff's Department personnel thus enabling them to receive the full panoply of services to which they are entitled; and second those, like plaintiffs and their class, who are unable to communicate effectively with Sheriff's Department personnel and who, as a result, are denied equal access to such services. This classification is arbitrary and denies plaintiffs equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The classification is particularly invidious in that it discriminates against plaintiffs and their class on the basis of race or national origin.

In cases involving possible discrimination based on race or national origin, disparity in treatment is subject to great scrutiny under the equal protection clause. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,372 (1971). The facts here compel application of the strict scrutiny test. That Mexican-Americans

(or Spanish-Surnamed Americans) constitute an identifiable ethnic or national origin minority group for purposes of equal protection, or for purposes of enforcing statutory rights, is settled law. Serna v. Portales, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606-08 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1970). In the instant case, defendants have constructed a classification based upon one of the prime characteristics of Mexican-Americans, their Spanish language. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, supra, 324 F. Supp. at 608. And, when a significant disparity exists in public services delivered to the members of different races, Courts hold such disparity unconstitutional. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972); Selmont v. Improvement Ass'n v. Dallas County Comm'n, 339 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Ala. 1972).

Several federal courts have recently refused to dismiss complaints by Spanish-speaking plaintiffs making allegations almost identical to those set forth in the Second Amended Complaint. E.g., Association Mixta Progresista v. United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Civ. No. C-72-882 (N.D. Cal. August 13, 1973) (Copies of the Court's Order and Stipulated Dismissal are attached hereto as Exhibit II).

In Sanchez v. Norton, Civ. No. 15732 (D. Conn.), Spanish-speaking welfare recipients and applicants, alleged facts and sought relief which is almost identical to that set forth by plaintiffs in this action. The Sanchez Court denied defendants motion to dismiss, stating:

Whether viewed in the context of an "invidious classification" under the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46(1948); Koremastu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216

-7-

(1944); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1175-1178 (2nd Cir. 19 Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment 1 2 395 F.2d 920, 931-932 (2nd Cir. 1972), or as viable causes of action under Title VI 3 of the Civil Rights Act, see Lau v. Nichols, [414 U.S. 563 (1974)], the plaintiffs' allega-4 tions are sufficient to survive pretrial dismissal. 5 A copy of the Sanchez order is attached to this Memorandum as 6 Exhibit III. 7 Spanish-speaking plaintiffs in Aspira of New York, Inc. 8 of Education of the City of New York, 58 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 9 1973), sought more bilingual school teachers and cirriculum on 10 Equal Protection and Title VI grounds. Judge Frankel denied 11 defendants' motion to dismiss, stating in part, 12 The motion [to dismiss] is not meritorious. Without attempting to 13 foretell the outcome, we find it sufficient to say that "novel issues" 5/ 14 of such apparent difficulty ought not to be resolved in the broad and relatively 15 abstract terms of the complaint considered by itself. We may be permitted to wonder 16 why the concerned legal officers of the city should choose to leave the plaintiffs' 17 allegations unexplored and unanswered, cutting off at this threshold stage 18 the possibility that such efforts could 19 promote resolutions by means short of but very possibly preferable to constitutional pronouncements of judges. 20 Having ventured that dictum, and 21 intending it as a suggestion, the court's formal office remains to say that the complaint should not be, and will not be dismissed on motion, 58 F.R.D. at 64-65 (emphasis added). 22 23 Officials of Yolo County, California, perhaps followed the 24 suggestion in Aspira by stipulating 'to a Consent Decree providing, 25 inter alia, for the hiring of bilingual-bicultural Deputy Sheriffs. 26 Mexican-American Concilio v. County of Yolo, Civ. No. S74-371 27 (E.D. Cal. April 2, 1975). 28 In urging this Court to dismiss the Fifth Cause of Action, 29 defendants rely upon Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 30 31 See 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice And Procedure §1357 at 603 (1969), noting that courts "should be extremely reluctant 5/

of liability is novel. .

to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings when the asserted theory

1 1973), Kuri v. Edelman 491 F.2d 684, (7th Cir. 1974) and Guerrero 2 v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1973). 3 None of these cases is wholly dispositive. Defendants ignore 4 Association Mixta Progresista v. United States Department of 5 Health, Education and Welfare, another federal California case 6 cited above in which a motion to dismiss was denied. Defendants 7 also omit the Sanchez and Aspira cases discussed above. 8 Guerrero and Kuri, decisions dealt exclusively with the question 9 of bilingual notices, not the primary issue in this action-- the 10 delivery of equal services. 6/ Moreover, Kuri merely denied an 11 injunction pending appeal, not the more drastic dismissal action 12 defendants seek here. The Carmona decision is a cursory affirmance 13 of a district court opinion, which speaks of the burdens which 14 bilingualism might place on defendant state unemployment insurance 15 agency. Finally, it is not clear whether plaintiffs in Carmona 16 alleged the unequal distribution of services as set forth in 17 Paragraph 29 of the Second Amended Complaint. 18

In sum, plaintiffs have stated claims under the Equal Protection 19 Clause and 42 U.S.C. §1983 by alleging facts showing the 20 discriminatory impact on Mexican-Americans of defendants' failure to employ sufficient Sheriff's Department personnel 22 fluent in Spanish and English. This claim is directly supported by the Association Mixta, Sanchez, and Aspira decisions discussed 24 above.

> Plaintiffs Have Stated A Claim For Relief Under Title VI Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000d, et seq.

Section 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000d,

-9-

28

27

25

26

21

29

30

Indeed, as Justice Tobriner noted in dissent, 9 Cal. 3d at 820, "the defendant departments have already seen fit to identify 31 Spanish speaking recipients who are illiterate in English, to assign caseworkers fluent in Spanish to those recipients, and to furnish welfare forms [other than the termination notice] in Spanish.

provides,

1

2

3

1

5

6

7

8

9

10

77

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

28

27

28

29

30

31

No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

In their Sixth Cause of Action, plaintiffs allege that the challenged practices and policies of the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County discriminate against Mexican-American job applicants and effectively deny plaintiffs the full benefits of the Sheriff's Department programs. The plain words of the statute, when applied to the facts alleged, lead to the conclusion that defendant Sheriff's Department has violated Title VI. This conclusion is strengthened by the regulations promulgated by the Justice Department, since said defendant is alleged to be receiving federal funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 23 C.F.R. §42.104.

Although written in equal protection terms, Title VI is neither dependent upon nor necessarily concident with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather it is grounded on the general authority of the federal government to place reasonable restrictions upon the use of federal funds by the recipients. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569; 94 S.Ct. 786 (1974); United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Thus, Guerrera, Carmona, and Kuri, cited by defendants are clearly inapposite to plaintiffs' Title VI claim.

Moreover, many courts have held that employment discrimination and failure to provide equal services to foreign language speakers by agencies receiving federal funds establish violations of Title VI. Lau v. Nichols, supra, (education; Chinese speaking students); Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, supra, (education; Spanish speaking students); Sanchez v. Norton, supra, (welfare, 32 Spanish speaking recipients) United States v. Frazer supra (hospital employment). These are precisely the violations of Title VI alleged by plaintiffs in the Second Amended Complaint.

Therefore, plaintiffs have stated a claim under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

E. Plaintiffs Have Standing To Litigate All Claims Raised

1. The Standing of Plaintiff Lopez. Defendants first argue that plaintiff Lopez has been injured only by defendants' actions taken after certification to the Sheriff's Department. Therefore, they conclude, he lacks standing to challenge the employment criteria described in Sub-paragraphs 18(c) and (d). (Def.Mem., pp. 5-6). Defendants' contentions lack merit.

Plaintiff Lopez clearly has standing to challenge the Sheriff's Department interview described in Sub-paragraph 18(d), even according to defendants' view of the case. Defendants conducted this interview after plaintiff's certification to the Department, and plaintiff alleges that he was denied employment "as a result of said interview", "during which he was subjected to racial slurs . . . " (see Paragraph 13, Second Amended Complaint). Moreover, Paragraphs 13 through 15, incorporated in Paragraph 18, allege that defendants applied the post-certification interview to him in a discriminatory manner. Thus, plaintiff may challenge the interview, since he suffered "actual [economic] injury" from its application to him. Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,

For the same reason, plaintiff Lopez may challenge the written examination described in Sub-paragraph 18(c). In his Affidavit attached to this Memoradum as Exhibit I, plaintiff states that although he may have passed the examination, his combined score of 92 placed him lower on the eligibility list compiled by defendant Civil Service members than if the

examination had not been discriminatory. Plaintiff's Affidavit is consistent with his allegations in Sub-paragraph 18(d), and certainly shows that he suffered injury as a result of the alleged examination. $\frac{8}{}$

Finally, plaintiff Lopez may litigate the Title VI claim. In Paragraph 35 of the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory employment practices which injured him violated his rights under Title VI. And federal courts have not questioned the standing of a rejected job applicant to raise Title VI claims. E.g., Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 378 F.Supp. 126, 129 n.l (N.D. Miss. 1974).

2. The Standing of Plaintiff Casa Justicia. Defendants attack the standing of plaintiff Casa Justicia (CASA), apparently on the ground that CASA has merely a "special interest" in the subject matter of this case (Def.Mem., p.6). Defendants' argument is inaccurate and incorrect.

Plaintiff CASA has standing to represent its members who have been injured by defendants' discriminatory employment practices and unequal provision of Sheriff's Department services. In Paragraph 7 of the Second Amended Complaint, CASA alleges, in part:

Plaintiffs' affidavits, Exhibits I, IV and V, are submitted solely for the purpose of supporting allegations of standing, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin, 43 U.S.L.W. 4906, 4909 (U.S., June 24, 1975). See also Robinson v. Conlisk 385 F. Supp. 529, 537 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (employment discrimination case in which court relied upon plaintiff's affidavit to support standing).

Even if plaintiff Lopez had not received a lower ranking as a result of the examination, he would nevertheless have standing to represent the members of his Mexican-American class who had either failed or scored very low on the examination. See, e.g., Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34, 42 (5th Cir. 1974); Huff v. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973). These decisions hold that where the suit is an "across the board" attack on unequal employment practices, the named plaintiff need only show that he belongs to the class adversely affected by the practices. In this case, plaintiff attacks defendants' practices "across the board" and Lopez is a member of the adversely affected class—rejected Mexican-American applicants.

Members of CASA, who desire employment in the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County, and who need effective services from said Department, have been or will be denied such services and equal employment opportunity in a discriminatory manner as described more fully below.

Moreover, CASA alleges further injury in fact to its members in the provision of Sheriff's Department services (<u>see</u> Paragraphs 31 and 36 of Second Amended Complaint). Finally, affidavits of CASA members, attached hereto as Exhibits IV and V, detail specific injuries suffered as the result of defendants' challenged actions.

The controlling Supreme Court decisions recognize that the allegations and supporting materials discussed above are sufficient to confer standing on plaintiff CASA. In <u>United States v. SCRAP</u>, 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973), the Supreme Court held that an organization of law students had standing to challenge actions taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission based on <u>allegations of non-economic injury to organization members</u>. The Court distinguished <u>SCRAP</u> from <u>Sierra Club v. Morton</u>, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), relied upon by defendants, reasoning that while the Sierra Club alleged only a special interest in the problem being litigated, SCRAP alleged injury to its members. The Court's recent decision in <u>Warth v. Seldin</u>, <u>supra</u>, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4912, also recognized that associations have standing to represent its members if

[t]he association . . . allege[s] that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate of threatened injury as a result of the challenged action . . .

Decisions of lower federal courts following the <u>SCRAP</u> approach in the employment discrimination context also support CASA's standing. These decisions hold that allegations of injury to organization members are sufficient to confer standing on the organizational plaintiff to challenge the employment practices which harmed its members. <u>E.g.</u>, <u>Oakland Federation of Teachers v</u>.

-13-

Oakland Unified School District, 9 EPD ¶10,079 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Robinson v. Conlisk, supra, 385 F.Supp. at 537-39.

It is also settled that since individual recipients of public services alleging constitutional and Title VI violations have standing to litigate those claims, so do their organizational representatives. E.g., Lau v. Nichols, supra; Associacion Mixta Progresista v. United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, supra (see Exhibit II); Coleman v. Humphreys County Memorial Hospitals, 55 F.R.D. 507, 510 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291, 297 (M.D. Ala. 1969).

For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff CASA has standing to litigate this action.

II

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER EACH DEFENDANT

A. Jurisdiction Exists Over Each Defendant Pursuant To The Claim Based On Title VII Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Plaintiff Lopez concedes that prior to invoking this

Court's jurisdiction for violations of 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq.,

he must have filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission naming each defendant sought to be sued. 42 U.S.C.,

\$2000e-5(e). See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416

F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969). Plaintiff has fully complied with

this requirement. While his original charge named only the

Sheriff's Department of San Diego County as respondent,

his amended charge filed with the EEOC on or about

October 23, 1974, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1601.11(b), named

every other defendant sued herein. The Affidavit of Dorothy

Mead, EEOC Deputy Director, attached hereto as Exhibit VI, attests

.....

32

.30

to the fact that plaintiff's amended charge is on file with EEOC. 9/ By filing charges conforming with Title VII requirements and by obtaining his suit letter, plaintiff Lopez has done all that can be expected of him prior to bring this action. See, McDonnel Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); cf. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc. 431 F.2d 455, 460-67 (5th Cir. 1970). Thus, jurisdiction exists over each defendant named in the Second Amended Complaint. 10/

B. Jurisdiction Exists Over The San Diego Sheriff's Department Under Titles VI And VII Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and 28 U.S.C. §1331(a).

Although citing the wrong decision, defendants are correct in asserting the Sheriff's Department is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and may not be sued under that statute. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973). In any case, the point is immaterial. Since the Sheriff's Department is an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e (see Paragraph 9 of the Second Amended Complaint) and is a recipient of federal financial assistance under 42 U.S.C. §2000d (see Paragraph 33 of the Second Amended Complaint), the Department may be sued under those statutes. Moreover, the Sheriff's Department is subject to suit for violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981 under 28 U.S.C. §1343 and for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment

Ms. Mead's Affidavit readily distinguishes the instant case from Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1967), relied upon by defendants, in which the Court attached significance to an Affidavit from the EEOC indicating that a particular charge was not on file.

Although either the United States Attorney General or the EEOC may have erred in issuing the "Right to Sue" letter without naming each individual charged, Courts refuse to penalize Title VII litigants for mistakes committed by such administrative personnel. See, e.g., McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 9 EPD \(\frac{19868}{9868}\) at 6608 (E.D. Cal. 1974); Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft, Inc. 373 F.Supp. 937, \(\frac{940}{940}\) (M.D. Ala. 1974). Similar sentiments have been expressed by this Court in giving Title VII a liberal application. See, Slack v. Havens, 8 EPD \(\frac{19491}{9491}\) (S.D. Cal. 1973).

1	under 28 U.S.C. §1331. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg
2	State College, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3rd Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
3	Conlisk, supra, 385 F.Supp., at 536 (N.D. III. 1974); Maybanks v
4	Ingraham, supra 378 F. Supp. 913, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Since
5	these provisions have been pleaded (see Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
6	Second Amended Complaint), this Court has jurisdiction over the
7	Sheriff's Department under these statutes as well.
8	III
9	CONCLUSION
10	For all the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss
11	should be denied.
12	Respectfully submitted,
13	DIANE GREENBERG
14	VICTOR HARRIS
15	Dated: July 3, 1975 By Chita Harris
16	Dated: July 3, 1975 By Mille Harris VICTOR HARRIS
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	\$.
26	
27	
28	
29	
30	
31	

ADDENDUM

```
VICTOR HARRIS
1
     LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
     964 Fifth Avenue, Room 400
2
     San Diego, CA 92101
3
     Telephone: (714) 239-9611
     DIANE S. GREENBERG
4
     CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
     COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
5
     1212 Market Street
     San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: (714) 864-2752
6
7
     Attorneys for Plaintiffs
8
9
                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
10
                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
12
     LOUIS O. LOPEZ, et al.,
                                    Civil Action No. 75-0219-GT
13
                   Plaintiffs,
                                    AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS O. LOPEZ
14
     VS.
15
     JOHN DUFFY, et al.,
16
                   Defendants.
17
           I, Louis O. Lopez, being duly sworn, depose and say:
18
           1. I am the individual plaintiff in the instant action.
19
20
              I have been subjected to all discriminatory employment
      policies and practices alleged in Paragraph 18 of the Second
21
     Amended Complaint on file herein.
22
           3. I believe the combined score I received on the com-
23
      petitive examination and interview, alleged in Paragraph 12 of
24
      the Second Amended Complaint, would have been greater, if said
25
      examination were not discriminatory and otherwise invalid as
26
      alleged in Paragraph 18. As a result of said examination, I
27
      received a lower ranking among those who applied to be Deputy
28
```

30

29

31

Sheriffs in the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County.

4. I have personal knowledge of the foregoing paragraphs numbered 1 through 3. Dated: June 30, 1975 LOUIS O. LOPEZ Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6/30/75 YOLANDA PEREZ CASTILLO. OFFICIAL SEAL YOLANDA PEREZ CASTILLO NOTARY PUBLIC CALIFORNIA PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY My Commission Expires April 29, 1979 NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE SAID COUNTY AND STATE

EXHIBIT I

Page 2

CLERK, U. S. DIST. COURT, SAN ERANCISCO,

GILBERT M. DORAME ROBERT GONZALES CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 422 Healdsburg Avenue Healdsburg, CA 95440 Telephone: (707) 433-4429

1

4

10

11

14

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

ROBERT T. OLMOS 5 RICHARD PAEZ CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL 6 ASSISTANCE 335 Perkins Street McFarland, CA 93250 Telephone: (805) 792-2157 8

JOSE L. MARTINEZ CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 1212 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 863-4911

MICHAEL MENDELSON 13 ALAN EXELROD MEXICAN-AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND 145 Ninth Street

San Francisco, CA 94103 16 Telephone: (415) 626-6196

MARIO OBLEDO

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

ROBERT GNAIZDA ALBERT F. MORENO PUBLIC ADVOCATES, INC. 433 Turk Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: (415) 441-8850

KENNETH HECHT MICHAEL TOBRINER EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER 795 Turk Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 474-5865

CHARLES P. GILLET LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN MATEO COUNTY 2221 Broadway Redwood City, California Telephone: (415) 365-8411

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASOCIACION MIXTA PROGRESISTA, a nonprofit corporation, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, et al.,

Defendants:

CIVIL ACTION NO. C-72-882-SAW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS IN PART

Defendants, the San Mateo County Social Service Department, Robert Ripetto, individually and in his officially capacity as Director, the San Mateo County Social Service Department; the Tulare County Welfare Department; Hilmi Faud, individually, and in his official capacity as Director of the

Tulare County Welfare Department, having moved this Court for an order dismissing this action said motion having been filed on June 28th, 1973, and the same having come before this Court for hearing on August 2nd, 1973; James A. Aiello, Assistant District Attorney appearing for the San Mateo county defendants; Walter L. McArthur, Deputy County Counsel, appearing for the Tulare County defendants; Richard F. Locke, Assistant United States Attorney, appearing for the federal defendants; Jose L. Martinez, Robert T. Olmos, Richard A. Paez, California Rural Legal Assistance, and Don B. Kates, Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County, appearing for plaintiffs, and the Court having considered the legal memoranda submitted and oral arguments by counsel, and the same having been submitted to the Court for decision:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion to Dismiss by moving defendants be, and the same is hereby denied in all respects, except as ordered below,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that pursuant to the stipulation of plaintiffs and moving defendants, said Motion to Dismiss be, and hereby is granted as to defendants the San Mateo County Social Service Department and the Tulare County Welfare Department

1-1-11 22

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

28

23

1111 24

1111 25

1111 26

1111 27

11/1/

29 1111

30.

31

insofar as plaintiffs complaint purports to state a claim for relief against these two counties under 42 U.S.C. 1983, for the reason that said counties are not "persons" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983. DATED: August 2nd, 1973, and presented for signature and signed Approved as to form: JOSE L. MARTINEZ CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE MMES A. AIELLO ssistant District Attorney for the County of San Mateo Deputy County Counsel for the County of Tulare

ORIGINAL CHARLES P. GILLET DOO: B. KATES, JR. FILED an Mateo County GGT 29 1974 Local Aid Society 2221 Broadway

Redwood City, CA 94063

S. Transie

Telephone: (415) 365-8411

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ FRANCISCO MACIEL and HERMELINDA LOPEZ, and the class they represent

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ASOCIACION MIXTA PROGRESISTA, a nonprofit corporation, et al., 11 Plaintiffs,

CIVIL ACTION 110. C-72 882 SAW

SETTLEMENT AND STIPULATION TO DISHISSAL

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs FRANCISCO MACIEL and HERMELINDA LOPEZ brought 17 18; the above-entitled action on their own behalf and on behalf of 19: all primarily Spanish speaking persons who are eligible for 20! participation in the public social services programs in the 21 County of San Mateo, State of California, pursuant to Title VI 22 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Protection Clause of 23 | the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 24 and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 25 Section 1983, alleging that the San Matco Social Service Depart-26 ment had failed to deliver social service benefits to primarily 27. Spanish speaking persons on an equal basis, or in the same manner 28 or extent that such benefits are delivered to non-primarily Spanish 29 speaking persons.

30 After extensive negotiations between the parties herein-31 above referred to, and in light of ongoing progress by the 32 defendant SAN MATEO COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT and the

defendant FOBERT RIPPETO, Director of the San Mateo County Social 2 Service Division of the San Mateo County Department of Public 3 | Health and Welfare (sued herein as , "Robert Rippeto"), in providing 4 more adequate bilingual (Spanish-English) staffing, the above-5 mentioned parties hereby agree to settle this action insofar as alit concerns the San Mateo County plaintiffs and defendants by means 7 of the following stipulation. The parties hereto further agree g that upon execution of the following stipulation, and the filing o thereof with the Court, that this action shall be dismissed without 10 | prejudice as to the San Matco County defendants above named.

STIPULATION

The parties hereto hereby stipulate as follows:

1. Definitions:

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

21

25

26

- (a) The San Mateo County Social Services Division of the San Mateo County Department of Public Health and Welfare shall hereinafter be referred to as "the Department".
- (b) The word "bilingual" as applied to employees of the Department herein shall mean tested fluency in both Spanish and English.
- (c) The words "primarily Spanish speaking" as applied to recipients of or applicants for aid from the Department herein shall mean that Spanish is the language primarily relied on or preferred for oral and/or written communication.
- 2. That the Department does now have and will continue 29 in the future to have a number of Spanish-English bilingual 30 social workers and eligibility workers sufficient to 31 assign every primarily Spanish speaking recipient of benefits

from the Department with one such social worker and eligibility worker; that each said bilingual social worker and eligibility worker has and will in the future continue to have a normal case-load in relation to the average caseload of non-bilingual social workers in the Department; and in addition that the Department will insure that all specialized eligibility and social service units that have substantial contact with primarily Spanish speaking claimants (e.g., in Eligibility: intake and continuing units, Food Stamps, Medical; in Service: Public Assistance Referral, Child and Adult Protective Services, Medical Social Services, Day Care, etc.) are adequately staffed with sufficient bilingual employees or have immediate access to bilingual interpreters in order to meet the specialized service needs of all primarily Spanish speaking recipients.

- 3. That the Department will establish procedures for identifying all primarily Spanish speaking recipients in all caseloads at the earliest possible time to the end that they might benefit from the agreements and stipulations contained herein without undue delay. In particular, said procedures will provide for prompt identification of primarily Spanish speaking applicants so that immediate assistance can be rendered in Spanish with forms, application procedure, etc.
- 4. That the Department does now and will continue to
 utilize San Mateo County Civil Service bilingual job classifications
 as a means of obtaining employees with tested fluency in Spanish
 to that the result referred to in paragraph (1) above can be
 adequately fulfilled in an ongoing fashion.
 - 5. That the Department now has and will continue to have procedures with adequate personnel to implement them that insure prompt fluent bilingual response to primarily Spanish speaking recipients and applicants who contact any of the Department's offices either in person or by telephone.

- 6. That the Department now and in the future will continue to provide for translation into Spanish, all materials relating to available services provided by the Department, as well as all general notices sent to recipients. It is acknowledged that the Department now has available for recipients brochures, pamphlets, notices and other materials translated into Spanish. As to individualized notices sent to recipients, the Department is now and will continue to stamp on all such notices a statement in Spanish that if they need assistance in translating, they should contact their bilingual social worker for a translation and explanation in Spanish. In addition, in all individualized notices seat to recipients relating to reduction or termination of assistance from the Department, all of the general information relating to fair hearings and requests for them shall be both in English and Spanish, as to the G.A. Notices, immediately, and as to the categorical recipients, as soon as state approval is obtained.
- 7. That the Department will designate a bilingual high-level employee to receive, investigate, and respond to any complaints that may arise from primarily Spanish speaking recipients relating to problems they have in communicating or dealing with the Department; that the Department will issue a notice to this effect in Spanish.
- ment to the objectives of employment of persons from racial and ethnic minority groups as set forth in the official San Mateo Count Affirmative Action Program for County employment, by achieving parity, in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof, between the ethnic composition of the employees of the Department and that of the population of the County, as well as by achieving an appropriate ratio of minority persons employed in positions requiring personal contact or delivery of human services to minority persons.
 - 9. That the San Mateo County plaintiffs, in consideration

II. Page 6

of the foregoing, shall dismiss the instant complaint and attendant causes of action against the San Mateo County defendants above named.

DATED: October 16 1974.

For the San Mateo County Plaintiffs FRANCISCO MACIEL and HERMELINDA LOPEZ, and the class they represent:

By Foromotico Machi

By Hasquittelinon toller

CHARLES P. GILLET-Attorney for Plaintiff

For the San Mateo County Defendants, the SAN MATEO COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT and ROBERT D. RIPPETO, individually and in his official capacity as Director, the San Mateo County Social Service Department:
KEITH C. SORENSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY

October 17, DATED: 1974.

JAMUS A. AIELLO, Assistant District Attorney, County of San Mateo, State of California

BY THE COURT:

Based upon the above Stipulation, and by reason of the contents thereof, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the complaint, and attendant causes of action be, and the same are hereby, DISMISSED as to the County of San Mateo, THE SAN MATEO COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT and ROBERT D. RIPPETO, individually, and in his official capacity as Director, the San Mateo County Social Service Department.

Dated | 107 8 0 1974

STANLEY A. WLIGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT J U D G E 1-1-1

32

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

- 0

JUT & 1974 NEW HAVEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

17 17 22 14 3 100 17 100 1012 1210 2 10 17 100 1212 1210 1211

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ADRIANA SANCHEZ, ET AL. :

v. : CIVIL NO. 15732

NICHOLAS NORTON, ET AL.

RULING ON STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

This class action brought by non-English speaking
Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking persons eligible
to receive welfare benefits seeks relief against unequal
welfare services and benefits which are alleged to violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(d). In effect, the plaintiffs claim they are being
subjected to discrimination by the state defendants in two
major respects: 1) by the failure to provide application
forms, informational brochures, fair hearing summaries and
decisions and other written documents in Spanish; and 2) by
the failure to hire an adequate staff of Spanish-speaking
welfare workers.

The plaintiffs' detailed factual allegations must,

for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, be accepted as

true; the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiffs are entitled to no relief

under any state of facts which could be proved in support of their claims. <u>Couley v. Gibson</u>, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); <u>Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority</u>, 425 F.2d 853, 857 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).

The state defendants' first contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief to the plaintiffs is without merit. The plaintiffs' claims are bottomed squarely on the grounds that the defendants have violated their constitutional and statutory rights; thus, jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and (4) is evident.

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681 (1946). See also Rosado v. Myman, 397 U.S. 397, 402-403 (1970).

The Court also rejects the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiffs set forth manifold abuses: a denial of and delay in receiving welfare benefits; a lack of interpreters; unfair hearings; unjust penalties for failure to comply with unintelligible rules and regulations; and inadequate communication between Spanish-speaking clients and welfare personnel. In sum, the plaintiffs contend they are being deprived of income maintenance and social service benefits equal to those provided English-speaking welfare recipients, which has resulted in their exclusion from full participation in the federally assisted welfare program administered by the state defendants.

Whether viewed in the context of an "invidious classification" under the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., EXHIBIT III Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Oyama v.

California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-646 (1948); Kovematsu v. United

States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Chance v. Board of Examiners,

458 F.2d 1167, 1175-1178 (2 Cir. 1972); Norwalk Core v.

Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-932 (2 Cir.

1958), or as viable causes of action under Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act, see Lau v. Nichols, U.S. (1974),

the plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to survive pretrial dismissal.

Accordingly, the state defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 3rd day of June, 1974.

What Company United States District Judge

```
1
     VICTOR HARRIS
      LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
2
      964 Fifth Avenue
      San Diego, CA 92101
      Telephone: (714) 239-9611
3
      DIANE S. GREENBERG
4
      CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
      COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
5
      1212 Market Street
     San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone: (415) 864-2752
6
7
      Attorneys for Plaintiffs
8
9
                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
10
                     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
                                             ) Civil Action No. 75-2019-GT
      LOUIS O. LOPEZ; CASA JUSTICIA,
12
      individually and on behalf of
                                              ) AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL MAGANA
      all persons similarly situated,
13
               Plaintiffs,
14
      VS.
15
      JOHN DUFFY, individually and as Sheriff of San Diego County;
16
      SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF SAN DIEGO
17
      COUNTY; C. HUGH FRIEDMAN, TROY MOORE, CHARLOTTE ROBERTS, KING
18
      TAYLOR, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE,
      individually and as members of the
19
      San Diego County Civil Service
      Commission,
20
               Defendants.
2.1
              I, Daniel Magana, being first duly sworn, depose and
22
23
      say:
               I reside in Vista, California, within San Diego County.
24
          2. I am a member of the organization Casa Justicia, and I
25
      speak only Spanish.
26
              In March, 1973, I lived at 105 Connecticut Avenue, Vista,
27
      California. One morning during that month, at approximately
28
      2:00 a.m., two men in plain clothes knocked on my door, identified
29
      themselves as Border Patrol agents, and demanded entry. I was
30
      frightened because I didn't know the true identity of these
31
      men -- they didn't wear uniforms and they smelled of alcohol.
32
                                                         Page 1
                               EXHIBIT IV
```

While the two men were searching the residence, I ran out to look for help.

- 4. About one block away from my residence, I spotted a San Diego County Sheriff's patrol car, with two uniformed deputies inside. I tried to seek assistance from the deputies and have them determine the actual identity and purpose of the men who were searching my residence. However, because the deputies spoke only English and I spoke only Spanish, I could not communicate with them and they couldn't communicate with me. Instead, I could only point toward my residence. saying anything to me in Spanish, the deputy sheriffs placed me in their car and drove me back to my residence, where the plainclothes men were still searching.
- 5. The deputy sheriffs went into my residence while I waited in the patrol car. The deputies returned shortly and tried to make me go inside my residence. They did not communicate why I was to go inside, and I was confused and afraid to go. The deputies then tried to pull me inside my residence, but I resisted and they placed me under a choke hold and handcuffed me. I asked the deputies what they wanted, but I spoke in Spanish and they didn't understand. They asked for my identification, demanding "sus papeles". I displayed my identification, and the deputies left, saying nothing more and leaving me with the same problem I had when I first sought their service.
- 6. I believe the San Diego County Sheriff's Department provides more English-speaking personnel for each Englishspeaking County resident than it provides Spanish-speaking, Mexican-American personnel for said Spanish-speaking, Mexican-American residents in the County.
- 7. I believe that if the San Diego County Sheriff's Department employed more Spanish-speaking, bicultural EXHIBIT IV

-2-

2

1

5

7

8

9

10 11

12

13

14 15

16 17

18

19

20 21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

29 30

31

deputies and other personnel, I would have received the same type of services provided to English-speaking residents. I know I would have been able to communicate with Spanish-speaking, Mexican-American deputies. I believe Spanish-speaking deputies would have explained the identity of the plainclothes men and would have described the purpose of their search.

- 8. To my knowledge, since the events described above in paragraphs 3 through 7, the San Diego County Sheriff's Department has not substantially increased the proportion of its deputies and other personnel who are Mexican-American and speak Spanish. I know that my ability to speak only Spanish has not changed since those events.
- 9. As a direct result of the actions taken by the San Diego County Sheriff's Department described above in paragraphs 3 through 7, and because I cannot communicate with the Department, I have been discouraged and deterred from asking the Department for services to which I am entitled and which are provided to English-speaking residents of the County.
- 10. I know that if there were Mexican-American, Spanish-speaking Sheriff's Department personnel provided in substantial numbers to my community, I could and would call and explain to them my problems and request the necessary services.

The foregoing was read to me in Spanish and the Spanish translation is attached hereto. Esto me fue liedo en Espanol y la traducción en espanol esta aqui incluida.

Dated: July 2, 1975

Quiel Magana

Subscribed and sworn to before me this July 2, 1975.

OFFICIAL SCAL
JEDUSITA RIVERA
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
SAN DIEGO. COUNTY
My Commission Expires March 20, 1079

NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE SAID COUNTY AND STATE

EXHIBIT IV

```
VICTOR HARRIS
1
      LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
      964 Fifth Avenue
San Diego, CA 92101
2
      Telephone: (714) 239-9611
3
      DIANE S. GREENBERG
4
      CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
      COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
5
      1212 Market Street
                            94102
      San Francisco, CA
      Telephone: (415) 864-2752
7
8
      Attorneys for Plaintiffs
9
                IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
10
11
                      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
                                              ) Civil Action No. 75-0219-GT
12
      LOUIS O. LOPEZ; CASA JUSTICIA,
      individually and on behalf of
                                              ) AFFIDAVIT OF DANIEL MAGANA
13
      all persons similarly situated,
               Plaintiffs,
14
15
      VS.
      JOHN DUFFY, individually and as
Sheriff of San Diego County;
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF SAN DIEGO
COUNTY; C. HUGH FRIEDMAN, TROY
16
17
      MOORE, CHARLOTTE ROBERTS, KING
18
      TAYLOR, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE,
      individually and as members of the
19
      San Diego County Civil Service
      Commission,
20
                Defendants.
21
          Yo, Daniel Magana, ante todo formalmente jurando, declaro y
22
      digo:
23
              Resido en Vista, California, dentro del condado de San
24
      Diego.
25
               Soy miembro de la organización Casa Justicia y hablo
26
      solo espanol.
27
           3. En marzo, 1973, vivía en 105 Connecticut Avenue, Vista,
28
      California. Una mañana del mismo mes aproximadamente a las
29
      2:00 de la mañana dos hombres vestidos en rapa particular tocaron
30
      a mi puerta, se identificaron como agentes del Departamento de
31
      Immigración y exigieron entrada a mi casa. Tenía mucho miedo
32
                             EXHIBIT IV
                                                          Page 4
```

porque no sabía quien eran estos hombres -- no trían uniformes y olían a alcohol. Mientras los dos hombres investigaban mi casa, corrí yo a buscar auxilio.

- 4. Mas o menos una cuadra de mi casa vi un carro patrullero del San Diego County Sheriff dentro del cual estaban dos diputados en uniformes. Traté de pedir ayuda a los diputados Quería que ellos determinaran la verdadera identidad y la intención de los dos hombres que investigaban mi casa. Pero como los diputados hablaban solo inglés y yo hablaba solo español, no pude comunicar con ellos y ellos no pudieron comunicar conmigo. Solo pude apuntar hacia mi casa. Sin decirme nada a mi en español, los diputados me pusieron en su carro y me regresaron a mi casa donde las agentes de la Inmigración todavía estaban investigando mi casa.
- 5. Los diputados entraron a mi casa mientras yo esperaba en el carro patrullero. Los diputados pronto regresaron y trataron de hacerme entrar a mi casa, y yo estaba confuso y tenía miedo entrar. Entonces los diputados trataron de forzarme físicamente a entrar pero yo resistí y los diputados me agarraron del cuello y me pusieron esposas. Les pregunté a los disputados que querían pero no me entendieron porque yo hablaba solo español. Me pidieron mi identificación, exigiéndole "sus papales". Les mostré mi identificación y los diputados se fueron, diciéndome nada mas y dejándome con el mismo problema que tenía cuando primero busqué sus servicios.
- 6. Yo creo que el departamento del San Diego County Sheriff emplea mas personas de habla-inglés para cada residente del condado de habla-inglés que personas de habla-español, méxico americanos para cada residente del condado de habla-español, méxico-americanos.
- 7. Yo creo que si el departamento del San Diego County

 Sheriff empleara mas personas y diputados de habla-español y

 EXHIBIT IV Page 5

1 2

bi-culturales yo hubiera recibido servicios de la misma calidad que reciben los residentes de habla-inglés. Yo se que yo hubiera podido comunicar con diputados méxico-americanos de habla-español. Yo creo que disputados de habla-español me hubieran explicado la identidad de los hombres vestidos en ropa particular y me hubieran explicado el propósita de su investigación.

- 8. Que yo sepa, desde los acontecimiento describidos arriba en los párrafos 3 hasta 7 incluso, el departamento del San Diego County Sheriff no ha aumentado substancialmente la proporción de diputados y otros empleados méxico-americanos de habla-español. Yo se que mi habilidad de hablar solo español no ha cambiado desde esos acontecimientos.
- 9. Como consequencia directa de la acción, del departmento del San Diego County Sheriff describida arriba en los párrafos 3 hasta 7 incluso, y porque no puedo communicar con el departamento, me he desanimado a pedir servicios del departamento a los cuales tengo derecho y a los cuales son dados a los residentes de habla-inglés del condado.
- 10. Yo se que si el departamento del Sheriff aumentara substancialmente el número de empleados de habla-español, méxico-americanos, yo pudiera llamar y llamaría y explicaría a ellos mis problemas y pediría los servicios necesarios.

Dated: July 2, 1975

Daniel MAGANA

Subscribed and sworn to before me this July 2, 1975

CETTIGNAL STAL

JECUSTTA RIVERA

THOSE STATE DERIVATION

FROM DIECO CONTROL

My Commission Expires Carelo 20, 1979

RA COUNTY AND STATE

Page 6

```
VICTOR HARRIS
   LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.
2
    964 Fifth Avenue, Room 400
    San Diego, CA 92101
3
   Telephone: (714) 239-9611
4
   DIANE S. GREENBERG
   CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE
5
    COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
    1212 Market Street
6
    San Francisco, CA
                         94102
    Telephone: (415) 864-2752
 7
8
    Attorneys for Plaintiffs
 9
10
             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
11
                   SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
    LOUIS O. LOPEZ; CASA JUSTICIA,
12
                                            Civil Action No. 75-0219-GT
    individually and on behalf of
13
    all persons similarly situated,
                                            AFFIDAVIT OF ENRIQUE GARCIA
14
       Plaintiffs,
15
    VS.
   JOHN DUFFY, individually and as
Sheriff of San Diego County;
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF SAN DIEGO
16
17
    COUNTY; C. HUGH FRIEDMAN, TROY
18
    MOORE, CHARLOTTE ROBERTS, KING
    TAYLOR, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE,
19
    individually and as members of the
    San Diego County Civil Service
20
    Commission,
21
        Defendants.
22
        I, Enrique Garcia, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
23
           I reside at 930 B Street, National City, San Diego
24
    County, California. I have resided in San Diego County since
25
    1950.
26
        2. I am a Mexican-American proficient in Spanish and English,
27
    and I am a member of the organization Casa Justicia.
28
           I am 27 years old, stand 5'6" tall, and have graduated
29
    from high school.
30
        4. During the last three years, I have seriously considered
31
    applying for a deputy sheriff position within the Sheriff's
32
    Department of San Diego County. I believe I am fully qualified
```

EXHIBIT V

Page 1

for such a position. I would have applied for the position but for my belief that the required written examination is very difficult for Mexican-Americans to pass. I was also discouraged from applying for such a position because of my belief that the Sheriff's Department discriminates against Mexican-Americans by imposing subjective background and credit checks. I live and work in the Mexican-American community in San Diego County, and my foregoing beliefs are based upon what I have learned and experienced in this community.

NOTARY

PUBLIC

SAID COUNTY AND STATE /

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

NOTARY PUBLIC SALIFORNIA

OFFICIAL SEAL SEPH P. ORTEGA

SAN DIEGO COUNTY
My Commission Expires June 17, 1977

FOR THE

Dated: July /, 1975

Subscribed and sworn to before me this July / , 1975.

EXHIBIT V



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

PHOENIX DISTRICT OFFICE

112 N. CENTRAL AVE., SUITE 601

PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85004

IN-REPLY REFER TO:

State of Arizona)) ss County of Maricopa)

AFFIDAVIT

- I, DOROTHY E. MEAD, being duly sworn, depose and say:
- 1. I am Deputy Director and District Counsel for the Phoenix District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
- 2. In my official capacity, I have access to all files compiled by the Phoenix District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect to charges of discrimination filed with that office.
- 3. I am responsible for processing charges of discrimination filed with the Phoenix District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
- 4. In my official capacity, I have received the administrative file compiled with respect to the charge of Louis Lopez against the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, Charge No. TPX5 0069.
- 5. My review indicates that the document attached hereto and marked "Exhibit A" is a true and genuine copy of a letter received by the Phoenix District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and contained in the administrative file compiled with respect to the charge of Louis Lopez, Charge

Page 1

Page 2

Affidavit of Dorothy E. Mead

No. TPX5 0069.

DATED: June 17, 1975.

Darathy & Meal DOROTHY E. MEAD

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1975.

Sandra L. Ertelt NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires: June 17, 1978

LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC ATTORNEY

ROOM 430, GRANGER BUILDING 964 FIFTH AVENUE SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101

TELEPHONE: 272/3199 239-9611

October 23, 1974



Mr. Edward Valenzuela
District Director
Phoenix District Office
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
112 N. Central Ave., Suite 601
Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Re: TPX 0069 (TLA4 0853)
Lopez v. San Diego Co.
Sheriff Dept.

Dear Sir:

This office is representing Mr. Louis O. Lopez with respect to a charge of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act formally filed by him on or about June, 1974. Before proceding any further with this case, this office would like by this letter to make an amendment of party-defendants to the complaint as originally filed.

This amendment is hereby submitted for the purposes of including the following party-defendants to the complaint, thus amending the original complaint to read as follows:

County of San Diego; C. Hugh Friedman, Troy M. Moore, Charlotte E. Roberts, King O. Taylor, Timothy M. Considine, each individually and as members of the San Diego County Civil Service Commission; William D. Winterbourne, individually and as San Diego County Director of Personnel; John F. Duffy, individually and as Sheriff of San Diego County; Jack Walsh, Dick Brown, Lou Conde, Jim Bear, Lee Taylor, each individually and as members of The San Diego County Board of Supervisors; Richard Robinson, Lt. Henry Shope, each individually and in his official capacity.

The defendants herein included, impose a number of requirements which operate as barriers to the employment of Mexican-American (Spanish-Surname) citizens, including but not limited to, the barriers or requirements outlined in the original charge, and various other devices.

Page Two

Our client believes the entire procedure operates to discriminate against the class of Mexican-American (Spanish-Surname) citizens of which he is a member.

Sincerely,

EDMUNDO ESPINOZA B.

Staff Associate

EEB/sm

cc: Mr. Louis O. Lopez 281 E. Taylor Street San Jose, CA 95112

VICTOR HARRIS, ESQ. 1 FILED LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, INC. 964 Fifth Avenue, Room 400 2 San Diego, CA 92101 JUL 3 - 1975 (714) 239-9611 3 Telephone: CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT DIANE S. GREENBERG, ESQ. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CALIFORNIA RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE BY COOPERATIVE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER DEPUTY 5 1212 Market Street San Francisco, CA 94102 Telephone: (415) 864-2752 7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 8 9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 Civil Action No. 75-0219-GT LOUIS O. LOPEZ; CASA JUSTICIA, 12 individually and on behalf of SECOND AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS all persons similarly situated, 13 COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiffs, 14 VS. 15 JOHN DUFFY, individually and as Sheriff of San Diego County; SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT OF SAN DIEGO 16 17 COUNTY; C. HUGH FRIEDMAN, TROY MOORE, CHARLOTTE ROBERTS, KING 18 TAYLOR, TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, individually and as members of the 19 San Diego County Civil Service Commission, 20 Defendants. 21 22 I. 23 INTRODUCTION 1. Plaintiffs bring this action on their behalf and on 24 behalf of the persons they represent to redress the injuries 25 suffered by them as a result of defendants' policies and practices 26 of employment discrimination, as set forth more fully herein, 27 which operate to deny plaintiffs equal opportunity for employment 28

and advancement in the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County

this action to redress the injuries they have suffered as a

because of their race and national origin. Plaintiffs also bring

result of defendants' failure to provide meaningful and effective

29

30

31

32

services to Mexican-American residents of San Diego County.

II

JURISDICTION

- This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1981,
 1983, 2000d, and 2000e et. seq., and 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202.
- 3. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by each of the following statutes: 28 U.S.C. §\$1343(3)(4); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3); and 28 U.S.C. §1331. The amount of damages suffered by each plaintiff exceeds \$10,000, exclusive of interest.

III

VENUE

4. For the cause of action based upon 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq., venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(3), since the discriminatory employment practices complained of herein occurred in San Diego County, California, which is situated within the Southern District of California.

TV

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

5. For the cause of action based upon 42 U.S.C. §2000e,

et. seq., plaintiff Lopez exhausted his administrative remedies

by filing complaints with the California Fair Employment Practices

Commission and the United States Equal Employment Opportunities

Commission. The commencement of this action has been authorized

by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-5(f)(l). A copy of the letter evidencing such authorization is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.

28

30

31

32

2

1

3

4

6

7 8

9

1011

12

13

1415

16

1718

19

20

22

21

2324

25

2627

28

2930

31

32

PARTIES

- 6. Plaintiff Louis O. Lopez is a 33 year-old Mexican-American (Spanish-Surnamed) citizen of the United States, standing six feet tall and weighing 200 lbs. At all times relevant herein, he was a resident of San Diego County, California. speaks Spanish and English and is a high school graduate. about November 1971, Plaintiff applied with the San Diego County Civil Service Commission for the position of Deputy Sheriff within the San Diego County Sheriff's Department. He performed and passed the examinations required of applicants for said position. However, despite his qualifications, he was denied employment and consequent opportunity for advancement in said Sheriff's Department in October, 1972 and again in early 1973. Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges thereon that some or all of the applicants for said position were less qualified than he, that a less qualified Anglo-American was hired for said position, and that he was denied employment because of his race and national origin, as described more fully below.
- 7. Plaintiff CASA JUSTICIA (hereinafter CASA) is a nonprofit organization whose members are Mexican-American (SpanishSurnamed) individuals residing in San Diego County, a substantial
 number of whom speak Spanish as their sole or primary language.
 For more than four years, two of CASA's primary purposes have been
 the eradiction of racial discrimination in public employment and
 the provision of effective and meaningful public services to
 the Spanish-speaking community in San Diego County. Members
 of CASA, who desire employment in the Sheriff's Department of
 San Diego County, and who need effective services from said
 Department, have been or will be denied such services and equal
 employment opportunity in a discriminatory manner, as described
 more fully below.

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and: 2 (A) All Mexican-American (Spanish-Surnamed) individuals 3 who have applied for positions as Deputy Sheriffs in the San Diego 4 County Sheriff's Department, but who have been or will be denied 5 equal opportunity in obtaining such employment, and consequent 6 opportunity for advancement within said Department, on the basis of defendants' discriminatory policies and practices complained 8 of herein; 9 All Mexican-American (Spanish-Surnamed) individuals 10 residing within San Diego County who might hereafter apply for 11 Deputy Sheriff positions in the San Diego County Sheriff's 12 Department, and who will be denied equal opportunity in obtaining 13 such employment, and consequent opportunity for advancement within 14 said Department, on the basis of defendant's discriminatory 15 policies and practices complained of herein; 16 (C) All Mexican-American (Spanish-Surnamed) individuals 17 residing within San Diego County who have been discouraged from 18 applying for Deputy Sheriff positions in said Department on the 19 basis of defendants' discriminatory policies and practices 20 complained of herein; and 21 (D) All Mexican-American (Spanish-Surnamed) individuals 22 residing in San Diego County who have been or will be denied equal 23 access to effective and meaningful services from defendant 24 Sheriff's Department by reason of defendants' failure to employ 25 sufficient Mexican-American personnel proficient in both Spanish 26 and English. 27

The persons in each class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. There are questions of law and fact common to the classes. The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims presented by members of the

28

29

30

31

classes, and plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the classes. The defendants have acted on grounds applicable to the classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief to the class as a whole.

9. Defendant Sheriff's Department of San Diego County is

- 9. Defendant Sheriff's Department of San Diego County is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b), having more than fifteen employees.
- 10. Defendant John Duffy is the Sheriff of San Diego County, and he is sued in his individual and official capacity. Said defendant is responsible for the administration, control, hiring, and personnel requirements of the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County.
- 11. Defendants C. Hugh Friedman, Troy Moore, Charlotte
 Roberts, King Taylor, and Timothy Considine are the Members of
 the San Diego County Civil Service Commission. Said defendants
 are responsible for prescribing, amending, enforcing, and supervising the policies and practices for the employment of individuals within the several Civil Service departments, including
 said Sheriff's Department.

VI

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

12. In or about November 1971, plaintiff Lopez applied with the San Diego County Civil Service Commission for the position of Deputy Sheriff within the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, and performed the written competitive examination. In or about February, 1972, plaintiff sat for an oral interview and submitted to a physical examination with said Civil Service Commission. He received a combined score of 92 as a result of the written examination and personal interview, passed the physicial examination, and was certified to defendant Sheriff's Department for possible employment.

-5-

1 2

personal interview with defendant Sheriff's Department during which he was subjected to racial slurs concerning his race and national origin. As a result of said interview, plaintiff was denied employment as a Deputy Sheriff, and consequent opportunity for advancement with said employer, for the ostensible reason that he possessed excessive personal debts and a poor credit rating, both of which plaintiff denies.

14. During February, 1973, plaintiff Lopez reapplied for the Deputy Sheriff's position and again was certified for possible

- 14. During February, 1973, plaintiff Lopez reapplied for the Deputy Sheriff's position and again was certified for possible employment. However, defendant Sheriff's Department again denied plaintiff employment this time upon an adverse personal reference from his neighbor.
- 15. Plaintiff Lopez is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, in fact, he was denied employment and consequent opportunity for advancement primarily because of employment policies and practices which have an adverse impact upon persons of his race and national origin, Mexican-American.
- 16. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that the defendants utilized employment selection devices in a discriminatory fashion, applying requirements such as background checks more stringently to Mexican-Americans than to Anglo-Americans.
- 17. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that defendants employ Mexican-Americans as Deputy Sheriffs and as higher ranking officers at a rate substantially beneath their representation in San Diego County. While Mexican-Americans comprise 16% of said County's population, they constitute only 3.6% (18 out of 496) of the Deputy Sheriffs. More glaring are the statistics for higher official positions within said Sheriff's Department. Only 1 Sargeant out of 66 (or 1.5%) is Mexican-American. And no Mexican-Americans hold the position of

1 Lieutenant or Captain, even though 41 such positions exist in 2 said Department. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege 18. 3 that defendants' acts described in Paragraphs 13 through 16, and the disparate treatment accorded to them and their classes 5 described in Paragraph 17, are due directly and proximately to 6 defendants' policies and practices of using unlawful, discriminatory, and non-merit hiring criteria including, but not 8 limited to, the following: 9 (a) Utilization of credit reports and 10 debt levels as employment criteria, which are neither job-related nor 11 justified by business necessity, and which disqualify disproportionate 12 numbers of Mexican-American applicants; 13 (b) Utilization of personal references from the applicant's neighborhood, which are 14 totally subjective, subject to personal bias, and which do not measure job performance capability, but which dis-15 qualify disproportionately large numbers 16 of Mexican-Americans; 17 (c) Utilization of a written competitive examination which has an adverse, dis-18 proportionate impact on Mexican-Americans and which has not been 19 demonstrated by defendant to be jobrelated, as required by the EEOC Guidelines 20 on Employment Selection Procedures; and 21 (d) Utilization of a personal interview by said Sheriff's Department after applicants 22 have been certified as eligible for employment by said Civil Service Commission; 23 said interview disqualifies a disproportionately large number of Mexican-American applicants 24 for positions in the Sheriff's Department, is subjective, and fails to serve as a valid 25 predictor of job performance. 26 19. As a direct and proximate result of the acts, policies 27 and practices set forth in Paragraphs 13 through 18, defendants 28 have discriminated against plaintiffs and the members of their 29 classes on grounds of race and national origin in violation of 30 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2. 31 Plaintiffs and the classes they represent have no plain, 32 adequate or complete remedy at law to redress the discrimination -7set forth above. This action for declaratory and injunctive relief is their only means of obtaining adequate relief from defendants' unlawful employment practices. Plaintiffs and the classes they represent are now suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable injury from defendants' unlawful employment policies and practices as set forth above.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

- 21. Plaintiffs hereby refer to and incorporate each and every allegation in Paragraphs 12 through 18 and 20 of the First Cause of Action.
- 22. As a direct and proximate result of the discriminatory employment policies and practices set forth above, plaintiffs and the members of the classes they represent are substantially and effectively deprived of the equal opportunity to obtain the position of Deputy Sheriff and opportunity for advancement within said Sheriff's Department. Such a deprivation constitutes an arbitrary and invidious discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

- 23. Plaintiffs hereby refer to and incorporate by reference each and every allegation in Paragraphs 12 through 18 and 20 of the First Cause of Action.
- 24. As a direct and proximate result of the discriminatory employment practices set forth above, plaintiffs and the members of their classes are substantially and effectively denied their equal rights to make and enforce employment contracts enjoyed by white citizens, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

25. Plaintiff Lopez hereby refers to and incorporates by reference each and every allegation in Paragraphs 12 through 18 of the First Cause of Action.

Plaintiff Lopez is informed and believes and thereon 1 alleges that defendants discriminated against him in violation 2 of 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983 by refusing to hire him because 3 he had previously opposed unlawful employment practices of one of his employers. 5 27. Plaintiff Lopez has no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law to redress the discrimination set forth above. action for declaratory and injunctive relief is his only means of obtaining adequate relief from defendants' unlawful employment 9 practices. Plaintiff is now suffering and will continue to 10 suffer irreparable injury from defendants' unlawful employment 11 policy and practice set forth above in Paragraph 26. 12 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 13 28. Plaintiffs hereby refer to and incorporate each and 14 every allegation in Paragraphs 12 through 18 and 20 of the First 15 Cause of Action. 16 29. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege 17 that a substantial number of Mexican-Americans, who comprise 18 16% of San Diego County's population, speak Spanish as their sole 19 or primary Ianguage and relate most closely to Mexican-American 20 culture. A substantial number of these individuals incur 2.1 problems which require services and information, to which they are 22 entitled, from defendant Sheriff's Department by personnel who are 23 proficient in both Spanish and English (hereinafter "bilingual") 24 and who are trained in and familiar with Mexican-American 25 culture (hereinafter "bicultural"). However such services and 26 information have not been provided to members of CASA and the 27 classes it represents because Sheriff's Department personnel are 28 not proficient in Spanish and English. As a direct result, such 29

30. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege

that the number of defendant Sheriff's Department personnel

-9-

problems have gone unresolved.

7

30

31

who are bilingual and who possess said bicultural background is substantially beneath their representation in the San Diego County population. Plaintiffs are also informed and believe and thereon allege that the number of defendant Sheriff's Department personnel who are proficient only in English and who possess only an Anglo-American background exceed their representation in the San Diego County population.

31. As a direct result of (a) defendants' unlawful and

31. As a direct result of (a) defendants' unlawful and discriminatory employment practices and policies set forth above, and (b) defendants' failure to employ sufficient bilingual-bicultural personnel, members of plaintiff CASA and the classes it represents have been injured by the denial to them of Sheriff's Department services which are as effective and as meaningful as those provided to the Anglo-American, English-speaking population in San Diego County--all of which is known to defendants and to each of them. Such a deprivation constitutes an arbitrary and invidious discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and is a violation of 42 U.S.C. \$1983.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

- 32. Plaintiffs hereby refer to and incorporate each and every allegation in Paragraphs 12 through 18 and 20 of the First Cause of Action and Paragraphs 28 through 31 of the Fifth Cause of Action.
- 33. Defendant Sheriff's Department of San Diego County receives federal financial assistance which includes, but is not limited to, Law Enforcement Administration funds.
- 34. By virtue of accepting these federal funds, and pursuant to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000d, Defendant Sheriff's Department is prohibited from providing services, and from engaging in employment practices, in a manner

-10-

which discriminates on the basis of race or national origin. 1 In maintaining the policies and practices of employment 2 discrimination on the basis of race and national origin, as set 3 forth above, defendant Sheriff's Department is violating 42 4 U.S.C. §2000d, and depriving plaintiffs and the classes they 5 represent their rights thereunder. 6 In failing to employ sufficient personnel who are proficient in both Spanish and English, and who are trained in 8 and familiar with Mexican-American culture, as set forth above, 9 defendant Sheriff's Department is denying members of plaintiff 10 CASA and the classes it represents equal provision of Sheriff's 11 Department services. Such denial on the basis of race and 12 national origin violates 42 U.S.C. §2000d. 13 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully pray that this Court: 14 Determine by order, pursuant to Rule 23, 15 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that this action be maintained as a class action; 16 (b) Declare that the employment selection procedures 17 described above violate the federal statutory and constitutional provisions set forth; 18 Preliminarily and permanently enjoin each defendant and successors from utilizing, (c) 19 in connection with the position of Deputy 20 Sheriff and other positions within the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County, 21 selection procedures which have an adverse impact on Mexican-Americans and which have 22 not been and cannot be adequate predictors of job performance; 23 (d) Preliminarily and permanently enjoin each 24 defendant and successors from discriminating against plaintiff Lopez because he oppossed 25 unlawful employment practices; 26 Order each defendant and successors to employ (e) plaintiff Lopez as Deputy Sheriff; 27 Award to plaintiff Lopez and to the other (f) 28 members of the classes so entitled equitable restitution in the form of back pay and 29 back seniority to compensate for defendants' wrongful failure to hire plaintiff and other 30 members of the classes represented herein; 31 Order each defendant and successors to engage in (g) special recruitment activities and to take other 32 -11-

remedial measures to redress the present 1 and past exclusion of Mexican-Americans from the Sheriff's Department of San Diego 2 County; 3 Declare that by virtue of defendants' and (h) each of their knowing denials to provide Sheriff's Department services to plaintiffs as effective and as meaningful as those 4 5 provided to the Anglo-American, Englishspeaking population, as described above, defendants and each of them are in violation 6 of federal statutory and constitutional 7 provisions set forth; 8 Declare that the federal statutory and (i) constitutional provisions set forth require 9 each defendant to undertake any and all necessary measures to employ a sufficient number 10 of Sheriff's Department personnel who speak both Spanish and English and who are trained 11 in and familiar with the Mexican-American culture, so as to provide plaintiffs with 12 Department services as effective and meaningful as that provided to the Anglo-American, 13 English-Speaking population; 14 Preliminarily and permanently enjoin each (j) defendant and successors from failing to employ 15 a sufficient number of Sheriff's Department personnel, who speak both Spanish and English and who are trained in and familiar with the 16 Mexican-American culture, so as to insure 17 the provision of services to plaintiffs as effective and meaningful as those provided 18 to the Anglo-American, English-speaking population; 19 Order each defendant and successors to engage (k) 20 in special recruitment activities and to take remedial measures to insure employment 21 of sufficient bilingual personnel trained in and familiar with Mexican-American culture, in the Sheriff's Department of San Diego County; 22 23 Order the defendants pay the cost of this suit (1)and reasonable attorney's fees; and 24 Grant such other and further relief as this (m) 25 Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted, 26 27 DIANE GREENBERG VICTOR HARRIS 28 29 Dated: June 19, 1975 by 30 VICTOR HARRIS 31 Attorneys for Plaintiffs



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

Address Reply to the Division Indicated and Refer to Indicated Number USP 1 HAG: USD

MOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE WITHIN 90 DAYS

FEB 2 / 1876

AIR IRIL

Or. Louis Lotez

c/o Diane S. Greenberg, Esquire
Attorney at Law

California Rural Legal Assistance
Cooperative Legal Services Center

1212 Market Street - Mezzanine

San Francisco, California 94102

Re: EEOC Charge Against San Diego County Sheriff's Department No. TPX5-0069

Dear Mr. Lopez:

Because you have-filed a charge against the respondent named above and more than 180 days have elapsed since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission assumed jurisdiction over that charge, and no suit based on that charge has been filed by this Department, and since you through your attorney have specifically requested this Notice, you are hereby notified that you have the right to institute a civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., against the above-named respondent.

If you choose to commence a civil action, such suit must be filed in the appropriate United States District Court within 90 days of your receipt of this Notice.

"EMBIT A"

Your attorney may inspect the investigative file pertaining to the case at a time and place convenient to the parties. That file is located in the REOC District Office, at 112 N. Central Avenue, Suite 601, Phoenix, Arizona 85004.

We request that you send this Department a copy of any complaint initiating suit.

This Notice should not be taken to mean that an agency of the United States has made a judgment as to whether or not your charge is meritorious.

Sincerely,

J. STANLEY POTTINGER
Assistant Attornay General
Civil Rights Division

By: / Herbert A. GOLESMITH, JR.
Attorney

Employment Section

cc: Mr. Edward Valenzuela

District Director

Phoenix District Office

Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission

112 N. Central Avenue, Suite 601

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

Dorothy E. Mead, Esquire
District Counsel
Phoenix District Office
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
112 N. Central Avenue, Suite 601
Phoenix, Arizona 85004