

December 4, 1963

In England
SUMMARY

~~Many among the conservatives are inclined to think that~~

England ought to retain her special relationship to America, but have a substantial independent strategic atomic striking force in order to be able to stand up to Russia if America should stand aloof in a conflict in which some major English interests are at stake.

To me it seems that

~~To my mind,~~ England could not make use of such a strategic striking force in any conflict with Russia in which major English interests might be at stake, but not the very existence of England as a nation.

Other people in England hold

~~Many people in the Labor Party are inclined to think that~~ England ought to pursue in her foreign policy, an independent course, verging on neutrality in conflicts centered outside of Europe, but that she should have no strategic striking force under her own control.

To me it seems that

~~To my mind,~~ it may be politically difficult or impossible for England to adopt such a position of "semi-neutrality" without having a strategic striking force under her own control.

I am inclined to think

~~It seems to me that~~ England would be more secure in the years to come if she were to adopt a position of semi-neutrality and were to maintain a small, but independent, striking force, just enough to function as the sting of the bee. By pooling their resources England and France could jointly develop submarines, rockets and bombs and equip themselves each with a small but invulnerable striking force. Neither France nor England could use such a striking force for anything except for threatening ~~to~~ *a counterblow* retaliate in case of an atomic attack extended to her own territory. If this were clearly understood and kept in mind, the possession of a small striking force by France and England would probably do no harm and it might conceivably do some good.